Question Thirteen
[QUESTION THIRTEEN
Whether Certain Implications of Aristotle Hold Formally] Therefore, all others either are said of primary substances or are in them.1
t is asked about the implications which Aristotle2
gives for proving this conclusion, namely, "animal is
predicated of man; therefore, <it is predicated> of some man" and "color is in a body; therefore, <it is> in some body," whether implications of this kind hold formally.
1. It seems that they do not:
Since neither does it hold in another place that "species is predicated of man; therefore, <it is predicated> of some man," where it is the same form of arguing.
2. Second, it seems that <this> is a fallacy of the consequent "by not being distributed from the higher to the lower,"3 and so it is an affirmation of the consequent, which implications are not valid.4
1. Categories, Ch. 5 (2a 34–36).
2. Categories, Ch. 5 (2a 36–b 2). The implications to which Scotus refers are two hypothetical arguments that he uses to prove the conclusions mentioned here, namely, "if animal is not predicated of any individual man, then it is not predicated of man in general," and "if color is not in some individual body, then it is not in a body at all."
3. Apparently, the objection is based upon the fact that Aristotle's hypothetical syllogism moves from an inferior term in the antecedent to a superior term in the consequent, instead of the other way around.
4. According to the objection, the hypothetical argument is fallacious because it affirms the consequent, whereas in reality, the consequent is already
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3. Third, a term of itself is indifferent to every supposition.
Therefore, if it is argued from that thing taken absolutely to that thing <taken> only under one supposition, it is argued from <something> indifferent to <something> determinate, and so it commits a fallacy of the consequent. It is <taken> in this way in the affirmation.
4. Fourth, by the same reason by which that implication holds, it seems that this <implication also> holds: "animal is predicated of every man; therefore, some animal <is predicated of every man>"; but this is not valid; therefore, neither is that <valid>. Proof of the major: in each of them a similar descent is made, except that here <the descent is made> in the subject, there <the descent is made> in the predicate; this diversity does not impede <the argument>, since every universal can be converted when the terms are taken uniformly. The proof of the minor: since the antecedent is true, the consequent is false.
5. Fifth, with equal reason it follows that "an animal is every man; therefore, some animal <is every man>," which is not true, since the antecedent is true and the consequent false, since its contradictory is true. That the antecedent is true is evident: since "an animal is man insofar as <it is> man; therefore, <an animal is> every man." The antecedent of this is evident: since
"animal through the nature of man is man; therefore, to that extent <it is> man." The implication is evident according to Aristotle in Bk. I of the Prior Analytics in the chapter "On Reduplication."5
6. Sixth, the primary <substances> destroyed (destructis primis),6 <if> animal is predicated of man, and not of some man, negative, so that, without qualification, the conclusion is an affirmation, even though in the syllogism it is actually a denial of the original consequent. As the reply in n. 7 states, Aristotle actually "proves each implication by inferring from the opposite of the consequent to the opposite of the antecedent." In short, the syllogism is a modus tollens argument.
5. Prior Analytics, Bk. I, Ch. 38 (49a 11–26).
6. "The primary [substances] destroyed (destructis primis)" is an ablative absolute. Appealing to the authority of Priscian, Scotus points out in n. 24 that this phrase can be explained by any one of the following qualifiers: "if," "since," or "when." Scotus, however, deliberately leaves this question unanswered, claiming that any one of them is possible. Consequently, in translating this phrase
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then the implication <i.e., that it is predicated of some man> is not valid, since there is not any <primary substance>. From this it also follows that the <third> conclusion7 of Aristotle is false, namely, "the primary <substances> destroyed,"8 etc., since <if> these <primary substances> did not exist (eis non existentibus), secondary substances could <still> be mutually predicated of themselves essentially (per se); therefore, <they could> also remain <in themselves>; since "to be a secondary substance" is to be predicated essentially in the genus of substance.
7. To the opposite is Aristotle. And he proves each implication by inferring the opposite of the antecedent from the opposite of the consequent.
