Question Twenty-Five
[QUESTION TWENTY-FIVE
Whether the Genus of Relation is One Genus] Indeed, such things are said to another.1
irst, it is asked whether the genus of relation is one
genus.
1. It seems that it is not:
One univocal genus is not common to being and non-being; but some relations are beings, and some <relations> are nonbeings; therefore, etc. Proof of the second part of the minor: there is a contradiction between being and non-being, which <contradiction> is an intermediate relation, which seems to be a non-being.––First, since nothing is an intermediate <thing> between contradictory <terms>, and such a relation is an intermediate between contradictory <terms>, therefore it is not something.—Second, since that opposition can be in a nonbeing as in a subject, but an accident that is in a non-being as a subject cannot be a being.
2. It will be said2 to this second proof that this opposition is only in a being as in a subject, according to what seems to be held by the Commentator <in his commentary> on Bk. VI of the Metaphysics.3
3. Against this <argument>: A relative of equivalence equally denominates each extreme in comparison to the other. That is manifested in <this> proposition, since it is equally true to say
1. Categories, Ch. 7 (6a 36–37).
2. Cf. Petrus de Alvernia, Praedic. q. 46 (CIMAGL 55, p. 65).
3. Averroës, Metaphysics, Bk. VI, com. 8 (ed. Iuntina, VIII f. 72ra).
QUESTION 25
"non-being is opposed to being" as "being is opposed to nonbeing"; therefore, such a relation can equally be in each extreme as in a subject.
4. <Second>, to the principal <argument>, nothing is univocal to a being of reason and to a being of nature, but certain relations are beings of nature, as paternity and filiation, which would exist <even if> the intellect did not exist; certain others, however, are beings of reason.
5. This is proved: first, since a relation does not have a truer being than the subject upon which it is based; and many relations are based upon things of reason, as the relation of genus to species and others of this kind; therefore, relations of this kind are only beings of reason.
6. <This is proved> secondly, since every relation requires two extremes; therefore, that relation, whose extremes are not two except according to reason, is only a being of reason. Such a relation is identity according to what is said in Bk. V of the Metaphysics, in the chapter "On the Same":4 in that relation the intellect "uses one <extreme> as two <extremes>."
7. Third, to the principal <argument>: According to Aristotle,5 "those things whose being is to have themselves to another are relations." That <description> is in all <things> which are essentially (per se) to another in the first mode; therefore, <it is> through the nature of something univocal to them. That is not <anything else> except the most general <genus> of relation. Therefore, the most general <genus> of relation is "that its very being is (hoc ipsum quod est)" to have itself to another; nor is it to something prior or posterior, since "relatives6 are simultaneous by nature"; nor is it to <something> equal, since in this way there would be two most general <genera>. Also, that what is most general has itself to another is evident from its very name. For it is said by Aristotle
<to be> "to something"; and it cannot be conceded <to be> "to something" and not be towards another, unless a contradictory
<term> can be said of a contradictory <term>.
8. Fourth, to the principal <argument>: there are only two 4. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 9 (1018a 7–10).
5. Categories, Ch. 7 (8a 32–33).
6. Categories, Ch. 7 (7b 15).
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primary species of any one genus; but there are not only two primary species of the most general <genus> of relation; therefore, the most general <genus> of relation is not one. Proof of the minor: since if there were <only two primary species>, they would be A and B. Then either A refers to itself and B to itself, and then both are relatives of equivalence; then also all inferiors, and so relatives of supposition and of imposition,7 would be in another most general genus. Or, A is referred to B, and vice versa; and if this is the case, then their species would refer to each other. Since, according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the Topics:8
"If genus is <relative> to genus, <then> species is also <relative> to species." And similarly in Bk. II <of the Topics>:9 "if a proposition follows to <another> proposition, <then> what is relatively opposed to the consequent also follows to what is relatively opposed to the antecedent"; this must not be understood of <anything> except an implication from the higher to the lower. If, however, A and B refer mutually to each other, then all relatives are relatives of supposition and imposition; therefore, relatives of equivalence will be in another most general genus. Or third, that A refers to another and not to B, as <for example> to C; and B refers to another and not to A, as <for example> to D; and then it follows that C and D are neither prior nor posterior to A and B (since each is equally first with its correlative, since relatives are simultaneous by nature); therefore, there will be four primary species of this genus. Or, fourth, A is referred to itself and B to another, or B to itself and A to another, and in either way there will be three primary species of this genus; since that other to which A or B is referred is equally first with its correlative. Therefore, in none of these four <alternatives> given
<here>, will this genus be one.
