Question Twelve
[QUESTION TWELVE
Whether "Some Man" is a Primary Substance]
oncerning the chapter on substance, it is asked wheth-
er "some man" is a primary substance.
1. It seems that it is:
According to the authority of Aristotle, who exemplifies a primary substance in this way: as "some man," <or> "some horse."1
And later on, when he maintains that everything else is said about primary <substances> as primary <substances> or exists in them, he argues in this way:2 "animal is predicated of man; therefore, of some man," <and> through "some man" <he> understands a primary substance.
2. Second, it is not a secondary substance, and there is no intermediate between this and a primary <substance>; therefore, it is a primary substance. Proof of the first proposition: if it were a secondary substance, it would not be <anything> except a species; but this is false, since this is true: "no man is a species"; therefore, its contradictory is false.
3. Third, if "some man" were not a primary substance, it could be predicated of many, and so this would be true: "every man is some man," since it cannot be common to other
<things> than to the supposits of a man; but this <statement> is not true. Proof: first since the predicate of a universal affirmative is stated indefinitely (confunditur) only confusedly <or indefinitely, (confuse)>, and so through an accident, to the indefiniteness (confusionem) of the other, as of a subject;3 there1. Categories, Ch. 5 (2a 11–13).
2. Categories, Ch. 5 (2a 36–37).
3. An example of a universal affirmative stated indefinitely is "all men are non-mortal."
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fore, it can be stated indefinitely through itself.4 But <to> this, I say that "some man" cannot be stated indefinitely through itself in such a way by saying "every some man."5 Second, since every predicate of a universal affirmative can be the subject of a particular <statement that is the> converse <of> that universal
<statement>; this <predicate> cannot be stated in this way, since it is <already> "some man."
4. If one were to say this: "every man is some man," it must be converted to this: "some man is <every> man"––against this
<argument>: these differ: "every man is man" and "every man is some man"; therefore, the converses of these differ.
5. To the opposite:
"Some man" is predicated of many; therefore, it is not a primary substance. The antecedent is evident, since this <one> is some man and that <one> is some man.
6. Second, it follows that "this man runs; therefore, some man runs"; and not vice versa; therefore, "some man" is prior to and thus more common <than "this man">; therefore, it is not a primary substance.
7. Third, this is true: "every man is some man"; first, since its contradictory is impossible, <i.e.,> "some man is not some man"; second, since it is true of every singular <man>. Therefore, "some man" is predicated of every man; therefore, it is not a primary substance.
4. The argument is that a universal affirmative is confused or stated indefinitely only when the predicate is the negation of an accident, not through a negation or limitation of the subject itself. This conclusion, i.e., "therefore, it can be stated indefinitely through itself," is denied in the following statement.
5. The force of this argument makes for an awkward English translation.
The point of the argument, though, is that the predicate "some man" cannot be negated by adding the adjective "every" in front of it, in the way that the predicate "mortal" can be negated by adding the prefix "non" in front of it.
QUESTION 12
[I. To The Question] [A. The Opinion of Others] 8. To the question, it is said6 that "some man" is a primary substance, nor is it said of many except equivocally.
9. To the second <argument to the opposite>,7 one can say that the implication is not valid except by the consequent having been distinguished.
10. To the third <argument to the opposite>,8 one can say that that universal is false and its contradictory true, by taking
"some man" in the predicate for a primary substance, namely, so that a false <statement> is affirmed of man, since some man is not some man, for example, as Socrates is not Plato. The induction is not valid, but is a figure of speech, by proceeding from more determinate <things>9 to one <thing>, and so a quality
(quale) is changed into this <individual thing (in hoc aliquid)>.10
[B. Against the Opinion of Others] 11. Against the <opinion of others>: from this <opinion> it follows: (A) that a particular does not lead to a universal unless a distinction is previously made; and (B) that a particular does not lead to a singular unless a distinction is previously made; and (C) that a particular proposition would not have a contradictory <proposition> unless a distinction is previously made; and then a universal would not contradict itself, but <a universal would contradict> a particular affirmative in the sense that a singular negative will sufficiently contradict it, since in these an affirmation and the negation of the same is of the same
<thing>; and (D) that a particular proposition cannot be a part of a syllogism simply and absolutely, or not unless it is singular; and (E) that no syllogism would be absolutely valid, since no converted <syllogism> would be absolutely valid, since in every
