Questions Thirty through Thirty-Six
<QUESTIONS THIRTY THROUGH
THIRTY-SIX>
[Question Thirty Whether the Species of Quality are Suitably Assigned] I say, however, that quality is that according to which something is qualified,1 etc.
irst, it is asked whether the species of quality are
suitably assigned.
1. It seems that they are not:
No multiple has species; but quality is multiple, according to Aristotle in this text:2 "quality is of those things which are said in many ways." The major is evident, since a genus is predicated univocally, according to Aristotle3 in the definition of univocals.
2. Second, there are only two first species of any one genus; quality is one genus; therefore, it does not have four first species. Nor do these species seem to be subalternate <species>, since none <of them> is contained under the other. The major is proved thus: every division of a genus is made through contrary differentiae, according to Aristotle in Bk. X of the Metaphysics4 and according to Boethius in his book On Division;5 but "one is only contrary to one," as Aristotle proves in the same
<work> in Bk. X.6 Therefore, there are only two first differen1. Categories, Ch. 8 (8b 25).
2. Categories, Ch. 8 (8b 26).
3. Categories, Ch. 1 (1a 7–8).
4. Metaphysics, Bk. X, Ch. 8 (1058a 10–11).
5. Boethius, Liber de divisione (ed. J. Magee, p. 20; PL 64, 881D).
6. Metaphysics, Bk. X, Ch. 5 (1055b 30).
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
tiae divisive of any genus; therefore, there are only two species constituted through them.
3. Third, it is impossible for two species of the same genus to be predicated of the same <thing>; but "habit" and "disposition," which are assigned to the first species, and "affection" or "affective quality," which are assigned to the third <species>, are predicated of the same quality, as of hot and cold and similar
<qualities> which Aristotle enumerates in the first and third species;7 therefore, the first and third species are not two <species>.
Proof of the major: "every differentia according to its species is a contrariety," according to Aristotle in Bk. X of the Metaphysics;8 and contraries are in no way predicated of the same thing.
The minor is also proved by reason: since the same quality according to its essence can imply the affection of sense, and so it can be an affective quality and can be easily or with difficulty moveable from a subject, and so it is a habit or a disposition.
4. To the opposite is Aristotle.9
[Question Thirty-One Whether the First Species of Quality is Habit and Disposition]
ext it is asked whether the first species of quality is
habit and disposition.
5. It seems that it is not:
Since either these are two <species> or <they are> not. If they are two, then there are not only four species. Also, not every habit is a disposition, which is contrary to Aristotle here and in Bk. V of the Metaphysics.10 If they are not two, then the conjunction is not suitably posited between them, since the conjunction is usually placed between diverse things, and their differentia
7. Categories, Ch. 8 (8b 25–9a 27).
8. Metaphysics, Bk. X, Ch. 8 (1058a 17–19).
9. Categories, Ch. 8 (8b 28, 9a 14, 9a 29, 10a 11).
10. Metaphysics, Bk. X, Ch. 8 (9a 10).
QUESTIONS 30–36
is unsuitably posited through "easily moveable" and "with difficulty moveable," which Aristotle11 posits, since these, because they are opposites, do not inhere in the same <thing>.
6. Second, habit is one most general <genus>; therefore, it is not a species of quality.
7. Third, those that are posited in this species, for example knowledge, virtue, and others of this kind,12 are relatives according to Aristotle above in the chapter "On Relation" and in Bk. IV of the Topics,13 in the many considerations of relative opposites. And if these are relatives (ad aliquid), then the genus of them, which is habit, is relative (ad aliquid). The implication is evident according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the Topics,14 in the first consideration of relative opposites. Therefore, it is not a species of quality.
8. Fourth, in Bk. V of the Metaphysics,15 Aristotle says that disposition (dispositio) is the disposition (ordinatio) of the parts into <something> having parts; but the order (ordo) of parts is not a species of quality; therefore, neither is disposition <one> of its species.
9. To the opposite is Aristotle.
[Question Thirty-Two Whether the Second Species of Quality is Natural Ability16 or Inability]
ext it asked whether the second species of quality is
natural ability or inability.
10. It seems that it is not:
11. Categories, Ch. 8 (8b 29–9a 10).
12. Cf. Categories, Ch. 8 (8b 30).
13. Categories, Ch. 7 (7b 23–35); Topics, Bk. IV, Ch. 4 (124b 15–125b 14).
14. Topics, Bk. IV, Ch. 4 (124b 16).
15. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 20 (1022b 13–14).
16. Here and throughout this question, I translate potentia and impotentia as "ability" and "inability" respectively.
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Since ability is essentially (per se) referred to act; any species of quality is some absolute form. That is evident to a less <degree> about this species, since hardness and softness, which are enumerated here,17 are absolute forms.
11. Second, in accordance with Aristotle in Bk. IV of the Topics18 in the first consideration of privative opposites: "privation, however, is either not in the same genus, or not in the same proximate <genus>"; therefore, inability is not in the same proximate genus with ability.
12. Third, ability is transcendent, since it is the first differentia of being; therefore, it is not a species of quality.
13. Fourth, it is manifest that ability and inability are not subalternated, since neither is predicated of the other; therefore, they are two primary species, and so they are not both in the second species.
14. To the opposite is Aristotle.19
[Question Thirty-Three Whether the Third Species of Quality is Affection and Affective Quality]
ext to this it is asked whether the third species
of quality is affection and affective quality.
15. It seems that it is not:
Since affection <or passion, passio> is one most general <genus>.
16. Second, either "affection and "affective quality" are two <species> or not. If they are, then they are not one species of quality, as the third <species>; if they are not <two species>, then
<something> untenable follows.—First, that Aristotle poorly assigned their differentia, saying that those are affections which 17. Categories, Ch. 8 (9a 25–26).
18. Topics, Bk. IV, Ch. 4 (124a 36–39).
19. Categories, Ch. 8 (9a 14–15).
QUESTIONS 30–36
quickly change,20 and <that> affective qualities are permanent.21
Second, it follows that they are poorly joined to each other. It is also shown that they are the same, since every affection is a quality; therefore, "according to it we say <that something is> qualified"22 through the description of a quality, and he implies the affection of sense. Therefore, every affection is an affective quality and vice versa. Proof: since in Bk. V of the Metaphysics23
Aristotle says that "an affection expresses a quality according to which we say <that something> is altered"; but every affective quality is such, since an alteration is essentially (per se) according to it; therefore, every affective quality is an affection.
17. Third, I prove that no <thing> is an affective quality in the way in which Aristotle understands it. For he says that a quality is not affective because some subject <which has it> is affected by it, but because it makes an affection on the senses.24
I prove that each of these is false.
18. First: since according to the qualities of the third species, there is an essential (per se) alteration, according to Aristotle in Bk. VII of the Physics.25 Therefore, to the extent (ad hoc) that a subject receives such a quality it is necessary that it be altered, and in this way that it be affected by some agent having the same quality in species. Therefore, such a quality implies an affection in the subject receiving it.
