A Brief Analysis of Scotus's Questions on the Categories
INTRODUCTION
who employ the words modi intelligendi, modi significandi, and modi essendi.79 By such broad standards, Scotus can legitimately be considered a Modista since he regularly employs these terms in his logical commentaries. The word "modist," however, also has a much narrower meaning, signifying only those Parisian masters who held to an isomorphism between signification, understanding, and being. In this latter sense, Scotus is certainly not one of the Modistae.
A Brief Analysis of Scotus's Questions on the Categories At this point, it may be helpful to provide a more detailed analysis of Scotus's Questions on the Categories, explaining what is unique about it and how it relates to his other, more mature teachings. In doing so, I hope to show its relevance for medieval philosophy, contrary to what many medieval scholars have hitherto thought about it.
It must be admitted that not everyone has appreciated the importance of Scotus's writings. During the Reformation, when his name was a term of opprobrium, meaning "dunce," no less a figure than Thomas Cromwell attempted to eradicate his works and influence from Oxford.80 Thankfully, Cromwell's attempt failed, and such contempt for the "Subtle Doctor" is no longer prevalent, at least not within medievalist scholarship. Although
Scotus is perhaps best known for his theological arguments in support of the Immaculate Conception, a number of his distinctive teachings have recently been made the subject of scholarly research and deserve mention: his arguments for the existence of God, his notion of haecceity as the principle of individuation, the formal distinction, and his teaching on the transcendentals, to name just a few.81 Still other teachings of Scotus have yet to 79. Ebbesen, "The Paris Arts Faculty," 273–74.
80. William Frank and Allan B. Wolter, Duns Scotus: Metaphysician (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1995), 11.
81. The ideas developed in his commentary on the Categories are, in one sense, the correlative of the ideas that he develops regarding haecceity. For given the Avicennian distinction between common natures or quidditative being, ma-
INTRODUCTION
receive the attention that they too deserve, namely, those pertaining to his logical writings.
Scotus's Logical Writings Although he does not comment on the entire Organon, Scotus's logical writings include one commentary on the Categories, two commentaries on Peri hermenias, one on the Elenchorum, and one on Porphyry's Isagoge.82 On the basis of what little evidence we have of his life, these commentaries appear to have been written during his mid-thirties, right around 1300 CE.83
Because they are "considered youthful works," however, Scotus's commentaries on the logical writings are often dismissed.84
The perceived absence in Scotus's logical writings of any of the unique contributions that he made in his more mature writings––the doctrine of the univocity of being, the formal distinction, or an increase of the number of transcendentals––have led many scholars to conclude that they are "youthful works."
As a result, several medieval scholars have publicly dismissed his logical writings as negligible and inconsequential. Early in this past century, for example, Charles Bali´c asserted that "Scoterial or individual being, and cognitive or objective being, one can see that Scotus's treatment of the problem of individuation is analogous and parallel to his treatment of second intentions. For more on Scotus's concept of haecceity, see Allan B. Wolter, "John Duns Scotus," in Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation, 1150–1650, ed. Jorge J. E. Gracia
(Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1994), 271–98. This theme will be developed at more length in the fourth chapter.
82. The following works, found in the Wadding-Vivès edition, are spurious: the Grammatica speculativa (written by Thomas of Erfurt), Quaestiones in librum
I et II priorum Analyticorum Aristotelis, Quaestiones in librum I et II posteriorum Analyticorum.
83. Cf. Andrews, "Question Commentaries," 272; Charles Bali´c, "The Life and Works of John Duns Scotus," in John Duns Scotus, 1265–1965, ed. Ryan and Bonansea (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1965),
22. For a discussion of Scotus's years in Oxford, see C. K. Brampton, "Duns Scotus at Oxford, 1288–1301," Franciscan Studies 24 (1964). It should be pointed out, however, that Sheppard thinks that the logical commentaries were written in the 1280s, even as early as 1281 or 1282. Sheppard, "Two Theories of Signification," 290–93.
84. Pini, Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus, vii.
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tus' Logicallia did not exert a great influence on the history of Scotism."85 Pinborg likewise claimed that "even if Scotus had a tremendous impact on other aspects of English theology and philosophy in the 14th century, I find his importance for the specific change in conceptual languages here studied negligible."86 This neglect and dismissal of his logical commentaries in general, though, seems to be especially true of his commentary on the Categories.87 In fact, a quick glance at Scotus's Questions on Aristotle's Categories is likely to give the impression that it is nothing more than a medieval exercise in dialectic.
