Question Ten
[QUESTION TEN
It is to be Asked About the Second Rule:
Whether the Same Can Be in Diverse Genera]
t is asked about the truth of this rule:1 "of diverse
genera <that are> not posited in subalternation <to
each other>, the species and differentiae are diverse," whether something that is the same can be in diverse genera.
1. It seems that it can:
Body is in the genus of substance, according to Porphyry;2 and in the genus of quantity, according to Aristotle in the chapter "On Quantity."3
2. Second, figure is in the genus of quantity, since the geometer, who essentially (per se) considers only quantity, essentially
(per se) considers figure. And figure is in the genus of quality, according to Aristotle in the chapter "On Quality."4
3. Third, science is essentially (per se) in the genus of quality, since it is in the first species;5 and it is essentially (per se) relative, according to Aristotle in the chapter "On Relation"6 and in Bk. V of the Metaphysics.7
4. Fourth, double and half are essentially (per se) quantities and <they are essentially> relatives. Similarly, it is distinctive according to quality that "similar" or "dissimilar" is said <of some1. Categories, Ch. 3 (1b 16–17).
2. "Body is a species of substance but a genus of animate body"; Isagoge, "On Species" (AL I6 9–10; ed. Busse, 4.27–28).
3. Categories, Ch. 6 (4b 23–25).
4. Categories, Ch. 8 (10a 11–12).
5. Categories, Ch. 8 (8b 27–30).
6. Categories, Ch. 7 (6b 1–2).
7. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 15 (1021a 30–31).
QUESTION 10
thing that falls into that category>, and it is distinctive according to quality that "equal" or "unequal" <is said of something that falls into that category>; therefore, these <"similar," "dissimilar," "equal," and "unequal"> are in those genera <i.e., in the genera of quality and quantity, respectively>;8 and they are essentially (per se) relatives, according to Aristotle.9 Similarly it is argued of many other relatives.
5. Fifth, motion seems to be in the genus of quantity, and in the genus of action or affection. Proof of the first <position, i.e., that motion is in the genus of quantity> according to Aristotle in Bk. V of the Metaphysics, in the chapter "On Quantity":10
"time is quantity through motion," therefore motion <all the> more <is a quantity>; and time essentially (per se) is <a species of quantity>, since there are five species of continuous quantity according to Aristotle;11 therefore, all the more is motion a species of quantity. Proof of the second <position, i.e., that motion is in the genus of action or passion>: since every true predicate in the abstract is essentially the same as that <predicate in the concrete>;12 it is true that "affection is a motion" and "action is a motion"; therefore, etc.13 Proof of the minor: it is essentially (per se) true that "being acted upon14 is being moved"; therefore, affection is motion.
6. Sixth, according to Aristotle in Bk. V of the Physics:15 motion receives its species from the term to which <it proceeds>; therefore, it is the same for the genus also. But the term of motion is essentially (per se) in three genera, according to Aristotle in the same place,16 namely, quantity, quality, and place. Therefore, motion is essentially (per se) in these three genera.
8. Categories, Ch. 6 (6a 35), Ch. 8 (11a 18–19).
9. Categories, Ch. 7 (6b 21–24).
10. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 13 (1020a 32–33).
11. Categories, Ch. 6 (4b 23–25).
12. That a concrete term and an abstract term signify the same thing, see q. 8, n. 14.
13. The conclusion is that "motion is in the genus of action and passion."
14. "Suffering," patiens, is related etymologically to "passion," passio.
15. Physics, Bk. V, Ch. 1 (224b 7–9).
16. Physics, Bk. V, Ch. 1 (225a 35–b 9).
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
7. If it is said that motion is equivocally in these three genera:17––Against this: motion is said of alteration, of augmentation, and of a change of place according to the same name and the same essential meaning, namely, "the act of being in potency insofar as it is in potency," which is its nature (ratio), according to Aristotle in Bk. III of the Physics;18 therefore, <it is said> univocally.