19. I prove that the second is false <as follows>: first, since every affection is a motion and every motion is in time, the change of the senses by the sensible, however, is not in time; second, since every affection is with the rejection of a contrary, since every motion <is> also <with the rejection of a contrary>, according to Aristotle in Bk. V of the Physics.26 But there is not a rejection of the contrary when there is a change of sensation by the sensible, since sensation is disposed (dispositus) to the highest degree to receive the sensible species. Each <thing> as20. Categories, Ch. 8 (9b 29–30).
21. Categories, Ch. 8 (9b 21–22).
22. Cf. supra, fn. 1.
23. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 21 (1022b 15–16).
24. Cf. Categories, Ch. 9 (9a 36–b 7).
25. Physics, Bk. VII, Ch. 3 (248b 27–29).
26. Physics, Bk. V, Ch. 1 (225a 34–b 5).
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sumed is evident according to the argument (locum) from the greater, since the medium is changed in an instant and is without the rejection of the contrary, which, nevertheless, seems less disposed to the sensible species than sensation <does>.
20. To the opposite is Aristotle.27
[Question Thirty-Four Whether the Fourth Species of Quality is Form and Figure]
fter this, it is asked about the fourth species
whether "form and the constant figure around some-
thing"28 is the fourth species of quality.
21. It seems that it is not:
Since a form, according to what is evident through its definition which is assigned in the beginning <of the book> On the Six
Principles,29 is common to every accident; therefore, it is not a species of quality.
22. Second, according to Aristotle in Bk. V of the Metaphysics,30 form is not in itself a being, but is the principle <of being>; however, being in itself is divided into the ten genera; therefore, in no genus does form exist as a species.—Likewise, figure is a quantity, since it is a surface; therefore, it is not a species of quality.
23. Third, these are either the same or not. If they are not the same, then they are poorly posited <as> one species of quality, since they are two. If they are <the same>, they are poorly joined to each other.
24. To the opposite is Aristotle.31
27. Categories, Ch. 8 (9a 29).
28. Categories, Ch. 8 (10a 11).
29. Liber sex principiorum, Ch. 1, n. 1.
30. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 7 (1017a 23–28).
31. Categories, Ch. 8 (10a 11).
QUESTIONS 30–36
[Question Thirty-Five Whether These Four Species are Suitably Ordered]
fter this it is asked whether these four species are
suitably ordered.
25. It seems that they are not:
Since among all accidents, quantity first inheres in a substance; therefore, those qualities which immediately follow quantity are naturally prior, of which kind are the qualities of the fourth species; therefore, those ought to be naturally first.
26. Second, according to Aristotle in Bk. III of the Topics,32 prior is that "which is by nature rather than that which is not by nature"; but qualities of the second species are by nature, qualities of other species are not; therefore, the second species ought to be first.
27. Third, the qualities of the elements are said to be the first qualities, since all other qualities follow them; but those are qualities of the third species; therefore, the third species ought to be first.
28. Fourth, habit and disposition presuppose all the other qualities, as is evident inductively. For a figured man, <or one> having sensible qualities and a natural ability or inability, <they are> naturally prior to knowing or virtuousness. Therefore, the first species ought to be the last.
29. Fifth, natural ability is the principle of operating <which> immediately follows the substantial form, however habit <follows form> mediately. But, according to Aristotle in Bk. III of the Topics,33 what is nearer to the prior, is prior. Therefore, ability is prior to habit. This also is evident, since natural ability is the immediate subject of a habit or a disposition, as the intellectual ability <is the immediate subject> of knowledge; a subject is naturally prior to an accident, of which it is the subject.
30. To the opposite is Aristotle.
32. Topics, Bk. III, Ch. 1 (116b 11).
33. Topics, Bk. III, Ch. 1 (116b 17–21).
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[Question Thirty-Six Whether the Species of Quality are Sufficiently Enumerated]
ext to this, it is asked whether the species of
quality are sufficiently enumerated.
31. It seems that they are not:
Since the ability of a soul seems to be a quality, since according to it a soul is said <to be> qualified; but it can exist in no other species than in the second, and it is not in that <species>.
First, since according to qualities in the second species it is said that <one> can do something easily or undergo something with difficulty;34 but the ability of the soul is not for doing <something> easily, but simply for doing <something>. Second, since it is impossible for some species of some genus to be the subject of another species of that genus; but ability is the subject of habit, which is in the first species; therefore, etc. The major is proved <in two ways>: first, since in Bk. IV of the Topics,35 in the fourth consideration after the considerations of opposites,
Aristotle says that genus and species naturally come to be in the same subject. But a genus is not of such a nature that it is in any of its species as in a subject, according to <Aristotle> in the eleventh consideration following <after that one>,36 but a <genus> is only of such a nature as to be said of a species; therefore, neither does any species of a genus naturally come to be in another
<species> of the same genus as in a subject. Second, since in the thirteenth consideration of Bk. IV of the Topics,37 Aristotle says that if any superior <term> is predicated of a subject essentially (in quid), and the inferior <term> is predicated of that subject, <the superior term> will be predicated of it as a genus
<is predicated>. Therefore, since the most general <genus> is predicated essentially (in quid) of every one of its species, if any of its species is said of this species, it would be said of it as a ge34. Categories, Ch. 8 (9a 16–25).
35. Topics, Bk. IV, Ch. 5 (126a 5–6).
36. Topics, Bk. IV, Ch. 5 (127a 20–25).
37. Topics, Bk. IV, Ch. 2 (122b 12–18).
QUESTIONS 30–36
nus <is said of it>. Therefore, no other <species> is in this <species> as in a subject.
32. Second, anger and madness and <other things> of this kind are qualities, since someone is said to be qualified according to them, and they are in no other species except the third
<species>. But they are not there, since alteration can happen according to the qualities of the third species. But <alteration does> not <happen> according to them, since these are in the soul, according to Aristotle in this text.38 And the soul is not altered, since it is not a quanta, and every motion according to quality presupposes quantity.
33. Third, beauty and elegance seem to be qualities according to the nature (rationem) of quality; and <they are> in none of these species; therefore, there are more <species>. Proof of the minor: since they seem most greatly to be in the fourth species, and they are not there since they receive more and less, which Aristotle denies about qualities of the fourth species.39
34. To the opposite is Aristotle.
[I. To The Thirtieth Question] [A. The Response of Scotus] 35. To the first question40 one can say that Aristotle does not assign <these to be> the species of quality on account of the third reason to the first question.41 This is confirmed in this way: since these four species are not subalterns, for of no two of them can it be truly said that whatever is in one <of them> is in the other, or vice versa. Therefore, if these were species, they would not be subalterns, and it is impossible for such diverse
<species> to be predicated of the same thing. But it is possible for these <species> to be predicated of the same thing, since it is possible for the same quality to be essentially rooted in a subject, for a habit is both a natural principle for operating easily or not easily and it is an essential (per se) object of the senses.
