Question Forty-Four
[QUESTION FORTY-FOUR
Whether Aristotle Suitably Distinguishes the Species of Motion] There are six species of motion, etc.1
t is asked whether Aristotle suitably distinguishes the
species of motion.
1. It seems that he does not.
Since those into which it is distinguished are in diverse genera, for example "alteration is in quality and augmentation is in quantity";2 therefore, nothing is univocal to them. Therefore, they are not species of motion, since everything having a species is univocal to them.
2. Second, Aristotle proves in Bk. V of the Physics,3 that generation is not a motion; with equal reason, neither is corruption; therefore, etc.
3. Third, Aristotle shows here4 that those motions are distinct, since they do not happen simultaneously to the same
<thing>, of which the opposite seems <to be the case>, since alteration is always joined with augmentation. Nor is that a true objection (instantia) that he posits in the text concerning the square and the gnomon.5 For many conditions6 of augmentation cannot be saved there, since not every part of <something> increased is increased from such an addition. Similarly, such an 1. Categories, Ch. 14 (15a 14–15).
2. Physics, Bk. V, Ch. 2 (226a 24–33).
3. Physics, Bk. V, Ch. 1 (225a 26–27).
4. Categories, Ch. 14 (15a 15–33).
5. Categories, Ch. 14 (15a 29–31).
6. Cf. On Generation and Corruption, Bk. I, Ch. 5 (321a 18–22).
QUESTION 44
addition is only a juxtaposition, as Aristotle says in Bk. I of On Generation,7 and not an augmentation.
4. Similarly, an alteration is joined with every generation and corruption, since the substantial form is not an immediate principle of acting, but only active and passive qualities <are immediate principles of acting>; and according to them there is an alteration to which a change follows according to a substantial form, of which form those qualities are proper.
5. Fourth, everything <that has> increased occupies a greater place than it did previously, since it is greater; and "a place is equal to what is in the place";8 therefore, everything <that has> increased changes place.
6. Fifth, in the genus of quality there is only one motion, namely, alteration; and in the genus of place, there is only one
<motion, namely, locomotion>; therefore, there will only be one <motion> in the genus of quantity and only one in the genus of substance; therefore, there will not be <that number of motions> unless there are only four motions.
7. Also, it can be argued that in the other genera than <those> four, there is some essential (per se) motion. But there is a concatenation of speaking (anxioma).9 Nevertheless, this seems to hold through the one saying of Aristotle in Bk. III of the Physics,10 that "there are as many species of motion as there are of being"; therefore, there is motion in every genus.
8. To the opposite is Aristotle.11
[I. To The Question] 9. One can say that motion––according to that notion (rationem) which is assigned in Bk. III of the Physics,12 that is, "the act of being in potency insofar as it is in potency"––pertains to all
7. On Generation and Corruption, Bk. I, Ch. 9 (327a 24–26).
8. Physics, Bk. IV, Ch. 4 (211a 1–2).
9. Cf. Lexicon Latinitatis Nederlandicae Medii Aevi (ed. J. Fuchs and O. Weijers,
I, 411a): Anxioma: concatenatio loquendi ut sophisma ut aliquod insolubilia seu aliquod problema difficile.
10. Physics, Bk. III, Ch. 1 (201a 9).
11. Categories, Ch. 14 (15a 14–15).
12. Physics, Bk. III, Ch. 1 (201a 10–11).
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
these six <modes> equivocally, just as both the definition and the defining <words>, which are "act" and "potency," pertain to them equivocally. But motion is taken more properly in Bk. V of the Physics,13 because "motion is from a contrary to a contrary, and it is in time." And in that mode it is distinguished in contrast to sudden change, which is in an instant. Nor, as it is thus taken, can it be suitably divided into those six modes, but only into four of them. Therefore, it is taken here in the first mode, and so the division is suitable, as of an utterance into its significations.
