Question Five
[QUESTION FIVE
Whether the Definition of Equivocals is Suitably Given]
t is asked whether the definition of equivocals is suit-
ably given, namely, that "equivocals are said <to be
things> of which only the name is common; however, <according to the name>1 the account2 of the substance is diverse."3
1. It seems that it is not <suitably given>:
First, on the part of the thing being defined: since it is concrete, and that <i.e., a concrete term> does not have a defini1. "According to the name" is not in the original formation of this question, but it is referred to in Scotus's solution and is part of the definition as it appears in the Aristotelis Latinus.
2. By "account of the substance" (ratio substantiae), Scotus intends the "essential intellect," which is different from the common nature. No one word, however, is entirely suitable for translating the word ratio. Some translate it as "meaning," but this implies a view of language that is foreign to Scotus. The word "definition" will not work either, for the word ratio must cover descriptions and properties as well as definitions in the strict sense. According to Ashworth,
"there was a tendency to identify [ratio] with an Avicennian common nature"; Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic," 105. Scotus, however, rejects the identification of ratio substantiae with a common nature.
Ashworth often translated it as "analysis." See Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation," 100.
3. The full definition of "equivocal" is as follows: Aequivoca dicuntur quorum nomen solum commune est, secundum nomen vero substantiae ratio diversa, ut animal homo et quod pingitur, which, very literally, is translated as "those are said to be equivocals, of which only the name is common, but according to the name the account of the substance is diverse, as animal [is predicated] of man and of that which is painted"; Categories, Ch. 1 (1a 1–2).
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
tion, since it neither <is under> a genus, according to Aristotle in Bk. III of the Topics.4
2. Second, plural is nothing other than the singular doubled, through Priscian;5 therefore, "equivocals" is not other than "equivocal and equivocal." But a total joined together is not definable. Therefore, neither is that <which is> in the plural <definable>. The minor is evident, since a total joined together (copulatum) is not one, since the copula (copulatio) needs
(vult) to be posited between diverse <things>. In this way, one can generally argue that no definition given of something in the plural is suitable.
3. Third, the genus and differentia are not posited; therefore, there is no definition. The implication is evident according to Aristotle in Bk. VI of the Topics6 and according to Boethius in his book On Division.7
4. Fourth, one can argue against a single part <of the definition as follows>. Primarily in this way: if equivocals "are said," then they are utterances, since "to be said" belongs essentially
(per se) to an utterance. But utterances are nouns; therefore, they are not of those things that are nouns. Therefore, the first part <of the definition, i.e., "to be said of"> and the second
<part of the definition>, namely, "of those things" <which have the name alone in common>, etc., are repugnant.
5. Fifth, if only the name is common, then nothing else follows after this, from an understanding of exclusion. Therefore, it is superfluous to add afterwards, "and the account of the substance is diverse."
6. Sixth, "equivocals are not defined";8 therefore, they do not 4. Topics, Bk. III, Ch. 1 (116a 23–28). The example that Aristotle gives, i.e.,
"a just man," does not fall within a genus, for it is neither a simple substance nor a quality, whereas the term "justice" does fall within the genus quality.
5. "Therefore, the single number is also expressed well, which, doubled and multiplied, makes all numbers"; Institutiones grammaticae, Bk. V, Ch. 9, n. 47 (ed.
M. Hertz, I 172). Cf. also St. Thomas, "the plural is nothing except the singular doubled"; Summa Theologica, III, q. 67, a. 6, n. 2.
6. Topics, Bk. VI, Ch. 4 (141b 23–28).
7. Boethius, Liber de divisione (ed. Magee, p. 38; PL 64, 887D).
8. The quotation referred to is not in the Greek text but appears to be a gloss in the Latin translation of Aristotle. "There is no definition of equivocals, so a definition is of univocals alone"; Topics, Bk. VI, Ch. 2 (139b 30–31).
QUESTION 5
have the account of a substance, that is, <they do not have> an essential definition. Therefore, the account of their substance is neither the same nor diverse, since, nevertheless, not any of it—and this in virtue of the very name according to which they are equivocals—is posited opposite <to it> in the definition.