38. Categories, Ch. 8 (9b 35–10a 2).
39. Categories, Ch. 8 (11a 5–7).
40. Cf. supra, nn. 1–4.
41. Cf. supra, n. 3.
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Also on account of the first reason to the third question.42 But before he enumerates them he assigns <them to be> its modes
(which is evident through its name). For he says:43 "Quality is said in many ways," that is, in many modes; and in the end, after they have been enumerated, he says: "And perhaps some other modes <may> appear, but those which are most said are these."
36. There is, however, a difference between a species and a mode. Since a species, beyond that of which it is, adds an essential difference, <whereas> a mode <adds> an accidental difference. And so these modes express a diverse relation (habitudinem) of quality to the subject in the <fact> that it is "to be permanent" or not, "from nature" or not, "sensible" or not.
Nevertheless, all <things> which do not essentially vary the quality, since all these are relations, or many <of them are relations>, can be in the same quality according to its essence.
[B. To the Principal Arguments of the Thirtieth Question] 37. To the first argument to the contrary:44 "multiple" is not understood, that is "equivocally," but "in many modes." And the difference is manifest between the significates which make a multiplicity in the first mode, and between modes which are accidental differences and make a multiplicity in the second mode.
38. To the second and third <arguments,45 a reply> is evident.
39. To the authority of Aristotle to the contrary <argument>:46 when he says "species" it must be taken for a special mode, and when he says "genus" <it must be taken> for a general mode. And perhaps he says this since these modes are neither the most general nor the most specific, but general and specific in comparison to diverse <things>. Nor does this exposition do much violence to the text, since intermediate <things> must be understood according to those <things> which are posited in the proem and in the epilogue,47 namely "multiple" and "other modes."
42. Cf. supra, n. 10.
43. Categories, Ch. 8 (8b 26); Ch. 8 (10a 25–26).
44. Cf. supra, n. 1.
45. Cf. supra, nn. 2–3.
46. Cf. supra, n. 4.
47. Categories, Ch. 8 (8b 26); Ch. 8 (10a 25–26).
QUESTIONS 30–36
[II. To The Thirty-First Question] [A. The Response of Scotus] 40. To the second question,48 it must be said that "habit" in one mode signifies something transcendent, insofar as "to have" is said denominatively from it, which is distinguished later at the end of the book.49 In another mode it signifies an intermediate relation (habitudinem) between the one having and the thing had, which is like an intermediate action between the agent and the patient, and in this way <habit> is in the most general tenth category. In another mode, it signifies the same as a positive form <signifies>, and thus it is taken below <in the book>50 in privative opposition. In none of these modes is this speech about habit made. But in the fourth mode, insofar as habit signifies a quality rooted in the subject and with difficulty movable.
41. A disposition, however, is either taken absolutely, and then it is superior to a habit, insofar as it is said here in Bk. V of the Metaphysics, in the chapter on "Habit,"51 where a harmony is posited between a habit and a disposition. In another way, <a disposition> is taken with precision, and then it is distinguished in contrast to a habit. In the first way, the first mode can be posited as a disposition, and by taking it in the second way, it is necessary to posit it simultaneously as a habit and a disposition. In another way, it is said that a disposition signifies a quality, which of its own nature is easily movable from its subject; and a habit <signifies a quality> which, according to its own nature, is with difficulty movable <from its subject>. But this is contrary to Aristotle, since then no habit would be a disposition.
42. Otherwise, it is said that a disposition is related52 to a habit as the imperfect <is related> to the perfect.
48. Cf. supra, nn. 5–9.
49. Categories, Ch. 15 (15b 18–32).
50. Cf. Categories, Ch. 10 (12b 26–13a 17).
51. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 20 (1022b 10–14).
52. The Latin has dispositio se habet ad habitum, which literally translates as "a disposition has itself to a habit."
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43. Against <this argument>: either this imperfection is in the essence of a quality, or <it is> in <something> informing a subject. <But> it is in neither mode. <It is> not in the essence
<of a quality>, since the essence is measured by the instant; therefore, it is equally perfected whether it remains in the subject for a while or not. Nor <is it> in <something> informing a subject, since if the essence, <which> remains briefly, is equally perfected in the subject as <it is if it is> remaining for a while, as it was shown now; therefore, it equally denominates the subject perfectly.
44. For this reason it must be said, as above,53 that a disposition according to one significate is perhaps as general as a quality according to another significate <is general>, just as is the first mode of quality; but taken precisely, <together> with a habit, it constitutes the first mode of quality. The example is as it is in Porphyry.54 Porphyry divides a differentia into <the one> making another <quality> (alteratum) and <the one making> another
<thing> (aliud); and nevertheless he says that every differentia makes another <quality> (alteratum). Therefore, in the division it is necessary to understand "another <quality>" precisely, and in the second proposition "another <quality>" absolutely.
[B. To the Principal Arguments of the Thirty-First Question] 45. To the first argument,55 it is evident how they are two and how they are not two.
46. To the second <argument>,56 the equivocation of "habit" is evident.
47. To the third <argument>,57 I say that not any which is in this way, according to that signification according to which it is essentially (essentialiter) a quality, is essentially (per se) in the genus of relation, whether as a relation or as said denominatively from a relation, but if it is, this is according to another signification.
53. Cf. supra, n. 40.
54. Isagoge, Ch. "On Difference" (AL I6 15; ed Busse, 8.17–20).
55. Cf. supra, n. 5.
56. Cf. supra, n. 6.
57. Cf. supra, n. 7
QUESTIONS 30–36
48. To the fourth <argument>:58 disposition is equivocal insofar as it signifies the same as a position, which is the most general <genus>, and insofar as it signifies a species of quality.
[III. To The Thirty-Second Question] [A. The Response of Scotus] 49. To the third question,59 I say that ability or inability does not signify some <things> which are essentially in the genus of quality. But, <ability> only signifies a mode of quality absolutely, insofar as it is a principle of operation. And inability signifies a mode of quality insofar as that is a principle of acting with difficulty or of undergoing <something> easily. Qualities, however, which subsist, are absolute forms and are not called by names naming them absolutely, but in comparison to the operations of which they are the principles. According to what Aristotle says below <in the section beginning with the words> "however qualified,"60 that "names are not imposed from habits (valetudinibus)," since we do not conceive of these except perhaps in comparison to their operations.
[B. To the Principal Arguments of the Thirty-Second Question] 50. To the arguments. The first reason must be conceded,61 because ability and inability do not signify species of quality, but <they signify> modes of the essence through a comparison to the operation.
51. To the second <argument>,62 it is evident that inability is not a species of quality. Also, that quality which is under inability, as it is taken here, is a positive form just as softness.
