Question One
[QUESTION ONE
Whether the Book of the Categories is About Ten Utterances Signifying the Ten Genera of Things] Equivocals are said, etc.1
t is asked whether the book of The Categories is about
ten utterances signifying the ten genera of things.2
1. It seems that <the subject is the ten utterances signifying the ten genera of things>:
Since Boethius says so.3
2. Second, this work is concerned with <what is> univocal, equivocal, and denominative, which are differentiae only of signifying utterance; since no thing and no concept is equivocal.
For where the concept is the same, there is univocity.
1. The full definition is: "Equivocals are said to be things which have only the name in common, but the account of whose substance is different" (my translation): Aequivoca dicuntur quorum solum nomen commune est, ratio autem substantiae est diversa; Categories, Ch. 1 (1a 1). This definition is the opening line of the Categories. By the time of Duns Scotus, however, it was customary to begin lectures and Quaestiones by "quoting the beginning of the section of the text, the lemma succeeded by an 'etc.'" Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg, "Medieval
Philosophical Literature," 9–42, 20. For Scotus's treatment of the definition of equivocals, see q. 5, nn. 10–12.
2. Scotus will often refer to the categories simply as the "ten genera" (decem genera). At other times, he refers to them as the "ten most general [genera]" (decem generalissima) or the "ten most general genera" (decem generalissima genera).
Cf. also infra, q. 2, n. 7.
3. In his commentary on Aristotle's Categories, Boethius claims that "the intention of this work is about words signifying things"; Boethius, In Categ. Aristot.
I (PL 64, 160A–B).
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3. Third, all these <i.e., univocal, equivocal, and denominative> are defined through "these are said."4
4. Fourth, <a> in the first division5 it is said "of them which are said."6 Similarly, <b> a little lower <Aristotle says> "of those non-complex <things which are said>, <c> a single <term> either signifies a substance," etc.7 But a non-complex <thing> that can be said to signify (dicibile incomplexum significare) is proper of a signifying utterance;8 therefore, that <i.e., the non-complex thing that can be said to signify> is the subject. And most of all, therefore, <the Categories is about> the ten utterances signifying the ten genera, since this work only treats of these <things, i.e., significative utterances>.
5. Fifth, logic is either a science of the real or of speech; it is manifest that it is not of the real; therefore, <it is a science> of speech. As a result, each and every part of it is about a significative utterance; and so that part which is primary will be about the utterance signifying a simple concept, just as the book On Interpretation is about the utterance signifying the composite concept.
6. To the opposite, according to Boethius:9 "logic is about second intentions applied to first intentions"; therefore, some part of it is not about utterances.
7. Second, that which is treated here is essentially (per se) part of the subject considered in the book On Interpretation, and that <subject> is part of that which is considered in the book Prior
4. Categories, Ch. 1 (1a 1, 7, 13).
5. "In the first division" simply refers to the beginning of chapter 2, where Aristotle divides the subject of the book into that which involves combination and that which is without combination; see Categories, Ch. 2 (1a 16).
6. Categories, Ch. 2 (1a 16).
7. Categories, Ch. 2 (1b 25–26).
8. The Latin is as follows: Sed dicibile incomplexum significare est proprium vocis significantis. According to Andrews, the word dicibile "calls to mind Boethius's description of the subject of the categories as words signifying things, insofar as they are significant"; Robert Andrews, Peter of Auvergne's Commentary on Aristotle's Categories: Edition, Translation, and Analysis (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University,
1988), 14.
9. According to the editors of the critical edition, this quotation is from Avicenna, not Boethius. Cf. Avicenna, Metaph. I, Ch. 2 (AviL 10).
QUESTION 1
Analytics, which is the syllogism; but, as is manifest, that <subject> has all its attributes (passiones) inherent to itself <and> not in any existing utterance, nor is it possible. Similarly, an enunciation has its <attributes inherent to itself>. Therefore, each of these <i.e., a syllogism and an enunciation> is naturally prior to a significative utterance. And therefore that which is considered here is naturally prior to each of these, just as an integral part is to a whole;10 therefore, that which is considered here in the first place is naturally prior to any significative utterance. Therefore, a significative utterance is not the subject here.
