Question Eleven
[QUESTION ELEVEN
Whether there are Only Ten Most General Genera] Of non-complex <terms> a single <term> either signifies substance, etc.1
oncerning this it is asked whether there are only ten
most general <genera>.
1. It seems that there are not <only ten most general genera>.
Being is divided into substance and accident, into absolute and non-absolute (comparatum), into being through itself (per se) and being in another; but there is only one most general beingabsolute or being through itself (per se) or substance; therefore, there is only one accidental predicament <or category>;2 therefore, etc.
2. The implication is denied, since being through itself (per se) is univocal to all <the things> of which it is said, and so it can be a genus; accidental being (ens per accidens), or <being> in another, is not univocal to those to which it is suitable (convenit).
3. Against this <argument>: "if one of <a pair of> opposites is said in various ways, <then> also the remaining <one is said in many ways>," according to Aristotle in Bk. I of the Topics;3 and he verifies this <principle> in every genus of opposites. If, therefore, "being in a subject" is equivocal to the nine <accidental
1. Categories, Ch. 4 (1b 25–26).
2. Cf. Topics, Bk. I, Ch. 15 (106b 14–15).
3. Topics, Ch. Bk. I, Ch. 15 (106b 13–17).
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
categories>, "not being in a subject" will be equivocal to just as many; and so there will be eighteen genera.
4. Second <against the first argument>, given that <the term> accident is equivocal to the nine genera, it follows that accidents are not more suitable (non plus conveniant) among themselves than one of them with substance, since on each side there is only a suitability to some equivocal utterance. Therefore, the division of being into substance and accident will not be more suitable
(convenientior) than <a division of being> into "when" and into "being not-when," since on each side that divides one <thing> there is a single most general <genus> and <something that> divides what remains <which is> equivocal to the other nine genera.
5. It also follows4 that there is not a sufficient division of being into substance and accident, for "accident," when it is equivocal, is taken for some <one> significate; and so a division would come about only into two most general <genera>.
6. Second <objection>, to the principal <argument>: "what is said through a superlative, is suitable to only one," according to Priscian;5 the most general <genus> is of this kind; therefore, there is only one most general <genus>.
7. Third, "every division and multitude is reduced to one that is prior to that multitude."6 Therefore, if there are many most general <genera>, then some one <genus> is prior to them. But nothing is prior to the most general <genera>. Therefore, neither are there many.
8. Fourth, white is essentially something one <thing>, since— according to what was previously determined7—it signifies nothing other than whiteness. Therefore, it is essentially (per se) in some genus. It is not in the genus of quality: since quality is truly predicated of everything that is essentially (per se) in the genus of quality; quality is not truly predicated of white; there4. This is the third argument against n. 2.
5. Topics, Bk. V, Ch. 5 (134b 23–25).
6. Cf. Proclus, Institutio Theologica, ed. Vansteenkiste, Ch. 21, p. 273. Cf. supra, q. 4, n. 8.
7. Cf. supra, q. 8. n 19.
QUESTION 11
fore, white is essentially (per se) in another most general genus.
One can argue in this way about a concrete <term> of any other genus of accident; therefore, there are eighteen genera of accidents.
9. Fifth, quality (quale) is predicated of white. I ask: Under the notion (ratione) of which universal? It is not <predicated under the notion> of a property, since it is not convertible <with it>.
Nor is it <predicated under the notion> of an accident, since it is not "present and absent,"8 etc. Nor is it <predicated under the notion> of a differentia, since it does not distinguish white from other <qualities>. Nor is it <predicated under the notion> of the lowest species, since it is predicated of <things> differing in species. Therefore, it is <predicated> under the notion (ratione) of a genus. And it does not have a genus "superior to it";9 therefore, quality (quale) is a most general <genus>. And it is not the same as quality (qualitas), since neither one has the same species, since neither one is predicated of the same <things>; therefore, it is a most general <genus>.—Also, that quality
(quale) is a genus, is evident according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the Topics,10 who teaches <us> to consider the genus in abstract
<terms> through what the concrete is or is not.11
10. Similarly, just as whiteness is <related> to <something> white, so also is color <related> to <something> colored; therefore, by recombining <the terms>, just as color is <related> to whiteness so also is <something> colored <related> to <something> white. But color, or quality (qualitas), is a genus of whiteness; therefore, quality (quale) is the genus of white.—It is evident that quality (quale) is also another genus than quality
(qualitas), since intentions are attributed to a thing not absolutely but as they are considered by the intellect. But white is conceived by the intellect under another mode than whiteness, although it is the same essence. Therefore, it can be another
<genus>, having another intention than whiteness.