[II. To The Principal Arguments] 10. To the first argument,14 I say that "species" is not taken there as Porphyry15 takes it, but for a mode or a special significate, just as in that authoritative quotation of Aristotle in Bk. III of the Physics,16 where he says that "there are as many species of motion as there are of being." For being does not have those as it were as proper species, but as significates.
11. To the second <argument>,17 I concede that generation and corruption are not motions as Aristotle speaks there about motion as it is distinguished from change; nevertheless, they are motions as he speaks of motion in Bk. III of the Physics.
12. To the third <argument>,18 I say that although those motions happen to the same <thing>––either simultaneously or by a certain order––nevertheless, they are never simultaneous, that is, to the same essential (per se) term; and this suffices for their distinction.––When it is argued about augmentation and alteration, I concede that every natural augmentation properly said presupposes an alteration, <and that> the augmentation in mathematics is not of this kind; but no augmentation is to that term to which there is an alteration. And it can be conceded
<well> enough that the objection (instantia) of Aristotle is not 13. Physics, Bk. V, Ch. 2 (224b 27–225b 9).
14. Cf. supra, n. 1.
15. Isagoge, Ch. "On Species" (AL I6 8–14; ed. Busse, 3.21–8.6).
16. Cf. supra, n. 7.
17. Cf. supra, n. 2.
18. Cf. supra, n. 3.
QUESTION 44
to the question about augmentation properly said, but is about juxtaposition, which is assimilated in some way to augmentation; and for such is that objection to the question.
13. When it is argued about alteration and generation,19 by conceding that an alteration precedes every generation, it does not follow that this is essentially (per se) to the same term, since an alteration is essentially (per se) to a quality, a generation is
<essentially> to a substantial form.
14. When it is argued about augmentation and change of place,20 I concede that <what has> increased occupies a greater place than previously, but nevertheless it does not change the place according to the whole. Therefore, since the whole does not have another place, for this reason it is not said to be moved according to place. Or if it is conceded that it is moved according to place, the change of place and augmentation are essentially (per se) to diverse terms.
15. To the sixth <argument>,21 I say that in the genus of quantity there is one motion in genus, just as in the genus of quality and in the genus of place; but it is not named in genus but only in its proximate species, which are augmentation and diminution. And it must be said similarly about generation and corruption.
16. To the seventh <argument>,22 I say that motion properly is only in three genera, namely, in quantity, quality, and place, as it is distinguished in contrast to sudden change, as it is proved in Bk. V of the Physics.23
17. When it is argued to the contrary "there are as many species of motion as there are of being,"24 the Commentator adds25
"having been acquired through motion." And that proposition, thus particularly taken, is universal enough to the question of Aristotle there. And only things of those three genera are essentially (per se) acquired through motion properly said.
19. Cf. supra, n. 4.
20. Cf. supra, n. 5.
21. Cf. supra, n. 6.
22. Cf. supra, n. 7.
23. Physics, Bk. V, Ch. 2 (225b 6–9).
24. Cf. supra, n. 7.
25. Averroës, Physics, Bk. III, com. 5 (ed. Iuntina, IV f. 41va).
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
18. Likewise, one can argue that he distinguishes motion unsuitably here, since motion is a natural attribute, and so it does not pertain to the logician.
19. To this, one can respond that motion, insofar as its principle is natural matter or form, or insofar as it comes from the principles of a natural body as an attribute from the principles of its subject, pertains to the consideration of the natural <philosopher>. But insofar as there is anything transcending <that is> discovered in the diverse genera through reduction insofar as it is to the things of the diverse genera, so it pertains to the consideration of the logician who considers the most general
<genera>.