[I. To The Question] [A. A Doubt about the First and Second Implication Concerning the First Conclusion9 of Aristotle]
8. It must be said that this implication is good: "animal is predicated of man; therefore, <it is predicated> of some man,"10 by taking "is predicated" as Aristotle takes it here, namely, <by taking it for the predication> of a superior <term> of an inferior <term> in a genus. For what lies above this rule11 "when one <thing> is predicated of another," etc., which is valid, is this
<rule>: "what is prior to the prior in a genus, is prior to the posterior."12 It must also be understood that this implication holds by descending to that <particular> man, where it is a determinately determined primary substance (prima substantia determinata et determinate), since it follows that "if animal is prior to man, then <it is prior> to that <man>." But Aristotle, in making throughout this question, I have followed Scotus's lead and left it as ambiguous as he does.
7. The third conclusion referred to is that "it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist."
8. Categories, Ch. 5 (2b 6–7).
9. Categories, Ch. 5 (2a 34–36).
10. Cf. supra, fn. 2.
11. Categories, Ch. 3 (1b 10); cf. supra, q. 9.
12. Cf. supra, q. 9, n. 14.
QUESTION 13
the inference, applies it to a determinate primary substance, although indeterminately, as it is posited through this <phrase>:
"what is some man," since the opposite of the consequent is taken in this way.
9. But about the <second> implication, "color is in a body; therefore, <it is> in some body,"13 it is more doubtful, since it does not hold through the rule expressed above.14
10. It is said that it holds for common accidents through the dialectical <rule> "from the greater," since these are primarily in primary substances rather than in secondary <substances>, although it holds for a property the other way around.
11. Against this <argument>: then he does not prove universally that all other <things> are <either> said primarily of primary substances or are in them, since proper accidents are not <in primary substances>.
12. One can say that the second implication holds of every real accident, since no such <accident> exists in <something> common, except by some mediating supposit. Therefore, if it exists in a common <thing>, it also exists in a supposit, nevertheless indeterminately. And according to this it must be understood that the second implication does not hold by descending determinately to a determinate primary substance, but <this> is a fallacy of the consequent. Nor does Aristotle descend in this way, since he neither takes the opposite of the consequent in this way, but he descends to a determinate <primary substance>; nevertheless, <he does so> indeterminately.
13. Furthermore, this proof does not seem sufficient, since a property is in <something> common, and not insofar as it is in the supposits. Since, insofar as it is a property, it is primarily in <something> common, and according to this, the common
<thing> is extraneous to the supposits. Since by taking "common" for the middle <term>, so that the property is primarily said of it, and <by taking it> in the minor so that it is in the sup13. Cf. supra, fn. 2.
14. Cf. supra, n. 8.
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posit, there is a fallacy of accident in this way: "man is primarily risible; that is a man; therefore, that <man> is primarily risible."
Therefore, not every real accident is in <something> common as it is in the supposits.
[B. The Solution to the Doubts about Each Implication] 14. Therefore, it is said that each implication15 holds only by taking "common" as it has personal supposition, and then the second implication holds in virtue of this rule: "nothing is in something suppositing disjunctively for many, unless it is in something of those <which is> taken indeterminately."
15. But nevertheless the first implication seems to hold absolutely without such a specification of supposition, since the significate of the superior is prior to the inferior. Therefore, whatever is prior to that significate, is prior to the supposit; and the first implication holds according to this <rule>.
16. One can say that in a simple supposition the significate is taken for the significate, and that whatever is prior to the significate of a superior in that mode, is not prior to the inferior.
Since the significate of a superior in that mode is not prior to the inferior, but is extraneous to it, as is evident by joining the premises together, when a term holds absolutely in the major, and in the minor it is said of the supposits.
[C. Concerning the Second Conclusion16 of Aristotle] 17. From these consequent proofs from the opposites, Aristotle infers:17 "therefore, all other <things> either are said of the principal, substantial subjects, or are in them." This conclusion must be understood, as it follows from the antecedent proof, and it is <understood> in this way: all other <things> which are said of secondary <substances> or are in them, as they have a personal acceptance, are said of primary <substances> or are in them.
15. Cf. supra, nn. 8–9.
16. The second conclusion, which is given at (2b 4–5), is a recapitulation of the first conclusion, which is given at (2a 34–36).
17. Categories, Ch. 5 (2b 4–5).
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[D. Concerning the Third Conclusion of Aristotle] 18. From this second conclusion Aristotle infers a third <conclusion>18 "Therefore, the primary <substances> destroyed, it is impossible that any of the others remain." This <conclusion> can be explained in this way: "with respect to that existence which the other <things> have in primary <substances>," although they could remain with respect to another existence, as a quiddity or as an intelligible existence.
