Question Two
[QUESTION TWO
Whether this Book is About the Ten Categories as about a Subject]
t is asked whether this book is about the ten catego-
ries as its subject.
1. It seems that it is not:
Since "to know is to understand (cognoscere) the thing through its cause" according to Aristotle in Bk. I of the Posterior Analytics,1 therefore everything knowable has a cause; these ten <categories> do not have a cause; therefore, there is not a science of them. Proof of the minor: "a cause is naturally prior to that of which it is the cause";2 but nothing is naturally prior to these <ten categories> since they are first; therefore, etc.
2. Second, "of one science there is one subject";3 these ten <categories> are not one subject, since they are not definable
<as> one <subject>. Therefore, since this science4 is one, it will not be about these ten <categories>.
3. Third, there is a real science of the categories; therefore, <there is> not a logical <science of the categories>. The implication is evident according to Aristotle in Bk. III of the On the Soul:5 "Sciences are divided as things <are divided>"; but logic is diverse from every real science; therefore, the subject of logic is diverse from the subject of any real science. Proof of the ante1. Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, Ch. 2 (71b 9–12).
2. "Whatever is a cause of a cause, is also a cause of the effect"; Liber de causis, prop. 1. (ed. A. Pattin, p. 49).
3. Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, Ch. 28 (87a 38).
4. The context indicates that the science referred to is logic.
5. On the Soul, Bk. III, Ch. 8 (431b 24–25).
QUESTION 2
cedent: first, since the metaphysician determines these <categories>, as is shown in Bks. V and VII of the Metaphysics;6 second, since these <categories> are things of first intention—proof: since it is impossible for any second intention to be essentially
(per se) predicated of a thing of first intention; but these ten most general <genera> are predicated essentially (per se) of the things of first intention—for this is essentially (per se) true: "man is substance"; therefore, every science of these ten <categories> is a real science.
4. To the opposite is Aristotle, <who> determines here about the ten most general <genera>; similarly, the book is entitled Of the Categories.7
[I. To The Question] [A. The Status of the Question] 5. One reply to this question is that the ten categories can be considered in two ways: in one way insofar as they are beings; in another way insofar as they are considered by reason (ratio), or insofar as some property caused by the intellect is attributed to them.
6. In the first way the metaphysician considers them; for his primary subject is being qua being.
7. In the second way, they are considered here. For attributes (passiones) are shown of them which inhere in them insofar as they are the most general <genera>; for example, of substance
<it is shown> "to be predicated univocally"8 and "not to be in a subject,"9 and "it seems to signify this something."10 Similarly, determinations about the other genera are made in such a way, insofar as they are divided into their own species, and these
<species are> further <divided> into other <species>, and there 6. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 7 (1017a 22–30) and Bk. VII, Ch. 1 (1028a 10–20).
7. The word used here is predicamentorum, which is the Latin title. For consistency's sake, I have chosen always to translate praedicamenta as categories, following the custom established by other translators.
8. Categories, Ch. 5 (3a 34).
9. Ibid. (3a 7).
10. Ibid. (3b 10).
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
is nothing above them which descends into them through division. It is evident that, insofar as they are the most general
<genera>, this attribute exists in them: "to be divided into species,"11 and "to have many subordinate species,"12 and "not to have a genus above them."13 And if <something> is determined here of some other attributes which exist in these most general
<genera>, insofar as they are beings, this is not principally to the issue, but is to the greater manifestation of them insofar as <they are> intentional predicates.
8. But since these ten <categories> are not the subject of one real science, namely, of metaphysics, except insofar as among them there is a primary one to which the others are attributed, as it is held in Bk. IV of the Metaphysics;14 and insofar as there is not any to which they are attributed <except insofar> as they are considered by reason (ratio), in which way are they one subject?
9. It is necessary to say that the unity of them is greater in some property caused by the understanding than insofar as they are beings. And thus, since this science is not one by the unity of analogy, it is necessary to assign some intentional object that is common to them, and a first subject, since only such is what the logician essentially (per se) considers.
