Question Twenty-Six
[QUESTION TWENTY-SIX
Whether the Second Description of Relatives is Suitably Given]
t is asked whether the second description of relatives
that Aristotle posits1 is suitably given.
1. It seems that it is not:
Since that <description> pertains to nothing in the genus of relation; therefore, it does not pertain to the most general <genus> of relation. Proof of the antecedent: since if the being of a relation were "to have itself to another," this would be through another relation; therefore, with equal reason, the being of this other would be to have itself to another, and so on ad infinitum, the posterior of which would always be a relation of the prior.
This is untenable.
2. Second, that definition is either: (A) of the form of a relation in itself, which according to the preceding argument was disproved; or (B) of the subject in itself, which is false, since its being is not to have itself to another, because in itself (secundum se) it is a thing of another genus and it is absolute; or (C) of a subject informed by such a form, and then it is of an accidental being, which is unsuitable, since there is not a definition <of an accidental being>, according to Aristotle in Bk. VI of the Metaphysics.2 Therefore, that description is of none <of these>. This is untenable.
1. "Those things are relatives [to something] in which their very being is to have itself in a certain measure to another (sunt ad aliquid quibus hoc ipsum esse est ad aliquid quodammodo se habere)"; Categories, Ch. 7 (8a 32–33). Note that the first description of relatives is given at the beginning of chapter 7 (6a 37–38).
2. Metaphysics, Bk. VI, Ch. 5 (1026b 3–4).
QUESTION 26
3. Third, the most general <genus> is predicable of any of its species; but this <genus> cannot be <predicated of its species> except insofar as it is signified in the singular—that description, however, is given of something according to what is signified in the plural; therefore, <that description> is not about the most general <genus> itself.
4. Fourth, this description does not seem to pertain to all <the things> which are in the genus of relation. For many <things> are said in regard to another, whose being is not essentially to have itself to another.
5. To the opposite is Aristotle.3
[I. A Common Opinion] [A. Exposition of the Opinion] 6. It is said4 to the question that relatives are twofold: some
<things are relatives> according to being, and some according to speech. The first description of Aristotle is given about relatives according to speech, namely, "anything whose very being is said of others are called relatives <to something>, or otherwise
<anything whose very being is said> howsoever <or in some other way> to another <are called relatives>."5 The second description, which he approves more, is given of relatives according to being, namely, that "<those things> are related (ad aliud) <to another> whose very being is to have itself to another."6
[B. Against the Common Opinion] 7. Against this distinction: either the division is given through opposites, or not. If it is not, then it is not valid. If it is, then relatives according to speech are not relatives according to being;
3. Categories, Ch. 7 (8a 32–33).
4. Cf. Lambertus de Latiniaco, Summa logicae c 3 (ed. F. Alessio, p. 80); Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I q. 13 a. 7 ad 1.
5. Ad aliquid dicuntur quaecumque hoc ipsum quod sunt aliorum dicuntur, vel quomodolibet aliter ad aliud; quoted from Categories, Ch. 7 (6a 37–38).
6. Ad aliquid sunt quorum hoc ipsum esse est ad aliud se habere; quoted from Categories, Ch. 7 (8a 32–33).
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
therefore, they are not relatives; therefore, relatives are poorly divided into these <divisions>. Similarly, if they are opposites, it follows that relatives according to being are not relatives according to speech, which is false.—If it is said that the members <of the division> ought to be understood with precision, it follows that relatives according to speech are only according to speech, and so they would not be more true than black, being called white, is white.
8. Second, the other member of the division7 is converted with the divided; for man absolutely and man according to being are the same.
9. Third, that description which is posited of relatives according to speech is none <of them>. First, since that <description> is appropriate to substances which are in no way related (ad aliud) <to another>, according to Aristotle,8 since he considers this ridiculous. Second, since according to this <description>,
"discipline" is said relatively to "disciplined," since <discipline> is of <the disciplined>; and with equal reason "whiteness" <is said relatively> to "white," and with equal reason all accidents
<are said relatively> to their subject, since they are said of them.
Therefore, from that description none of them can be concluded to exist in the genus of relation.
[II. The Solution Of The Question] 10. Therefore, it must be said that relatives are in no way divided into relatives according to being and relatives according to speech, since by taking the members <of the division> precisely, a relative according to speech is no more a relative than a dead man is a man.
11. Nevertheless, perhaps beings are divided in this way: so that some are relatives according to being, for example, as those which are named denominatively from relations; some, however, are relatives according to speech, for example, as those which are in other genera and according to some relationship
7. I.e., relatives according to being.
8. Categories, Ch. 7 (8a 28–31).
QUESTION 26
(habitudinem) are said <to be related> to others—nevertheless, these, strictly speaking, are not relatives.