9. To the opposite is Aristotle.10
7. In this question, I have translated superpositionis as "imposition," which is distinct from impositio, which is also translated as "imposition" in other questions.
8. Topics, Bk. IV, Ch. 4 (124b 15–18).
9. Cf. Topics, Bk. II, Ch. 8 (113b 15–26).
10. Categories, Ch. 7 (8a 32–35).
QUESTION 25
[I. The Response To The Question] 10. It must be said that the most general <genus> in the genus of relation is one, since it is said of all its inferiors according to one account, which account is a relation (habitudo) of one
<thing> to another. And since all relations have the same mode of denominating a substance, namely, in comparison to another as accidents, since they denominate substance in the same way, they are of one genus.
[II. To The Principal Arguments] [A. To the First and Second Principal Arguments]
[1. The Previous Response] 11. To the first argument.11 To the minor, I say that no relation is a non-being. Since the opposite is proved about a contradiction: to the first proof, since it is said that "there is no intermediate between contrary <terms>," <this> must be understood of those <things> which exist under the intention of a contradiction. For example, <it must be understood> of complex
<terms, i.e., propositions>, in this way: "a true predicate can be affirmed or denied of any subject,"12 and there is no middle
<alternative>; <it must be understood> of non-complex <contradictory terms>, in this way: <one or> the other of them is said of anything, and there is no middle <alternative>. But the other proposition, namely, that "such a relation is an intermediate between contradictory <terms>," must be understood by reason of intentions. And then when the conclusion is drawn, a fallacy of accident occurs; since "intermediate" is taken extraneously in the premises, namely, that there is an intermediate that exists between contradictory <terms>. This is evident in the example:
"being" and "non-being" do not essentially (per se) refer to each other, and between them nothing is absolutely an intermediate.
But insofar as those <terms> are contradictory <to one another>, they are referred <to one another>; and in this way there
11. Cf. supra, n. 1.
12. On Interpretation, Bk. I, Ch. 9 (18a 29–30).
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is an intermediate contradiction between them, just as between similar <things> a similitude is an intermediate, and between any relatives a relation is an intermediate.
12. To the other proof,13 I concede that that relation can be in non-being as in a subject, just as <it can also be> in a being.
Nevertheless, insofar as "non-being" is the subject of this relation, it is a being of reason, and so such a relation can be a being of reason.
13. To the second principal <argument>,14 I deny the major <premise>. And I concede that a relation expresses a being of reason;15 either since each extreme or at least one <of them> is a being of reason; or since its extremes are not two except according to the consideration of reason, as it is in identity. Nevertheless, the major of each argument (rationis) can be proved in this way: something is not univocal to every being, nor is something even univocal to every being of nature; therefore, by much less will something be univocal to being and non-being, or to a being of reason; since if nothing is univocal to the <former>, which seem to pertain <to them> more, neither <will anything be univocal> to the <latter>, which <pertain to it> less.
14. And to this proof,16 insofar as it is for the second reason, it must be said that the implication is not valid, nor is there here a dialectical argument (locus) "from the greater," since not all beings of nature pertain more to some univocal <thing> than a being of nature and a being of reason <do>, except perhaps in several <things> said of them equivocally.
[2. Objection] 15. But because of the opposition that is between being and non-being, it is absolutely true to say that it is a non-being (since otherwise there would be an intermediate between being and non-being), and since it is absolutely in a non-being as in a subject, for this reason it does not seem that one must place it in the genus of relation, since being in itself is divided into the ten most general genera. Also, even though something may be univocal to a being of nature and to a being of reason, that is, to 13. Cf. supra, n. 1.
14. Cf. supra, nn. 4–6.
15. Cf. supra, n. 5.
16. Cf. ibid.
QUESTION 25
a being that is in the reason, as something is univocal to knowledge and to virtue, nevertheless to a being that exists only by the consideration of reason and to a being of nature, nothing seems to be univocal. Since then they would have opposition, since all things univocally contained under something that is the same, such as species, differ by contrary differentiae, and so such beings of reason cannot be applied to any being of nature, which is false.
[3. Another Response] 16. Therefore, it seems that one must answer the first two reasons otherwise.
To the first <reason>,17 I concede that a contradiction between being and non-being is simply non-being, but it is not a species in the genus of relation.
