Question Forty-Two
[QUESTION FORTY-TWO
Whether in a Negative <Opposition> the Subject Stands for Being and for Non-Being Indifferently] Indeed, whatever <things are opposed> as an affirmation and negation, etc.1
ere, Aristotle assigns the differentia between con-
tradictory opposites and all other <opposites>, since
in all other <opposites> it is not necessary for one extreme to be true and the other one to be false. In these, however, it is necessary: Either, since none of the other <opposites> is <such that one is> necessarily true and the other (aliud) is
<necessarily> false; but in contradictory <opposites>, one of the two (alterum) is <necessarily> true, and the other (alterum) is
<necessarily> false; and in this manner it is said of simple, contradictory <terms>. Or since none of the other opposites is true or false since it is simple; and contradictories are complex. It seems more <likely> that the second sense is understood there:2
"Altogether, however, nothing is true or false <regarding> those which are said without combination." And all others which are said "without combination" are said to be "the others," that is, <other> than contradictories. And then it must be understood that a contradiction, of which <Aristotle> speaks here, is not only in simple <terms>, although he principally speaks here about the opposition of simple <terms>, since perhaps a contradiction is univocally found in propositions and in <simple> terms. So perhaps it is not in other oppositions, since that <one> is more intentional; for it is absolutely intentional.
1. Categories, Ch. 10 (13a 37–b 2).
2. Categories, Ch. 10 (13b 10–11).
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
Afterwards,3 it is added that although it is necessary for an existing subject that one of the <two> contraries that lack an intermediate to be true of that <subject>, nevertheless this is not necessary for a subject that does not exist. But in contradictories, whether the subject exists or does not exist, it is always <the case> that one of the two is true about the subject and the other one is false; since whether Socrates exists or not, this is always true, "Socrates is weak," or this <is true>, "Socrates is not weak."
About this, it is asked whether in negative <propositions>, the subject stands for being and non-being indifferently.
1. It seems that it does <stand indifferently for being and non-being>.
Since, if Socrates does not exist, this <proposition>, "Socrates is not weak," would not be true unless the subject stands for a non-being, since otherwise the sense <of the proposition> would be "Socrates, who exists, is not weak," and its contradictory, <i.e., "Socrates, who exists, is weak,"> is false, if Socrates does not exist; and so two contradictory <propositions> would simultaneously be false.4
2. It will be said to this <argument> that when a term supposits, not having many supposits––as a discrete term does––it is possible for such a subject to stand for non-being; but this is not possible concerning a common term.
3. Against this: <if> it is posited that no man exists, this is <still> false, "every man is weak."5
[I. The Response To The Question] 4. For the solution of this question, it is necessary to know beforehand what is signified through the term and what are its
3. Cf. Categories, Ch. 10 (13b 18–20).
4. The two propositions that would simultaneously be false are: "Socrates is not weak" and "Socrates is weak."
5. The argument is that if no humans existed, it would be true to say that "every man is not weak," where the subject term, "every man," is not a discrete term, or proper noun, but a common term. Hence, according to the argument, not only a proper noun, but also a common noun, must stand for a non-being.
QUESTION 42
essential supposits. Since from this <knowledge> one must conclude for what <things> the term essentially supposits for in the sentence. For in every affirmative or negative proposition, <the term> supposits for its essential supposits. And for this reason, perhaps mention will be made about this in the book On Interpretation,6 where those (discussions> are more proper.
[II. What Must Be Noted About The Properties Of Contraries] [A. Concerning the First Property] Indeed, contraries, etc.7
It must be noted that Aristotle posits four properties of contraries.
5. The first <property>8 is that "what is always contrary to good is evil, but <what is contrary> to evil is sometimes evil and sometimes good." This must not be understood only of those forms "good" and "evil," since those <forms> are only among themselves contrary <to one another> and evil is never <contrary> to evil by reason of the form of evil; but <it must be understood> of those things which exist under <those forms>, since sometimes that which is evil is contrary to that <other thing> which is evil. Just as it also is in propositions: sometimes that which is false is contrary to that <other proposition> which is false, since both contrary <propositions> can be simultaneously false.
[B. Concerning the Second Property] 6. The second <property> is:9 "if one of <a pair of> contraries exists, it is not necessary that the remaining one exist, so that if all <people who> existed were well, health would exist and sickness would not exist." Or, if the forms are taken absolutely,
6. Cf. Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super Peri Hermenias, I, q. 5–8, nn. 49–50.
7. Cf. Categories, Ch. 11 (13b 36).
8. See the preceding footnote.
9. Categories, Ch. 11 (14a 7–8).
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
there would not be any contraries except in comparison to the same subject, so that <if> being healthy and being sick <were contraries> concerning Socrates, (since it is impossible for them to be in the same subject simultaneously), it would be impossible if one existed for the remaining one to exist <as well>.
Perhaps the first <position> is more true, since forms among themselves are primarily contraries, since they are the greatest distance from one another in the same genus.10
7. Against this property. In <the book> On the Heaven and the Earth,11 it is held that "If one of the contraries is in nature, the remaining <one is in nature> also." Therefore, if one <of two contraries> exists, it is necessary for the remaining one to exist.
To this <argument>, one can say that that proposition is not true of being in act but of being in act or of being in potency, and of contraries which mutually expel each other concerning the same subject. Since then, if one contrary exists, its subject exists. And if its subject exists, then the remaining contrary exists in potency, since that subject is in potency to the other contrary.
[C. Concerning the Third Property] 8. The third property12 is that "they have the <attribute> of belonging to the same <thing, either> in species or in genus."
This must be noted, since, even though one contrary is repugnant to some <other one> of the species, as gathering is to whiteness,13 nevertheless, those contraries have the <attribute> of belonging to the same <thing> in genus, as to color, which exists in diverse species; since in this way it is only the same in genus. And this is valid for what was said previously,14 <namely,> in what way the definition of contraries ought to be understood.
10. Categories, Ch. 6 (6a 12–19); Metaphysics, Bk. X, Ch. 4 (1055a 5–33).
11. On The Heavens, Bk. II, Ch. 3 (286a 23–24).
12. Categories, Ch. 11 (14a 15–16).
13. Cf. supra, q. 6, n. 10.
14. Cf. supra, q. 40, n. 8.
QUESTION 42
[D. Concerning the Fourth Property] 9. The fourth property15 is that "contraries are either in the same genus or in contrary genera, or are genera of other
<things>"; and that must be understood about proximate genera. For contraries are always in the same primary genus, unless perhaps they are transcendent, and then they are equivocally in diverse genera, as perhaps good and evil, insofar as they are transcendent, are of this kind; however, insofar as they are accepted in <moral> habits (moribus), they are genera of habits (morum).
10. Nevertheless, it must be understood that in the primary way, namely, as good is convertible with being, nothing is said to be absolutely bad, nor are good and evil thus contrary <to one another>; but good and evil are said only in comparison to another, since it is evident that <evil> detracts from the perfection of the entity of the other.
15. Categories, Ch. 11 (14a 19–21).