Question Four
[QUESTION FOUR
Whether Being is Univocal to the Ten Categories]
t is asked whether being is univocal to the ten cat-
egories.
1. It seems that it is, according to the middle <terms> studied in logic.1
There is no contradiction in equivocals, according to Aristotle in the Sophistical Refutations;2 but this is a contradiction:
"Socrates is a being, and Socrates is not a being." Therefore, being is univocal.
2. Second, no equivocal is determinable through anything added to any of the equivocates, since <what is added> expresses something of them in act;3 but through something that is added being is determinable to one category, as, when one says
"absolute being" and "being through itself (per se)," it is contracted to substance; therefore, it is not equivocal.
1. The Latin has Quod sic, videtur per media logicalia, which is very cryptic. I take it that media logicalia is short for the middle term of a syllogism, since in his other writings Scotus argues that the middle term of a syllogism is univocal if it produces a valid argument. For a fuller discussion, see Timotheus A. Barth, "Being, Univocity, and Analogy," 252.
2. Sophistical Refutations, Bk. II, Ch. 30 (181b 1–3).
3. For Scotus, a univocal term, such as a genus, is determinable or contracted to a species by adding the differentia. Thus, for example, although it may not be clear as to whether the univocal term "animal" signifies a dog or a person, the term can be clarified by adding "rational" to it, which will contract it to the species man. On the other hand, since the equivocal term "animal" may signify either a real man or a man in a picture, no differentia can be added to the term to clarify it. For there is nothing signified by an equivocal term that is the same for both significates. Cf. infra, q. 5.
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
3. Third, it follows that "man is substance; therefore, man is a being," since the antecedent cannot be true without the consequent <being true>. But in equivocals, there is no implication.
Therefore, etc.
4. Fourth, if being is equivocal, this is in some way true: "substance is non-being." And it follows that "therefore, substance is not something," since "something" is not more common than being,4 and further on, this follows: "therefore, substance is nothing." Therefore, this consequent is in some way true, which seems untenable, since then the account (ratio) of Parmenides in Book I of the Physics,5 would not be wrong, insofar as he claims that "non-being is nothing," which nevertheless seems to be contrary to Aristotle.
5. Fifth, "to be predicated essentially (in quid)" is one aspect (ratio)6 pertaining to being as it is said of all these <categories>;7 therefore, that which is said of these <categories> is one, since the aspect (ratio) under which something is said is not more one than what is said.
6. Sixth, "possible" is univocal: first, since it has a contradiction; second, since it is consequent to "necessary"; each of which is evident in Book II of On Interpretation.8 But "possible" does not seem to be more common than being, but less common, since being is divided by act and potency. Therefore, all the more so is being univocal.
4. To say that "something is not more common than being" seems to be a technical phrase that signifies that "something is coextensive with being," or that they are identical. Furthermore, since "being" is a transcendental, by definition it would seem that nothing could actually be more common than being. Thus, the opposite would be that "something" is less extensive than being, which is how Scotus interprets the phrase in his reply.
5. Physics, Bk. I, Ch. 3 (186a 31–b 12).
6. According to Ashworth, "there was a tendency to identify it [i.e., ratio] with an Avicennian common nature which was distinct from both the mental conception and the external object." Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation," p. 105.
7. The argument is that "being" is said essentially of all the categories. For example, to the questions "what is substance?" and "what is quantity?" the answer would always be "being" as if it were a genus of these terms.
8. The modern edition of Aristotle's On Interpretation does not divide the work into two books. The reference is to chapters 12–13 (21a 34–22a 37).
QUESTION 4
7. Seventh, every division begins from one; but being is divided into these ten <categories>; therefore, there is something
<that is> one in these <categories>.
8. Eighth, every multitude is reducible to unity, according to the author of The Book of Causes.9 But substance and accident are many since they are diverse, as is evident according to Aristotle in Bk. X of the Metaphysics,10 where he says that "every being is either the same as or diverse from every other being." Therefore, these many are reduced to some one thing (ad aliquod unum).
Nothing seems to be this <one thing> except being. Therefore, etc.
9. Ninth, according to Aristotle in Bk. VII of the Physics,11 "every comparison is <made> according to something univocal"; but a comparison is <made> according to being; therefore, etc.
Proof of the minor: first, since we say that "accident is less being and is posterior to substance";12 second, since it is said in Bk. II of the Metaphysics:13 "just as each thing is in respect to being, so it is with respect to truth." And in the same place, the principles of eternal <things> are proved to be most (maxime) true,14 from which it follows that they are beings in the highest degree (maxime). Therefore, according to being is a comparison <made>.15
10. Tenth, of one science there is one univocal subject; but being insofar as it is being is the subject of metaphysics, as Aristotle determines in Bk. IV of that work;16 therefore, it is univocal. Proof of the major: First, since demonstrations are made from the subject; in demonstrations, however, it is necessary that something be univocal, according to Aristotle in Bk. I of the Pos9. Liber De Causis, prop. 31 (ed. A. Pattin, p. 114).