8. To the opposite is Aristotle.
9. Likewise, those things that differ in the prior, differ in the posterior; therefore, those which differ in a genus, differ in whatever is posterior; and nothing is in different most general genera.
[I. To The Question] 10. To the question19 it must be said that "same" is said in many ways, as is said in Bk. I of the Topics:20 in genus, in species, and in number. And "same" in number <can be said> in three senses: in accident, in property, and in definition.21 And in Bk.
V of the Metaphysics,22 it is said that "same" in itself is said in as many ways as one <is said> in itself, namely, in number, in species, in genus, and in proportion.23 "Same" in proportion and "same" in number, with respect to two modes, namely, "same" in accident and in property, can be in diverse genera. Since animal and color are the same in proportion, since such an identity consists in "being the case similarly";24 for as color is to whiteness, so animal is to man. Similarly, Socrates and white are the same in accident; Socrates and "capable of being taught"
<literally: "participating in teaching"> or "risible" are the same 17. Cf. supra, n. 6.
18. Physics, Bk. III, Ch. 1 (201a 11–13).
19. Cf. Scotus, Metaphysics, Bk. V, q. 4.
20. Topics, Bk. I, Ch. 7 (103a 7–14).
21. Topics, Bk. I, Ch. 7 (103a 24–31).
22. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 9 (1018a 4–8).
23. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 9 (1018a 12–13).
24. The Latin is similiter se habere, which may also be translated as "[behaving] similarly."
QUESTION 10
in property, and thus <they are> the same; it is manifest that they are in diverse genera. The same in species or in genus is in no way in diverse most general genera, or in any <that are> not subalternated, such as species or differentia, except perhaps that the same in a superior genus <is> in diverse inferior genera. That the same, however, in species or in an inferior genus is not in diverse superior genera <that are> not subalternated, such as species or differentia, seems to be manifest, since the genus pertains to the essence of the species. Therefore, if the same in a species or in an inferior genus were to be in diverse superior genera, then both <the diverse most general> genera would be of its essence; therefore, that would not be the same essentially, since two non-subalternated genera predicate a diverse essence. Similarly, a differentia is one essentially with its genus; but with diverse genera that are not subalternated nothing is the same essentially; therefore, etc.
[II. To The Principal Arguments] 11. To the first argument,25 Albert says26 that a body, as it expresses a nature suited to receiving three dimensions, is in the genus of substance; insofar as it names those three dimensions themselves, it is in the genus of quantity. <A reply to> the first
<argument> is evident, since an incorporeal nature is said to be a substance to which it is repugnant to receive dimensions.
12. To the second <argument>,27 I say that this noun "figure" in one way signifies the surface terminated by lines, and so is in the genus of quantity; in another way it signifies the enclosure itself of the lines or the termination, and so is in the fourth species of quality. Hence the qualities of the fourth species are said to be qualities concerning quantity.
13. To the third <argument>,28 it is said that relations are essentially (per se) in the genus of relation; however, relatives are able to be things of other genera, since relatives are those
25. Cf. supra, n. 1.
26. Albertus Magnus, Praedic. tr. 1 c 6 (ed. Borgnet, I 162b–163a).
27. Cf. supra, n. 2.
28. Cf. supra, n. 3.
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
<things> in which a relation is founded, and those <things> are things of other genera. Through this <type of reasoning>, it is said to all these <arguments> that although those <things> are relatives, nevertheless they are not in the genus of relation but <are> in other genera.
14. Against this <argument>: concrete and abstract <terms> signify the same essentially; therefore, they are in the same genus.29 Therefore, if relations are essentially (per se) in the genus of relation, relatives will also be <in that genus>. The implication is evident, since the essence of the same genus is the same, because being according to itself is divided into the ten genera.
15. Likewise, if relatives were not in the genus of relation, nothing determined <about them> in the chapter "Concerning
Relation" in the Categories would pertain to anything in that genus. And in this way all things which he determines there would be irrelevant to the determination of that genus, which seems unsuitable. The first implication is evident, for neither the first definition "of relation,"30 nor the second <definition>,31 which Aristotle approves, nor any property that he posits, would pertain to relations, but only to relatives, which, through the hypothesis, are not in the genus of relation.
