Question Forty-Three
[QUESTION FORTY-THREE
Whether Aristotle Suitably Assigns the Modes of Prior] One <thing> is prior to another, etc.1
oncerning this, it is asked whether Aristotle suitably
assigns the modes of prior.
1. It seems that he does not:
Since, in Bk. V of the Metaphysics,2 he assigns many more, for example, prior in place, prior according to cognition, prior according to motion and many others; therefore, etc.
2. Second, "one of the opposites is said in as many modes as the remaining one is said in";3 but "simultaneous" is opposed to that which is "prior," and it does not have five modes, but only three modes, according to Aristotle in the same place;4 therefore, etc.
3. Third, nothing is prior according to time; therefore, the first mode5 is unsuitably posited. Proof of the antecedent: since, according to Aristotle in Bk. V of the Metaphysics,6 "prior is what is nearer to the beginning"; but there is no beginning in time, since it is infinite, according to Aristotle in Bk. VIII of the Physics.7
4. Fourth, the second mode8 is unsuitably assigned. Proof:
1. Categories, Ch. 12 (14a 26).
2. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 11 (1018b 9–1019a 14).
3. Topics, Bk. I, Ch. 15 (106b 14–15).
4. Cf. Categories, Ch. 13 (14b 24–15a 12).
5. Categories, Ch. 12 (14a 27).
6. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 11 (1018b 9–11).
7. Physics, Bk. VIII, Ch. 1 (250a 10–15).
8. Categories, Ch. 12 (14a 30–31).
QUESTION 43
since an implication is between propositions, but "prior," about which <Aristotle> speaks here, is in simple <terms>; therefore, the consequent, "from which the implication is not convertible," ought not to be said to be prior in some mode; nevertheless, that is posited in the second mode of priority.
5. Fifth, an implication is not converted from an integral part to the whole, as is evident in the example of Aristotle, "there are two; therefore, one is and not from the converse";9 therefore, an integral part is prior to the whole, in the second mode of prior. But this is false, since, according to Aristotle in Bk. VII of the Metaphysics,10 the whole belongs in the definition of some integral parts; but <the terms used in> defining <something> is prior to <that which is> defined, according to Aristotle in Bk. VI of the Topics.11
6. Sixth, it seems that a part does not follow the integral whole; the opposite of which is said in the text.12 First, since every good implication is reducible to a syllogism; but that <implication> is not <reducible to a syllogism>. Proof: since if this implication, "a house is; therefore, a wall is," were to be reduced to a syllogism, the proposition "a house is" could not be the minor <premise>, since its predicate ought13 to be the predicate of the conclusion.
Therefore, it would be necessary that it be the major <premise>.
But "wall," when it is directly the subject of the conclusion, is the minor term; and "house," when it is the subject of the major
<premise>, is the middle term. Therefore, it is necessary for the reduction of this implication <to a syllogism> to assume such a 9. Categories, Ch. 12 (14a 32–33).
10. Metaphysics, Bk. VII, Ch. 10 (1034b 20–1036a 25).
11. Topics, Bk. VI, Ch. 4 (141a 27–35).
12. Metaphysics, Bk. VII, Ch. 10 (1034b 20–1036a 25).
13. I have amended the Latin to make sense out of the argument. The Latin actually states that "its predicate ought not to be the predicate of the conclusion." On formal grounds, the antecedent of the pronoun "it" cannot be the predicate of the minor premise, since in first-figure syllogisms, the predicate of the minor is by definition the middle term. Consequently, it is necessary to take the antecedent of the pronoun "it" to be the predicate of the statement "A house is." If, however, existence should not be the predicate of the conclusion, then it actually should be the predicate of the minor premise, not, as the Latin text states, the predicate of the major. Here is how the syllogism should look: A house is; a wall is a house; therefore, a wall is.
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minor <premise as> "a wall is a house," and so it universally is in other integral wholes and parts. But every such minor <premise> is impossible, since, according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the Topics:14 "in no way is the part predicated of the whole."15 Therefore, every implication of this kind, holding in virtue of such a minor, is useless.––Second, since the implication, holding for somewhere, holds for everywhere. But an integral whole with respect to some predicate does not imply a part, namely, with respect to that which is greater than a part, or <with respect to that which is> composed from parts, either the being of such a figure or such <simply>. Therefore, <a whole> never implies <a part>.
7. Seventh, in the second mode, Aristotle says, "a genus is prior to the species";16 and this is false. Proof: first, since in Bk. I of On the Soul,17 <Aristotle says>: "The Universal is either nothing or it is posterior." Second, since genus and species are correlatives, according to Porphyry;18 therefore, they are simultaneous by nature.