10. Metaphysics, Bk. X, Ch. 3 (1054b 25–26).
11. Physics, Bk. VII, Ch. 4 (248b 9).
12. Metaphysics, Bk. VII, Ch. 1 (1028a 30–31).
13. Metaphysics, Bk. II, Ch. 1 (993b 30–31).
14. Metaphysics, Bk. II, Ch. 1 (993b 27–28).
15. The Latin is this: secundum ens est comparatio, which is the converse of the original statement, i.e., comparatio est secundum ens. In its original formation, the syllogism is invalid, since it contains an illicit minor. By converting the minor premise, however, the syllogism is at least logically valid, which is why I have translated this last sentence literally, in spite of the English being awkward.
16. Metaphysics, Bk. IV, Ch. 1 (1003a 21).
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terior Analytics;17 and a little lower <in the Posterior Analytics>:18 equivocation does not happen in demonstrations. Second, since it is necessary to know, regarding a subject, what it is (quid est)19 before a demonstration; but an equivocal <term> does not have an essence (quid est),20 since it neither <has> a definition.
11. Eleventh, in Bk. II of the Metaphysics,21 it is argued that the principles of eternal <things> are most true, since they are the cause of a univocal effect; for example, <they are the cause> of the truth in others. Then the truth exists univocally in every cause and effect; therefore, the character of being (entitas) is also <univocal>. Since Aristotle says in the same place: "just as each thing is in respect to being, so it is with respect to truth";22 but all things either are causes or caused; therefore, being is univocal to all.
12. Twelfth, in Bk. IV of the Metaphysics23 this is posited as the first principle and <it is the> most certain of all principles: "that it does not happen that the same thing simultaneously both is and is not." But if being were equivocal, this principle would be doubtful, on account of the multiplicity of terms; therefore, some other <principle>, the terms of which not being multiple, would be more certain; but this is untenable.24 Therefore, being is not equivocal.
13. Thirteenth, of one cognitive power, there is one first object in a genus; but being, insofar as it is being, is the first object of the intellect, according to Avicenna;25 therefore, it is univocal. The major is evident inductively and by reason: since
17. Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, Ch. 11 (77a 6–7). Cf. Posterior Analytics, Bk. II,
Ch. 19 (100a 6–8).
18. Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, Ch. 11 (77a 9–10).
19. Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, Ch. 1 (71a 11–12).
20. Topics, Bk. VI, Ch. 2 (139b 22–28).
21. Metaphysics, Bk. II, Ch. 1 (993b 30–31).
22. Ibid.
23. Metaphysics, Bk. IV, Ch. 3 (1005b 22–24).
24. The objection makes it clear that the certainty at issue here is a psychological certainty, not a metaphysical certainty.
25. "Therefore, both thing and being are necessarily such since they are immediately impressed on the soul in a first impression, which [impression] is not acquired from other things more known than they." Avicenna, Metaph. I, Ch. 5
(AviL 31).
QUESTION 4
a cognitive power is of such a nature as to be essentially (per se) perfected through the form of its own essential (per se) object; but forms that are diverse in genus are not essentially perfective of one power; therefore, diverse genera do not correspond to the same power of cognition for an object.
14. Fourteenth, Avicenna says:26 "he who says being does not say substance nor accident." But he who says <something> equivocal, says either of the significates, since no equivocal establishes an understanding except of either of the significates.
Therefore, it is not equivocal.
15. Fifteenth, being is imposed from one aspect (ratio), as from the act of existing (essendi); therefore, it signifies one <thing>.
16. To the opposite is Porphyry, who says that "if anyone calls all <things> beings, he will designate them equivocally."27
17. Second, in the beginning of the Categories, Aristotle <says that>: "of non-complex <expressions> a single <term> signifies either substance or quantity," etc.28 But if being were to signify something common to them, it would signify none of them, since that which signifies the higher does not signify the lower under its proper aspect (ratio). Therefore, being would not be non-complex, which is untenable. Therefore, etc.
18. Third, if being were univocal to them, then it would be a genus of them, and thus these would not be the ten first genera, but there would be one most general <genus>. Proof of the first implication: every univocal <term that is> said of many, is said of them under the aspect (ratio) of some universal; otherwise, these five universals would not sufficiently divide <that which is> "predicable of many."29 But being, if it were univocal, could not be said under the aspect (ratio) of the most specific species, since these <categories> are not singular <things>; nor <could
26. "Therefore, the first subject of this science is being qua being, and those things which he inquires of are the implications of being without condition. Of which there are certain things to it as species, as substance, quantity and quality
. . ." Avicenna, Metaph. I, Ch. 2 (AviL 13).