16. For this reason, one can say that relatives are essentially (per se) in the genus of relation, just as concrete <terms> of other <things> are in other genera, which will be discussed afterwards;32 and in this way nothing essentially (essentialiter) the same is essentially (per se) relative and a species of another genus. Therefore, "science" is equivocal for signifying the habit of a mind and for signifying an image of <something> knowable, which two are essentially diverse. In the first way it is a species of quality; in the second way, it is essentially (per se) relative.
17. To the fourth <argument>,33 it is said that double and half are essentially (per se) in the genus of relation, not <in the 29. Relatives, e.g., things that are knowable, are concrete, whereas relations are abstract. Categories, Ch. 8 (11a 20–31).
30. Categories, Ch. 7 (6a 37–38).
31. Categories, Ch. 7 (8a 29–34).
32. Cf. infra, q. 25–26.
33. Cf. supra, n. 4.
QUESTION 10
genus> of quantity; neither does Aristotle say that <they are in the genus of quantity>, although that to which double is essentially (per se) inherent, as two, is essentially (per se) a quantity.
Since it is not necessary that an accident be in the same genus as a species with its subject. Similarly about equal and unequal, similar and dissimilar, it must be said that they are essentially
(per se) relatives, but they are in the genus of quantity or quality, not as species but as properties, as it is evident according to Aristotle,34 in the last property of quantity and quality. It is possible, however, of many <things> to be in one genus as species, in another as properties, since "risible" is in the genus of substance as a property, in quality as a species.
18. To the authority of Aristotle,35 I say that he says:36 "If it happens that the same <thing> is a relative and a quality (quale), nothing prevents that which is the same in this manner from being numbered in diverse genera"; because it is not the same essentially.
19. To the fourth <argument>37 about motion, it will be addressed later.38
[III. Objections And Their Solutions] 20. Against this position.39 According to Aristotle in Bk. V of the Metaphysics,40 "one in number entails one in species." According to the response, an accident and a subject are one in number;41 and they are in diverse genera; therefore, the same in species can be in diverse genera.
21. Likewise, it is argued through an expository syllogism in the third figure, namely, "that this donkey is a non-quality; this donkey is a non-man; therefore, non-man is a non-quality," by taking in the premises each extreme so that it is an indefinite
34. Categories, Ch. 6 (6a 35), Ch. 8 (11a 18–19).
35. Cf. supra, n. 4.
36. Categories, Ch. 8 (11a 37–38).
37. Cf. supra, nn. 5–6.
38. Cf. infra, q. 44, nn. 9–19.
39. This and the subsequent paragraph are further objections to Scotus's position.
40. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 6 (1016b 31–1017a 1).
41. Cf. supra, n. 10.
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term, and thus concluding. But "if the opposite of the opposite, and the proposed of the proposed <term, be taken>," according to Aristotle in Bk. II of the Topics,42 then, "man is a quality." But a quality in the abstract is predicated of no thing, except what is of that same genus. Therefore, man is in the genus of quality and is a substance; therefore, etc. This reason can commonly be made to show that every affirmative is true.
22. To the first of these <objections>,43 one can say that Aristotle44 previously distinguished the modes of one accidentally
(per accidens), and afterwards45 he divided one essentially (per se) into these modes: in number, in species, etc. And when he adds that "one in number entails one in species," he understands it only of one in number as he had previously posited it, namely, as it is a mode of one essentially (per se). If, however, the subject and the accident were to be one in number, that is, one accidentally (per accidens) and not essentially (per se), then of these he does not understand such an implication to hold.46
23. To the other <objection>,47 it is said that the rule "if the opposite," etc., holds of contraries in themselves,48 <then it holds> of contradictories from the contrary, as it is said in Bk. II of the Topics.49 Therefore, it cannot be argued in the same order affirmatively and negatively without <committing> the fallacy of the consequent, but it must be argued from the opposite of the predicate to the opposite of the subject. It is argued, however, in this way: "non-man is non-quality; therefore, man is quality," which implication is not valid.