The widespread neglect to take Scotus's logical writings seriously, however, has not always existed. In an early encomium, a gloss on one of the early manuscripts of Scotus's logical commentaries declares that he "who compiled this work is called the subtle Duns, the theologian doctor dominates all by his logic. He who wants to be rightly considered experienced in logic, should learn his words."88 Likewise, in response to the slights by Bali´c and Pinborg, Bos rightly points out: "[S]uch a judgment is only possible after a thorough study of Duns Scotus' logicallia, which is still wanted."89 Although a thorough study of all of 85. Bali´c, "The Life and Works of John Duns Scotus," 22. Subsequent research into medieval logic has begun to challenge this negative evaluation. For example, regarding his contribution to medieval logic, Ashworth claims that "when one considers the influence of the great medieval philosophers on the discussions found in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, it seems that Duns Scotus held pride of place"; E. J. Ashworth, "Jacobus Naveros (fl. ca.
1533) on the Question: 'Do Spoken Words Signify Concepts or Things?'" in Logos and Pragma, ed. de Rijk and Braakhuis (Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers,
1987), 207.
86. Jan Pinborg, "The English Contribution to Logic Before Ockham," Synthese 40 (1979): 19–42; see 32.
87. Pini's main work on the Categories, published in 2002, is the one exception to this claim. Even this work, however, gives only a relatively brief overview of Scotus's Questions on the Categories.
88. E. P. Bos, "The Theory of the Proposition According to John Duns Scotus' Two Commentaries on Aristotle's Perihermeneias," in Logos and Pragma, ed. de Rijk and Braakhuis, vol. 3 (Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers, 1987), 121–40; see 134. It should be noted that this gloss is appended at the beginning of Scotus's treatment of Aristotle's Categories.
89. Ibid., 122.
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Scotus's logical writings is still a long way off, recent scholars–– such as Richard McKeon, E. P. Bos, Robert Andrews, E. J. Ashworth, and Giorgio Pini––have begun to make significant contributions to the study of Scotus's logical writings.90 So far, their judgments support the early encomium rather than the criticisms of Bali´c and Pinborg.91 Pini even goes so far as to claim that Scotus's logical writings are a correction and perfection of Aquinas's teaching on logic.92 As one author notes, "we would be mistaken to believe that his philosophical commentaries on Aristotle's works necessarily represent the fruit of an introductory stage in his academic career."93
Before turning explicitly to Scotus's commentary on the Categories, though, four features about it should be emphasized.
First, it is one of the few thirteenth-century commentaries on 90. Prior to Pini's contributions, there was not even a single article, much less an entire book, devoted exclusively to Scotus's Questions on the Categories.
The one article that discusses his commentary at length is E. P. Bos and A. C. van der Helm, "The Division of Being Over the Categories According to Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus," in John Duns Scotus (1265/6–
1308): Renewal of Philosophy, ed. Bos (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998). Several other articles making a positive contribution to a study of his logical writings include the following: Richard McKeon, "The Relation of Logic to Metaphysics in the Philosophy of Duns Scotus," Monist 49 (1965): 519–50 (see especially p. 550, where he approvingly quotes Pierce to the effect that Duns Scotus was one "of the most acute logicians" of the Middle Ages); Bos, "The Theory of the Proposition According to John Duns Scotus"; and E. J. Ashworth, "Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic: A Preface to Aquinas on Analogy," Medieval Philosophy and Theology 1 (1991): 39–67. Other articles on either medieval logic or semantics tend to mention Scotus only in passing.
91. In some ways, the recent appreciation of Scotus's logical writings, in contrast to the previous neglect, is part of a general trend in modern philosophy.
Spade describes this trend as follows: By 1960, "medieval logic had been established as a rich and sophisticated field worthy of serious study. But this claim was not established without resistance. For many years, students of medieval philosophy had concentrated mainly on issues in metaphysics and epistemology. There were perhaps several reasons for this––the sociology of the revival of medieval studies in Europe and America, the preeminence of Thomas Aquinas until recently in the intellectual life of the Catholic Church, and so on." Paul
Vincent Spade, "Recent Research on Medieval Logic," Synthese 40 (1979): 3–18; see 3.