19. Against this exposition: a secondary substance, insofar as an expression is made about it here, is opposed to a primary
<substance>, since they divide substance through <being> opposite, and an accident <is opposed> to each of them. No opposite, however, has its existence in its opposite. Therefore, no secondary substance has its existence in a primary <substance>.
Therefore, according to that exposition "the primary <substances> destroyed, nothing of the other <things> is destroyed" is said absolutely. This is confirmed through the fact that Aristotle, speaking of secondary substance and accidents, says, "all other <things> than primary <substance>."19 But these, insofar as they have their existence in a primary <substance>, are not other <things>. Therefore, it is not said of these insofar as they have their existence in a primary substance.
20. For this reason, one can say otherwise that this third conclusion, as it is taken logically, namely, of these intentions, is manifest in this way: a secondary substance is said relatively to a primary <substance> as it is said to that of which it is said.
Therefore, if there is not a primary <substance>, there is not a secondary <substance>, since "relatives are simultaneous by nature," according to Aristotle further on in the chapter "On Relation."20
21. Likewise, an accident is said relatively to a subject, when speaking of the intentions; and an intention of a subject is based on either a primary or a secondary substance. If <it is based>
18. Cf. supra, n. 6.
19. Cf. supra, n. 17.
20. Categories, Ch. 7 (7b 15).
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on a primary <substance>, then by the primary <substance> being destroyed, it is not the subject of that accident. If it is not the subject, then neither <is it> the accident, in virtue of this rule: "relatives are simultaneous by nature." If an intention of a subject is based on a secondary substance, it can be argued in this way: the primary substance destroyed, there is no secondary <substance>, according to the argument (locum) from relatives. And if there is no secondary substance, the subject of such an accident does not exist. And if this <is true>, then there is no such accident, according to the argument (locum) from relatives.
22. It is said that the intention of a subject, with respect to its accident, can be based in some accident, which is neither a secondary nor a primary substance.
23. Against this <argument>: that accident has a subject, <which is> either an accident or a substance. If it is a substance, it is argued <in the same way> as above.21 If it is an accident,
<then> that <accident> has a subject: either it proceeds ad infinitum in accidents, of which <things> anything is the subject of another—which Aristotle holds to be untenable in Bk. IV of the Metaphysics;22 or it will come to a stop at a secondary or a primary substance. And concerning all these, it is argued from first to last.
24. It must be noted, however, that this proposition, "the primary <substances> destroyed," etc., does not posit that the primary <substances> are destroyed. Since an ablative absolute, according to Priscian in Bk. II of the Constructions,23 is explained through "if," "since," or "when." Therefore, it is possible that this is the sense: "if" the primary substances were destroyed, the other <things> would be destroyed; or "since" or "when." And whichever explanation is true, since the affirmation of any one is in comparison to another, it does not require that that one be
21. Cf. supra, n. 21.
22. Metaphysics, Bk. IV, Ch. 4 (1007a 34–b 1).
23. Priscianus, Institutiones grammaticae, XVIII, Ch. 1 (ed. M. Hertz, II 214– 215).
QUESTION 13
posited absolutely, but <that> is a fallacy according to a certain respect (quid) and absolutely.
25. Also, the aforesaid conclusion,24 namely, <the one that follows,> "the primary <substances> destroyed," etc., can be understood about those which exist under intentions, since a secondary substance does not have another existence than <the existence> from a primary substance. Similarly, the being of an accident (esse accidentis) is from a subject. If it is from a primary substance that is not <actually> existing, <then> there is no accident. If from a secondary <substance>, that <substance> does not exist if the primary <substance> does not exist. Therefore, if there were no primary substance, no substance would exist nor would any accident.
26. Perhaps this third conclusion is even more generally true than the first or second <conclusion>, although it is not <true> insofar as it is inferred from them.
[II. To The Principal Arguments] 27. To the first argument,25 I say that a species is not predicated of man, as "to be predicated" is taken here, since it is not superior to it in a genus.