42. Topics, Bk. IV, Ch. 3 (124a 8–9).
43. Cf. supra, n. 20.
44. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 6 (1015b 16–35).
45. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 6 (1015b 32–33).
46. Cf. infra, q. 37–38, nn. 28–29.
47. Cf. supra, n. 21.
48. I have chosen to follow an alternate reading here. The critical edition has in se ipso, which does not make sense, since it cannot refer to the regula, which is feminine, nor to the contrariis, which are plural. In the alternative manuscript, which I have followed, the Latin has in se ipsis.
49. Topics, Bk. II, Ch. 8 (113b 15–26).
QUESTION 10
24. Against <this argument>, I argue from the contrary in this way: "non-man is non-quality; therefore, quality is man."
And if this is true, then this also <is true>: "man is a quality" through conversion. Similarly, transpose the premises, "therefore, non-quality is non-man," and further, "therefore, man is a quality," from the contrary; therefore, etc.50
25. For this reason it is said otherwise, that "man" and "nonman" are not opposed as indefinite terms are, but as "non-man" is a negated term. And in this way the conclusion does not follow in the expository syllogism.
26. Against this: as it is an indefinite term, "man" or "nonman" is said of anything whatever, and both <are not said> of anything that is the same;51 so they contradict themselves in the subject.
27. Likewise, a negation that renders a term indefinite and <a negation that> negates a term do not seem to differ with respect to the significate, since on both sides the significate of the finite term is negated.
28. Otherwise, it is said that in an expository paralogism there is a fallacy of accident, since the middle term is varied.
Since in the first <premise> "that donkey" is taken insofar as there is a completive differentia through which it is in the species by which it is distinguished from man. In the other <premise>, "that donkey is non-quality," <the term> is taken according to the form of the substance in which it agrees with man and is distinguished from everything which is of another genus.
29. Against this: one can argue similarly elsewhere where such a defect cannot be assigned; therefore, neither is it here essentially (per se). The implication is evident according to Ar50. The statement "non-man is non-quality" is taken universally for "all non–man," hence it can be contraposited to the statement "quality is man." The converse of this statement, however, is, "some man is a quality," which cannot be contraposited, since it is a particular affirmative statement. Thus the conclusion, i.e., that "a non-quality is a non-man," cannot be contraposited again to mean that "[every] man is a quality."
51. On Interpretation, Bk. I, Ch. 9 (18a 29–30).
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
istotle in Bk. II of the Sophistical Refutations:52 "Of all speeches which depend on the same <point>, the solution is the same."
The antecedent is evident if it is argued in this way "whiteness is a non-man; whiteness is a non-donkey; therefore, a non-donkey is a non-man"; "therefore, man is a donkey."
30. Otherwise, one can say, when the conclusion of the expository syllogism has been conceded, that the last <proposition>, "therefore, man is a quality," does not follow, nor <does the statement> "therefore, quality is a man." What is said, however, in Bk. II of the Topics,53 "in contradictories it holds from the contrary," is manifestly said of the implication, not of the predication.
31. Likewise, that rule, "if opposite from opposite,"54 etc., must be understood only in contraries. Or if it is understood in contradictories of the predication from a contrary, this is true only if the predication in the antecedent is essential (per se), or to a universally lesser if the terms are common. I say this for the conversion of a universal affirmative through contraposition.
Now, however, whatever conclusion that is inferred through an expository syllogism is concluded to be true neither essentially
(per se) nor universally, and for the same reason in no way does it follow that an opposite is predicated of its opposite, neither in itself nor from the contrary.
52. Sophistical Refutations, Bk. II, Ch. 5 (177b 31–32).
53. Topics, Bk. II, Ch. 8 (113b 15–26).
54. Topics, Bk. IV, Ch. 3 (124a 8–9).