Question Forty
[QUESTION FORTY
Whether it is Possible of Some Contraries that One Determinate <Thing> be in Some Subject By Nature]
n addition, one member1 is connected to this: that
in both contrary <things> it sometimes happens that
one extreme inheres <in a subject> by nature; which does not happen in privative <opposites>.
From this, therefore, one can ask of some contraries whether it is possible for one determinate <thing> to be in some subject by nature.
1. It seems that it does not:
Since Aristotle says in Bk. II of the Topics,2 that if some predicate is assigned to be in some subject, <then> if the contrary of the predicate cannot be in <the subject>, neither can the case in question be in <that subject>; therefore, one determinate contrary is not in any subject.
2. Second, "contraries are of such a nature that they happen to (circa) the same <thing>";3 therefore, <a contrary> is not in some <subject> unless <the subject> is of such a nature as to receive one of the two (alterum); therefore, neither <contrary> is determinately in <some subject by nature>.
3. Third, this is seen especially in those <examples> in which Aristotle4 exemplifies <his point>. For fire does not seem <to be> determinately hot, nor water cold, since an alteration pre1. Categories, Ch. 10 (12b 41–13a 2).
2. Topics, Bk. II, Ch. 8 (113b 15–26).
3. Categories, Ch. 10 (11b 37–12a 2).
4. Categories, Ch. 10 (12b 39–41).
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
cedes every generation; therefore, the alteration of fire precedes the generation of water from fire through which the qualities of water are induced. But in the whole alteration the form of fire remains, since, according to Aristotle in Bk. VIII of the Physics,5 in the whole change the subject is under the prior form; therefore, fire can remain fire and not be hot. And so <it is> of all transmutable <things> according to those qualities which they have, since generally according to contraries mutation seems capable of happening.
4. To the opposite is Aristotle.6
[I. The Response To The Question] 5. It must be said that in some extremes it is possible for one contrary to be in some subject by nature. That is evident to a lesser <extent> about contrary species in a genus, where contrariety is proper, which <species> are constituted through proper contrary differentiae, and its differentia is in each <species> determinately, so that it is impossible for the opposite <contrary differentia> to be in <the other species>.
6. Similarly, it is evident in attributes that some subject according to its nature is an essential (per se) principle of some attribute <that> has a contrary, the contrary of which attribute cannot be in <the subject>, since that attribute follows the form of the subject.
[II. To The Principal Arguments] 7. To the first argument,7 I say that the consideration of Aristotle must be understood according to aptitude, not according to potency.8 Since if one contrary is in <a subject>, the remaining <one> is apt to be in it, nevertheless, it is not necessary that it be possible for the remaining one to be in it.
5. Physics, Bk. VIII, Ch. 8 (263b 9–264a 5).
6. Categories, Ch. 10 (12b 41–13a 2).
7. Cf. supra, n. 1.
8. Cf. supra, n. 2.
QUESTION 40
8. To the second <argument>,9 it must be said that that definition is true according to the general nature (rationem) of contraries, since insofar as it is from this <general nature> which one contrary is in, it is of such a nature for the remaining one to be in it. But it is not necessary that it be the same of certain contraries compared to every subject, except perhaps in speaking about that subject according to genus. Since some subject according to its own proper nature (rationem) determines to itself one contrary; this is not from the nature (ratione) of the contraries, nor from the nature (ratione) of such a genus of a subject. Perhaps this following particle is added on behalf of the species which determine to themselves some determinate contrary differentiae; because, although it is also from the part of the species and differentiae, nevertheless it is not in the species through the nature of the genus.
9. To the third <argument>,10 one can concede that the qualities of the elements are not in those <subjects> by nature nor determinately, since their substantial forms can remain under opposite qualities, as is evident <in> the alteration preceding the generation of the elements. Nevertheless, Aristotle exemplifies <his point> in these <examples>, since according to the common conception, those <qualities> seem to follow inseparably the elementary forms.
10. Or it can be said otherwise that any quality, according to some grade, is determinately in its element, and according to that <grade> it is never lost in the change, although according to the most perfect grade it can be lost, since according to that grade it does not inseparably follow the form of fire.
11. Or <it can be said> otherwise: that those qualities follow the form of fire in its most perfect being, as it does not have that <most perfect> being in change, when it tends to corruption.
9. Cf. ibid.
10. Cf. supra, n. 3.