27. Porphyry, Isagoge, Ch. 3 (AL I6 12; ed. Busse, 6.8–9).
28. Categories, Ch. 4 (1b 24–16).
29. On Interpretation, Bk. I, Ch. 7 (17a 39–40).
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
it be said> under the aspect (ratio) of a differentia, since it distinguishes none of them ("differentia is that by which singulars differ from each other");30 neither <could it be said under the aspect> of a property, nor <could it be said under the aspect> of an accident, since being is predicated essentially (in quid) <of the categories>, according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the Metaphysics;31 <thus it is> not these two. Therefore, if <being> were univocal, it would be a genus in respect to them. Not only does an untenable supposition follow from this, namely, that these are not the first genera, but it is contrary to Aristotle in Bk. III of the Metaphysics,32 since being is <predicated> of the concept of everything, and genus is not <predicated> of the concept of the differentia.
19. Similarly, if these ten <categories> have something univocal that is predicated of them, it is manifest that they are not distinguished through that <thing>; therefore, each one differs from the other through something added. Whatever that may be, it follows that they are different and not in themselves diverse, since "they are the same being in some respect," which is contrary to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the Metaphysics.33 It also follows that they are species, since every <thing> that is, according to its definition (ratio), composed of something common said of it essentially (in quid) and something formal added <to it>, is properly definable through them. A definition, however, is properly only of a species, according to Aristotle in Bk. VI of the Topics.34
20. Fourth, if <being> were common to them, since these are different, and not through being, I seek the addition in this one and that one: either it is being or non-being. If it is being, then being belongs to its concept; therefore, by adding that <thing> to being, it will be a vain repetition. Both being and that <other differentia which was added> pertain to the concept of every category; therefore, there is a vain repetition in the simple concept of every category. Accordingly, there is a vain repetition
30. Porphyry, Isagoge, Ch. "On Difference" (AL 16 18–19; ed. Busse, 11.21).
31. Metaphysics, Bk. IV, Ch. 2 (1003b 5–10).
32. Metaphysics, Bk. III, Ch. 3 (998b 21–28).
33. Metaphysics, Bk. IV, Ch. 9 (1018b 12–13).
34. Topics, Bk. VI, Ch. 4 (141b 25–28).
QUESTION 4
in the concept of every <other thing>, since some <aspect> of the categories is included in the concept of everything <else>.
There will also be a vain repetition in every definition, by placing the definitions (rationes) in place of the names <and> by always resolving each one to its most general genus; which Aristotle holds as untenable in Bk. VII of the Metaphysics.35
21. This proof is universal for proving that every determination, which is essentially (per se) one with the determinable, is beyond the concept of the determinable and vice versa; this is more manifest of a determination which is not one essentially.
22. If that which is added to any category is non-being, two absurdities follow. First, that every category would be formally non-being, and in this way all lower <kinds> will be essentially
(per se) non-beings, since something of <the higher genera> is predicated of everything lower <than it>. The other <absurdity> is that there would be a repugnance to the concept of any of the categories, and so of the concept of anything whatsoever, as was deduced earlier.36
23. Fifth, in Bk. VIII of the Metaphysics,37 Aristotle says that just as separate substances are immediately what they are, i.e.,
<they are> not <constituted> through some form coming to the matter, so being is immediately any of the categories; therefore,
<it is> not <constituted> through an added differentia; therefore, it is not common.
24. Sixth, if being were univocal to them, this would be a vain repetition: "substance of a certain magnitude," "white man," and universally by adding an accident to the subject, since something that is the same is included essentially (per se) in the concept of each. Therefore, by making this resolution, <i.e.,> by positing the definitions (rationes) for the names, something that is the same will be said twice, and in this way it will be a vain repetition.
25. Similarly, in every definition there will be a vain repetition on account of the same, since in the concept of each thing being defined the same thing is included.
35. Metaphysics, Bk. VII, Ch. 12 (1038a 19–21).
36. Cf. supra, n. 20.
37. Metaphysics, Bk. VIII, Ch. 6 (1045b 23–24).
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
[I. Regarding The Question] [A. Conclusion 1: Being is Not Univocal to the Ten Categories]38 26. On account of this, it must be said that being is not univocal to the ten categories. Nevertheless, it is doubtful in which way this is the case, whether <it is predicated> purely equivocally or analogically.
[1. Whether Being is Analogical or Equivocal]39 27. An analogy in utterances (vocibus) is posited in three
<ways>: either insofar as the <utterances> primarily signify one aspect (rationem), which by virtue of existing in different ways pertains to two or more <objects>, which are said <to be> analogates.40 Just as this noun "cause" and this noun "principle" and many other nouns, which are distinguished in Bk. V of the Metaphysics,41 primarily signify one aspect (rationem), nevertheless this <aspect> is in diverse <things> according to order.