92. Pini, Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus, vii, 125, and 138.
93. Frank and W0lter, Duns Scotus, 3.
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the Categories covering all of Aristotle's text, including the postpredicamenta.94 Second, as indicated above, this commentary was written at the high point of medieval question commentaries. This fact, as we shall see in the next section, is important since the form of a question commentary allows Scotus a great deal of liberty to discuss matters that are only remotely raised by the text. Third, Scotus's text was one of the last commentaries to be written before Ockham reduced the number of categories to two.95 Finally, although the size of a work alone is not necessarily indicative of its worth, the size of Scotus's commentary is,
I contend, a sign of its relative importance.96 Scotus's Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis is approximately ten times as long as Aristotle's Categories and three to four times as long as most of the other question commentaries on the Categories written during the same time period.97 Such a large size is, I think, one indication that Scotus is attempting both to work through a complex set of questions regarding the categories and to articulate a clear distinction between the categories as they are studied in logic and as they are studied in metaphysics.98
To be exact, Scotus's commentary on the Categories is a set of 94. The post-predicamenta are the things discussed by Aristotle after he specifically treats the ten categories. They include a discussion of contraries, motion, priority, and having. Traditionally, it is said that Aristotle discusses them after the categories because they apply to all of the categories in some way.
95. Andrews lists only three people who probably composed commentaries subsequent to Scotus's commentary, namely, Radulphus Brito, Peter Bradley, and Walter Burley. See Andrews, "Question Commentaries," 272. Ockham's logical writings were all completed before he left Avignon in 1328. Spade alludes to the fact that the rise of "secondary signification," which is a technical term used by the Modistae, is inherently related to the "program of reducing the number of ontological categories." Paul Vincent Spade, "The Semantics of Terms," in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, 192.
96. These points, taken together, might suggest that the theory that there are only ten categories is a theory in crises. In response, one could argue that they point to the complexity of reality and predication, and to the patience and learning required of philosophers.
97. Scotus's commentary is over three hundred pages. The next longest commentaries that I was able to consult are Martin of Dacia's and Peter of Auvergne's, both numbering close to eighty pages each, and Simon of Faversham's, numbering seventy pages.
98. I will return to both of these issues below.
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forty-four questions, most of which are only loosely motivated by something that Aristotle says in the Categories. In fact, a number of questions asked are not obviously raised by the text at all.
Of these forty-four questions in his commentary, the first four are prolegomena to the work itself and raise the question of its subject matter as well as whether there can be a science of the categories; questions 5–8 deal with equivocals, univocals, and denominatives; questions 9–11 discuss Aristotle's two rules regarding predication and the sufficiency of the categories; questions 12–36 discuss the four main categories treated by Aristotle, namely, substance, quantity, relation, and quality; and the remaining eight questions discuss the post-predicamenta.
Although Scotus's Questions on the Categories is important in and of itself, especially as it departs from the standard theory of signification and insofar as it articulates a propter quid science of the categories, there are several hints in this work of his later, more distinctive teachings. A careful reading of his commentary will, then, reveal that he is already beginning to think about, and perhaps just beginning to formulate, some of his more mature views. Three particular issues emerging from a careful reading of Scotus's commentary substantiate my claim: the univocity of being, the category of relation, and the transcendentals.
The Univocity of Being, the Category of Relation, and the Transcendentals in Scotus's Commentary One idea Scotus explores in his commentary that emerges in his later theological writings is the univocity of being. In his commentary on the Categories, he asks whether being is univocal to the ten categories, a question that is, at best, only occasioned by Aristotle's Categories. In this question, he concludes that being is predicated equivocally for the logician, and analogically for the metaphysician.99 In his later theological writings, as is well known, he seems to differ with his former thinking, instead stating that, in fact, being is univocal. Although there is considerable debate as to whether he actually changes his mind or not, what is important here is that his commentary on the Cate99. Q. 4, n. 38.
INTRODUCTION
gories reveals his intense preoccupation with the question of the univocity of being so early in his writings.100
This claim is confirmed by the fact that most of his contemporaries do not ask the question in their commentaries on the categories, and even when they do raise the question, they devote at most a page or two to it.101 Consequently, that Scotus does raise this question is quite significant in light of his subsequent view regarding the univocity of being. Another indication of the importance of the univocity of being in this early work is simply the space he devotes to it.102 Compared to his other questions, the one concerning the univocity of being is almost twice as long as the two next-longest questions, and is, on average,
100. Whether Scotus changed his mind or not is an open question. Prior to the twentieth century, most scholars thought that he always maintained the univocity of being. In the last century, though, an increasing number of scholars have held that Scotus did, in fact, change his mind. An early and eloquent argument in support of this position is expressed by Raymond de Courcerault,
"L'ontologie de Duns Scot et le principe du pantéisme," Etudes Franciscaines 24 (1910), 154. That Scotus changed his mind is also held by the following: C.
