Questions Eighteen and Nineteen
<QUESTIONS EIGHTEEN
AND NINETEEN>
[QUESTION EIGHTEEN
Whether Speech is a Quantity]
t is asked whether speech is a quantity.
1. It seems that it is not:
Since speech is not in writing, for that is a substance. It is not in the mind, since that is in <something that is> not quantified.
And neither <writing nor the mind> essentially (per se) measures <something>, and Aristotle explains that he understands
<speech to be> about neither of these. Nor is speech in an utterance, since that is essentially (per se) sensible, since it is an utterance. Therefore, it is in the third species of quality.
2. To the opposite is Aristotle.1
[QUESTION NINETEEN
Whether Speech is a Discrete Quantity]
t is asked whether speech is a discrete quantity.
3. It seems that it is not:
Since "short" and "long" are differentiae of continuous quantity; speech measures according to these, according to Aristotle in this text:2 "for a syllable is measured <as> short and long."
1. Categories, Ch. 6 (4b 31–35).
2. Cf. supra, n. 2.
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
4. <If> it is said that a syllable is short and long, not speech–– against this: then a continuum is essentially (per se) a part of a discrete <quantity>. Likewise, the major is taken in this way: every <thing that> essentially (per se) measures according to the differentiae "short" and "long" is a continuum; speech is of this kind, even if it is not long.
5. Second, if discrete were a quantity, it would not seem to differ in species from number, since <they differ> in no specific differentia.
6. It is said that discrete quantity, as it is in a permanent matter, is number, since "number is caused by the division of a continuum":3 and as <discrete quantity> is in successive <matter>, it is speech, since no part of speech remains.
7. Against this: This <reply> concedes the proposition. Since a differentia according to the species is a formal differentia; these
<i.e., number and speech>, if they differ only in this way, differ in no formal <way>; therefore, <they do> not <differ in> species.
8. Second, a falsehood is expressed; since succession and permanence are differentiae posterior to motion and rest, therefore also by natural being insofar as it is natural. But quantity, insofar as it <pertains> to the whole genus, is naturally prior to natural being insofar as it is natural. Therefore, succession and permanence are, to a greater degree, posterior to the whole genus of quantity; therefore, they are not the differentiae of the species in this genus.
9. Third, number is applied to successive matter just as <it is applied> to permanent <matter>; therefore, not every number is a quantity in permanent matter. The antecedent is evident by example, as we say "in two times" and "in two days"; and with reason, since some continuum is successive; therefore, number is caused by its division.
10. Fourth, then speech does not differ from time, which is "numbered motion";4 and in this way discrete quantity is in successive matter.
11. To the opposite is Aristotle.5
3. Physics, Bk. III, Ch. 7 (207a 32–b 2). 4. Physics, Bk. IV, Ch. 11 (219b 1–2).
5. Cf. supra, n. 2.
QUESTIONS 18–19
[I. The Response To The Eighteenth Question] 12. It must be said to the first question that speech is a quantity on account of the reasoning (rationem) of Aristotle, since
"a syllable is measured <as> short or long"; therefore, there is another essential (per se) measure of this; that is speech; therefore, etc.
[II. To The Principal Argument Of The Eighteenth Question] 13. To the argument,6 I concede that speech is said in none of these ways; but, as Aristotle says, speech <is that> which happens with a spoken utterance. I say, however, that the distinction
(discretionem) that is appropriate to speech is through its specific differentia. This differentia is neither written, nor spoken, nor in the mind, nor in the act of speaking—since that is measured by time—nor are its parts discrete. But the distinction (discretio) is not common to number and speech, but is appropriate to speech.
[III. The Response To The Nineteenth Question] 14. To the second question, it must be said that it is a discrete quantity, since its parts "are joined to no common boundary."7
For every syllable is divided from another <syllable>; <and> neither the act of speaking nor the significate unite (continuat) them, since the boundary essentially (per se) uniting the parts of quantity is not essentially beyond them; but these two are essentially beyond the parts of speech. Similarly, this speech can exist when the significate does not exist, for example, by joining nonsignificative utterances, and then there is not any significate.
6. Cf. supra, n. 1.
7. Categories, Ch. 6 (4b 31–36).
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
[IV. To The Principal Arguments Of The Nineteenth Question] 15. To the first argument,8 one can say that "long" and "short" pertain equivocally to continuous and discrete; to the former— namely, to continuous—properly; to the latter, derivatively (transumptive). Therefore, every <thing> measuring <something> essential (per se), according to the fact that it is taken properly, is a continuum. Speech is not of this kind; for the length of a syllable and of <what is> measured by a line is equivocal.
16. To the second <argument>,9 I say that speech differs essentially from number and from every <other> species of quantity, not only by a material differentia, but also by a formal and specific <differentia>. Nevertheless, that <differentia> is not known; indeed, the differentia of some of the most specific species is barely known to us. Since if <this differentia> were <known to us>, that could not be true which is said in Bk. II of the Posterior
Analytics,10 that "every part of the definition ought to be in more <things than what is defined>, however all <parts of the definition ought to be> equally in <the thing defined>."11 This, however, would not touch <the issue at hand>, if the last differentia were known <to us>. For that <differentia>, when it is taken from the proper form of the species, is in no way in more <things> than the species. Therefore, what was said is true, since the lowest differentiae, of almost all things to be defined, are unknown.
8. Cf. supra, n. 3.
9. Cf. supra, n. 5.
10. Posterior Analytics, Bk. II, Ch. 13 (96a 32–35).
11. By equally in the thing, Scotus signifies that the parts of the definition, taken altogether, ought to be convertible with the definiendum. For example, when "animal," which is in more things than man, is joined to "rational," the two together are equally coextensive with "man."