Question Seven
[QUESTION SEVEN
Whether a Genus is Univocal with Regard to Its Species]
t is asked about the example that Aristotle1 gives to
illustrate the account of univocals ("for example, man
is an animal, and cow <is an animal>"), whether the genus is univocal with regard to its species.
1. It seems that it is not:
Since, according to Aristotle in Book VII of the Physics:2 "a comparison can be made according to a univocal <term>"; but, according to him in the same place,3 "a comparison is not made according to a genus"; therefore, etc.4
2. Second, if the genus were univocal, the unity of the genus would be as great as the unity of the species. The consequent is false, according to Aristotle (in Bk. V of the Metaphysics, in the chapter on "One"), who says that "one in species implies one in genus and not the other way around"; therefore, the antecedent is false.5 Proof of the implication: a species is not one in existing (rather, it is as manifold as its supposits, since it exists only in its supposits), but it is only one according to the definition and the one object of the intellect. But a genus has both of these unities, given that it is univocal. Therefore, etc.
1. Categories, Ch. 1 (1a 6–7).
2. Physics, Bk. VII, Ch. 4 (248b 6–9). The critical edition has the following footnote: Sola univoca et non aequivoca sunt comparabilia, that is, "only univocals and not equivocals are comparable [or commensurable]."
3. Physics, Bk. VII, Ch. 4 (249a 3–8).
4. The conclusion is: "the genus is not univocal with regard to the species."
5. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 6 (1016b 32–1017a 6).
QUESTION 7
3. Third, what is univocal with regard to many is not in itself (secundum se) diverse in them. But a genus is in itself diverse in diverse species, and not accidentally, so according to Aristotle in Bk. X of the Metaphysics 6 (in the chapter <beginning with>
"Diverse <things>, however, in themselves"). Therefore, etc.7
The major8 is evident, since then the genus would be one and many in the species according to the same <thing>.
4. Fourth, a genus predicated of any species predicates the whole which is that species; therefore, just as no species is univocal with regard to diverse species, so neither is a genus <univocal with regard to diverse species>. And this is confirmed according to Aristotle in Bk. VII of the Metaphysics:9 "a genus is nothing beyond its species, or if it is <something>, it is so as matter"; therefore, it does not predicate <anything different> from these.
5. To the opposite is Aristotle.
6. Second, otherwise the genus would not be posited in the definition of any species—just as an equivocal is not posited in the definition of equivocals—since in Bk. VI of the Topics and in Bk. VII of the Metaphysics Aristotle says: "the genus must be posited in every definition."10
7. Third, in equivocals, there is no prior nor posterior, since only the utterance is common; but the genus is prior to the species; therefore, etc.
[I. The Response To The Question] 8. It must be said that the genus is a univocal predicate with regard to its species, since it is predicated of them according
6. Metaphysics, Bk. X, Ch. 8 (1057b 35–1058a 2).
7. The conclusion is: "a genus is not univocal."
8. The major premise is the statement: "what is univocal with regard to many is not in itself diverse with regard to them," while the minor is: "a genus is in itself diverse with regard to diverse species."
9. Metaphysics, Bk. VII, Ch. 12 (1038a 5–7).
10. Topics, Bk. VI, Ch. 4 (141b 25–28), and Metaphysics, Bk. VII, Ch. 12
(1037b 30–31).
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
to the same name and according to the same account, which account or definition is the account of the substance for these species, although <it is> not proper <to them>, since the genus is predicated essentially (in quid) of them, according to Porphyry.11
9. <Whence the univocation of the genus is taken>—But since some unity in the thing corresponds to every univocal
<term> —otherwise, something would be univocal with regard to an accident and a substance—there is a doubt as to what that one<ness> in the thing is from which the univocation of the genus is taken.
10. And one can say that all <things> belonging to one genus have some kind of agreement in substance among them, which they do not have with regard to other <things> belonging to other genera. This is known from the identity of an operation or of an attribute in the singulars. That <genus> is imperfect and potential <with regard to> its species, since diverse species have diverse perfecting forms. Therefore, something material in every species—whether it is the matter or an incomplete form existing in all <the species> of this genus and not of another <genus>––which is the principle of some operation or of an attribute in them, is that one<ness> in the thing. Since that which the intellect considers (not as in this <particular thing>), it considers that <thing> in itself to be essentially in different
<things according to> species, and it attributes to it the intention of a genus—and just as much as the genus is more common, to the same degree is there less unity in the thing. And in this way the noun "of genus" in its own primary understanding implies something that is material in the species, yet according to the mode of the whole, as was said previously.12
11. Porphyry, Isagoge, Ch. "On Genus" (AL I6 6–7; ed. Busse, 2.15–16).
12. Above in this paragraph. Cf. also Duns Scotus, Super Porphyrii, q. 16, n.
36.