17. To the second <reason>,18 similarly I concede the major, by saying in regard to the minor that no relation according to reason is a species in the genus of relation, neither is an identity, nor are relations founded upon second intentions, nor are other similar things.
[4. Objections and Responses] 18. Against this: "those <things> are relatives19 whose very being (quorum hoc ipsum esse) is to have itself to another."20 This is a true description of relatives, according to Aristotle. That <description also> inheres in a contradictory, since "its very being
(hoc ipsum quod est)" is the contradictory of a contradictory; and <that description inheres in> the same, since "its very being (hoc ipsum quod est)" is the same to the same <thing>; and <that description inheres in> intentional relatives and similar <things>, as "the very being (hoc ipsum quod est)" of a genus is the genus of a species. That <description> is shown of all things through the fact that in their definitions their correlatives must be pos17. Cf. supra, n. 1.
18. Cf. supra, nn. 4–6.
19. The Latin is ad aliud, which literally means "to another," based upon the fact that they are "related to another."
20. Cf. supra, n. 7.
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ited, as Porphyry manifestly says about genus and species.21 That would not be necessary, unless they essentially depended upon each other. Therefore, all the aforesaid are truly relatives; therefore, also forms, insofar as they are said to be <related> to one another, are true relations, which is denied.
19. Second, those <things> (ista) seem to be in no other genus except in the genus of relation, and it seems unsuitable to concede that those <things> (illa) are in no genus.
20. Third, if a contradiction between being and non-being is not in the genus of relation, <then> I ask whether a contradiction that is between other extremes is in the genus of relation.
If it is, then a contradiction does not inhere in all things univocally, which is untenable, since in Bk. I of the Posterior Analytics22 the same definition is assigned to a contradiction universally taken: "contradiction is an opposition of which there is no intermediate in itself." If, however, a contradiction <that is> between other extremes is not in the genus of relation, then there is not any contradiction. And contrariety is in the genus of relation, as is manifest, since it truly is an essential (per se) relation
(habitudo) of two beings. Therefore, opposition will not be univocal to contradiction and contrariety, which, in the subsequent chapter <which begins with the words> "As often, however, as one is accustomed to oppose,"23 seems contrary to Boethius,24 who divides opposition into these four species of opposition, as a genus <is divided> into its species.
21. To be more precise, a greater incongruity follows because opposition is unsuitably posited in the definition of contradiction in Bk. I of the Posterior Analytics,25 since an opposition taken according to that signification according to which it pertains to a contradiction, is either the same as contradiction or <is> superior to it. If it is the same, <then> it is in vain that that "of which there is no intermediate in itself" is added in the definition, since opposition according to that mode of accepting is essen21. Porphyry, Isagoge, Ch. "On Species"(AL I6 9; ed. Busse, 4.9–14).
22. Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, Ch. 2 (72a 13–14).
23. Categories, Ch. 10 (11b 16 [in the apparatus]).
24. Boethius, In Categ. Aristot. IV (PL 64, 264C).
25. Cf. supra, n. 20.
QUESTION 25
tially (per se) determined to a contradiction. If it is superior, it does not have other inferiors than a contradiction under it, except other species of opposition. But the other <species> are beings, and a contradiction is a "non-being"; and then something will be univocal to being and to non-being, which is denied.
22. To the first of these <arguments>,26 one can say that a true description of relatives, which Aristotle posits, pertains to none of these <things>, since the being of none of them is to have itself to another. For "another" is a differentia of being, and it is said only in comparison to a "being"; for something is not said <to be to> "another" from a non-being. Now the aforesaid, or their correlatives, are non-beings, speaking commonly, and therefore the being of none of them is to have itself to another except perhaps according to reason—just as those and their correlatives are beings.
23. And if it is argued that "the being of a contradictory is to another according to reason, namely, to have itself to a contradictory, <and> therefore to have itself is a relation," this is a fallacy in a certain respect (secundum quid) and simply.
24. When it is said27 "that their correlatives are posited in their definitions," I say that none of them has a true definition expressing what the thing is, although it may have a definition expressing what is said through the name, or that which the intellect conceives of them; which account, although it may be a definition of them absolutely, nevertheless is not an absolute definition.
25. To the second <argument>,28 I say that it is not untenable to concede that these are not in some most general genus as species. Nevertheless, if they ought to be posited in some genus through reduction, <then> most of all they must be posited in the genus of relation, since they are assimilated more to those species, as, perhaps, all intentional things are in a genus through reduction—and this <is done> in that <genus> of 26. Cf. supra, n. 18.