52. To the third <argument>,63 it must be conceded that <ability and inability> are two equally primary modes, neither of which is contained under the other; and so it is of every other mode. And thus, speaking precisely, eight primary modes of 58. Cf. supra, n. 8.
59. Cf. supra, nn. 10–14.
60. Categories, Ch. 8 (10a 29–b 2).
61. Cf. supra, n. 10.
62. Cf. supra, n. 11.
63. Rather, to the fourth argument; cf. supra, n. 13.
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quality can be conceded. But according to some general nature (rationem) these two pertain among themselves, which are enumerated in some one mode, according to which they do not pertain with others which are enumerated in another mode; as natural ability and inability in the fact that their being is innate and is a principle of operating. Therefore, this <pair> can be posited as the second general mode, and so in all other modes.
53. To the other reason,64 it is evident that ability is taken equivocally: insofar as it is a differentia of being and insofar as it signifies the principle of doing <something> easily.
[IV. To The Thirty-Third Question] [A. The Response of Scotus] 54. To the fourth question,65 it must be said that "affection" is equivocal, insofar as it is distinguished in Bk. V of the Metaphysics66 into many significates. But here, it is taken insofar as it signifies a quality according to which there is an alteration.
And then: it is taken either absolutely or with precision. Taken absolutely, it is convertible with an affective quality, or superior to it. Taken precisely, it is distinguished in contrast to an affective quality, just as an affective quality expresses that from which something is denominated by a denomination signifying a permanence of form in the subject. Therefore, <taken> absolutely, the third mode is an affection which expresses a comparison of a quality to a subject that is apt to be altered according to it; or <it expresses> a comparison of quality to sensation, to which it implies an affection, as will be evident in responding to the arguments.
[B. To the Principal Arguments of the Thirty-Third Question] 55. Therefore, to the first argument,67 it must be said that an affection is equivocally an effect of action, according to what
64. Cf. supra, n. 12.
65. Cf. supra, nn. 15–20.
66. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 21 (1022b 15–21).
67. Cf. supra, n. 15.
QUESTIONS 30–36
the author of On the Six Principles68 says, and insofar as it is quality according to which there is an alteration.
56. To the second <argument>,69 I say that affection is distinguished precisely in contrast to affective quality, and that distinction and the differentia which Aristotle posits must be understood in this way. And nevertheless they can be posited as one mode, since they have some general nature (rationem), as it is predicated of the second mode;70 and speaking absolutely about each they are convertible, since every affection is a quality, and so according to it we say <that something is> qualified.
But then to the saying of Aristotle, when he says that "according to affection we do not say <that something is> qualified,"71 this must be understood <in this way>: Either since what is taken from an affective quality which denominates the subject through the mode of remaining is not in that denominative (as something red is not said <to be red> from a redness caused through shame, since that denominative denotes that this form remains with the subject), nevertheless for a time, for which that red is in it, one can say <that it is> reddish or reddening, which absolutely denotes such a form as is in the subject. Or, what Aristotle said must be understood in the way that we do not express
<something> qualified from affections, since denominatives are not commonly taken from these; but if they were taken <from them>, <something> having an affection could be denominated from that <one>, as <something> having an affective quality is denominated from that <one>.
57. To the <third argument>,72 I say, as Aristotle says, that qualities of the third species are not said to be affective because they imply affections in their subjects—for no form is apt to have an effect (agere) on its own subject—but they are said to be affective because they imply an affection in the senses in some mode.
58. When it is argued against the first member,73 I say that an affective quality is induced through alteration; and so a sub68. Liber sex principiorum, Ch. 3, n. 29.
69. Cf. supra, n. 16.
70. Cf. supra, n. 54.
71. Categories, Ch. 8 (9b 30–31).
72. Cf. supra, n. 17.
73. Cf. supra, n. 18.
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ject is affected by something altering <it>, but not from a form which it receives, but from something having the same form in species.
59. When it is argued against the second member,74 I say that an affective <quality> effects a certain affection in the senses, not a true <affection> as Aristotle says. And what kind of affection it is, is distinguished in Bk. II of On the Soul.75
60. It must also be noted, after this, that to imply an affection of sensation is not of the essence of quality, insofar as it is considered in Bk. II of On the Soul, in the beginning of the chapter
<entitled> "On the Visible,"76 because the being of the visible is not of the essence of color but is its affection. Therefore, an affection, or an affective quality, which names a quality insofar as it implies an affection of the senses, does not name the essence or the species of quality, but its modes. And this is valid for the solution to the first question.77
[V. To The Thirty-Fourth Question] [A. The Response of Scotus] 61. To the fifth question,78 it must be said that "form" in one way is transcendent, insofar as it is taken in the beginning of the Six Principles;79 in another way it is an exterior disposition of the animate thing or its proper lineation. Similarly, in one way
"figure" signifies the enclosed surface or the boundary with its lines; in another way <it signifies> that boundary or the enclosing of the surface. These two, according to the two primary significates, do not pertain essentially (per se) to the genus of quality, but according to the other two <significates, they do pertain to the genus of quality>. And according to these: either they are subalterns, so that every form is a figure and not the other way around; or speaking precisely, they are two disparate <types of qualities>.
74. Cf. supra, n. 19.
75. On the Soul, Bk. II, Ch. 5 (417b 2–7).
76. On the Soul, Bk. II, Ch. 5 (418a 26–31).
77. Cf. supra, nn. 34–35.
78. Cf. supra, nn. 21–24.
79. Cf. supra, n. 21.
QUESTIONS 30–36
62. That the form has a second signification is evident according to Porphyry in the chapter "On Species,"80 who says that "species in one mode expresses a form of anything," where form signifies the same <thing> as what is seemly (decor), or the exterior disposition of an animate thing, insofar as it is evident through the example of it, namely "the look (species) of Priam is worthy of power," and insofar as what is said in Bk. IV of the Ethics,81 that "small <bodies> can be well formed and proportionate," that is, decently delineated.
[B. To the Principal Arguments of the Thirty-Fourth Question] 63. To the first two arguments,82 <the reply> is evident through the equivocation of these two, <namely,> "form" and "figure," which was said previously.83
64. To the third <argument>,84 it must be said that if form is proper lineation, and <if> figure is an enclosing or boundary of a surface, then taken absolutely they are subalterns; but taken with precision they are diverse. If, however, figure is an exterior disposition of an inanimate thing and form <an exterior disposition> of an animate thing, then these are altogether diverse. Nevertheless, they can be suitably posited as one mode of quality, since they add to the essence of quality this one general aspect (rationem): that is, to dispose externally or to establish around something, and not within <it>. This aspect (ratio), if it happens to be of the essence of quality, is not extraordinary in that these two do not constitute a species of quality, but a mode.
[VI. A Second Way] [A. The Response of Scotus to Questions Thirty through Thirty-Four] 65. To all these five questions,85 <if someone> maintains that Aristotle enumerates species of quality and not only modes,
80. Isagoge, Ch. "On Species" (AL 16 8; ed. Busse, 3.21–4.1).
81. Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. IV, Ch. 8 (1123b 7–8).