QUESTION 7
[II. To The Principal Arguments] 11. To the first <argument>,13 I say that a comparison is not made according to every univocal, but only according to an indivisible species, that is, <according to> the most specific <species>, as it is said there.14—Or otherwise,15 <I say> that according to the logician every univocal expresses that which arrives at the intellect through one account, according to which it is said of many; according to the natural <philosopher>, every <term> is not such, but only what is one according to the ultimate, perfecting form. Therefore, it is said in Bk. VII of the Physics: "Many equivocations are latent in the genus,"16 which the logician, however, would not say. Therefore, if it is said that "a comparison is made according to every univocal," this must be understood only of a univocal according to the natural <philosopher>, which is only the most specific species, not of every univocal according to the logician, in which way the genus is univocal.
12. To the second <argument>,17 I say that the unity in the thing from which the univocation of the species is taken, is greater than <the unity> from which <the univocation> of the genus <is taken>. The reason is that there <in the species>, there is the unity of a perfecting form, whereas here <in the genus> there is only <the unity> of some material and incomplete <form>. Therefore, to the form <of the argument>, I say that there is one genus <with respect to> the two unities of the species that are enumerated there,18 but the third <unity>,19 in which the species exceeds the genus, is omitted.
13. Cf. supra, n. 1.
14. Physics, Bk. VII, Ch. 4 (249a 15–17); cf. also Duns Scotus, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, q. 13 nn. 73–75; Lectura II d. 3 p. 1 a. 1 n. 18; Ordinatio II d. 3 p. 1 q. 1 n. 16.
15. Cf. Duns Scotus, Super Porphyrii, q. 7–8 n. 12; cf. also Thomas Aquinas, Physics, VII Lecture 7, n. 9.
16. Physics, Bk. VII, Ch. 4 (249a 22–25).
17. Cf. supra, n. 2.
18. "There" refers to the second argument, where it was objected that the genus, provided that it is univocal, has a unity according to its definition and a unity as it is an object of the intellect.
19. Cf. Duns Scotus, Super Porphyrii, q. 25 n. 20.
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
13. To the third <argument>,20 I say that there is an equivocation there <in that argument>, since "in itself" (secundum se) can be taken effectively or solitarily, as "essentially" (per se) is taken in the third way,21 or by excluding another cause; and in all these ways, the major <premise> is true and the minor is false.22
In another way "in itself" is taken as it is taken in Bk. V of the Metaphysics,23 namely, as it is opposed to "accidentally," which brings together diverse essences in itself (in se), such as "white man"; and then being in itself is anything having one essence.
In this way, the major is false and the minor is true. And Aristo20. Cf. supra, n. 3.
21. Cf. Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, Ch. 4 (73b 5–10). "[It] should be noted that this preposition per ['in virtue of' or 'by'] denotes a causal relationship, although sometimes it signifies a state, as when someone is said to be per se, i.e., by himself, when he is alone. But when it designates a relationship to a cause, sometimes the cause is formal, as when it is stated that the body lives in virtue of the soul; sometimes the relationship is to a material cause, as when it is stated that a body is colored in virtue of its surface, i.e., because the surface is the subject of color; again, it might even designate a relationship to an extrinsic cause, particularly an efficient cause, as when it is said that water is made hot in virtue of fire. But just as this preposition per designates a relationship to a cause, when something extrinsic is the cause of that which is attributed to the subject, so also when the subject or something pertaining to the subject is the cause of that which is attributed to the subject. This latter is what per se, i.e., in virtue of itself, signifies. . . . Therefore, the first way of saying something per se
(73a 34) is when that which is attributed to a subject pertains to its form. . . . The second mode of saying per se is when this preposition per implies a relationship of material cause. . . . Then (73b 5) he sets down another mode of that which is per se, i.e., the sense in which it signifies something in isolation. Thus something which is a singular in the genus of substance and which is not predicated of any subject is said to be per se. The reason for this is that when I say, 'walking' or 'white,' I do not signify either of them as something isolated or apart, since something else which is walking or white is understood. . . . It should be noted, however, that this mode is not a mode of predicating, but a mode of existing; hence at the very start he said that they exist per se and not that they are said per se. . . . Then (73b 10) he gives the fourth mode, according to which the preposition per designates a relationship of efficient cause or of any other"; Thomas
Aquinas, Posterior Analytics (Bk. I, lect. 10); for the English trans., see Thomas
Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, trans. Larcher, I, lect. 10
(New York: Magi Books, 1961).
22. Thus, "what is univocal to many is not in itself diverse to them" is true, while the minor, "a genus is in itself diverse to diverse species," is false.
23. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 6 (1015b 16–20).
QUESTION 7
tle understands <it> in this way in Bk. X of the Metaphysics, since a genus is diverse through its differentiae, which differentiae are not accidental to the <genus>, since the differentiae with the genus do not make <a thing> one accidentally, but <they make it> one essentially.
14. To the fourth <argument>,24 it is evident that the first proposition, namely, "a genus predicates the whole," must be understood in this way, namely: "<a genus predicates the whole> materially through the mode of the whole," which in itself is one; nevertheless, <the genus> is formally diversified in the species. And in this way the unity of the genus is in itself greater than <the unity> of the species, insofar as they differ through the differentia, since there is not any differentia in the understanding of the genus, but conversely.
24. Cf. supra, n. 4.