27. Cf. ibid.
28. Cf. supra, n. 19.
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which they are most assimilated to the species in the mode of predicating.
26. To the third <argument>,29 I concede that "opposition" may not be univocal to contradiction and to contrariety.30 Since it is assumed by Boethius that the division of opposition into these four is a division of a genus into its species, that can be understood in two ways: "of a genus," that is "of <something> general," since according to some mode <what is> divided is predicated of <what> divides <it>, and through this, this division is distinguished from a division of the whole into its parts.
Or <it can be understood> in this way, that it is so understood for some dividing things, not for all, since contrariety and relative opposition are species of opposition taken according to one signification according to which there is an intermediate genus in the genus of relation, although a contradiction would not be a species of it as it is thus taken.
27. Through this <twofold distinction>, I say <in response> to that <argument> concerning the book of the Posterior Analytics,31 that the definition of contradiction is well assigned, and <I say> that opposition, according to that signification according to which it pertains to a contradiction, is not altogether the same as that, but is superior <to that>. And it has another <species>, inferior <to it>, namely, "privative opposition"; since insofar as that is a contradiction, it is either of a non-being as of a subject or as of a term, of which it would be necessary that each be a being to this because a relation is a being.
28. From these <distinctions>, it follows that opposition taken in one sense is said univocally of contrariety and relative opposition; taken in another sense it is said univocally of contradiction and privative opposition.
29. Cf. supra, n. 20.
30. For a fuller discussion on the various types of opposition, cf. infra, q.
37–38.
31. Cf. supra, n. 21.
QUESTION 25
[B. To the Third and Fourth Principal Arguments] [Prefatory Reply] 29. To the third <principal argument>,32 I say that the most general <genus> of relation is not "to something," nor is there something that is essentially (per se) in that genus; but that most general <genus> is a relation (habitudo) of one <thing> to another, and all <those things> which are in the genus of relation are in this way.––To the proof to the contrary, it is said that this definition is not given of relation, but of relatives. Similarly, this name "to something" is said concretely from a relation and not of a relation unless it is understood in this way: "to something
(ad aliquid)" is a relation (habitudo) to something (ad aliquid).
[C. To the Fourth Principal Argument] 30. Through this <distinction, it can be said> similarly to the fourth principal reason,33 that the first species of relation are not referred mutually to themselves nor to others; but they are principles of referring, just as all other <principles> that are in the genus of relation are as well.
[1. Objections and Responses Against the Two Responses Stated Above] 31. Against those two responses.34 From these it follows that neither definition, which Aristotle35 posits, would be of those
<things> which are in the genus of relation, nor also would any property that he assigns. And so every determination of Aristotle would be <something> not pertaining to the genus of relation. The first implication is evident, by leading to (inducendo) the singular properties that Aristotle posits, none of which pertains to relations, but <which pertains> to relatives.
32. Second, the opposite is not the principle of its opposite.
Therefore, an absolute form is not the principle according to which something is said <to be> compared to another; but a 32. Cf. supra, n. 7; nn. 29–51, with few exceptions, have many similarities to his Questions on the Metaphysics, q. 5–6, nn. 114–129.
33. Cf. supra, n. 8.
34. Cf. supra, nn. 29–30.
35. Categories, Ch. 7 (6a 37–38).
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relation is a form of this kind; therefore, <a relation> is not an absolute <form> in itself; therefore, it is to another.
33. Third, by conceding what was said, the difficulty of the principal arguments is not avoided. Since if the most general
<genus> in the abstract is a relation, something according to that <relation> is said relatively to another.
34. The proof of this: since, according to Aristotle,36 "we express a quality (quales)" "according to a quality (qualitatem)," insofar as it is a most general <genus>, since he describes quality in this way as it is the most general <genus>, therefore some things are said <to be> relatives according to a relation, as that is the most general <genus>.
35. The second <proof of this>, since some things are said <to be> relatives according to lower relations in the genus of relation. Everything essentially (per se) inhering univocally in the first way in any species, however, inheres through the nature of the genus, and so <it inheres> to the genus primarily; therefore, something is said relatively according to the most general
<genus>. From this, I argue <as follows>: either a relative said according to the form of the most general <genus> is said to something according to another form, or according to the same
<form>. If <it is said> according to the same <form>, then that relative is a relative of equivalence; therefore, that relation is also a relation of equivalence; therefore, all lower relations <are relations of equivalence>.