82. Cf. supra, nn. 21–22.
83. Cf. supra, nn. 61–62.
84. Cf. supra, n. 23.
85. Cf. supra, nn. 30–34.
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one can say that these differentiae "to be easily or with difficulty moveable," "to be the principle of operating or not," "to imply an affection of sensation," "to dispose a substance externally" are accidental differentiae <with respect> to the genus of quality, which, nevertheless, Aristotle uses for essential differentiae, since the essential differentiae are unknown; and so those forms, which are primarily under those differentiae, are four species of quality. And this way of speaking does not differ much from the prior <way of speaking>,86 except in this, that according to the prior way <of speaking>, it is not necessary to concede that those four modes essentially (per se) follow distinct species of quality, but rather more are able to be in the same quality according to species. But in the second mode of speaking, it is necessary at least to concede that these differentiae— although <they are> accidental—are proper to four distinct species of quality; so that just as one of these species is not said of another nor are both <species said> of something the same, so also none of these differentiae is said of another nor are two
<differentiae said> of something the same, since "proper" is said universally of that of which it only is.
66. When speaking in this second mode, it must be answered, as <it was said> to the four preceding questions,87 by conceding that these differentiae, which are assigned here, are accidental, nevertheless the forms, which these differentiae follow as if they were their properties, are essentially qualities.
67. But <in order> to distinguish these differentiae from each other, one can say that "form" as well as "figure" is an exterior disposition of the thing; <that> an "affection" as well as "affective quality" is an essential (per se) change of the senses;
<that> "ability" as well as "natural inability" is a natural principle of acting or of being acted upon (patiendi). And these three differentiae seem to be so distinct that none of them are in the same quality.
68. The first species, however, does not seem to be taken through some differentia <that is> positively distinct from these
86. Cf. supra, nn. 35–36.
87. Cf. supra, nn. 31–34.
QUESTIONS 30–36
three, but through a privation of every one of them, so that this quality which underlies none of those differentiae (which is as if it were "the only quality," since no differentia which is added to a quality is known, nor is it essential, nor is it an accidental property), is said to be in the first species of quality. For those differentiae, "easily moveable from a subject" or "with difficulty <movable from a subject>," are not distinct from others but rather they can be said of the same quality of which any one of those differentiae is said. But still, those differentiae are accidental to the quality existing in the first species; and habit and disposition taken precisely are distinguished from one another through these <differentiae>.
69. This is evident in the example: "knowledge," "virtue," and "health rooted <in a subject>" or "not rooted in a subject" and <others> of this kind, are neither exterior dispositions of the thing, nor are they essentially (per se) sensible, nor are they innate principles of operating and of being acted upon, nor is some positive differentia known which those <principles> add to a quality. Therefore, they seem to be the only qualities, as through that precision they are distinguished from other species which add a known differentia; and nevertheless among these, <being> rooted or not rooted <in a subject> (which are of the first species), the differentia is through "being easily moveable" and "with difficulty <moveable>."
70. <Three Objections>—It can be argued against the distinction of species in this way: some quality in the third species is an innate principle of operating or of being acted upon, as heat in fire and coldness in water; therefore, the same quality is in the third species and the second.
71. Second, someone is said to be a fighter or a runner from a natural ability for fighting or running, and also one is said to be such from the art of fighting or running;88 but the same denominatively qualified <person> is not said from diverse qualities; therefore, qualities of the second species and the first do not differ.
88. Cf. Categories, Ch. 8 (10a 34–b 6).
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72. Third, according to Aristotle in Bk. II of On the Soul,89 figure, which is posited in the fourth species, is essentially (per se) sensible; therefore, it implies an affection of the senses, and so an affective quality; therefore, the fourth species and the third do not differ.
73. <General Response to the Three Objections>—To this <set of objections> one can say that the species that are understood through the accidental differentiae assigned here do differ. But neither are these differentiae proper to the species unless they are taken precisely. For instance: <if> that quality is divided in this way: one <part> is an interior disposition, the other an exterior <disposition>. The exterior: figure. The interior: either a primary sensible, and in this way it is the third species. If it is an interior disposition and not a primary sensible: either it is an innate principle of operating, and thus it is the second species; or it is an interior disposition and not an innate principle of operating, and thus it is the first species. It must always be understood through these accidental differentiae, differentiae <which are> essential to the species. And so it is evident how one species includes a privative differentia with respect to another species; and so the one more perfect species ought always to be taken with precision with regard to its inferior.
74. <To the Three Objections taken Separately>—Therefore, to the first reason,90 it must be said that the heat of fire is in the third species, since it is primarily sensible, and not in the second; since it is not only an innate principle of operating––unless <it is taken> with precision of the differentiae of the third species and the fourth; however, in this way it is proper to the second species.
75. To the second <objection>,91 I say that a fighter and a runner, and universally all <that are> said to be qualified (qualia) from the qualities of the first and second species, are said equivocally. Since, of the same one, <something> can be affirmed, as <something> is said from qualities of the first species,
89. On the Soul, Bk. II, Ch. 6 (418a 17–25).
90. Cf. supra, n. 70.
91. Cf. supra, n. 71.
QUESTIONS 30–36
and <something can be> denied, as <something> is said from qualities of the second species and vice versa. And the same
<thing> taken equivocally can be affirmed and denied of the same <thing>. This is evident in an exemplary manner in other
<instances>, since someone healthy due to a natural ability can be sick due to a habit.
76. To the third <objection>,92 it must be said that figure is of a number of the common sensibles, and those are essentially
(per se) sensible; nevertheless they do not imply an affection of the senses, but they only diversify the mode of changing the senses from the proper sensible; because a single sensible implies an affection to the senses, etc. In the third species there are only proper sensibles.
[B. The Response to the Thirty-Fifth Question] 77. In this second way of speaking,93 the order of the species can be preserved in some way. Since the first species is the most common: for any quality, not having some differentia of some other species, can be posited in this species. After this <species>, the second <species> is prior to the others, since it follows the nature of the thing as its cause. And the third <species is> after this one, since even though of its nature (ratione) it is not inherent from nature (natura), nevertheless it more commonly displaces its subject both in depth and in surface. The fourth
<species> is the last through a privation of all the others, for neither is it more common in the genus of quality than the other species, that is, containing more species of quality, although perhaps it may inhere in more subjects; nor is it innate, since figure can be varied concerning the subject, since no variation is made in nature; nor is it a disposition in depth, but only <in the> exterior; therefore, it is reasonably posited last. According to this way, it must be said that the species of quality are suitably distinguished; not perhaps the first ones, since these are only two, but those nearest to the first, and this <is done>, by only understanding these qualities through those differentiae, of which <qualities> those <differentiae> are proper, although accidental.