7. Seventh, against the example: if "animal" pertains equivocally to a man in a picture and to a true man, with equal reason any name will be equivocal to a true nature and to its similitude; and in this way every proposition would have to be distinguished, and none would be simply true. Similarly, "a painted man <is an animal>; therefore, a man <is an animal>," seems to be a fallacy both in a certain respect and absolutely9 (secundum quid et simpliciter) and not a <fallacy> of equivocation.
8. Eighth, "man," as an intention of species is said of it and as it is said of a supposit, only has the name in common; and it is not equivocal; therefore, etc. The proof of the first proposition
<is had> by positing the definition for the name: since "rational animal" is not the species but the definition; however, "species" and "definition" are opposite intentions. The proof of the second <proposition>: if it were equivocal, then this <argument>,
"man is a species, Socrates is a man, therefore, etc.,"10 would not be a fallacy of a figure of speech nor of an accident, each of which is false. The implication is evident, since when there is an actual multiplicity, then by reason of the same <actuality>, there is not an imaginary multiplicity. For in this way the same <term> would signify many <things> truly and only apparently, which is to say incompossible. Similarly, in a fallacy of accident, the varied term is one according to signification, since the fallacies
9. Unlike the fallacy of equivocation, which is one of the six fallacies listed by Aristotle that do depend upon language, this fallacy is one of the seven fallacies that do not depend upon language. Aristotle discusses both types of fallacies in Sophistical Refutations, Bk. I, Ch. 4 and 5 respectively (165b 24 ff, and 166b 37ff). According to Coffey this fallacy has no English name. "The fallacies
A DICTO SECUNDUM QUID AD DICTUM SIMPLICITER, and A DICTO SIM-
PLICITER AD DICTUM SECUNDUM QUID, have this in common, that they confound what is true absolutely with what is true only under certain restrictions and limitations"; P. Coffey, The Science of Logic: Method, Science, and Certitude, vol. 2 (New York: Peter Smith, 1938), 309.
10. The conclusion to the argument is that "Socrates is a species."
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
(loci) beyond diction11 do not err against the contradiction;12 and otherwise <the fallacy of> accident would not be the "most apt" to deceive among the sophistical fallacies (loci) beyond diction.13 Therefore, by reason of the same <actuality>, equivocation and figure of speech are not in the same paralogism, nor are equivocation and fallacy of accident. Therefore, equivocation is not <suitably defined>.
9. To the opposite is Aristotle.
[I. The Response To The Question] 10. To the question one must say that this description is given suitably enough concerning equivocated equivocals.14 It must be understood that when equivocation is actively expressed, it expresses a relation of one <thing> that functions (in ratione) as a sign to many that function (in ratione) as significates, and the passive is the other way around. And in this way equivocal includes a double relation, both <when it is> taken actively and <when it is taken> passively:15 namely, a relation to the <utter11. In the Sophistical Refutations, Ch. 1 (165a 2–5), Aristotle lists thirteen different types of fallacies, which he divides into two main groups: those in dictione, i.e., due to an ambiguity in language, and those extra dictionem, those from sources other than an ambiguity in language. Here, the phrase loci extra dictionem refers to the fallacies from sources other than an ambiguity in language.
12. A univocal term is such that the contrary of a true statement produces a contradiction, i.e., it errs against a contradiction, whereas in an equivocal statement, two apparently contradictory statements could both be true since the term is used in different senses. For example, "dog is a living substance," and "dog is not a living substance," while contradictory in nature, are both true if the term "dog" is taken equivocally. Since the fallacies beyond diction, extra dictionem, such as the fallacy of accident, are not due to any ambiguity in language and are one in signification, i.e., are univocal, then they do not err against the contradiction.
13. Sophistical Refutations, Ch. 1 (165a 2–5).
14. "In the thirteenth century, a special vocabulary was developed to deal with the issue of equivocal words as opposed to equivocal things. A thing was called aequivocum aequivocatum, and a word was called aequivocum aequivocans, with parallels for univocals." Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation," 98.