[B. A Certain Opinion of Others] 10. Some,15 however, posit that <the subject of this book is a>
"non-complex being, sayable and orderable in <one> genus."16
11. Porphyry, Isagoge. Ch. "On Species" (AL I6 13; ed. Busse, 7.2).
12. Ibid. (AL I6 13; ed. Busse, 7.13–15).
13. Ibid. (AL I6 13; ed. Busse, 4.17–18).
14. Metaphysics, Bk. IV, Ch. 2 (1003b 16–17).
15. Nicolaus Parisiensis, Praedic. (cod. lat. Monacen. SB Clm. 14460, f. 24ra) and Ioannes de Saccavilla, Praedic. (cod. Cantabrig. Domus Petri 205, f. 10va).
16. In n. 8, Scotus raises the question regarding the nature of the subject under which, as a science, the categories are studied. In nn. 5–7, Scotus makes a distinction as to the investigation of the categories between the categories considered as essential beings and as beings of reason. The former, studied by metaphysics, only has a unity of analogy (n. 9), but the latter has a unity of univocity
(see n. 19). In nn. 10–18, however, Scotus raises and dismisses an alternative possibility, that the subject of the categories is "ens incomplexum dicibile ordinabile
QUESTION 2
11. From what we have said above, one can argue against this latter <opinion> in this way: being does not pertain univocally to every being outside the mind;17 therefore, by much less is it univocal to being outside the mind and to being caused by the consideration of the intellect,18 since these differ more. Therefore, either "being" is taken here for being outside the mind or for a being of reason (ente rationis):
12. If <it is taken> for a being outside the mind, two absurdities follow, <the first is> namely that the subject posited would not be univocal to the ten categories considered here, <which is> the opposite of what <this opinion> intends to maintain.
The second is that the subject here would be an accidental being, since it is composed from a thing of first intention and a thing of second <intention>, which do not make one essentially
(per se). There is no science concerning accidental being, however, according to Aristotle in Bk. VI of the Metaphysics.19
13. If, however, <it is taken> for a being of reason (pro ente rationis), it follows that it is a vain repetition, since the other additions <i.e., non-complex, sayable, and orderable in a genus> include being thus taken,20 and so it is a vain repetition.
14. Likewise, "sayable" is either understood for something that can be signified through speech—and it was shown in the solution of the preceding question21 that this is accidental to the subject of this book. Or "sayable" is taken for "<something> that can be predicated" (praedicabili), and then by adding "noncomplex" a vain repetition is made; and again a vain repetition
<is made> by adding "orderable in a genus." Proof of the first: because neither a proposition, nor something complex, insofar in genere." Pini translates this compound expression as "incomplex sayable being, capable of being ordered in a genus." See Pini, Categories and Logic in Duns
Scotus, 158, and also C. Lafleur, "Logique et théorie de l'argumentation dans le
'Guide de l'étudiant' (c. 1230–1240) du ms. Ripoll 109," Dialogue 29 (1990):
335–55.
17. Cf. infra, q. 4, nn. 27 and 38.
18. Cf. infra, q. 25, nn. 10–14.
19. Metaphysics, Bk. VI, Ch. 2 (1026b 24–26).
20. The phrase "being thus taken" means a being of reason, or a being that is caused by the act of the intellect.
21. Cf. supra, q. 1, nn. 11 and 15.
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
as it is complex, is predicated <of a subject>.22 Proof of the second: "orderable in a genus" includes "predicable," or the other way around, since on the basis of the fact that something is
"predicable," as Aristotle says here, it is ordered to some <other predicates> according to below and above.
15. Against this last <argument>,23 one can say that individuals are orderable in a genus; nevertheless, they are not "able to be said" <of something>; <and> the most general <genera> are
"able to be said"; nevertheless, they are not orderable in a genus; thus neither of these includes the rest.
16. Against this <argument>:24 then "an orderable being," etc., does not pertain to the most general <genera>, which nevertheless are most extensively treated here; therefore, this is not the subject.
17. If only "non-complex being" were posited for the subject, or only "being able to be said" or only "a being orderable in a genus"—against any of these is the first of the reasons (rationum) given against the prior position and the first position.25
And <an argument> against all three of these is that whichever of these is posited as a subject, it exceeds the ten categories, which seems untenable.