92. Cf. supra, n. 72.
93. Cf. supra, nn. 65–66.
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[C. To the Principal Reasons of the Thirtieth Question] 78. According to this, <a reply> to the second reason of the first question is evident.94
79. To the first <objection>, it seems that it must be said as it was said previously.95
80. To the third <objection>,96 it must be said that no quality is the same in one species and in another; nor also are some differentiae of two species said of the same quality. And when it is argued that "the same quality can imply an affection of the senses and is easily or with difficulty moveable," I say that "easily moveable" or "with difficulty <moveable>" are not proper differentiae of the first species, neither <are they> essential or accidental, unless they are determined to qualities which do not have some differentia of the other species, of which kind, as was previously said, are the qualities of the first species. These differentiae, "easily moveable" or "with difficulty <moveable>," however, can also inhere in a quality having another differentia of another species; but from this it does not follow that this quality is in the first species, unless those differentiae are, to a lesser <extent>, properties of the first species.
[D. To the Principal Arguments of the Thirty-Fifth Question] To the arguments of the sixth question which are against the order of the species.
81. To the first <argument>,97 it must be said that the species of quality are not ordered according to the fact that <one>
"more immediately follows quantity or substance," but according to other reasons <which were> said above, namely according to a greater universality (communitatem) in the genus of quality, and according to inhering naturally, and <according to> disposing in the surface and in depth, and their opposites. And according to all these conditions, the fourth species ought to be last.
94. Cf. supra, n. 2.
95. Cf. supra, nn. 1, 37.
96. Cf. supra, n. 3.
97. Cf. supra, n. 25.
QUESTIONS 30–36
82. To the second <argument>,98 I say that that species which is more common in the genus of quality, that is adding less beyond the nature (rationem) of quality absolutely, even though it may not be from nature, ought to be posited prior to another species which is not common in this way.
83. To the third <argument>,99 I say that the qualities of the elements are not the only qualities of the third species, but all qualities that essentially (per se) affect the senses <are of the third species>, of which <qualities> certain ones are of the elements, and <these> do not inhere <in a subject> by nature.
Therefore, a general priority of all the qualities of the third species to the others cannot be concluded from the priority of the qualities of the elements or from a natural inherence of these in the elements, since it is necessary for a sufficient medium to exist to conclude that that is a common aspect (rationem) of all qualities of the third species.
84. To the fourth <argument>,100 I say that qualities of the first species, even though they do not inhere primarily in substance but others precede them, nevertheless this species is more common than the others, adding less to a quality, and perhaps containing more species below them.
85. To the fifth <argument>,101 it is evident through this that even though this quality which expresses a "natural ability" follows the substantial form more immediately than <does> that which expresses a "habit," nevertheless it is not as common as that <one>, and therefore it ought not to be posited as a prior species.
[VII. To The Thirty-Sixth Question] [A. The Response of Scotus] 86. To the seventh question,102 one can say that not all species of quality are enumerated here, as Aristotle also says in the text,103 but <he enumerates> the species that are more famous,
98. Cf. supra, n. 26.
99. Cf. supra, n. 27.
100. Cf. supra, n. 28.
101. Cf. supra, n. 29.
102. Cf. supra, nn. 31–34.
103. Categories, Ch. 8 (10a 25–26).
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since these are neither the primary species, nor perhaps do two divide the same genus primarily, and the other two another genus.
[B. To the Principal Reasons of the Thirty-Sixth Question] Nevertheless, if it is maintained that they are sufficiently enumerated, one can respond to the reasons <in this way>:
87. To the first <reason>,104 one can say that the ability of the soul is in the second species of quality, by speaking of the quality to which that account, which is the principle of operating, is attributed.—To the first proof to the contrary, I say that not only is the ability which is in the second species only for doing <something> easily, but <it is> also that which is for doing
<something> simply, provided that it is innate.
88. To the <second> reason,105 one can say that anger and madness and <others> of this kind are in the first species, and perhaps all qualities of the soul.—When it is said that these are enumerated in the third species, I say that affection and affective quality, taken precisely, differ according to these accidental differentiae, <namely,> "easily moveable" and "with difficulty <moveable>," according to which habit and disposition also differ. And therefore those which are in the first species can be enumerated in the third, since they participate in that differentia which is not proper to the third; just as, the other way around, heat and cold can be enumerated in the first species, which nevertheless are truly in the third species, so that through this mutual enumeration of species Aristotle insinuates that these differentiae, <namely,> "easily moveable" and "with difficulty <moveable>," not only are not essential, but neither are they proper to another <one> of those species, but they accidentally distinguish an affection from an affective quality and a disposition from a habit.
89. To the third <argument>,106 I say that elegance and beauty, when speaking of corporeal beauty, which is a harmonious disposition of the members, are in the fourth species of quality.—
104. Cf. supra, n. 31.
105. Cf. supra, n. 32.
106. Cf. supra, n. 33.
QUESTIONS 30–36
When it is argued against this that the qualities of the fourth species do not receive more and less and these do receive <more and less>, I say that Aristotle does not deny that all qualities of the fourth species receive more and less, but <only> certain ones.
For it suffices to his point that the property "to receive more and less" does not inhere in every quality; however it does not inhere in those which are in the fourth species—which are qualities of mathematics,107 since these are prior to motion, and more and less is not attributed <to something> except where there is motion.
[VIII. Certain Things Must Be Noted Concerning Quality] [A. Concerning Rare and Dense and Others of This Kind] 90. It must be noted that rare and dense, rough and smooth,108 in one way signify the extension of quantitative parts, and so the same body compressed and uncompressed can be rare and dense, as is evident of wool and a sponge. In another way, they signify extension of the parts of matter, just as rare expresses what has much of form and little of matter, and dense the other way around. In the first way, these perhaps signify position, since they express the order of parts in the whole and in place;109 in the second way they perhaps signify qualities. And so a solution of the controversy, which is between the authority here110 and in Bk. IV of the Physics, in the chapter "About a Vacuum"111 and between the authority of the <book> On The Six Principles,112 is evident, namely, in which way they are qualities and in which way they are positions.
107. Cf. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 14 (1020b 2–3).
108. Cf. Categories, Ch. 8 (10a 21–25).
109. Cf. Liber sex principiorum, Ch. 6, n. 60.
110. Categories, Ch. 6 (5a 15–37).
111. Physics, Bk. IV, Ch. 9 (216b 22–217b 29).
112. Cf. supra, n. 21.
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[B. Concerning the Description of Qualified] 91. Concerning the description of "qualified" (qualium) it seems that there, and in the description of quality (qualitatis),
<the description> is circular. For in the first place it is said that "quality is that according to which we are said <to be> qualified,"113 and in the second place <it is said that> "<those things> are said to be qualified, which are said denominatively from qualities"114 and so each one is mutually described through the other. But perhaps the first description is better known with respect to us <and> the second <description> is better known absolutely; nevertheless neither description is a definition.