8. Eighth, the fifth mode19 seems to be poorly posited, where a cause is said to be prior to <the thing> caused and the being of a thing <is said to be> prior to the truth of speech; since a cause and the <thing> caused are referred <to one another, and> a sign and <what is> signed are referred <to one another>; therefore, a cause and <the thing> caused are simultaneous by nature, and similarly the being of a thing that is signed, and the truth of speech that is a sign, <are simultaneous by nature>.
9. To the opposite is Aristotle.20
14. Topics, Bk. IV, Ch. 5 (126a 27).
15. This quotation does not support the point being made. As one can see from the minor premise stated in the previous sentence, it is not the case that the part is being predicated of the whole, but the whole is being predicated of the part. Of course, as it is given, the initial syllogism is not sound, since the minor premise is false, but it can be reduced to an oblique syllogism that is sound, namely, "A house exists; a wall is a part of a house; therefore, a wall exists."
16. Categories, Ch. 13 (15a 4–6).
17. On the Soul, Bk. I, Ch. 1 (402b 7–8).
18. Isagoge, Ch. "On Species" (AL I6 8–9; ed. Busse, 4.5–9).
19. Categories, Ch. 12 (14b 12–21).
20. Categories, Ch. 12 (14b 22–23).
QUESTION 43
[I. The Response To The Question] 10. According to Aristotle, in the beginning of the chapter
"On the Prior" in Bk. V of the Metaphysics,21 it must be said: in all its modes the general nature (ratio) of prior is to be nearer to the beginning (principio). Therefore, "prior" is said in as many diverse modes as the many modes of "beginning" can be taken
(the distinction of which is evident in the beginning of Bk. V of the Metaphysics),22 and in however many modes something can be nearer to the beginning, in whatever way it is taken. But this can come to pass in many more modes than are enumerated here, as is manifest there in Bk. V <of the Metaphysics>. Therefore, not all the modes of prior are posited here, but as many as suffice for the question. But perhaps only the second mode, which is <when> the sequence <cannot be reversed>,23 is here to the question; according to which mode the genus is said to be prior to the species in every single category. And perhaps the fifth <mode is here to the question>, which is in causing, since substance is the cause of all the accidents. The other three modes, which are <prior> in time, <prior> in order, and <prior> in honor, are not principally posited as what he had in mind, but so that through them the modes that he did have in mind would be principally manifested.
[II. To The Principal Arguments] 11. To the first argument,24 I say that in Bk. V of the Metaphysics "prior" is distinguished insofar as it is a differentia of being; here, however, <it is distinguished> principally insofar as it is an attribute of those which are in the genera of the categories insofar as they are considered by reason, and so taken, it has altogether diverse modes. As a result, those which are principally intended here, are omitted there, and vice versa. Therefore, I 21. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 11 (1018b 9–11).
22. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 1 (1012b 35–1013a 23).
23. The Latin has in consequendo. According to Aristotle, the second mode of prior is what does not reciprocate as to implication of existence.
24. Cf. supra, n. 1.
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concede that he does not posit all the modes of prior here, nor, perhaps, those to which all <the other modes> are reducible.
Nevertheless, he enumerates <the ones that are> sufficient for the question, and <he enumerates> some other <modes> for the manifestation of the others.
12. To the second <argument>,25 I say that altogether "simultaneous" has as many modes as "prior" <has>. But Aristotle does not posit all of its modes, either since they can sufficiently be had through the modes of prior, or since it suffices for him to posit those modes of "simultaneous" which are to the question: they are those among which there is a mutual implication, since neither is the cause of the other; as species oppositely dividing the same genus, each of which is opposed to the second mode of prior, which is principally to the question. And after those special modes, he adds "simultaneous in time,"26 so that the remaining ones can thereby become known.
13. To the other <argument>,27 as Aristotle says in Bk. V of the Metaphysics in the chapter "Concerning the Prior,"28 one can say that prior and posterior are taken in time through a comparison to <what is> signified as the present "now." But, it is the other way around in past <events> and in future <events>: since in past <events> the <one that is> more remote from this "now" is prior, <whereas> in future <events the one that is> nearer to this "now" is prior.
14. To the fourth <argument>,29 I say that when an implication is between propositions, nevertheless it is by reason of the simple <terms>; and then that simple <term> in the consequent, by reason of which it follows the antecedent and not the other way around, is prior to that <term> in the antecedent by reason of which the antecedent implies the consequent.
15. To the fifth <argument>,30 one can say that it can be conceded that every integral part, without which the whole cannot exist, is prior to the whole in the second mode of prior.31
25. Cf. supra, n. 2.
26. Cf. supra, n. 3.
27. Cf. ibid.
28. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 11 (1018b 15–20).