8. Third, no property of a significative utterance is shown here of it, nor <is a property shown> of it in any other part of logic; therefore, etc.
9. To these two <arguments>,11 one can say that "to have three terms" is an attribute (passio) of a syllogism as it is of an utterance, just as "to signify something true or false" is an attribute (passio) of the enunciation, and so it is of the other attributes (passionibus) of this kind.
10. Against <this argument>:12 either a syllogism in the mind is a syllogism, and an enunciation in the mind is an enunciation, or not. If they are, then they have the attributes (passiones) of the syllogism and of the enunciation even if they are not spoken. If they are not, then <one> having a demonstration in the mind does not have a demonstration unless he speaks; and <one> is not knowing unless he speaks <what is known> and this is manifestly false.
[I. The Solution Of The Question] 11. To the question one can say that this book is not about ten utterances as about a first <or primary> subject—nor is any part of logic about an utterance <as a first subject>, since all the attributes (passiones) of the syllogism13 and of all its parts can inhere in them according to the being that they have in the 10. Cf. infra, q. 43, n. 15.
11. Cf. supra, nn. 7 and 8.
12. Cf. supra, n. 9.
13. Cf. also Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge, q. 3, n. 20.
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mind, even if they are never spoken, as is evident inductively— but <this book> is about something prior, which has the nature
(rationem) of a significate only with respect to a significative utterance.
[II. To The Principal Arguments] 12. To the <first argument, i.e., to the> authority of Boethius14 one can say that he understands the passive through the active <voice>, thus: <by saying that this work is> "about ten utterances signifying the ten genera of things," <what he means> is that it is about the ten genera signified through the ten utterances.15 And in the solution of the following question it will be explained in which way this is true.16
13. To the second <argument>17 one can say that "univocal" and "denominative" are primarily differentiae of a predicate that in itself exists in a concept, not primarily in a signifying utterance. On the equivocal, however, he offers a solution on account of its opposition to the univocal: either since the equivocated equivocal is a proper concept, although not the equivocating equivocal;18 or since it is a concept insofar as it is signified.
14. To the third <argument>:19 he says "they are said" to show that he does not assign true definitions to those equivocals, etc.—which are through a genus and differentia—but <he shows> only the nature (rationem) that expresses what is said through the name.
15. To the fourth <argument, part a>,20 I say that in the second division Aristotle says "of them which are";21 but just as it does not follow from these words that the subject of this book
14. Cf. supra, n. 1.
15. See Pini, Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus, 142.
16. Cf. infra, q. 2, nn. 19–27.
17. Cf. supra, n. 2.
18. An equivocated equivocal is a thing that is signified by an equivocal term, whereas an equivocating equivocal is the equivocal utterance. For a fuller discussion on this distinction, see below, q. 5, nn. 11–12, and nn. 18–19.
19. Cf. supra, n. 3.
20. Cf. supra, n. 4.
21. Categories, Ch. 1 (1a 20).
QUESTION 1
is something real to which being pertains essentially (per se), so also neither does it follow here that the subject is an utterance to which being spoken pertains essentially (per se); for this reason he says "they are said," which is to say, "they are conceived."
And "are" in the second division is taken for the same: <that is,> "are" according to reason.22
16. To the fourth <argument, part b>23 about the non-complex, I say that this pertains primarily to a simple concept,
<then> to a signifying utterance by implication. Therefore, if the subject here is the simple <term>, it holds all the more that <the subject> is a concept rather than an utterance.
17. To the fourth <argument, part c>24 about "it signifies," I say to this <argument> that it does not follow that the subject of this book is the letter, as neither Boethius wishes—nevertheless, among those four <things> which are enumerated in the beginning of On Interpretation,25 the letter is only a sign and not <something> signified. In the same way, neither does it follow here that the subject is an utterance from that medium "it signifies,"26 since <to signify> is an exceedingly common medium, for a concept (passio)27 <is a medium that> signifies a thing.