28. Analogy in utterances (vocibus) is posited in another way, since through an utterance (vocem) one <thing> is signified primarily (per prius) and the rest secondarily (per posterius). The cause of which is posited <as follows>: since signifying follows understanding.42 Therefore, that which is understood prior to 38. I have emended the section heading from what is given in the critical edition so that it more accurately summarizes what is said in the actual text. According to the critical edition, the section heading is: "Being is Not Analogous to the Ten Categories."
39. Again, I have emended the section heading from what is given in the critical edition. According to the critical edition, the section heading is: "The Opinion of Certain Others."
40. "Analogates" refers to the things that are signified by analogous terms.
According to Ashworth, "In the thirteenth century, a special vocabulary was developed to deal with the issue of equivocal words as opposed to equivocal things.
A thing was called aequivocum aequivocatum, and a word was called aequivocum aequivocans, with parallels for univocals. . . . This type of vocabulary was also sometimes extended to include analogy." Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation," 98.
41. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 1–2 (1012b 35–1014a 25).
42. For a discussion of Scotus's general theory of signification, see Perler, "Duns Scotus on Signification," p. 109, and Pini, "Signification of Names in Duns Scotus and Some of His Contemporaries."
QUESTION 4
another (per prius . . . alio) will be signified primarily (per prius), if it is signified through the same utterance (vocem) through which the other thing is also <signified>.
29. In a third way: that utterance (vox) is properly imposed for one thing, and on account of some similitude to that to which it is primarily imposed, the utterance (vox) is transferred to signify something <else>, just as it is in the second mode of equivocation.43 There is also in a certain way an order in signifying, since an utterance (vox) is never transferred to signify something unless it is accepted that the imposed utterance is for signifying something properly, and that second <thing> signifies only on account of some similitude of it to that to which it is primarily imposed.
[2. Being is Not Analogous to the Categories]44 30. Analogical utterances (voces)45 in the first way seem to be simply univocal to the logician, since the genus, according to the logician, is simply univocal, although the nature (ratio), which it signifies primarily, may pertain to diverse species according to its order. "For in every genus there is a first one, which is the measure of all posterior things," according to Aristotle in Bk. X of the Metaphysics.46
31. Nevertheless, perhaps it is not altogether similar concerning utterances (vocibus) that are analogical in this way and 43. The different ways, or modes, of equivocation are taken from a passage in Aristotle's Sophistical Refutations: "There are three varieties of these homonymies [equivocations] and ambiguities: one when either the account or the name properly signifies more than one thing, e.g., mole and bank; one when by custom we use them so; thirdly, when words that have a simple sense taken alone have more than one meaning in combination; e.g., "knowing letters." For each word, both "knowing" and "letters," may have a single meaning; but both together have more than one––either that the letters themselves have knowledge or that someone else has it of them"; Sophistical Refutations, Ch. 4 (166a
16–22).
44. I have emended the section heading. The critical edition has: "Against the Opinion of Others."
45. For a detailed discussion of the three different types of analogical utterances in Scotus and how his views compare with other thirteenth-century logicians, see Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation," 120–22.
46. Metaphysics, Bk. X, Ch. 1 (1052b 18).
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concerning the genus in respect to its species, since, although the species of a genus have an order among themselves according to <the degree to which they are> more or less perfect in being, nevertheless in participating in the nature (rationem) of the genus they do not have an order, since all <of them> participate equally in the first, for "genus" is predicated with equal immediacy of <all> the primary species <into> which it is divided.
Then there is no difference in primacy among these predications: "whiteness is color," "blackness is color," although in comparing whiteness and blackness to each other, whiteness is more perfect. But in utterances (vocibus) that are posited analogically in the first mode, there is an order among the participants in <that in which they> participate, just as "end" and "matter" are not equally primarily a "cause," nor perhaps <are> "contrary,"
<and> "contradiction" equally primarily "opposition."
32. The second mode of analogy mentioned above seems impossible. For when a name is imposed on a secondary thing
(posteriori), it happens to ignore what is simply first, since what is absolutely posterior can be prior to us, and so it can be understood and signified first. If, therefore, in the second <mode of analogy> that utterance (vox) is imposed on something <that is> absolutely first, it is manifest that it will <not>47 signify <that which is absolutely first>, through that secondary <utterance>
(per posterius illud), to which it was first imposed, since once it has first signified that <secondary thing>, then <it will> always
<signify it>. For after an utterance (vox) has been imposed, it does not change in signifying that to which it was imposed; therefore, the order of things does not follow the order in the signification of utterances (vox).