6. Cf. supra, n. 5.
7. Cf. supra, n. 6.
8. Cf. supra, n. 7.
9. The opposite of "determinate" is "indefinite."
10. According to Deferrari, hoc aliquid is a translation of the Aristotelian phrase tode ti, which signifies this determined substance, this individual, substantial, non-accidental thing; Roy J. Deferrari, A Latin-English Dictionary, 461.
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syllogism, or in its converted <part>, some proposition is particular, which cannot be a part of a syllogism absolutely; and (F) that a particular <proposition> and an indefinite <proposition> are not convertible, since one <proposition> (as <for example> the indefinite) has singular <propositions> for the causes of its truth, which the particular has for its senses <or meanings> being multiplied; and (G) that there would not be an equivocation in speech, since neither "man" nor "some" is manifold. It is manifest <that it> is not <manifold> in itself; nor, for example, <when> it is added to another; proof: since the addition of something to another does not confer a new significate to it.
[II. The Solution Of The Question] 12. Therefore, since these <consequences> seem to be more untenable, contrary to Aristotle in his entire logic (tota logica), and against the whole nature (omnem naturam) of the syllogism and of contradiction, than the one passage of Aristotle <can> explain, it seems that one must rather say that "some man" is not a primary substance, that is, it does not signify only one supposit of man, as "that man" <does>, on account of the previous
<consequences being> untenable.
13. But on account of the authority of Aristotle, one must understand that "man" of itself is indifferent to many acceptances, namely, on behalf of the utterance, the intention, and on behalf of the supposits. Therefore, <these> signs, for example, "every,"
<and> "some," <which are> added to it, take away the indifference to the intentions and to the utterance, and determine <it> only to the acceptance for the supposits. But still, in that acceptance, it is indifferent to each and every <specific> supposit.
Therefore, Aristotle, wishing to express a primary substance as it is distinguished from a secondary substance, namely, as an intention of a secondary substance does not inhere in it,11 and nevertheless <wishing to express it> in a certain general measure, says "for example, some man," that is, any one that is that <particular> man.
11. I have followed an alternative manuscript here. The critical edition has:
"namely, as an intention of a secondary substance does inhere in it."
QUESTION 12
14. In another way, one can say that through "some man" a determinate primary substance is posited, nevertheless indeterminately, and then Aristotle exemplifies about a determinate primary substance, although not determinately, for example, to this <man> or that <man>.
15. But perhaps "some man" does not signify a determinate primary substance, neither determinately nor indeterminately, although <"some man"> supposits for that <determinate primary substance> when it is the subject of a particular proposition. That it <i.e., "some man"> does not signify <a determinate primary substance>, is evident through the truth of this proposition: "every man is some man." For a determinate primary substance, either determinately or indeterminately so taken, is not truly predicated of every man. And so "man," when it is the subject, supposits indefinitely <for> a determinate primary substance indeterminately; nevertheless, it does not signify that <determinate primary substance>. For this reason the subsequent way of speaking seems to be more suitable.
[III. To The Principal Arguments] [A. To the First and Second Principal Arguments]
16. To the first argument,12 it is evident that Aristotle names a primary substance in a certain common way (quodammodo in communi), through "common" being taken for the acceptance for the supposits.
17. To the <second argument>,13 I say that "some man" is an accidental being, composed from a thing of first and second intention; and neither is it a primary nor a secondary substance, but it is an accidental intermediate between them. And such an intermediate is found between the lowest species and the individual, as "white man," although <this> is not an essential intermediate.