8. Porphyry, Isagoge, Ch. "On Accident" (AL I6 20; ed. Busse, 12.24–25).
9. Porphyry, Isagoge, Ch. "On Species" (AL I6 20; ed. Busse, 4.17–18).
10. Topics, Bk. IV, Ch. 4 (124b 15–22).
11. I have adopted an alternate reading. The critical edition has docentem considerare genus in abstractis per hoc quod concretum est in concreto vel non est.
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11. Sixth,12 intentions are essentially (per se) intelligible since <they are> definable, and, in <regard to> them, it is manifest that there is something above and below; therefore, there is something supreme. It does not have any supervening genus of them, since being according to itself is divided into these ten <genera>,
<according to Aristotle> in Bk. V of the Metaphysics.13 There is, therefore, a "being in the soul"; therefore, there is one most general <genus> of intentions in addition to all these <ten genera>.
12. Seventh, it happens that one can understand non-being, since one can signify it, according to Aristotle in Bk. II of the Posterior Analytics;14 and in these there is the notion (ratio) of higher and lower; therefore, there is something supreme. That <supreme genus> is not contained in any of those ten <genera>, since none of them is predicated of it. Therefore, there is a distinct most general <genus> of non-being; and so there are more genera than ten.
13. Eighth, figments are conceived by the intellect, and in these there is <the notion> of higher and lower; therefore, there is a supreme <genus>; therefore, there is some <other> most general <genus>.
14. Ninth, concerning all these, namely, intentions, nonbeings, figments, one can argue in this way: the composing intellect makes compositions of them, of which it judges the truth or falsity, as is evident. Therefore, a simple intellect also conceives them. Therefore, <they exist> under some aspect (ratione) of conceiving. <They do> not <exist under the aspect> of a singular; therefore, <they exist under the aspect> of a universal; therefore, <they exist under the aspect> of a genus or of a species etc.; therefore, there is a most general <genus> in them.
The underlying implication, however, in all these reasons, namely, that if something is higher in them, there is also a supreme <genus>, is evident according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the Metaphysics:15 "that is truer which is nearer to the first truth";
12. The last four principal arguments are responded to in n. 19, not at the end of the question.
13. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 7 (1017a 22–27).
14. Posterior Analytics, Bk. II, Ch. 7 (92b 29–30).
15. Metaphysics, Bk. IV, Ch. 4 (1008b 35–1009a 5).
QUESTION 11
and <according to> Bk. V of the same <work>, "that is prior which is nearer to the beginning."16 And by <this> reasoning
(ratione): since otherwise there would not be a stopping <point> in ascending, but the process <would proceed> to infinity.—
Likewise, one can argue similarly about privations.
15. It can be said to this <objection> that concrete <accidents>, intentions, non-beings, figments, privations, and whatever else of this kind are in a genus through a reduction to abstract <terms>, <to> things of first intention, <to> beings, <the beings> of which are figments and privations. Since, when "the more common are understood prior to the less common,"17 it is necessary for the most general <genera> to be primarily intelligible. These, however, are not intelligible except through the attribution to those <things> with which they were said to have a relation. For this reason they cannot be posited as the most general <genera>, but they are posited in a genus through reduction. Similarly, one can posit <the same thing> about potency, which is in a genus through a reduction to the act of which it is said to be a potency.18
16. Against this <argument>: in all these there is an essential (per se) predication of a higher from a lower; therefore, <the predication is> under the aspect (ratio) of some universal. Since to be predicated is properly the property of a universal;19 <and it is> not <the property> of any <thing> other than a genus. One can argue of a single <things> just as it was argued above about concrete <accidents>.20 Therefore, if one is not to proceed to infinity in these <things>, there will be some genus which does not have a higher genus; therefore, <there will be> a most general
<genus>, since a most general <genus> is defined in this way by Porphyry.21 That <most general genus> is the same as none of these ten <categories>, since it does not have the same species,
16. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 11 (1018b 9–14).