33. The reason posited for this <type of analogy> does not seem to be valid. For "signifying does not follow understanding" by a necessary implication, as an effect follows a necessary cause. Since something can be understood prior to another by time and by nature, and nevertheless not be signified thus. For it is not necessary, as <or when> someone understands some47. Several of the manuscripts have the word non, which makes more sense of the passage. The negative reading is also the one preferred by Ashworth in her analysis of this passage. Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation," 121.
QUESTION 4
thing, that he impose an utterance (vocem) on that which he understands, but it is in his discretion to impose it or not. But this proposition, "signifying follows understanding," must be understood as that "without which not," since something cannot be signified unless it is understood; but in understanding and signifying, it neither follows necessarily nor with respect to a similar order.
34. But in which way ought an analogous utterance (vox) to be posited by the logician? The third way seems most probable, since otherwise there would not seem to be a difference between the first way of equivocation and the second.48 Or, if on both sides an utterance (vox) were to signify many <things> primarily, or, if in the second way it did not signify that to which it improperly pertains, then that <third> mode <of analogy> would not seem to be <a mode> of equivocation, since that utterance (vox) would be simply univocal, since it would only signify one.49
35. But however it is concerning the way of positing analogy, none of these ways seems to pertain to being in regard to the ten categories. All the arguments to the opposite50 prove that it is not <predicated in> the first way. Similarly, these <categories> do not seem to have an order in participating in being, since
<being> is predicated of everything essentially (in quid) and through itself (per se) in an immediate and primary way. <Thus>
48. The first way of equivocation, not to be confused with the first way or mode of analogy, is when a name or utterance properly or primarily signifies more than one thing, such as the word "dog," which signifies an animal, a constellation, and a Cynic philosopher. The second way of equivocation is when an utterance signifies more than one thing because of custom. See the Sophistical Refutations, Ch. 4 (166a 16–22). Earlier, Scotus identifies the second way of equivocation with the third way of analogy, which implies that there is a similitude involved in the second way of equivocation that is lacking in the first way of equivocation. Thus Scotus's argument is that if analogous predication is used by the logician, it would have to be analogous predication that is based upon a similitude between the two things signified. For if it were not based upon a similitude, then it would be essentially equivocation (in the first mode), not analogous predication.
49. This is a contrary-to-fact conditional statement, such that the consequent is understood to be false.
50. Cf. supra, nn. 16–25.
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the second way is not possible for the logician. The third <way does> not <pertain> to the question, since this noun "being" does not seem to be transferred from substance to accident on account of some similitude of an accident to a substance, since it is predicated of each essentially (in quid), according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the Metaphysics,51 and so <it is predicated> of neither <substance nor accident> improperly.
36. Similarly, accidents are prior to substance in sensation; therefore, <they are> also <prior to substance> in the intellect.
Therefore, it is possible to impose a noun on them that signifies them, not through <their having> a relation to a substance.
Even if an accident were signified through this noun "being," for example, as an "attribute of substance," it would therefore be signified under a proper aspect (ratione), since the aspect
(ratio) of an attribute is the proper aspect (ratio) of an accident.
Therefore, "being" is absolutely equivocal to substance and accident, since it signifies each under its proper notion (ratione).
[B. Conclusion 2: The Noun "Being" is Simply Equivocal to the Ten Categories] 37. On account of this it must be said that this noun "being" is simply equivocal to these ten genera in the first mode of equivocation, especially on account of this last <argument>.52
Since it is certain that substance is signified under its proper aspect (ratio), and accident <is signified> in another way. For if an accident were to be signified under its proper aspect (ratio) through this noun "being," <then> this <noun> would be proper to it under that aspect by which it is attributed to a substance or under some other similar <aspect> which is proper to an accident; furthermore it follows that each is to be signified under its proper aspect (ratio).
38. Nevertheless, it must be understood that this utterance (vox), which is simply equivocal for the logician, namely, because it imports many <aspects> equally at first, for the metaphysician or natural <philosopher> who does not consider the 51. Metaphysics, Bk. IV, Ch. 2 (1003b 5–10).
52. Cf. supra, n. 36.
QUESTION 4
utterance (vox) in signifying but <considers> those things which are signified insofar as they are, is analogous, on account of the fact that the things which are signified have an order amongst themselves, not insofar as they are signified, but insofar as they exist.53 For this reason, in Bks. IV and VII of the Metaphysics,54 the metaphysician posits that "being" is analogous to substance and accident, since undoubtedly the things that are signified have an order in being; but for the logician, it is simply equivocal, since, insofar as they are signified through an utterance
(vox), they are equally signified primarily.
[II. To The Principal Arguments] 39. To the first argument I say that there is no contradiction concerning being unless by a distinction having been previously made, or by supposing that "being" is accepted in an affirmative and negative statement for the same <thing>. And in this way, there is a contradiction in a refutation, since then they are taken as univocal, since <they are taken> for one significate.