92. It must also be noted that Aristotle says, "qualified <things> are said denominatively from qualities," except when either the names are not imposed from qualities, for example, as it is of qualities in the second species;115 or when, if the existing names are imposed, the denominatives are not taken directly from them, "for example, as someone is said <to be> "studious" from virtue" nevertheless that "qualified <thing>" is not taken directly from that quality.116 From which it is evident that denominatives ought to differ from their principles in no <thing> that pertains to the significate, but only perhaps in the mode of signifying and in the end of the utterance.
[IX. On The Properties Of Quality] [A. On the First Property of Quality] 93. Next to the first property <of quality>,117 which is "to receive contraries," it must be noted that in the intermediate qualities there is one extreme contrary among contraries, by a 113. Categories, Ch. 8 (9a 16–17).
114. Categories, Ch. 8 (10a 29–30).
115. According to Aristotle, one who is called a "boxer" in virtue of a natural ability for boxing is not called denominatively from it, because the abstract noun "boxing" does not signify a natural ability but a habit.
116. A person who is called "studious" is so called because of a virtue, but if he were called denominatively from virtue, he would be called "virtuous" not "studious." Categories, Ch. 8 (10b 7–8).
117. Categories, Ch. 8 (10b 12–24).
QUESTIONS 30–36
contrariety metaphorically said, which is a differentia according to species; and similarly by a contrariety properly said but diminished. First, since otherwise it could not be that motion is from the extreme to the intermediate or vice versa, the opposite of which is held by Aristotle in Bk. V of the Physics.118 Second, since some intermediate participates in each extreme, and so it is imperfectly contrary to each extreme for that which it holds in itself of the remaining one. But nothing is contrary to these by a perfect and properly said contrariety, since in the same way each extreme is contrary to the intermediate. And, according to what is said in Bk. X of the Metaphysics,119 the two cannot be contrary to the same <thing>, by a complete and perfect contrariety.
[B. On the Second Property of Quality] 94. Next to the second property,120 which is "to receive more and less," it must be noted that the essence of quality, which is signified in the abstract, does not receive more and less, insofar as it is said in the text121 that <one> justice is not said <to be> more than another justice, nor is <one> grammar <said to be more> than another grammar, and this <is the case> since the essence of quality, just as also of any form, is indivisible, according to the author of the <book> On The Six Principles in the beginning <of the text>;122 and an indivisible <thing> does not receive more and less. But <those things> said denominatively from certain qualities do receive more and less; as someone is said <to be> more just or more grammatical than another, as is said in the text.123 And so that form, when it informs the subject, receives more and less, although not in its essence, since one subject participates more in the form than another.
118. Physics, Bk. V, Ch. 1 (224b 27–36).
119. Metaphysics, Bk. X, Ch. 4 (1055a 16–24).
120. Categories, Ch. 8 (10b 25–11a 14).
121. Categories, Ch. 8 (10b 30–11a 1).
122. Cf. supra, n. 21.
123. Categories, Ch. 8 (11a 3–5).
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[1. Six Arguments Against the Position of Scotus] 95. Against <this>: According to Aristotle in Bk. V of the Physics,124 something can be changed from more and less. But no change is from the same <thing> in species to the same <thing> in species. Therefore, more and less are not in a quality of the same species. And they do not exist except in the quality of the same species, since a comparison does not exist except according to some same form in species, according to Aristotle in Bk.
VII of the Physics.125 Therefore, more and less do not exist absolutely in quality.
96. Second, in this way it seems that it must be conceded that quantity receives more and less, since according to its being in a natural subject it can be perfect and imperfect, even though it is not <perfect and imperfect> according to its essence; and it is posited of quality in this way. Therefore, both <quantity and quality> similarly receive more and less; and these properties must be denied from quantity, according to Aristotle above;126 therefore, <more and less must be denied> from quality.
97. Third, "if absolutely follows absolutely, more also follows more," according to Aristotle in Bk. II of the Topics,127 <and> if128 it follows to white that white is in whiteness; then it follows to the whiter that the whiter is more whiteness. Therefore, if a form, insofar as it is in a subject, receives more and less, <then> it also in itself receives more and less.
98. Fourth, every more according to some form is essentially (per se) relative to less according to the same form; therefore, the form, according to which these are referred, is essentially
(per se) a relation; therefore, more and less are essentially (per se) said according to no quality. The implications are evident: since a relative is not said essentially (per se) except from a relation, and since no quality is essentially (per se) a relation.
124. Physics, Bk. V, Ch. 2 (226b 1–5).
125. Physics, Bk. VII, Ch. 4 (248b 5–249a 2).
126. Categories, Ch. 6 (6a 25).
127. Topics, Bk. II, Ch. 11 (115b 4–9).
128. For the sake of the argument, I have followed an alternative manuscript, which has the conjunction si, as opposed to the conjunction sed, which the critical edition adopts.
QUESTIONS 30–36
99. Fifth, whiter and less white are relatives of supposition and imposition, since they are not <relatives> of equivalence, as is manifest. But relatives of supposition and of imposition differ in species, since they are opposites. Therefore, no quality in the same species receives more and less, nor <does a quality> in a diverse species, as the first reason proves;129 therefore, etc.
100. Sixth, I prove that if a quality receives more and less in some mode, it receives <more and less> according to its essence. For if it receives more and less according to its being in a subject or according to something else, let that thing be
A. Therefore, either A is of its essence, or not. If it is, and A is something of its essence, then it receives more and less according to its own essence. If it is not, A will receive more and less also, since otherwise a quality could not receive more and less according to it: therefore, either A receives more and less according to its essence, and the proposition holds; since with equal reason the first <subject> will receive more and less according to its essence, since so far as it concerns this, the same judgment seems to be about every accidental form. If A receives more and less according to something other than its essence, let that be b, and so by proceeding <in this way>: either there will be an infinite <number of> accidental forms, of which one receives more and less according to another, or it will stop at some accidental form which receives more and less according to its <own> essence. Therefore, with equal reason it seems to hold in the first <instance>, since the same judgment is about all <accidental forms>.
[2. The Response of Scotus to the Objections] [a. General Response] 101. If it is conceded on account of these reasons that a quality of a <certain> kind (specie) receives more and less according to its essence, since some subject according to a more perfect grade participates in the same essence in species, and another subject <participates> according to a less perfect grade:
102. Against this: either that (iste) grade and that one (ille) 129. Cf. supra, n. 95.
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are within the essence or not. If they are, and that grade is diverse from that one, then this essence is diverse from that one through something that is within the essence. Therefore,
"more" differs from less in species. This last implication is evident: first since every essential diversity diversifies the species; second since the essence is primarily of the species, not of the individual, <and> otherwise the individual could have a more specific definition than the definition of the species. Therefore, the differentia in its essence is not only a differentia in number, but in species.