17. Cf. Physics, Bk. I, Ch. 1 (184a 25–35).
18. See Pini, Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus, 114.
19. On Interpretation, Bk. I, Ch. 7 (17a 39–b 1).
20. Cf. supra, nn. 8–10.
21. Porphyry, Isagoge, Ch. "On Species" (AL I6 20; ed. Busse, 4.17–18).
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since it is not essentially (per se) predicated of the same <things> in the first mode; therefore, there is another most general <genus> than these ten.—Also according to <this> reason (rationem): it is predicated essentially (in quid) of its own <species> of none of those ten <genera>; therefore, according to none of those ten does it have the aspect (rationem) of a genus. But, when anything is said equally primarily22 of its own species just as any of those ten
<genera is said> of its <species>, it follows that they will be equally primarily genera, and they will not <be genera> through a reduction to any of those ten <genera>.
17. Similarly, that there may be a genus and species between any of the previously numbered is shown through two arguments previously mentioned concerning a concrete <accident>.23 Also, according to the fact that one can seek the "whatness" (quid) of any of them <and another can> respond through some univocal <term>, which is in more <things> than that of which the whatness (quid) is asked; every univocal predicate in what it is (in quid), which is in more <things> than the subject, is a genus, according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the Topics.24
18. Also, because it is necessary that the most general <genus> is primarily intelligible, what is said in the response25 is manifestly false, unless it is understood with respect to those
<things> of which it is the most general <genus>. For quantity is not the first intelligible simply, but is <the first intelligible thing> in its own genus. So the first "intention" is the first intelli22. The phrase aeque primo dicatur, which I translate as "is said equally primarily" means that a predicate is equally (aeque) and essentially (primo) said of two different species. See also Etzkorn's comment in Scotus's Questions on the Metaphysics: "One of the alternate expressions for 'primarily' given in the Thesaurus is 'particularly.' 'Primo' in the expression 'primo dicitur' has the sense of 'being predicated primarily,' i.e., according to its primary or essential meaning.
To express this as done 'equally' in regard to several subjects, I have chosen the phrase 'affirmed with equal particularity'"; Girard J. Etzkorn, in John Duns Scotus, Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, trans. Girard J. Etzkorn and Allan B.
Wolter, 2 vols. (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 1997), in Bk. V, q. 5 and 6, fn. 17.
23. Cf. supra, nn. 8–10.
24. Topics, Bk. IV, Ch. 6 (128a 5–25). To be in more things is to have a wider denotation, since a genus has a greater extension than a species.
25. Cf. supra, n. 15.
QUESTION 11
gible with respect to special intentions, and "non-being" <is the first intelligible> with respect to particular non-beings, and "privation" <is the first intelligible> with respect to particular privations. For, if the contradiction of non-being or the opposite of privation occurs to an intellect prior to a particular being and a particular habit, it follows that non-being and privation are first understood of these particulars. For being primarily leads to the cognition of non-being, and a habit primarily <leads> to the cognition of privation; <it does> not <lead> primarily <to the cognition> of this non-being and of this privation. So also one can argue about potency with respect to act. There is no doubt that concrete <accidents> and intentions are essentially
(per se) intelligible.
19. One can respond26 especially about non-being, privation, and potency, that although there is an essential (in quid) predication in them and <even though there is> the aspect (ratio) of a higher <term in them>, nevertheless there is not the aspect
(ratio) of a genus and a species. Since not anything is predicated of many <things> differing in species or in number; for there is not any distinction of non-beings or of privations or of potencies according to their own nature (rationem), but only in relation to their opposites.
20. Against this <argument>: then something is predicated properly of something—or more precisely <something is predicated> in essence (in quid); and <it is predicated> under the aspect (ratio) of no universal. This does not seem <to be possible>, since "to be predicated of many" is convertible with universal.27
21. Second, by the absolute nature (ratione) of the significates, this is true: "blindness is not deafness"; therefore, privations are distinguished <from one another>. Although their distinction may be from another, this does not prohibit them from being species. For in this way species which are in the genus of substance differ through forms, which forms are not the species themselves.
26. Cf. supra, n. 15.
27. Cf. supra, n. 16.
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
22. Third, "common to many" is never of itself distinguished in them; therefore, privation is not distinguished in blindness and deafness except through something added, which <along> with the privation constitute those in their own nature (ratione).
Therefore, in those additions "these abound from a genus."28
These additions, therefore, are differentiae, although they are not as complete in being as the differentiae of substance are.
Therefore, those are two differing species.