18. Against this <last argument>: "some man" is predicated essentially (in quid) of many <things> differing in number, ac12. Cf. supra, n. 1.
13. Cf. supra, n. 2.
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cording to the previous <argument>;14 therefore, it is a species.
19. Likewise, an accidental being is composed from things of diverse genera; <but> "some man" is not of this kind, since the mode of understanding man is not a thing of any genus.
20. To the first <argument>,15 one can say that "some man" is predicated essentially (in quid) of no one <thing>, since an accidental being does not have an essence (quid).
21. Against this: Then by equal reason this predication is not essential (in quid): "some man is an animal."
22. Second, in Bk. I of the Sophistical Refutations,16 Aristotle says: "the definition of a proposition and of only one <thing under> the proposition is the same, and <the definition> of a thing and of only one <thing> of the thing <is the same>." Nevertheless, the <phrase> "only one thing" is composed from a thing of first and second intention. Therefore, such a composite <phrase> can have a definition; therefore, <it can have> an essence (quid).
23. Third, "some" only17 expresses a mode of understanding man for the supposits, and only in that acceptance does it express the essence (quid) of the supposits.18 Therefore, "some" does not prohibit man from being predicated essentially (in quid) of these; rather, it contributes more to this.
24. On behalf of the response of these <arguments>,19 it is necessary to understand that every syncategorematic <term> in a predicate is part of the predicate.20 The proof of which is through the impossible: otherwise, from true <premises> a false
<conclusion> follows in this way: "no man is every man, that man is man." If the sign in the major <premise> is not part of the predicate, then one can infer in the conclusion, "therefore, that man is not a man," since it would not be necessary, in order to have an identity of the major extreme, that <the same term> be taken in the major and in the conclusion with the same
14. Cf. supra, n. 5.
15. Cf. supra, n. 18.
16. Sophistical Refutations, Bk. I, Ch. 6 (169a 8–10).
17. For the sake of clarity, it should be pointed out that in this argument, "only" is a translation of tantummodo, whereas in the previous argument, i.e., n.
22, and in his reply, n. 27, the word "only" is solus.
18. Cf. supra, n. 13.
19. Cf. supra, nn. 21–23.
20. Cf. supra, q. 8, n. 29.
QUESTION 12
sign––if that <sign> is not part of the predicate, as it is manifest in the second mode of the second figure.21 Since the major extreme is not taken with the same sign in the conclusion and in the major. And so a false <conclusion> follows from true <premises, unless the sign of the major term is part of the predicate>.
25. Likewise, it is shown more clearly (ostensive) on account of the essence (propter quid), since a syncategorematic <term> never has a relation to the preceding <term>.22 Otherwise, a negation subsequent to the composition can make a proposition negative, just as a negation <preceding the composition makes it negative>.23 Therefore, a syncategorematic <term> added to a predicate does not determine <or limit> it <i.e., the predicate> in comparison to the subject, and so not insofar as <it is> an extreme, since insofar as it is an extreme, it is related to the other extreme. But every syncategorematic <term> determines the extreme insofar as it is an extreme; therefore, no <thing> added to the term in the predicate is a syncategorematic <term>, but <that addition> is part of the extreme.24 Nevertheless, it determines the absolute understanding of the term to which it is added, and so it is a syncategorematic <term> in respect to part of the predicate, but not in respect to the <whole> predicate, since it itself is the other part of the predicate. But a syncategorematic <term> added to the subject is not part of the subject,
21. An example of a syllogism in the second mode of the second figure (traditionally known as camestres) is: All P is M; no S is M; therefore, no S is P. As one can see from this example, the major term is modified by the quantifier "all" in the major premise, but not in the conclusion; hence the identity of the major term does not include the syncategorematic term "all."
22. In the context, what precedes the syncategorematic term is the copula. In the former argument, i.e., in n. 24, the example is "no man is every man," where the syncategorematic term is "every" and the preceding term is the verb "is."