40. To the second <argument> I say that insofar as it concerns the force <or signification> of speech,55 being is not contracted through something added, unless an equivocal can be contracted. Nevertheless, in respect to those who use it, it can be contracted through something added, so that they may refer their understandings to the same thing, just as, in respect to the use of speakers, proper names are contracted through the 53. See Richard McKeon's article, where he claims, "Most metaphysicians hold that [being] is predicated analogically; most terminist logicians hold that it is predicated equivocally; Duns Scotus holds that it is predicated analogically in metaphysics, equivocally in logic"; "The Relation of Logic to Metaphysics in the Philosophy of Duns Scotus," Monist 49, p. 528.
54. Metaphysics, Bk. IV, Ch. 2 (1003a 33–1003b 5), and Bk. VII, Ch. 4 (1030a 21).
55. The Latin is as follows: quantum est de vi sermonis. According to Deferrari, vis can be translated as "signification"; Roy J. Deferrari, A Latin-English Dictionary of St. Thomas Aquinas (Boston: Daughters of St. Paul, 1986), 1097. Confirmation that this is Scotus's meaning is the last line of this argument, where Scotus says that proper names are contracted but not "in respect to the 'signification'
(significationem)."
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
surname being added, not in respect to the signification of an utterance in itself.
41. To the third <argument>: I deny every implication from being to something and the other way around <i.e., from something to being>, except by a distinction having been previously made and unless "being" has been taken for that significate.
And then this is not properly an implication: "substance, therefore being," but is an inference of the same from itself.—To the proof of the implication <posited in the objection>, I say that the antecedent, since it is simple, can be true without the consequent <being true, since it> has many meanings, unless the consequent is taken in one sense. Since the <consequent> has as many meanings as it has, it is neither true nor false, but must be distinguished.
42. To the fourth <argument>, I say that this <proposition> "substance is nothing" has many meanings, just as this <proposition> "substance is non-being," has, and is true in some sense, since substance is not quality, since "something," of which "nothing" implies a negation, does not seem to be more common than "being," since it can be explained as "something," that is, as some thing, and "thing" is not more common than being.56
43. To the fifth <argument>, it is evident that "to be predicated essentially (in quid)" of substance and quantity exists in being taken equivocally. Nor does it follow that just as what is predicated is the same, so is the mode of predicating <the same>, as is often said, since the unity of proportion in those
<predicates> in which there is such a mode suffices for the unity of the species of the mode of predicating.
44. To the sixth <argument>,57 I say that "possible" is equivo56. "Something" is equivocal. In one sense it is coextensive with "being"; however, it may also be taken to mean "some thing," in which case "thing" is coextensive with "being" and the adjective "some" would then limit it or make it less extensive than being. Thus the force of Scotus's argument is that "something may not seem to be more extensive than being," i.e., "it may seem to be coextensive with being," but if "something" is taken for "some thing," and "thing" is coextensive with "being," "something" is actually less extensive than
"being."
57. Cf. supra, n. 6.
QUESTION 4
cally a name of first and second imposition.58 In the first way, it signifies a potency to an act and divides being, and is equivocal just as "act" <is equivocal> in diverse genera.—In the second way, it signifies a mode of composition, and in this way it is univocal, and is not less <common> than universal being, which is divided into the ten categories, and is univocal just as the other intentions.59 The proofs from implication and contradiction proceed in this way. This distinction can frequently be perceived in Bk. V of the Metaphysics, in the chapter "On Potency."60
45. To the seventh <argument>,61 I say that division begins from one in some way, <i.e.>, a division is of one in some kind of mode.62 The division of being, however, into the ten genera is
58. According to Ockham, "Among names that signify conventionally, some are names of first imposition, and others, names of second imposition. Names of second imposition are those which are used to signify conventional signs and all such features as pertain to conventional signs in their function as conventional signs. . . . In their application in grammar expressions like 'name' [nomen or noun], 'pronoun,' 'verb,' 'conjunction,' 'case,' 'number,' 'mood,' and 'tense' are all, in the broad sense, terms of second imposition. These names are called names of names; the reason for this is that they are used to signify parts of speech insofar as they are significant. . . . 'Name of first imposition' has two senses. In the broad sense all names which are not names of second imposition are names of first imposition. In this sense syncategorematic signs like
'every,' 'no,' 'some,' and 'all' are names of first imposition. In the narrow sense, only those categorematic names which are not names of second imposition are called names of first imposition. In this sense, syncategorematic names are not names of first imposition. Taking the expression 'name of first imposition' in the narrow sense, there are two sorts of names of first imposition; for some are names of first intention, and others are names of second intention"; William
Ockham, trans. with intro. by Michael J. Loux, Ockham's Theory of Terms: Part I of the Summa Logicae (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974),
72–73.