Thus, the <thesis> holds good that the subject here is a concept.
18. To the fifth <argument>,28 I say that logic is neither a sci22. See Pini, Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus, 180–82.
23. Cf. supra, n. 4.
24. Cf. ibid.
25. On Interpretation, Ch. 1 (16a 3–8).
26. The Latin is as follows: Ita nec sequitur subiectum hic esse vocem ex hoc medio
'significat', quia illud est nimis commune medium, passio enim significat rem. Although the terminology is a bit awkward, the argument is clear enough. In the beginning of On Interpretation, Aristotle claims that written words signify vocal utterances, which signify concepts (passiones), which signify things. Consequently, both vocal utterances and concepts (passiones) are in between written words and things, and hence each one is a medium or intermediate since it is both signified by something and in turn "signifies" something else. The original objection is that the Categories must be about vocal utterances since they "signify" other things. Scotus's reply, then, is twofold. First, the phrase "it signifies" could, with equal reason, be taken to mean that the subject of the Categories is written words, a position that no one holds. Second, the phrase "it signifies" is as applicable to concepts as it is to utterances, since it is an "exceedingly common medium."
27. According to the following paragraph, a concept (passio) is a medium between a thing and an utterance.
28. Cf. supra, n. 5.
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ence of the real nor a science of speech (sermocinalis), since it considers neither speech (sermo) nor the attributes (passiones) of speech (sermo), nor <does it consider> its subject under the aspect (ratio) of speech (sermo). Indeed, one can show that this division is insufficient in the following way: the medium between thing and utterance or speech (sermo) is a concept (passio); therefore, just as some science is essentially (per se) about things, <and> some essentially (per se) about signifying utterances, as grammar and rhetoric, which consider the attributes
(passiones) of an utterance insofar as it is an utterance, namely congruous and ornate, so there can be another science that is essentially (per se) about the concept (conceptu); this <science> is logic. So <logic> ought essentially (per se) to be called a rational science, not only because it is treated through reason (ratio) just as any other science <is>, but <also> because it is about concepts formed by the act of reason (rationis).29
19. If someone30 says that logic is a verbal (sermocinalis) science, as it seems from an interpretation of the name:—it must be understood that much <of it> pertains to speech (sermo) for two reasons: <first> because a concept, which is what logic is about, is immediately signified through an utterance; and <second> because the attributes (passiones) of a concept exist in a signifying utterance—<for example> non-complex, complex, to signify true or false—as in a sign according to the nature of the significate.
20. To that31 which is touched upon in responding to the contrary arguments concerning "terms"32 and "to signify <something as> true or false," one can say that a term either is the same
29. See Giorgio Pini, "Species, Concept, and Thing: Theories of Signification in the Second Half of the Thirteenth Century," Medieval Philosophy and Theology 8 (2000): 21–52; and idem, "Signification of Names in Duns Scotus and Some of His Contemporaries," Vivarium 39 (2001): 20–51.
30. According to Pini, this is an old position. Pini, Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus, 35.
31. Cf. supra, n. 9.
32. I.e., "to be from three terms." The argument is that "to be from three terms" is a property of a syllogism. See also Duns Scotus, Super Porphyrii, q. 3, n. 20.
QUESTION 1
thing as an utterance signifying a single concept, and then there is not a syllogism from three terms unless it is spoken. Or more truly: a term signifies the same thing that a simple concept <signifies>,33 since it is transferred from geometry to logic for signifying an indivisible in propositions, which is able to be in the mind; and then every spoken syllogism and unspoken syllogism is from three terms. Similarly, "to signify true or false" pertains to the enunciation, but not in the way that an utterance signifies a concept, but in the way that a concept signifies a thing.34
21. Likewise, in the comment above in the beginning of this <work>, Boethius35 says that significative utterances are considered in one way as they are imposed for signifying,36 in another way as properties caused by the intellect exist <or inhere> in those signifying <utterances>. In the first way they are considered in logic; in the second way <they are considered> in grammar.37 According to this <division>, therefore, the first subject of logic must posit a significative utterance. And in this way the first subject of this book is an utterance signifying a simple concept, and most of all the ten utterances signifying the ten genera, since all other <utterances> are reduced to these.38
33. The argument is unclear. In one way, it could be read such that the word "term," either as a vocal utterance or as a second intention, signifies the same thing as the word "concept" signifies. In another way, it could be interpreted to mean that a "term," like a "concept," signifies extramental objects. Nevertheless, in all the readings, the conclusion is that "term" is identical to "concept."