28. Against this: this is true: "man is a species"; therefore, "species" is truly predicated of man.
29. Likewise, if a species is in man, it is argued that the following implication is not valid, since it does not follow <that>
"therefore, it is in some man."
30. To the first <objection>,26 I say that this verb "is" can indicate any union of the extremes, and it is not necessary that it always indicate that a predicate is superior to the subject. But for the exercising of that which is signified, here it is necessary to add some determination to the composition of this verb "is," as "essentially" or something of this kind.
24. The conclusion referred to is that "it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist."
25. Cf. supra, n. 1.
26. Cf. supra, n. 28.
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31. The second reason against the response27 proves that what is in man—not according to personal supposition but simple––is not in some man, which is well conceded.—One can also say to the <first> principal argument28 that "species," if it is said of man, is nevertheless not <said of man in such a way> so that man has personal supposition. And neither implication is valid unless it is taken commonly.
32. To the second principal argument,29 as it is against each implication,30 one can say generally that it is not a fallacy of the consequent, since it is not argued to a determinate primary substance determinately but indeterminately, and in this way it is equally common with a common term, by being taken personally. But insofar as it is against the first implication, one can specifically say that when "prior" or "superior" or others of this kind express a relation to the posterior and to the inferior, one may argue from a superior determining such a relation to an inferior. Since whatever is prior to man, is prior to that <particular man>. The cause of which is that since a superior, insofar as it determines such a relation, has the virtue <or force> of being taken universally. For what is prior to the superior, is said of it universally; and from the superior being distributed, one may descend to the inferior.
33. To the third <principal argument>,31 I say that a term in one proposition has but one supposition, since one proposition is a sign of one composite understanding. And diverse suppositions of terms are diverse accounts of understanding a term with respect to a third <thing>; and all diverse suppositions are opposites in their own genus. Since, therefore, it is impossible that the same <thing>, in the same composite understanding with respect to a third <thing>, be understood under diverse or opposite accounts of understanding, <then> it is impossible that the same <thing> have diverse suppositions in one proposition. Therefore, the term is indifferent to diverse suppositions, although not in one proposition. We speak, however, of the 27. Cf. supra, n. 29.
28. Cf. supra, n. 1.
29. Cf. supra, n. 2.
30. Cf. supra, nn. 8–9.
31. Cf. supra, n. 3.
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consequent <in the same way> that the antecedent is one proposition, and so there is no more indifference in the antecedent than in the consequent.
34. To the fourth <principal> argument32 that is against the first implication,33 one can say that it is not a similar type (ratio) of descending. Since by descending under the subject, one argues through this rule "what is predicated of the superior, is also <predicated> of the inferior," which is necessary as "to be predicated" is taken here. By descending under the predicate, however, it is argued through this rule: "the inferior is also
<predicated> of what the superior is predicated," which commits the fallacy of the consequent.
35. It must be noted that although one can concede that this is true: "every man is some animal," nevertheless, it is not <true> insofar as "some animal" is a primary substance. For a determinate primary substance, whether taken determinately or indeterminately, is not said of every man.
36. But then it seems that that reasoning34 is more valid against the second implication,35 since by arguing in this way,
"in every body there is color; therefore, in every body there is some color," so that "some color" expresses a primary substance, the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. Nevertheless, this implication seems also to hold through the same rule through which the implication of Aristotle also <holds>.
37. I say that <it does not hold> through the same rule, since the second implication of Aristotle holds through this rule:
"what inheres in something standing disjunctively for many, inheres in some of them indeterminately (indeterminate)"; but a term standing only indefinitely (confuse) <for many>, does not stand disjunctively for many. From this it follows that the implication only holds from a common <term> having personal supposition, and not <from a common term having> any <supposition> whatever but a determinate <supposition>; and that, I say, <does not have it except> when a term stands for some de32. Cf. supra, n. 4.
33. Cf. supra, n. 8.
34. Cf. supra, n. 4
35. Cf. supra, n. 9.
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terminate <thing>, nevertheless indeterminately, as the subject of an indefinite or particular <proposition>.
38. Against this: if it does not follow that "animal is predicated of every man; therefore, some animal <is predicated of every man>," then an animal that is predicated of every man is not some animal. And if this is not said of a primary substance, nor is it in it, as is manifest, then something neither is said of a primary substance nor is in it, which is contrary to Aristotle.