[III. What Must Be Noted About Motion And Rest] There is, however, absolutely, etc.26
20. It must noted that there are as many species of rest as there are of motion. And by taking both as they differ in the same genus, they are opposed <to one another> privatively. A specific rest, however, is opposed privatively to a specific motion: that is not motion which is in the term to which, since "that is well-being and a perfection";27 but that which is in a term from which, as rest in blackness is privatively opposed to the act of making white. On the other hand, however, motion that is to a contrary term, is contrary to the motion to the one term; and rest in the other contrary is contrary to rest in the one contrary, so that a specific motion has another motion for its contrary, and <it has> rest for a privative opposite. Similarly, rest has another rest for its contrary, and <it has> a motion for its privative opposite. Because if someone were to posit that rest is contrary to motion, it will not be possible to avoid <something that is> untenable, namely, that many <things will be> contrary to the same univocal <thing>, which is contrary to Aristotle in Bk. I of 26. Categories, Ch. 14 (15b 1–5).
27. On the Soul, Bk. II, Ch. 11 (417b 2–16).
QUESTION 44
the Topics28 and in Bk. X of the Metaphysics.29 It is not unsuitable, however, for one to be contrary and the other to be opposed privatively to the same <thing>.
[IV. What Must Be Noted About "Having"] To have, however, is said in many modes, etc.30
21. It must be noted that in however many modes something is said to be in another, it can be said in as many modes that one <thing> has the other which is in it. But, even though eight modes of "to have" are posited here and eight modes of "being in" <are posited> in Bk. IV of the Physics,31 they are not the same, nor, perhaps, are all these reducible to those, nor vice versa.
22. Nevertheless, it must be understood on behalf of this distinction that just as all genera of accidents are equivocally in substance, so substance has them equivocally. Therefore, Aristotle32 posits two primary modes, by which substance is said to have quality or quantity, and two other <modes> concerning the tenth category, which is having (habitus), as to have those
<things> which "are concerning the body according to the whole or according to the part"33––through those four modes of the primary genera of accidents and of the last genera, giving
<us> to understand the other modes of "to have" according to the other intermediate genera. And he adds four other modes of "to have," for example, a part, a content, a possession, and a cohabitant, through which the other prior modes can become known. Nor does he enumerate all the modes of "to have," but <only> the best known, and especially concerning the number of those that are to the question.
23. On behalf of all these, it must be noted concerning the 28. Topics, Bk. I, Ch. 7 (113a 23).
29. Metaphysics, Bk. X, Ch. 4 (1055a 20–24).
30. Categories, Ch. 15 (15b 17–32).
31. Physics, Bk. IV, Ch. 3 (210a 14–24).
32. Categories, Ch. 15 (15a 17–30).
33. Cf. Liber sex principiorum, Ch. 7, n. 74.
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
equivocation of "having," that it has four primary senses which are said to be prior,34 and as it is taken in the fourth sense, it has this whole distinction.
24. It must be noted on behalf of the third mode,35 that having (habitus), as it is a most general <genus>, is not had, as it says in Bk. V of the Metaphysics,36 since then there would be a process ad infinitum, but it is an intermediate relation (habitudo) between having and being adjacent to a body, which are had through that habit <or having> (habitus). For if a habit (habitus), as it is the most general <genus>, were to be had, this would be through another habit; and with equal reason, that <habit> would be had through another, and there would be an infinite
<number> of beings. This is untenable, since then there would be no first being––the opposite of which is proved in Bk. II of the Metaphysics,37 and in some way it is persuaded in the end of Bk. XII of the Metaphysics,38 thus: "beings do not wish to be poorly disposed; 'however, there is no good in a plurality of rulers; therefore, there is one ruler,'" who is God, blessed for ever and ever. Amen.
34. Cf. supra, n. 22; cf. also supra, q. 30–36, n. 39.
35. Cf. supra, n. 22.
36. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 20 (1022b 9–10).
37. Metaphysics, Bk. II, Ch. 2 (994a 1–b 30).
38. Metaphysics, Bk. XII, Ch. 10 (1076a 3–4). Homer, Iliad, Bk. II, l. 204.
INDEX