59. It is worth noting that "possible" is said to be "not less [common] than universal being, which is divided into the ten categories." As such, this would seem to be one of the few places in his Quaestiones super Predicamenta that foreshadows his later broadening of the notion of the transcendentals. See Wolter,
Transcendentals and Their Function. Perhaps more interesting still is that if "possible" is "not less [common] than universal being," which I take to mean that it is coextensive or identical with being, and if "possible" is univocal, then perhaps this too is a foreshadowing of Scotus's later claim that "being" is univocal.
60. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 12 (1019a 15–1020a 6).
61. Cf. supra, n. 7.
62. The Latin is as follows: divisio incipit a sic uno, quali modo unius est divisio.
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
a division of one, not of a genus, but of an utterance (vox) into its significations, and for this reason it begins from one in this manner, namely, from one utterance (vox).
46. To the eighth <argument>,63 I say that not every multitude64 is reduced to a one which is not <part> of that multitude, just as the multitude of a first cause and its effects is not reduced to some one thing beyond that multitude, since in this manner it would follow that something is prior to the first. But that whole multitude is reduced to a one, which is something belonging to that multitude, to which the others are attributed as to a first cause. It is in this way in the question at hand: a multitude of substance and accident is reduced to the unity of substance, not <to the unity> of something that is beyond that multitude.
47. To the <ninth argument>65 concerning <a quotation from> Bk. VII of the Physics,66 I say that Aristotle understands <that quotation> there concerning a comparison which is <made> according to something that is participated in by each extreme according to more and less, since more and less do not constitute an equivocation.67 But such a comparison is not according to being, but is a comparison according to the order of some things to each other. To be sure, this is the understanding <in the second quotation>:68 accident is less being than substance, that is, in being (in essendo) it has an order to substance; and this comparison does not require univocity.
48. To the <tenth argument>69 concerning the subject of the 63. Cf. supra, n. 8.
64. The Latin, non omnis multitudo, is ambiguous, depending upon whether the non negates "every" or "multitude." Thus it could mean that "some multitude is reduced," or that "no multitude is reduced." The latter interpretation, I think, makes more sense.
65. Cf. supra, n. 9.
66. Physics, Bk. VII, Ch. 4 (248b 9).
67. Metaphysics, Bk. VII, Ch. 1 (1028a 13–20).
68. The Latin has this: Est enim intellectus. The context makes it clear that the discussion of substance and accident refers to the quotation from the Metaphysics, not the one from the Physics. The former quotation is proof for the minor premise, whereas the latter one is proof for the major.
69. Cf. supra, n. 10.
QUESTION 4
Metaphysics,70 I say that a unity of analogy in the subject suffices for the subject of a science, as it is determined in Bk. IV of the Metaphysics,71 namely, that all things to which the subject of a science pertains have an essential (per se) attribution to one primary <subject> in being and being known (unum primum in essendo et cognoscendo).
49. When it is shown that a subject is necessarily univocal, I say that all those authorities and proofs hold good concerning the subject of demonstration. When, however, the subject is analogous, <then> from that <subject> in itself, demonstrations are not made, but <demonstrations are made> from a first <subject> to which all other things are attributed. For in order to determine many analogates, it suffices to determine <the subject> first to which all other things are attributed, as it is said in the beginning of Bk. VII of the Metaphysics.72 Nor is it untenable concerning the subject of a science, in itself, that no attribute is shown of it when it is analogous, if, nevertheless, attributes are shown of a primary <subject> to which the others are attributed.
50. To the <eleventh argument>,73 I say that Aristotle implied in his reasoning (ratione) that "true" is univocal to the principles of eternal things and to the eternal <things> themselves. And I also concede that the "true" that follows the character of the being (entitatem) of a thing in itself is univocal to all subjects and that "being" is univocal to these. But from this it does not follow that "being" is univocal to the ten genera, since all substances are under one genus.
51. Because it is accepted in the argument that "all things are causes or effects and to them 'being' is univocal, therefore to everything,"––I say that "cause" and "effect," "universal" and "particular," and many differentiae of this kind not only follow being according to its common aspect (rationem), but in particular, as in the same genus or in the same species, just as in generation a univocal cause and effect belong to the same species.
Therefore, to the form of the argument I say that "what is said 70. Cf. supra, n. 10.
71. Metaphysics, Bk. IV, Ch. 2 (1003b16–17).
72. Metaphysics, Bk. VII, Ch. 1 (1028a 30–34).
73. Cf. supra, n. 11.
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
concerning cause and effect is univocal" is true when they are of the same genus, not, however, concerning every cause and effect, since <it is> not <true> concerning substance and accident.