34. An utterance is a conventional sign that signifies a concept through an act of imposition; i.e., it is considered to be ad placitum. A concept, however, is a natural sign of a thing and hence does not require an act of imposition.
35. "Therefore, first was that position of names through which one may signify the subjects to the understanding or to the senses. The second was that consideration by which they perceive the figures and individual properties of names in this way so that the first name may itself be a designation of the thing";
Boethius, Commentarium in Categorias Aristotelis I (PL 64, 159B).
36. According to n. 24, what is signified by a vocal utterance is primarily a concept.
37. One of the alternative manuscripts has this inverted, such that "significative utterances are studied in logic insofar as they are caused by the intellect, whereas they are studied in grammar insofar as they are imposed for signifying."
38. At this point, Scotus broadens the subject of the Categories to include vocal utterances, thereby tacitly acknowledging the insights contained in the
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22. Against this <last argument>:39 "by knowing one of the correlatives definitely, the other is also known" according to Aristotle in the chapter on "Relations."40 Therefore, if the logician considers an utterance insofar as it is significative of a thing, it is necessary that he know the thing definitely.41 Which seems unreasonable.
23. Second, every significative utterance in the genus of a signifying utterance is singular; therefore, of none of these is there a relation to another; therefore, other signifying utterances are not reduced to these any more than these are to the others.
24. To the first of these <two opposing arguments>,42 one can say that an utterance is not primarily a sign of a thing but of a concept, which <thing>43 it is necessary for the logician to consider not as a primary subject, but on account of the understanding (cognitio) of a primary subject.
25. Against this:44 a concept is a further sign of a thing; therefore, it still follows that it is necessary that the thing is understood (cognoscere).
26. This argument (argumentum)45 is not only contrary to Boopposing views. In n. 26, he will broaden the subject even more to include extramental things as well. See footnote 1, above.
39. Cf. supra, n. 21.
40. Categories, Ch. 7 (8b 13–15).
41. For a fuller discussion of this objection and how it is solved by Scotus and Radulphus Brito, see Pini, Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus, 167–69.
42. Cf. supra, n. 22.
43. For the sake of a coherent argument, I have followed a different manuscript for this translation. The majority of manuscripts have quem, which would refer to the concept, not the thing. If this is the correct reading, then the text would be: "one can say that an utterance is not primarily a sign of a thing but of a concept, which [concept] it is necessary for the logician to consider not as a primary subject, but on account of the understanding (cognitio) of a primary subject." Scotus, however, repeatedly says that either a simple concept or an utterance signifying a simple concept is the primary subject of this work, which would contradict this reply if the relative pronoun quem refers to a concept.
Furthermore, both the preceding objection and the following objection imply that what is at issue here is the "thing," not the concept.
44. Cf. supra, n. 24.
45. Cf. supra, n. 25.
QUESTION 1
ethius, but also contrary to those who say that logic is about concepts. For this reason, one can say that it is not necessary on account of the cognition of one relative that the other <relative> is known with regard to everything which belongs essentially (in se) in it, but only with regard to those <properties> which exist in it insofar as it is referred to another. In this way, however, it is not unsuitable that a thing is understood in logic to the extent that it is signified by means of a concept.
27. To the second <argument>,46 one can say that although there may not be some relation between signifying utterances in the genus of utterance, nevertheless, insofar as they signify concepts there is an order among them, just as every proposition in the genus of propositions is singular; nevertheless "one is singular, another universal,"47 by reason (ratione) of the concept that is signified.
46. Cf. supra, n. 23.
47. On Interpretation, Ch. 7 (17a 38).