103. Of the six reasons130 posited against the <second> property <of quality>, if the second and third and sixth are conceded––since they do not disprove the property absolutely, but a false way of understanding it––then it must be understood that just as a similitude is a relation properly founded beyond the essence of a quality, so more and less <are relations properly founded beyond the essence of quality>. The foundation of "more," however, is the essence of the species under a perfect grade, which grade is something absolute concerning the genus of quality, although the relation of "more" may follow it to another <thing> imperfect in the same species which a relation of "less" follows.
104. Therefore, when Aristotle and Boethius131 say to the contrary that <one> justice is not said to be more and less than
<another> justice, but someone is said to be more just than another:
It must be understood that the essence of the species considered in itself, since it is abstracted from the supposits, does not in itself have more and less, since that <essence> thus considered is indifferent to every grade. But that <essence> is more perfect in itself in one supposit than it is in another supposit.
And as it is in the supposit, so it denominates the subject, since its essential (per se) supposit is not the subject, but is a quality in 130. Cf. supra, nn. 95–100.
131. Cf. supra, n. 94 (the authority of Boethius is not alleged there). Cf.
Boethius, In Categ. Aristot. III (PL 64, 257C).
QUESTIONS 30–36
this subject. Therefore, it is not "justice," when it is understood abstractly, but "a just man," that is, this justice as it denominates that subject, that is greater than another.
[b. To the Arguments Taken Separately] 105. Response to the first argument132 about motion: motion can essentially (per se) exist between two supposits of the same species, not insofar as it is of the same species, but insofar as there are opposites in some mode. And this opposition in a proposition is not only through relations, since motion is not essentially (per se) to a relation, according to Aristotle in Bk. V of the Physics.133 But it is through some absolute grades in this and in that, which are of the genus of quality, <and> which are opposed insofar as one has the aspect of an intermediate with respect to the other. Nevertheless, that relation of the intermediate is not the cause of motion, just as a relation of "less" is not, but that which is under it, as dark is the extreme of motion, not insofar as dark is an intermediate.
106. Against this: insofar as an extreme by which <something> is opposed to a term toward which; it is not opposed except by some relation.––Response: the first proposition is true, as "insofar as" corresponds to the second essential (per se) way, not the first. And so that grade, as far as that, is opposed to that, as far as "that" is <taken> in the second essential (per se) way and not the first.
107. <The response> to the fourth and fifth <arguments>134 about relations is evident.
108. <To> the fourth <argument>,135 it can happen concerning the third property of quality136 in the same way as here.
Therefore, when more is referred to less, it must be conceded <that it is> by speaking of these forms, not of those <things> which are under <them>; therefore, the forms according to 132. Cf. supra, n. 95.
133. Physics, Bk. V, Ch. 2 (225b 10–13).
134. Cf. supra, nn. 98–99.
135. Cf. supra, n. 98.
136. Cf. supra, n. 114.
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which more and less are said, are relations; "according to which" is true in the first essential (per se) way, not in the second.
109. Similarly to the fifth <argument>:137 these relations "the majority of intension" and "the minority of remission," which are properties of quality, are opposed in species; but not the foundations, just as "similar" and "dissimilar" are founded in the same quality in species.
110. This whole <argument> is confirmed: since the whole absolute perfection in <something that is> more white, namely any grade of whiteness in itself, can remain, <if the thing> with respect to more is destroyed, if it has been posited that there is not another <one that is> less to which it can be said. Just as the whole whiteness is in that subject which was first, although
"similar" is said to none of it according to it, as it was said previously.138 Therefore, that property ought to be understood to be in a quality according to aptitude.
111. But concerning the fifth argument:139 is whiter in the genus of relation? It seems that it is not, since then whiter would not signify the same thing that white <signifies>.––Likewise, "more" seems to be a mode of signifying in whiter.––Again, what essentially (per se) terminates motion in the same species from a lesser to a greater?
112. Against this: something is whiter, when there was not a prior, through only a change in another; therefore, it expresses only a relation.––Likewise, "more white" expresses a relation formally; nevertheless, <it expresses> the foundation in this; therefore, it also <expresses> "whiter."
113. Response: it signifies the essence under such a grade of quality. Therefore, it is as if it were a species of white, which is indifferent to every grade; a relation is an affection of this; it is neither about a significate nor perhaps about a mode of a signifying name. Nevertheless, if a grade is about a significate, then the relation can follow the "existence" of the mode of signifying––hence the response to the arguments.140
137. Cf. supra, n. 99.
138. Cf. supra, nn. 103, 109.
139. Cf. supra, n. 99.
140. Cf. supra, nn. 101–4, 105–9.
QUESTIONS 30–36
[c. On the Third Property of Quality] 114. Concerning the third property of quality, which is that "according to <quality> something is said to be similar or dissimilar,"141 it must be noted that although "similar" and "dissimilar" are proper to the genus of quality, nevertheless they are as species in the genus of relation, that is, as <something> said denominatively from the species of relations, since "similitude" is an essential (per se) relation and "similar" is essentially (per se) a relative. So it must be understood of the properties of other genera, which are not in that genus as species. Similarly they must be understood according to aptitude. For although something according to some quality has nothing similar if nothing else has that quality, this property does not pertain to that quality less than that <one>, since according to that quality something is of such a nature as to be said to be similar to another.
[X. Concerning The Other Categories] Doing and being affected, however, receive <contraries and more and less>, etc.142
115. It must be noted that "to receive contraries" and "more and less" are not in an action and an affection, except by reason of the terms towards which, since action as well as affection receive the species from the term to which, according to what is held in Bk. V of the Physics.143 It will also receive contrariety from it and similarly <with regard to> more and less.
116. It must be noted about these two <categories> and about the other four subsequent <categories>, that Aristotle passes over them quickly: either since their species into which they are to be divided, insofar as they are genera, are not known, or their affections which inhere in them insofar as they are considered by reason <are not known>. About their affec141. Categories, Ch. 8 (11a 19).
142. "Doing and being affected admit of contrariety and of a more and a less"; Categories, Ch. 9 (11b 1).
143. Physics, Bk. V, Ch. 1 (224b 8–9).
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
tions, however, which inhere in them according to their natural being, it is determined more fully in the books on nature and in the Metaphysics; about "action" and "affection" in Bk. III of the Physics144 and in On Generation and Corruption;145 about "when" and "where" in Bk. IV of the Physics,146 in the fact that it is determined there about place and time (for the properties of "where" and "when" are known through the properties of place and time); about "position" and "habit" somewhat in Bk. V of the Metaphysics.147 And so the determination considered here of these is sufficient for the logician.
144. Physics, Bk. III, Ch. 1–3 (200b 27–202b 29).
145. On Generation and Corruption, Bk. I, Ch. 3 (317b 19–36).
146. Physics, Bk. IV, Ch. 10–14 (217b 30–224a 17, and 208a 29–213a 10).
147. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 6 (1015a 36–1016b 16).