23. Again, an example helps clarify Scotus's argument. In the statement "All men are non–mortal," the subsequent negation, in this case the one that follows the copula, does not make the statement negative, whereas a negation preceding the copula does; e.g., "No man is mortal" is a negative statement.
24. Scotus's argument is that every syncategorematic term, such as "all,"
"some," or "no," limits or determines the subject of a proposition. When such a term, however, is added to the predicate, it does not limit it or determine it in the same way, but must be considered as part of the predicate, not merely as something that limits it.
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since it determines <the whole subject> to which it is added, in comparison to the predicate.
26. Since these things have been seen, <a response> is evident to the counter-argument (rationem).25 Since in this way, I recommend that "some man is an animal," is <to be understood as> "some" <to be taken as> only a syncategorematic <term> and "man" <to be taken> only <as> the subject, and therefore the proposition can be an essential (per se) <proposition>. But it is not <to be taken> in this <same> way when "some man" is the predicate.
27. To the other <argument>,26 I say that "one" (unus) and "only" (solus) can be <either> syncategorematic <terms> or categorematic <terms>. Aristotle understands them in the second way in Bk. I of the Sophistical Refutations,27 since "the definition of a thing and of only one <thing> is the same," that is, of the thing undivided in itself and divided from <all> others, since that is a thing through its essence. He does not, however, understand <that passage> such that "one" and "alone" are syncategorematic <terms>.
28. To the third <argument>,28 I concede that "some" expresses a mode of understanding man for the supposits; nevertheless, under such a mode of understanding, "man" cannot be predicated <of a subject> unless that mode is part of the predicate, on account of the reason expressed above;29 and that whole <predicate> is not predicated essentially (in quid). Since if "man" could be predicated under such a mode, only by remaining in the mode would it be predicated <of a subject> essentially (in quid). And since the species expresses nothing, except insofar as it is suitable to be <so> predicated, "man" under such a mode cannot be the species.
29. To the other <argument> above, which was against the response to the second principal <argument>,30 when it was
25. Cf. supra, n. 21.
26. Cf. supra, n. 22.
27. Sophistical Refutations, Bk. I, Ch. 6 (169a 8–10).
28. Cf. supra, n. 23.
29. Cf. supra, n. 24. In other words, "some," which is the mode of predicating man, has to be an essential part of the predicate, so that the entire predicate in question is "some man," not some "man."
30. Cf. supra, n. 19.
QUESTION 12
said, "an accidental being is composed from things of diverse genera," that can be denied. Since whatever is not essentially the same with something, whether <that something> be a thing of <another> genus or not, <that which has been so> composed with that something constitutes an accidental being.
[B. To the Third Principal Argument] 30. To the third principal <argument>,31 I concede that this is true: "every man is some man." When it is shown in the first
<proof> that it is not <true>, since the predicate cannot be stated indefinitely (confundibile) through itself, I deny <this proposition>. For in the contradictory of a universal predicate, it will be the same predicate that is also in that <original universal predicate>, both stated indefinitely in a confused manner and <stated> distributively; nor is it otherwise necessary for it to be stated indefinitely through an accident <in order for it> to be stated indefinitely through itself.—Or otherwise, one can concede that insofar as "some man" is predicated <of a subject>, it is understood to specify the thing of this verb "is," so that the predicate is the whole "being-some-man"; and that <predicate> can be stated indefinitely through a universal affirmative sign immediately added.—Through this <reasoning> I say to the second proof:32 since that universal <predicate> is converted in this
<way>: "any being-some-man is a man."
[III. What Must Be Noted About The Division Of Substance] 31. Substance, in the proper <and> principal sense, is,33 etc.
Note that the division of substance into primary and secondary <substances> is not a division of the most general <genus> into its species, but of a subject into accidents, since "substance" according to what is understood—according to which consideration it pertains to the logician—is divided into intentions <that are> accidental to it.
31. Cf. supra, n. 3.
32. Cf. ibid.
33. Cf. supra, n. 1.