36. If it is said to another according to another form, then the other form also corresponds to that other <form>, according to which it is said relatively to that <one>.—This is equally first with a relation which is the most general <genus>, since that relative is equally first with that <one>; therefore, two most general relations are equally first.
37. Similarly, there remains the difficulty of the fourth argument (rationis).37 Since if the first species are relations, I ask
<the following>. Are they either relations of equivalence? And if they are, <then> all inferior relations will be such relations. Or,
36. Categories, Ch. 8 (8b 25–26).
37. Cf. supra, nn. 8 and 30.
QUESTION 25
is A the principle of referring something said according to it to something denominated from B? And if it is, then A and B will be relations of supposition and imposition. Or is A the principle of referring <something> denominated from that to something denominated from another form as to C, and is B the principle of referring to another according to the same form? For then there will be three first species. Or, is A the principle of referring to something said from another form, and similarly of B?
For then there will be four first species. And universally, since a relative corresponds to every relation and vice versa, no diversity will exist in the number of relations and of relatives.
38. To the first of these <arguments>,38 one can concede the first consequent and say that that definition is not of the most general <genus> of relation nor of any of its species, but <it is> of that which is said denominatively from that <definition>; similarly concerning the properties. Nevertheless, it does not follow further that the determination of Aristotle is in no way suitable to the most general <genus> of relation, since a relation (relatio) among all beings is the most imperfect being since it is only a relation (habitudo) of two <things>, and thus it is the least knowable in itself. It is more knowable, however, insofar as it informs those <things> of which it is a relation (habitudo); and for the <sake of> determining a relation it was suitable to determine the relatives, especially since the cognition of the relation can be had from the cognition of the <relatives> or the definition, or with respect to their properties. Since if the being of a relative is to have itself to another, <then> proportionally the relation is the form according to which this <thing> has itself to another in this way. Similarly with respect to the properties, if relatives are said to be convertibles,39 the relation is the form according to which some <things> are said to be convertible (convertentiam).40 And so it is concerning the other properties.
38. Cf. supra, n. 31.
39. The Latin is as follows: si relativa dicantur ad convertentiam. See Wolter, Questions on the Metaphysics, Bk. 5, q. 5–6, fn. 172: "'Convertere' (to convert) and the noun 'convertentia' (convertibility) express the idea that one notion implies the other, and a proposition affirming the existence of one, entails necessarily a corresponding proposition affirming the existence of the other."
40. Categories, Ch. 7 (6b 29).
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39. To the other reason,41 I say that comparison and absoluteness are not opposites except concerning the same <thing>.
And for this reason, absoluteness concerning form and comparison concerning the subject informed by a form are not opposites.
40. Otherwise, one can say that a relation is not a compared form nor an absolute <form>. For since it is a form according to which something is said to be compared to another, for this reason it is by nature said to be neither absolute nor compared, just as absoluteness opposed to itself is neither absolute nor compared.
41. If it is said that absolute and compared are immediate contraries concerning being: it is true, concerning being that is naturally capable of receiving it. Just as "healthy" and "sick" are immediate contraries concerning the body of an animal, but not concerning health and sickness; for neither health nor sickness is healthy or sick.
42. To the other reasons,42 it is said that something is referred <to another> neither according to the most general <genus> of relation, nor according to its first species, but only according to its lower species.
43. To the second of the former <arguments> touched upon earlier against this,43 <which> conceded that "something is referred <to another> according to all lower relations; therefore,
<it is referred to another> according to the genus," etc.; what is according to that genus (secundum ipsum genus) as it is in its inferior <species> is conceded, not <as it is> in itself (non in se).
44. Against this: <First> according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the Topics:44 "If the species is to another, <then> a genus will also be to another"; therefore, if the species is the principle of referring to another, <then> a genus will also be <a principle of referring> to another.
45. Second, it seems impossible that the most general <genus> is a relation or a habitude to another and that by informing a subject it does not make a subject have itself to another.