23. To all the objects of these five <objections>—about concrete <accidents>, second intentions, privations, non-beings, and potencies—one can respond that, although these can be understood under some aspect of understanding (ratione intelligendi) and <although they can> be predicated among themselves under the aspect (ratione) of some universal and <although they can be> subordinated to something <that is> most universal, for insofar as an intention is attributed to them it is diverse from these ten <categories>, nevertheless it holds that there are only ten most general <genera> of things. Since not everything is intelligible, but being in itself is divided into these
<ten, according to Aristotle in> Bk. V of the Metaphysics,29 and so none of those is a being in itself distinct from these ten.30
24. Against this <argument>: Then it seems that the logician, who essentially (per se) considers intentions and the number of the most general <genera> only under this aspect (ratione)— namely, by which this intention "most general" can be applied to them––ought to say that there are more most general <genera> than ten, since there are more intentional <genera> than these
28. Porphyry, Isagoge, Ch. "On Difference" (AL I6 17; ed. Busse, 10.22–11.1).
29. Cf. supra, n. 11.
30. See Pini, Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus, 113–14. According to Pini, all second intentions are relations, since the intellect, "by considering one concept as related to another, establishes a relationship between them. This relationship is the second intention." Furthermore, as Pini points out, there was a debate regarding the ontological status of intentions. Contrary to Aquinas, who thinks that intentions have both a "subjective" and an "objective" existence, Scotus maintains that second intentions have only an "objective" existence. As Pini,
114, states it, "Since second intentions do not have real being, they lack what is usually named as 'subjective being.'"
QUESTION 11
<ten>, to which, insofar as they are understood, an intention can be attributed; although the metaphysician, who considers being insofar as it is being, will say that there are only ten <most general genera>. Aristotle31 seems to say the opposite of this, <when he> says "of the incomplex <terms>, a single <one> signifies substance, or quantity," etc., not that a single being only signifies substance, etc.
25. To the opposite is Aristotle.
[I. The Response To The Question] 26. It must be said that there are only ten most general <genera> of things, whose distinction is not taken only according to something in logic, but according to the essences themselves.
For the intention "most general <genus>" is only varied numerically in them. Therefore, with respect to this there is a difficulty, which is more metaphysical than logical. For this reason <the number of the most general genera> is sufficiently known here in the way of a simple fact (quia), whereas the metaphysician perhaps can or ought to know the reasoned fact (propter quid).32
[II. To The Principal Arguments] 27. To the first argument,33 I answer as above.34
28. To the first <objection> against this <argument>,35 I say that "being through itself (per se)" and "not being through itself (per se)," or "being in a subject" and "not being in a subject," are contradictories. And for this reason since a negation does not negate only the utterance, but <also> the significate, and <since> one cannot negate every significate in a single
31. Categories, Ch. 4 (1b 25–27).
32. See Pini, Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus, 144 and 187. According to Pini, Scotus, in his Commentary on the Metaphysics, changes his mind and decides that categories cannot even be demonstrated by the Metaphysician. See also Duns Scotus, Questions on the Metaphysics, Bk. V, q. 5–6, nn. 73–80.
33. Cf. supra, n. 1.
34. Cf. supra, n. 2, where the implication is denied.
35. Cf. supra, n. 3.
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act, <a negation> will be <just as> equivocal as an affirmation.
But "not being in a subject" is not the same as a substance, for "not being" is not being in a subject. Also, neither is "not being through itself (per se)" an accident, since "not being" is not being through itself (per se). But "being not through itself (per se)" is the same as an accident; and "being not in another" is the same as a substance. And the first <one> does not contradict being through itself (per se), nor does the second <one contradict> being in a subject.
29. To the second <objection against the first argument>,36 one can say that accidents are suitable to some <thing> intentional, for example, as "they are attributed to substance" or "they are posterior to substance"; in which an accident is not suitable with a substance.—Or one can concede <the point>, if there is a name, such as A, that equivocally signifies substance and the other most general <genera>, <then>, there could be an equally suitable division of being into "A" and "when" as <there is a division> into substance and accident, since on both sides of the equivocal <term there will be a division> into an equivocal <term> and into a univocal <term>.