52. To the twelfth <argument>,74 I say that "we know principles insofar as we know the terms," as it is said in Bk. I of the Posterior Analytics.75 And therefore that principle can be most known whose truth is most known in knowing the terms. Therefore, a multiplicity of terms is not repugnant to the certainty of a principle; nor is some <principle> that does not have many terms more certain, since something is not manifest by knowing the terms in this way, <i.e., by knowing that the terms do not have many meanings>.
53. To the thirteenth <argument>,76 the major premise can be conceded, since the first object of the intellect can be understood in one act of understanding. But this is not the case with an equivocal <expression>, since in an equivocal <expression> no concept is the same, but only the utterance. To the minor premise I say that the first object of the understanding is substance. Since, as Aristotle says in the beginning of Bk. VII of the Metaphysics,77 "substance is the first of all beings in the understanding," which is not understood according to a temporal priority but <according to the priority> of nature,78 namely, because the cognition of it is the most perfect.—The authority of Avicenna can be conceded as true, such that he accepts "being" for the one significate that is first, namely, substance.
54. Or perhaps the nature (ratio) from which this noun "substance" is imposed is twofold, namely, subsisting (subsistendi) and standing under (substandi). "Being" (ens), however, is imposed from the act of being (essendi). But the act of being seems to be a simpler aspect (ratio) than the act of standing under (substandi). And therefore "being" first occurs to the intellect with respect to that aspect (rationem) from which there is an imposition of the name, since it is the most simple. But with re74. Cf. supra, n. 12.
75. Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, Ch. 3 (72b 23–25).
76. Cf. supra, n. 13.
77. Metaphysics, Bk. VII, Ch. 1 (1028a 32–33).
78. For a general discussion of priority, cf. infra, q. 43.
QUESTION 4
spect to the signified essence, "substance" is understood when "being" is understood primarily. This is evident in other synonymous nouns, since they signify the same essence; nevertheless, they are imposed from a different (diversa) aspect (ratione). And when the essence signified through one is understood, the essence signified through the other is understood, since it is the same. But it is not necessary that they be co-understood with regard to the aspects (rationes) from which the imposition of the names is <made>.
55. To the fourteenth <argument>,79 I say that he who says "being" does not say substance or accident. But that is true if only it is understood with regard to the aspects (rationes) from which the names are imposed, not, however, with respect to the essences signified.
56. To the fifteenth <argument>,80 I say that that aspect (ratio), from which "being" is imposed, is not one, but is equivocal in diverse <expressions> just as being is also.
57. Against this <last argument>:81 the aspect (ratio) of being is not the same as the aspect (ratio) of substance, through what was previously said, nor <is it the same as> the aspect (ratio) from which the name of accident is imposed, but it is simpler than each. Therefore, when <being> is included in each, each has that <one aspect> with that <other> addition. Therefore, this is common to each.
58. One can say that the aspect of being is simpler than the aspect (ratio) of standing under (substandi), and, taken equivocally, it is simpler than the aspect of an accident. And so, taken equivocally, it pertains to one and the other. And so it can be equivocal to them, although of neither is it altogether the same but <taken equivocally it> is simpler than each, since, taken univocally, it is not simpler than each.
59. Against the response to the third-to-last argument,82 namely, about the object of the understanding, it is argued thus: nothing is known by any faculty except that which participates in the 79. Cf. supra, n. 14.
80. Cf. supra, n. 15.
81. Cf. supra, n. 56.
82. Cf. supra, n. 54.
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
aspect (rationem) of the first object of that faculty. If, therefore, substance were the first object of the understanding, since an accident is not a substance, it would not be essentially (per se) understood. This is manifestly false; since an accident is essentially
(per se) sensible, therefore it is also <essentially> understandable.
The major is evident, since nothing is essentially (per se) seen except the colored <object> or light, nothing is essentially (per se) heard except sounds, and likewise concerning the others.
60. One can say that it is not necessary that every <thing that is> essentially (per se) understandable by some faculty receives the predication of the first object of that faculty in a straightforward way, but it suffices that it has an essential (per se) relation, insofar as it is known, to the first object of that faculty. For, according to Aristotle in Bk. II of On the Soul,83 the common sensibles are essentially (per se) sensible by all or many senses.
Nevertheless, neither is the proper object of some sense predicated of them in a straightforward way, since "number" or "figure" is neither a color nor a sound. But on this account they are essentially (per se) sensed, since they have an essential (per se) relation to the proper sensibles, insofar as they are understood, since they make a diversity in the way in which the sense is changed by the proper sensible. Thus accidents, insofar as they are known by the intellect, have an essential (per se) attribution to the substance, although they are not substances; for this reason it remains that they are essentially (per se) understood.
83. On the Soul, Bk. II, Ch. 64 (418a 17–20).