29. Cf. supra, n. 4.
30. Cf. supra, n. 5.
31. Cf. supra, q. 1, n. 7.
QUESTION 43
And when it is argued "some such part is defined through its whole; therefore, it is posterior to the whole," I concede that it is posterior to the whole in another mode, as perhaps in the fifth <mode>, which is in causing; but not in the second mode, which is <when> the sequence <cannot be reversed>.32 Just as a conclusion in general terms follows a special principle and not the other way around, so that "this figure has three angles" follows the <proposition> "a triangle has three angles," where the principle is prior in the fifth way, that is in causing, but that which has been caused (principiatum) is prior in the second way, which is <when> the sequence <cannot be reversed>.33 Therefore, the second mode ought not to be posited prior according to nature, but according to consequence; and the fifth mode is prior according to nature or according to causality. Whence the verse:
16. Say that the prior is that which is followed in time, in order, and in honor; In the cause of which <things>, the fourth mode is foreign.
17. To the sixth <argument>,34 one can say that the existence of an integral whole implies the existence of an integral part,
<namely,> of that part without which the whole cannot exist.
And so perhaps the whole implies the part with respect to those predicates which cannot be in the whole unless they are in the part, as, for example, "a house is white; therefore, the wall is white." But with respect to <those> predicates that pertain to the diversity of the whole and the part, such an implication does not hold, as, for example, it does not follow <that because> "a house is composed from such <parts>"; "therefore, also the wall
<is composed from such parts>."
18. When it is argued from the reduction of such an implication to a syllogism,35 it can be reduced in this way: "every thing without which a house cannot exist" or "every integral part of the house is, if a house is; a wall is <an integral part> of this kind; therefore, a wall is if a house is," by understanding the major
<term> to be from a hypothetical predicate (condicionato praedi32. Cf. supra, fn. 23.
33. Cf. ibid.
34. Cf. supra, n. 6.
35. Cf. ibid.
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cato) and <by understanding> the conclusion similarly, where that from which the implication holds like an enthymeme (enthymematica) is taken for the middle <term>.36 And when it is argued that "such an implication does not hold everywhere," it is evident that an integral whole implies the part <that is> everywhere with respect to existence, and with respect to the other predicates which do not pertain to the diversity of the whole and of the part. But it is not necessary from this that it implies itself with respect to just any predicate, just as, if "Socrates" implies a man, it is not necessary that this implication holds: "if Socrates is an individual <term>, a man is an individual <term>," since with respect to this predicate they are extraneous. And so it is of an integral whole and part with respect to the predicate
<that> pertains to the diversity of them. But the first proof is not solved; for the enthymeme stated above does not reduce to a syllogism, but it concludes with a different proposition from that enthymeme only in order. Since when it is reduced to a syllogism, it is necessary for the antecedent of the enthymeme to be another premise in the syllogism, and the consequent of the enthymeme to be the conclusion in the syllogism.
19. Therefore, one can say that it is reduced in this way: "a house is; a wall is of a house; therefore, a wall is." Since when the predicate is said to be concluded from something through the fact that it is in another, an identity of those subjects to each other ought to be noted in the minor; at least insofar as it suffices for the inference to the conclusion. The identity, however, of an integral part to the whole that is of it, suffices for an inference
<from> the "existence" that is predicated of the whole <to the existence that> is true of the part. And so it is of other predicates that cannot be in an integral whole unless <they are in> the part; nor does a variation of the middle <term> from the nominative case to an oblique case impede the form of the syllogism, as is evident according to Aristotle in Bk. I of the Prior Analytics.37
36. The Latin for this is as follows: "omne illud sine quo domus non potest esse" vel "omnis pars integralis domus est, si domus est; paries est huiusmodi; igitur paries est, si domus est," intelligendo maiorem esse de condicionato praedicato et conclusionem similiter, ubi sumitur pro medio illud unde tenuit consequentia enthymematica.
37. Prior Analytics, Bk. I, Ch. 35 (48b 10–12).
QUESTION 43
20. To the seventh <argument>,38 what was said previously, from the chapter "Concerning Relation" <regarding> the fourth property <suffices>.39
21. To the eighth <argument>,40 a similar <reply suffices>.
There is a variation concerning those intentions "cause" and "effect," "sign" and "signed" and concerning those <things> which are under <them>. For intentions are essentially (per se) referred
<to each other> and are simultaneous. But those <things> which are under them are not referred <to one another> except perhaps accidentally, and for this reason they are not simultaneous.
38. Cf. supra, n. 7.
39. Cf. supra, q. 27, nn. 10–11, 12, 21–23.
40. Cf. supra, n. 8.