15. Pini explains the passive relation thus: "when something is said to be equivocal, it is considered according to two relations. According to a first relation,
QUESTION 5
ance> equivocating, which is a relation of supposition;16 and a relation to another equivocate, which is a relation of equivalence. For "heavenly star" is not said <to be> equivocal to "dog," but a heavenly star or a barking animal are equivocates. This double relation is evident by analyzing the name "equivocal," that is, "equally called":17 by reason of the first part it is said to <be related to> another that is equal to it; by reason of the second <part, a relation> is expressed to the <one> calling.
11. Therefore, on account of the relation of equality, the description is given in the plural, just as other relatives of this kind are defined in Bk. V of the Metaphysics:18 "similar," "dissimilar,"
"contrary," etc.—On account of the other relation, the correlative of the <thing> defined19 is posited, in the relation by which it is said to it: of which, as of the significates, only the name is common, as the sign; and through the following, namely, the account of the substance <is> diverse,20 the differentia of the equivocates is posited. And "account" is not taken there for a definition from the genus and the differentia, since the first genera, which do not have such an account, are equivocates in this name "being."
But the account of the substance, that is, the essential understanding, is diverse.21 And since those things equivocated in one such a thing is related to the other things equivocally signified by the same name.
According to a second relation, such a thing is related to the name signifying it."
Pini, Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus, 173.
16. The Latin is suppositionis, which literally means "of signifying something."
17. The Latin word equivocum can be broken down into aeque, which literally means "equally," and vocatum, which means "called."
18. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 9–10 (1018a 15–19, 26–32).
19. "The correlative of the thing defined" is the name that is common to the equivocates.
20. It should be pointed out that the use of "substance" in the phrase ratio substantiae is not intended to restrict the scope to a discussion of substances, but that it is taken for anything that could be referred to a second intention, in which case it more closely signifies an essence as opposed to the genus of corporeal things. See Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century
Logic," 104.
21. According to Pini, the expression ratio substantiae raises "some problems.
Scotus interprets such an expression as meaning 'essential intellect,' namely the concept that our intellect forms about the essence of something." See Pini, Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus, 173.
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
name are able to be univocal in another <name> and then to have the same account, for this reason according to that name is added; that is, the essential understanding of the equivocates is diverse insofar as an equivocating <term> is said of them, although in some univocating <term> the essential understanding of them may be the same.
12. If, however, it is said that "are said" is posited for "are conceived," that is, <if> they are <taken to be> concepts, and <if> some concept is of the essence of the equivocates:—one can say that this is a true definition, and that through the first part <of the definition> "are said" the genus is posited; through the rest, the correlative of the thing defined and its differentia.
[II. To The Principal Arguments] 13. To the first argument,22 I say that a concrete <term> has a genus and differentia with respect to which <genus and differentia> it is what it is (quorum est quid), although with respect to its substance it may be denominative and concrete;23 since, according to Aristotle,24 <one> is to discover what something is
("quid" est) in every genus, and in this way, it can be defined through those <notes> of its own genus.—Or one can say that it is a description; and the concept, which is understood through "<these> are said," is not of the essence of an equivocate but is its subject.
14. To the second <argument>,25 one can say that all relatives of equivalence are suitably defined in the plural, as is evident in Bk. V of the Metaphysics,26 where many nouns of this kind are defined, namely, relatives, and all in the plural, since in this way
22. Cf. supra, n. 1.
23. The substance in question is a "just man," which was referred to in the initial objection. As a compound phrase, it is unable to be defined, since it is neither a substance nor a quality. Scotus's solution, however, is that a just man is a concrete particular, in one sense falling under the genus of substance, and, in another sense, denominatively named "just" from the quality of justice.
24. Topics, Bk. I, Ch. 9 (103b 35–39).
25. Cf. supra, n. 2.
26. Cf. supra, fn. 18.
QUESTION 5
the understanding of them is more perfect insofar as it names each extreme. What Priscian said of the plural, however, must be understood of the nature of the construction, not with respect to the unity of the signified form.
15. To the third <argument>,27 it must be conceded that it is not a true definition. Or one can say that in the definition of a concrete accident,28 the subject ought to be posited first, as here "name <or noun> is an utterance";29 and it is <to be understood> in this way in the proposition.
16. To the fourth <argument>,30 I say that the definition is given of the equivocates, and it does not follow that "these are said, therefore these are utterances"; for a concept is expressed through an utterance. Therefore, if two <people> express the same concept through diverse utterances, we say that they express the same thing. Or "they are said" can be explained, that is, "they are conceived."