Schircel, Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Philosophy of Duns Scotus (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1942), 108; Étienne Gilson,
"Avicenne et le point de départ de Duns Scot," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age 2 (1927): 89–149; see 105; Timotheus Barth, "Zum Problem der Eindeutigkeit," Philosophical Jahrbuch 55 (1942): 300–321; idem, "De argumentis et univocationis entis natura apud Joannem Duns Scotum," Collectanea
Franciscana 14 (1944): 35–45; and idem, "De univocationis entis scotistica intentione principali necnon valore critico," Antonianum 28 (1953): 72–110. Although many scholars in the twentieth century accept that Scotus changed his mind on this subject, there are still others who think that he did not change his mind. Most prominent in this latter group is Allan Wolter; see Allan B. Wolter,
Transcendentals and their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus (Washington,
DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1946), 46–48 n. 35. Finally, it should be pointed out that Marrone criticizes both Barth's and Wolter's views; see Steven P. Marrone, "The Notion of Univocity in Duns Scotus's Early Works,"
Franciscan Studies 13 (1983): 347–95.
101. I could find only two commentaries that raise this question: one by Johannes de Stycborn, and the other by Martin of Dacia. In each case, however, the question is quickly dismissed. See Andrews, "Question Commentaries," 301; and Martin of Dacia, Quaestiones super librum Praed., q. 1 (ed. Roos, 155).
102. In considering the length of a question, I do not mean to imply that of itself length equals importance. Nevertheless, it is, I maintain, an indication or, as Aristotle might say, a fallible sign of the importance of a question.
INTRODUCTION
three times as long as most of the questions.103 That he spends so much time on this issue is quite remarkable given the almost complete absence of this question in his contemporaries' commentaries. While it is true, then, that Scotus appears to deny the univocity of being in this commentary, it is absolutely clear,
I argue, that the question of the univocity of being preoccupies his thoughts and that he is wrestling with this issue even at this early stage of his writings.104 Marrone, in one of the best articles written on the notion of univocity in Scotus's early writings, confirms this argument.105 At one point in his article, he points out that the "parallels between the passage from the Ordinatio and that from In librum Praedicamentorum could hardly be more prominent. I would argue that they show how already in the earlier work, and in the Questions on the Metaphysics, Duns was experimenting with theoretical innovations that would permit him eventually to fashion his theory of the univocity of 'being.'"106 Thus, whether or not he actually changes his mind, the fact remains that the univocity of being is a central issue in his commentary on the Categories.
103. The fourth question, which concerns the univocity of being, occupies twenty-three pages, while the two next-longest questions are q. 13, which is sixteen pages long, and q. 11, which is fourteen pages long.
104. Wolter points out that when Scotus denies the univocity of being to the categories, he does so insofar as he is speaking about the proper account of being, not a common account. See Wolter, Transcendentals and their Function,
47 n. 35. While it is beyond the scope of this introduction, it would be interesting to see how many of the arguments for the univocity of being presented in the fourth question surface again in his later writings. Andrews notes that the "format of question commentaries encouraged counterfactual thinking" and that "not infrequently, a preliminary argument could prove so persuasive that its standpoint would come to be adopted by subsequent generations of thinkers." Andrews, "Question Commentaries," 269–70.
105. The best discussion of this article as it appears in Scotus's mature works is Ludger Honnefelder, Ens inquantum ens. Der Begriff des Seienden als solchen als
Gegenstand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, N.F. 16 (Münster:
Aschendorff, 1979).
106. Marrone, "The Notion of Univocity in Duns Scotus's Early Works," 371.
Although it is beyond the scope of this study, perhaps one can even find in this question the seeds to his more mature view when he contends that being is univocal.
