Question Twenty-Seven
[QUESTION TWENTY-SEVEN
Whether Relatives are Simultaneous by Nature]
oncerning the fourth property, it is asked whether
relatives are simultaneous by nature.
1. It seems that they are not.
Since, according to Porphyry,1 a genus is referred its species and vice versa; but these are not simultaneous by nature, since that is naturally prior "from which the implication of subsisting is not converted";2 a genus is of this kind, since an implication from a species to a genus holds, but not conversely; therefore, etc.—One can argue similarly in almost all intentions relative to each other, for example, about primary and secondary substance, and about universal and particular.
2. Second, according to Porphyry,3 "old Socrates differs from the boy Socrates"; but a difference is a certain relation; therefore, the old Socrates and the boy Socrates are referred to each other. But these are not simultaneous by nature. One can argue in this way about all <things> that are not the same, but <that are> ordered to each other with respect to these relations "difference" and "diversity."
3. Third, "knowable" and "knowledge" are referred to each other, and they are not simultaneous by nature, since "knowledge is destroyed by the destruction of the knowable," but not the other way around.4 Similarly, <one can say the same
1. Isagoge, Ch. "On Species" (AL I6 8–9; ed. Busse, 4.2–6).
2. Categories, Ch. 12 (14a 26–31).
3. Isagoge, Ch. "On Difference" (AL I6 14; ed Busse, 8.10–12).
4. Categories, Ch. 7 (7b 26–30).
QUESTION 27
thing> about sensation and the sensible, as Aristotle argues.5
Since by the destruction of the sensible, the body of an animal is destroyed—although not "body" as a genus in the genus of substance or as it is in the genus of quantity; since by the destruction of the body of an animal, sensation is destroyed, since sensation is in a body as in a subject, although it is in the soul as in a principle or cause. Therefore, from the first: by the destruction of the sensible, sensation is destroyed, but not the other way around, since sensation is destroyed by the destruction of an animal, but it is not necessary that by the destruction of an animal the sensible is destroyed; for these can remain thus far, from which <things> an animal exists, since they are naturally prior to an animal. It happens <that one can> argue thus about all relatives according to the third mode, which <mode> is posited in Bk. V of the Metaphysics,6 namely, those which are referred to as the measure and the measurable and vice versa.
4. Fourth, a father is said relatively to a son; and a father can remain after the death of a son; therefore, they are not simultaneous by nature.
5. The <first> proof of the minor: since by the death of that <one> son, another son can remain to whom the father can be said <to be related>; The second <proof of the minor>: since by the death of a son, it is possible that there is no change concerning the substance of the father.
6. But it seems impossible that some real form previously existing in a subject does not exist afterwards in the <same> subject unless the subject is changed. Therefore, it is impossible that paternity, which exists previously in that <one person>, does not exist in that <same person> afterwards, only on account of the death of the son. Therefore, by the death of the son, that father will remain just as he was previously.
7. The third <proof of the minor>: since a father is said <in relation> to that which he begot. It is impossible, however, that he, who begot <a son>, did not beget <a son>, since every true proposition of the past is necessary.7 Therefore, it is impossible
5. Categories, Ch. 7 (7b 35–8a 11).
6. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 15 (1021a 30–b 10).
7. Cf. Scotus, Questions on the Metaphysics, Bk. VI, q. 2, n. 47.
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
that he, who is a father at any one time, is subsequently not a father; therefore, by necessity, he remains a father after the death of his son.
8. Fifth, the prior insofar as it is prior is referred to the posterior insofar as it is posterior; and a cause insofar as it is a cause is referred to what is caused. But the prior insofar as it is prior is not simultaneous by nature with the posterior, nor is a cause
<simultaneous by nature> with the caused. Therefore, neither are all relatives simultaneous by nature.
9. Sixth, relatives according to genus are essentially (per se) relatives, since in an essential (per se) understanding of them, there are their genera according to which they are referred, and they do not have other correlatives than the correlatives of the genera. But a correlative of a genus is simultaneous by nature with a genus, which is naturally prior to the species. Therefore, that correlative is also naturally prior to the species; therefore, etc.
10. To the opposite is Aristotle.8
11. Likewise, "all relatives are said in relation to correlatives that reciprocate,"9 according to <Aristotle in his treatment> on the third property, that is, according to mutual dependence.
Therefore, neither is prior to the other, since by the same reason that this one is prior to that one, conversely, that one would also be prior to this one, since they are mutually dependent.
And so the same <thing> with respect to the same would be <both> prior and posterior, which is untenable.
[I. To The Question] 12. It must be said that all relatives that essentially (per se) refer to each other so that the being of one is to have itself to another and vice versa, are simultaneous by nature, on account of the argument (rationem) of Aristotle.10 Since if one is posited,
8. Categories, Ch. 7 (7b 15).
9. Categories, Ch. 7 (6b 27). The Latin is: omnia relativa dicuntur ad convertentiam. See Wolter quotation in ch. 25, fn. 39, p. 219, supra.
10. Categories, Ch. 7 (7b 20–22).
QUESTION 27
the remaining one is posited, and the other way around, and if one is destroyed, the remaining is also destroyed, and the other way around.