30. To the third <objection> against the <first argument>,37 I say that "equivocal in act" includes all of its significates, and for this reason when he divides being into substance and accident,
<Aristotle> posits with respect to act all the nine genera as an "accident." When it is said that "equivocal is not accepted simultaneously except for one significate," this is true from the same <or in relation to the same> understanding; but it is not less <true> in itself <when> it posits all the significates simultaneously. And it is taken in this way, not, however, as it is understood by one.
31. To the second principal <argument>,38 it is said that a superlative is only suitable to one <thing> in one genus, and so there is only one most general <term> in one genus; but absolutely <speaking> there is not only one <most general genus>.—
Or otherwise: <it can be said> that "superlative" is said in two ways and is explained <as follows>: in one way <it is said> positively, <and it is explained> through <the phrase> "an excess of 36. Cf. supra, n. 4.
37. Cf. supra, n. 5.
38. Cf. supra, n. 6.
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all others"; in another way <it is said> privatively, <and it is explained> through <the phrase> "not to be exceeded by some other." In the first way no <thing> is absolutely a most general
<genus>, but <there is> only <a most general term> in some genus, that is, <one term is> more general than all the others in its own genus. In the second way, everything <said> of them is a most general <genus>, since there is not anything more general than it. And this proposition, "what is said through a superlative," etc., is true as the superlative is explained positively, not as it is explained privatively; since many can be first in this way, such that nothing is prior to every one of them.
32. To the third <argument,39 what was> said previously <suffices>.40—Or one can say that a multitude of the categories is reduced to one which is a first cause, which is prior to them, not by predication but by being and by causality; and so something can be prior to them.
33. To the <fourth> argument41 about concrete <accidents>, I say that the essence signified through "white" is in the genus of quality; but that under this mode of understanding or signifying, it is not essentially (per se) a quality or in the genus of quality but <is there> through reduction, since it is plain that it is essentially (essentialiter) the same as whiteness because it is essentially (per se) in that genus. It is, however, in some most general <genus> essentially (per se), namely, in quality (quali), but not in another. For quality (quale) only differs from quality (qualitate) in the way <or mode> of signifying; since the differentia, although it prohibits the predication of one from another, nevertheless does not suffice to distinguish genera or to make something be in diverse genera.
34. To the <fifth argument>,42 I concede that quality (quale) is a most general <genus> on account of those proofs, but it is not <something> other than quality (qualitas). When it is said that "it has other species," I say that it is false. When it is said that "it is predicated essentially (per se) of others," I say that it is false, since the essential (per se) species of one and of the other differ only in the mode of signifying.
39. Cf. supra, n. 7.
40. Cf. supra, q. 4, nn. 8 and 47.
41. Cf. supra, n. 8.
42. Cf. supra, n. 9.
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35. Against this: quality (quale) is a most general <genus> and quality (qualitas) is a most general <genus>, and these are not the same most general <genus>; therefore, <there is> another
<one>. The implication is evident, since concerning being, the same and diverse include <or contain> a contradiction, according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the Metaphysics.43 The second part of the antecedent is evident, since if they were the same most general <genus>, then one would be predicated of the other; thus "quality is a quality (qualitas est quale)," and one <would be predicated> of the species of the other.
36. One can say that they are the same most general <genus>. When it is shown that they are not, since one is not predicated of the other, one can say that something is the same as another and <yet> is not predicated of that <other> on account of a diverse mode of predicating. This diversity, although it prohibits the predication of one from another, nevertheless does not suffice to distinguish the highest genera or diverse species.
Similarly, on account of that <diverse> mode of signifying one is not predicated of the species of the other; nevertheless, neither are the former and the latter predicated of other species. Accordingly, this must be denied: "whiteness is a species of quality
(quale)," since this also <must be denied>: "whiteness is a quality (quale)." And it must be conceded that white is not whiteness, but it must not be conceded that they are species of another genus, nor <are they> other species. Since more is required to concede such diversity than impeding the mutual predication of the one to the other.—When it is proved above44 that they are diverse genera since "they are not predicated of the same," one can deny <this proposition>, since the same <things> are species of each, but the former is not the latter.
37. To the other proof,45 when it is said that "intentions are attributed to the essence as it is understood," I say that <intentions are attributed to the essence> according to the mode of abstract understanding or of concrete <understanding>, not <that> it is varied according to the genus or species, although the former is not the latter.
43. Rather, Metaphysics, Bk. X, Ch. 3 (1054b 25–26).
44. Cf. supra, n. 9.
45. Cf. supra, n. 10.