12. But truly some of the relatives are said according to their own proper form to another, for example, as those which are primarily relatives; others are truly and essentially (per se) relatives, but they are not said according to the proper form to others, for example, as they are relatives according to genus.
For those are essentially (per se) relatives, but not primarily; and they are said to others according to the form of their genus, for example, if knowledge is essentially a relative, it is impossible that that which is its species, according to that signification, is not a relative, since then a genus and its species would not be in the same genus. But it is not primarily a relative, since it is not <a relative> according to that which it adds over <and above> its genus. And for this reason it is said <in relation> to the correlative of the genus according to that very genus.
Therefore, it must be said that Aristotle's second description of relatives is suitable, since it indicates their nature (ratio) insofar as they are relatives, as will be evident in responding to the arguments (rationes).
[III. To The Principal Arguments] 14. Therefore, the first <argument>9 must be answered by conceding that that description is not given about relation, but about relatives said denominatively from them. Why he should, however, define these and not relations, and <why> he should posit their properties, was said in the preceding question.10
15. To the <second argument>,11 I say that that description is not of a relation absolutely, as it is signified in the abstract, nor of a subject absolutely, nor of the whole aggregate; but of the form as it informs the subject in that mode in which it is signified through a concrete name said from the most general
<genus> of relation, for example, in the way that "the"12 does not express a part of what is signified, but the mode.
9. Cf. supra, n. 1.
10. Cf. supra, q. 25, n. 38.
11. Cf. supra, n. 2.
12. The definite article here is ly.
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
16. To the third <argument>,13 <what> was said previously,14 <namely,> why relatives of equivalence <that are> defined in the plural are more suitable than <those that are defined> in the singular, <suffices for a reply>, since that which is defined here is of this kind, as is evident from the preceding question.15
17. To the fourth <argument>,16 it must be said that that account pertains essentially to all <things> which are in the genus of relation, as they are said denominatively from relations.
If, however, there are <some things> which are said to another, and which do not have this account, <then> they are not relatives except in a certain respect.
[IV. Notable Points About The Properties Of Relatives] 18. It must be noted about the first17 and second18 <properties>, which are "to receive contraries," and "to undertake more and less," that these do not essentially (per se) exist in relations nor perhaps in relatives, but only by reason of those <things> on which a relation is essentially (per se) founded. Therefore, those <things> which are founded on forms undertaking more and less or contrariety receive these, just as a similitude according to whiteness receives more and less and the opposite, since whiteness also <receives more and less and the opposite> on which <that similitude> is founded. Similitude, however, which is according to some <things> which are in the fourth species of quality,19 does not receive an opposite nor <does it undertake> more and less, since those <things> on which that similitude is founded neither receive <an opposite nor undertake more and less>; and this <is the case> when speaking of the first property and of contrariety said properly. First, since if these two were to exist essentially (per se) in relations, motion could exist essentially (per se) in the genus of relation, since an acquisition of parts can exist after the part of some form in the genus of 13. Cf. supra, n. 3.
14. Cf. the following note.
15. Cf. supra, q. 25, n. 38.
16. Cf. supra, n. 4.
17. Categories, Ch. 7 (6b 15).
18. Categories, Ch. 7 (6b 20–21).
19. Categories, Ch. 8 (11a 5–7).
QUESTION 26
relation; and such an acquisition is motion, according to the Commentator <in his commentary on that which is> above in Bk. III of the Physics.20 But the consequent is untenable, namely, that motion exists essentially (per se) in the genus of relation, since it is against <what> Aristotle <says> in Bk. V of the Physics.21
Second, since if to receive more and less is in the form of relation, <then> a relative said according to more would essentially
(per se) be referred to two: namely, to something said according to less according to the same form, and beyond this to that to which such a relative is said absolutely. For example, "more similar" (similius) would be said essentially (per se) to "less similar" (minus simile), and beyond this to that to which its positive
<form> is referred, namely, "similar"; but the consequent seems untenable, since it is against Aristotle in Bk. V of the Metaphysics,22 who says that it is ridiculous that the same thing is referred to twice, that is, to two <things>.
19. On account of this, it seems that it must be said that these properties exist in relatives accidentally. The authority of Aristotle to the contrary does not matter, since he seems to determine nothing about relatives according to his own opinion before that part where he begins to disprove the first description of relatives.23 But to a lesser <extent>, no relative is said properly <to be> a contrary to that to which it is relative, although it happens that some same <thing> is relative to one <thing> and contrary to another <thing>, as knowledge is contrary to ignorance, and it is not referred to that, but to the knowable.24
20. Averroës, Physica III com. 4 (ed. Iuntina, IV f. 41rb).
21. Physics, Bk. V, Ch. 2 (226a 24–26).
22. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 15 (1021a 31–b 3).
23. Categories, Ch. 7 (8a 13).
24. Cf. supra, q. 24, n. 24.