18. If, however, only "able to be said"—which is the same as a universal26—is posited, then the subject of this book and of <the book by> Porphyry is the same. This is untenable and exceeds the ten categories.
[C. The Response of Scotus] 19. For this reason one can say that here the ten categories are considered insofar as something caused by the reason is attributed to them, since otherwise they cannot be considered
22. Cf. infra, q. 43, n. 17, about a condicionato praedicato.
23. Namely, to the proof of the second argument. Cf. supra, n. 14.
24. Cf. supra, n. 15.
25. Cf. supra, n. 11.
26. On Interpretation, Ch. 7 (17a 39–40).
QUESTION 2
by the logician. And in this way they have not only a unity of analogy, but also <a unity> of univocity; and what is univocal to them in this way is something intentional, which is here the first subject. This <subject> can be called "the predicaments" or "the most general <genera>," since all properties that are essentially (per se) determined of them here, are determined of them insofar as they have the nature (rationem) of the most general
<genera> or of categories <or predicaments>.
20. Against this <argument>:27 then <what is determined> about substance, quantity, etc., is only determined here accidentally, since it is only according to something which is in them accidentally, namely, in some intention, since no such <intention> can be in them essentially (per se).
21. Second, no attribute is shown here of a category or a most general <genus> according to its own nature (rationem); therefore, this is not the subject.
22. Third, the subject here does not pertain to every concept formed by the first act of reason, as the subject of On Interpretation does pertain to every concept formed by the second act <of reason>. This seems absurd, since similarly this book seems to be about the non-complex concept, just as that <book is> about the complex concept.
23. Fourth, since the most general <genus> or category is contained under "universal," it follows that this science is subalternated to the book of Porphyry, since just as a subject <is subalternated to> a subject, so also is a science <subalternated> to a science. But this seems absurd.
24. To the first of these <objections>,28 I say that it is not untenable that what the logician considers only accidentally, the metaphysician considers essentially (per se).
25. To the second <objection>,29 I say that insofar as some univocal intention is determined here of substance and quantity, <that is> insofar as they have the aspect (ratio) of the most
27. Cf. supra, n. 19.
28. Cf. supra, n. 20.
29. Cf. supra, n. 21.
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
general <genera>, to such a degree this is primarily said of a most general <genus>, namely, "to be divided into species," and "not to have a higher genus," and "to be predicated univocally," which was shown of substance30 and is accepted as known of the others, since in this way something univocal is shown of many subjects <that are> not first, in that it is shown of its first subject.
26. To the third <objection>,31 one can say that "enunciation" is the first subject of the book On Interpretation,32 which is not said by a formal predication about every concept formed by the second act of reason, but others, such as imperative speech, are reduced to it. So <likewise>, every simple concept is reduced to some one of the categories.
27. To the fourth <objection>,33 one can say that although <one> subject may be under <another> subject, nevertheless this science does not take its principles from that <other science>; and for this reason one of the conditions which are required for the subalternation of sciences is absent.34
[II. To The Principal Arguments] 28. To the first principal argument,35 I say that although these <ten genera> may not have some cause in themselves
(in se), nevertheless with respect to their attributes they have a cause, especially with respect to the intentional attributes (passiones) which are in them insofar as they are considered by reason (ratione). And when it is said that "nothing is naturally prior to them," this is true in itself; nevertheless with regard to the inherence of an intentional attribute, something can be naturally prior to them.36
29. To the second <argument>,37 it is evident that the first 30. Cf. supra, n. 7.
31. Cf. supra, n. 22.
32. Cf. Duns Scotus, Super Porphyrii, q. 1, n. 1.
33. Cf. supra, n. 23.
34. Cf. Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Bk. I, q. 9, n. 40.
35. Cf. supra, n. 1.
36. Cf. infra, q. 43, which takes up the question of priority.
37. Cf. supra, n. 2.
QUESTION 2
subject here is something univocal to the ten categories, such as "predicament" <or "category">.
30. To the third <argument>,38 it is evident that what <things> the metaphysician considers essentially (per se), are here considered accidentally (per accidens), namely, since something intentional is considered essentially (per se), which is applicable to them.
38. Cf. supra, n. 3.