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A second issue in Scotus's commentary overlooked by modern scholars is Scotus's discussion of relations. For example, while Mark Henninger devotes a whole chapter to Scotus in his extensive work on medieval theories of relations, he never discusses any of the arguments raised in Scotus's commentary on the Categories, a surprising omission given the fact that one of the primary texts that discusses relations is Aristotle's Categories.107 Likewise, Pini has this to say of Scotus's treatment of relations: "Scotus, like Brito, maintains that relations are real things, really distinguished from the other categories. Actually, in his question on the Metaphysics and in his Sentences commentary, he pays much attention to the issue, and he can be regarded as one of the fiercest champions of the reality of relations. In his commentary on the Categories, however, he does not even mention the issue [emphasis mine]."108 Though Scotus does not have a whole question devoted to the reality of relations, he does, I think, "mention the issue," for he argues that "no relation is a non-being" and that perhaps beings are divided between "relative beings according to being" and "relative beings according to speech."109 Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the longest section of Scotus's commentary, at least as far as page numbers are concerned, are those questions that are devoted to issues concerning relations.110 Even though it is beyond the scope of this study to focus specifically on Scotus's views of relation, one can, I think, see in his commentary an emphasis on the category of relation, a focus that will become more prominent in his more mature teachings.
107. Henninger does acknowledge in a footnote that Scotus addresses relations in his Questions on the Categories of Aristotle, but he never once cites the text in question. See Mark G. Henninger, "Relation as Thing: John Duns Scotus," in Relations: Medieval Theories 1250–1325 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989),
68–97; see 70 n. 8.
108. Pini, Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus, 200–201.
109. Questions on the Categories, q. 24, n. 11; q. 26, n. 11.
110. There are five questions concerning substance, amounting to close to forty pages; nine questions concerning quantity, taking up thirty-seven pages; seven questions concerning quality, amounting to forty-one pages; and five questions concerning relations, taking up fifty-four pages. So even though there are fewer questions devoted to it, he spends more time addressing this issue than any other category.
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A final issue deserving brief mention is Scotus's treatment of the post-predicamenta, indicating that Scotus is already considering expanding the transcendentals. As I mention above,
Scotus's contemporaries often neglect the post-predicamenta.
In comparison, Scotus devotes the last eight questions of his commentary to a discussion of the post-predicamenta, roughly one sixth of all the questions. More important, however, are three comments suggesting that Scotus is already giving serious thought to the number and nature of the transcendentals. The first comment, at the end of question 42, raises the question
"Whether in a Negative Opposition, the Subject Stands for Being and for Non-being Indifferently?" While treating the fourth property of contraries, namely, that "all contraries must either be in the same genus or in contrary genera, or be themselves genera," Scotus adds that "contraries are always in the same primary genus, unless perhaps they are transcendent and then they are equivocally in diverse genera."111 Of course, those familiar with Scotus's metaphysics know that Scotus subsequently argues that there is a whole group of transcendentals known as the disjunctive transcendentals.112 The second statement, in question 43, asks, "Whether Aristotle Suitably Assigns the Modes of Prior?" In his reply to the first main argument, which holds that Aristotle assigns more modes of prior in the Metaphysics than he does in the Categories, Scotus states that in the Metaphysics, "'prior' is distinguished insofar as it is a differentia of being."113 Again, those familiar with Scotus's more mature writings recognize that "prior" and "posterior" constitute one of the pair of disjunctive transcendentals. Finally, his last question asks, "Whether Aristotle Suitably Distinguishes the Species of Motion?" Scotus claims that motion, insofar as it is treated by the logician, is something that transcends the categories.114 This last response of Scotus, I think, clearly exemplifies that Scotus
111. Questions on the Categories, q. 42, n. 9.
112. For a fuller discussion of the disjunctive transcendentals, see Wolter, Transcendentals and their Function, 128–61.
113. Questions on the Categories, q. 43, n. 11. For a fuller discussion of how "prior" and "posterior" are transcendentals in Scotus's metaphysics, see Wolter,
Transcendentals and their Function, 140–41.
114. Ibid., q. 44, nn. 18–19.
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is already beginning to increase the number of transcendentals, as Pini confirms.115 Of course, it would be reading too much into these three comments to claim that Scotus already presents a fully developed theory of the transcendentals in his commentary on the Categories. On the other hand, given Scotus's subsequent expansion of the number of transcendentals, one is justified in regarding these comments as a foreshadowing, as it were, of Scotus's more mature thinking.
115. Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus, 196.
QUESTIONS
ON ARISTOTLE'S
CATEGORIES