41. Cf. supra, n. 32.
42. Cf. supra, nn. 33–35.
43. Cf. supra, n. 35.
44. Topics, Bk. IV, Ch. 4 (124b 16).
QUESTION 25
46. Third, the second proof is not solved, since according to all the most specific species, something is referred <to another>; therefore, according to some univocal <term> these are the lowest and intermediate genera. But something is referred
<to another> according to all these; therefore, <something is referred to another> through something univocal to them—since a univocal genus is superior to them—and so by always ascending to the most general <genus>, at last it will be necessary also to concede that something is referred <to another> according to the most general <genus>; not only according to what has being in the inferiors, since in this way it is not <anything> other than its inferiors, and through the consequent <it is> not univocal to them.
47. To the second of these reasons,45 it might be said that the most general <genus> does not inform substance except in its inferiors, since it does not inform substance except insofar as it is a being; however, it is not a being except in its inferiors.
48. Against this: at least it can be conceived by the intellect that a relation informs a substance, without conceiving some inferior relation informing a substance. Since the prior can be conceived by the intellect, without conceiving the posterior, and in this way the opposites are conceded: that <relation> informs the substance, and nevertheless a relative is not related through that <relation>. This is impossible.
[2. Another Response to the Third Principal Argument] 49. Therefore, to the third principal reason,46 it must be said that the most general <genus> in the genus of relation is the principle of referring to another, but not to another <that is> related according to another form in the genus. Similarly, a relative said denominatively from the most general <genus> is said relatively, but not to something related according to another form in the genus.
45. Cf. supra, n. 45.
46. Cf. supra, n. 7.
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50. Against this: if relation is the principle of referring to something <that is> related according to the same form, then it is a relation of equivalence, and a relative denominated from that is a relative of equivalence, and so all relations and inferior relatives will be <relations> of equivalence, which is untenable.
51. To this <argument>, it must be said that "relative of equivalence" is equivocal, since, taken properly, something is related to another according to the same form in species, by which relation of equivalence one name is imposed which is said of each extreme of such a relation, of which kind are "similar" and "equal" and others of the like.—Taken in a transferred sense, every relative of equivalence expresses that which denominates each extreme from the same name, although that name is not imposed from one form of the species. And in this second way
I concede that relation, which is the most general <genus>, is a relation of equivalence; and a relative from it is said likewise to be a relative of equivalence. For it is said that "a relative is a relative of a relative." But a relation taken in the first way is a species of this genus.
52. Against this: in whichever way the most general <genus> is a relation of equivalence, it follows that all inferior relations are such relations in that way. This seems untenable, since paternity and others of this kind, such as relations of supposition and imposition, are in no way relations of equivalence, since they do not denominate each extreme by some name that is the same.
53. To this <argument>, one can say that every inferior relation is of equivalence, that is, there is a principle of referring to something said according to the same form in the genus. Also,
<it is the case> where each extreme is named by the same name of the genus, although not just anything is the principle of referring to something according to the same form in the species; nor where each <extreme> is named by the same name of a species. For "father" expresses the relative of a relative, according to the form of its genus, even though it does not express "father" according to the proper form of father.
QUESTION 25
[3. Another Response to the Fourth Principal Argument] 54. To the fourth principal reason,47 I concede that A as well as B is a principle of referring to another which was said according to the same form, namely, that A is that which is a relation of equivalence, B is that which is a relation of supposition and imposition. A relative denominated by B, which is a relative of supposition and imposition, is said to a relative of supposition and imposition. But it does not follow from this that it is a relative of equivalence except by taking it in the second way, as it was said previously.48
55. And if, perhaps, a division of this genus that is B is sought, in which way does its first species have themselves?—One can concede that they are mutually referred to each other, as they are a relative according to an active potency and a relative according to a passive potency. And furthermore, one can concede that their species are referred among themselves, as father and warmth, which are species of the first genus, <are referred> to a son and to something capable of being heated, which are species of the second <genus>. And it must be said proportionally of the corresponding relations.
56. From these <arguments>, so many <things> are evident: in what way relations of reason have themselves to the genus of relation; and besides this, in which way beings of reason are in a genus; and in which way "between contradictories there is no intermediate" must be understood; and in which way opposition has itself to those four into which the inferior is divided in this book;49 and in which way according to relation as it is the most general <genus> something is referred and to which <genera> it is referred, because it is said denominatively from the same <name>; and in which way some relatives of equivalence are said equivocally, and in what way the determination of Aristotle that is about relatives is suitable, since only relations are in this genus as its species; and in which way there are only two first species of this genus and other <issues> which are evident by inspection.
47. Cf. supra, n. 8.
48. Cf. supra, n. 51.
49. Cf. infra, q. 37–38.