17. To the <fifth argument>,31 one can say that from the fact that "only the name is common" it does not follow that "therefore the account of the substance is diverse." Since even if it follows that "the account of the substance is not common," nevertheless it does not follow that "the account of the substance is diverse."
18. Or otherwise, although it may follow <that "the account of the substance is diverse">, one can say that "only" refers
(refertur) to the <utterance> equivocating, to which the <thing> 27. Cf. supra, n. 3.
28. The comparison of "equivocals" to the definition of a "concrete accident" is unclear. It could refer to n. 12, where the "are said" of the definition of equivocals is taken to mean "are conceived," i.e., as "concepts." If so, then the "concrete accident" would have to refer to the fact that a concept is a concrete accident insofar as it inheres in a particular person. On the other hand, it could also refer to the example cited in n. 13, i.e., to a "just man," which is a concrete accidental term that is a denominative, where denominative terms are a species of equivocal terms. The definition of a "name" as an "utterance" suggests that the former alternative is what Scotus intends.
29. Literally, Scotus has nomen est, which could be translated as "a noun is an utterance," or "a noun is a word." Cf. Aristotle, On Interpretation, Ch. 2 (16a
19–21).
30. Cf. supra, n. 4.
31. Cf. supra, n. 5.
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
defined refers (refertur) according to a relation of supposition; and the following <part>, namely, "the account of the substance
<is> diverse," is referred to the equivocates in themselves. And in this way they do not pertain to the same <thing>.
19. Otherwise, more to the point, one must say that equivocates have a diverse account according to the name equivocating, that is, insofar as they are being equivocated (aequivocantur) in that <name>; but the equivocating <names> do not have another account.32
20. To the sixth <argument>,33 one must say that this intention "equivocals," as it is taken for the equivocates, is univocal, and so it can be defined, although those in which this intention inheres, are not univocal nor definable.34 Just as this intention
"the most general <genus>" is definable, and is defined by Porphyry, although substance, or another <genus> in which this intention inheres, is not defined.
21. To the seventh <argument>,35 one can say that he does not understand this name "animal" to be equivocal to a true man and to a picture. But if it were, it would be manifest there that only the name would be common and not any account. Just as generally he does not care much about the examples except that they are true as they are to the proposition, so that his art may be true in them.
22. To the last <argument>,36 one can say that a term is not equivocal to diverse acceptances of it,37 since it neither signifies nor consignifies those <acceptances>. Nor is it absolutely univocal as it is taken under those <diverse acceptances>, since
32. The Latin has aequivocantia non habent aliam rationem, which I take to mean that the activity or relation of equivocating does not have another definition.
33. Cf. supra, n. 6.
34. Simplicius "gave rise to the common sophism, 'Equivocals are univocals,' which could be solved by pointing out that each word correctly classified as equivocal is a member of the class of things falling under one univocal term, namely 'equivocal'"; Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation," 98.
35. Cf. supra, n. 7.
36. Cf. supra, n. 8.
37. "To diverse acceptances of it" has to do with the diverse acceptances of supposition, namely, with whether a term has personal, simple, or material supposition.
QUESTION 5
there is not one account of man according to which "species" is truly predicated of it and according to which it is predicated of Socrates.
23. Against this <solution>: every predicate is univocal, equivocal, or denominative; but "man" is not essentially (per se) predicated univocally nor equivocally of an intention and of a supposit; therefore, it is <predicated> denominatively. This is false, since it is predicated essentially (in quid) of the supposit.
24. To this <objection>, one can say that whatever is predicated of some one <thing> is univocal, equivocal, or denominative in respect to it. But not whatever is predicated of many is <univocal, equivocal, or denominative> in respect to many, behaving in some one of these three ways. But with respect to one, <it is predicated> in one way, and with respect to another, in another way. Just as "colored" is not predicated in one mode of a body and of white, but of white univocally and essentially
(in quid), and of a body denominatively. Thus whatever name is predicated univocally of the supposit, <is predicated> truly of the intention in none of the ways said, since the predication is accidental, or at least it is reduced to a denominative predication.