Therefore, it follows that <something> untenable is <held> contrary to Aristotle, unless a descent holds under a term standing merely indefinitely. In the same way one can argue about this:
"color is in every body."
39. To this I say that in the first implication there is a fallacy of the consequent, since in regard to "this follows that," it is inferred, "this is that," and not the other way around. For many <things> are truly said of each other through this word
"is," none of which implies the other. Therefore, when the same order is argued negatively, there is a fallacy of the consequent from the destruction of the antecedent.
40. Besides, when it is said, "if it is not some animal, it is not said of a primary substance," this implication is not valid, since
"something," insofar as it is a secondary substance, is said of a primary <substance>, as "to be said of" is taken here; and according to this it is extraneous "to some animal." Therefore, a fallacy of the accident is revealed in this implication.
41. Furthermore, when it is said, "if animal, as it is said of every man, is not said of some primary substance nor is it in it, then something neither is said of a primary substance nor is in it," there is a fallacy of a figure of speech, by exchanging
"in which" (quo) for "what" (quid).36 For it ought to be inferred in this way: "therefore, something under some mode of being received, is neither said of a primary <substance> nor is in a primary <substance>." And it must be conceded as if necessary, since "every man" neither is said "of" nor is it "in" <a primary substance>.
36. Cf. Sophistical Refutations, Bk. I, Ch. 4 (166b 10–14).
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42. When it is said in the fourth principal argument37 that "there is not a diversity here <in the subject> and there <in the predicate>, except that here a descent happens from the part of the subject, there from the part of the predicate," I say that that descent accompanies a diversity of suppositions which prohibits the implication, since it does not hold except by a term suppositing in one mode.
43. When it is said38 that "a universal is converted without a figure of speech," it is true, since a variation of supposition concerning one term is not <a variation> in relation to the remaining term suppositing in the same way; and it would not be a figure of speech unless it were.
44. To the <fifth principal argument>,39 I say that <something> similar does not follow from each part, since this proposition, "an animal is every man," is posited by no one as true such that "an animal" has a determinate supposition; and otherwise this implication does not hold.—Or otherwise: <I say that something similar does not follow from each part> since "every man" is not predicated of animal as "to be predicated" is taken here, even though the proposition is posited as true; for it is not true in the first mode of essential (per se) <predication>.
45. To the last <argument>,40 I say that in speaking of intentions, <if> the primary substances are destroyed, <then> there are no secondary substances; since by one relative being destroyed, the remaining is also destroyed.41 Neither is some predicate also in the genus of substance. Nor in that way are primary substances more corruptible than secondary <substances>.
46. It is similar about things which are under (subsunt) <them>, insofar as such intentions are attributed to them. But if we speak about the being of things, perhaps one can concede that man is an animal, although not this or that <animal>; but this is not according to the fact that "man" has a determinate personal supposition (for it does not have that except when there are some supposits of it), but since to accept the supposit
37. Cf. supra, n. 4.
38. Cf. ibid.
39. Cf. supra, n. 5.
40. Cf. supra, n. 6.
41. Cf. Categories, Ch. 7 (7b 20).
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of anything common, either existing or not existing, is through the addition of a demonstrative pronoun in this way: just as "that common <thing>" is. Therefore, it would be better to say that—whether some man exists or not—it always follows that "animal is predicated of man, therefore of some <man>," and that on account of the same the consequent is true, and on account of that the antecedent <is true>, namely, on account of the inseparable union of the extremes, even if neither exists.
47. Against the third conclusion,42 it is argued in this way: when the posterior is destroyed, it is not necessary that the prior be destroyed. But a secondary substance is prior to the primary
<substance>, since it follows the primary and not the other way around; and prior is <understood> as such according to Aristotle in the chapter "Concerning Priority."43 Therefore, <if> the primary substance <were> destroyed, it is not necessary that the secondary be destroyed.
48. One can say that, in speaking of intentions, they are simultaneous by nature since they are correlatives; in speaking of things, although perhaps "man" is prior to that man, nevertheless it is not <prior> to some man, since a secondary substance does not have another existence than the existence of some primary substance.
42. Cf. supra, n. 18.
43. Categories, Ch. 12 (14a 29–35); Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 11 (1018b 30– 1019a 14).