13. Nevertheless, if they are accidentally (per accidens) relative, or are not essentially (per se) <and> mutually relative,
<then> it is not necessary that they be simultaneous by nature.
Those are accidentally relative which are not said <to be related> to one another according to their forms; and those which do not depend on one other, of which one depends on the other according to its form and the other does not conversely depend on it, <for example> those which are referred to one another as a measure and the measurable are of this kind. For knowledge is essentially (per se) said of the knowable, but the knowable is not <said essentially> to knowledge except that knowledge is toward it, according to Aristotle in Bk. V of the Metaphysics, in the chapter about "Relations."11
[II. To The Principal Reasons] 14. To the <principal> reasons. To the first <principal reason>,12 it must be said that the intentions of genus and species are referred to each other and are simultaneous by nature. But what is under the intention of a genus insofar as that intention is attributed to it, although not insofar as it exists, is prior to that to which the intention of the species is attributed. And among those which exist under it, an implication is such and not the other way around; but among the intentions an implication is mutual; for concerning these it follows that "if a genus is, a species is," and vice versa. The subjects of these intentions, however, are accidentally relative; it is not necessary that relatives of this kind are simultaneous by nature.
15. To the second <argument>:13 old Socrates and boy Socrates are accidentally relatives, since in relatives of equivalence each extreme is essentially something called from the same name. Therefore, here the extreme is essentially (per se)
11. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 15 (1021a 30–b 2).
12. Cf. supra, n. 1.
13. Cf. supra, n. 2.
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
"different" and "different," and these are simultaneous by nature. For since "Socrates is a boy" is different from old Socrates, and since "Socrates is old" is different from boy Socrates; for each is simultaneously different from the other, although each one is not simultaneous.
16. To the third <argument>:14 that account proves true about relatives that do not mutually depend on each other.15
17. To the fourth <argument>,16 I say that although a substance subjected to paternity can remain after the death of a son, nevertheless, he cannot remain a father.
18. When the opposite is proved:17 to the first proof I say that a father is not referred to this son except accidentally, however,
<he is referred> to a son essentially. And therefore by the death of this son, provided that another son remains, he can still remain a father, since it is not necessary that a relative be simultaneous by nature with its accidental correlative.
19. To the second proof,18 I say that it is possible for a real form to be in a subject or not to be in a subject without a change of the subject in itself; since what exists in a subject only in comparison to another, can cease to exist in that <subject> only by the transformation of the other.
20. To the third proof:19
If it is conceded that <one who is> a father at some time cannot not be a father, it must be conceded that <one who is> a son at some time cannot not be a son. Since just as it is always true to say of him who begot <a son> that he begot <a son>, so also it is always true to say of him who was begotten that he was begotten, even though he may not always exist, and through the consequent, he always remains a son, just as a father also <always remains a father> 21. If, when a father exists and his son does not exist, it is said that a father is and a son is not, since when "being" predicates according to its adjacent <term>, it predicates "being existent"(esse exsistere), according to Boethius, then they are not simultaneous by nature.
14. Cf. supra, n. 3.
15. Cf. supra, n. 13.
16. Cf. supra, n. 4.
17. Cf. supra, n. 5.
18. Cf. supra, n. 6.
19. Cf. supra, n. 7.
QUESTION 27
22. One can say that relatives are simultaneous by nature according to that being which is proper to them insofar as they are relatives. But that <being> is not "being existent" (esse exsistere), since this happens to them insofar as they are referred
<to each other>. And for this reason one relative can exist in this way, while the other does not exist <in this way>. Therefore, these implications do not hold: "the father is—that is, he exists––therefore, the son is," that is, he exists, although it ought to hold by taking the "being" that is proper to a father insofar as he is referred <to his son>, and similarly regarding the "being" of a son. And so the implication of Aristotle, in which he proves that relatives are simultaneous by nature, must be understood in this way.
23. To the fifth <argument>,20 I say that the intentions "prior" and "posterior," "cause" and "effect" are referred to each other and are simultaneous by nature, but not the things which are under them.
24. Against this: what is simultaneous with the posterior insofar as it is posterior is posterior. Therefore, if the prior insofar as it is prior is referred to the posterior insofar as it is posterior,
<then> in this way it would also be simultaneous with the posterior, <and so> the prior insofar as it is prior would be posterior.
But this is untenable, even when speaking about the intentions, since the opposite is predicated of the opposite.
25. To this <argument> one can say that the major proposition is true by taking "simultaneous" in the <same> way in which "prior" and "posterior" are taken. It is not in this way in the <major> proposition, since "prior" and "posterior" are taken for these intentions, and "simultaneous" is taken for a simultaneity of nature.—Or otherwise: <one can say> that "prior" and "posterior" are taken according to the thing; "simultaneous" according to its nature (rationem). But then it seems to follow that a relation of prior and posterior is only according to nature (rationem) if the extremes are only according to definition.
20. Cf. supra, n. 8.
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26. To the sixth <argument>,21 it must be said that that account (ratio) proves true about correlatives of the genera to which some
<things> are said relatively according to genus; for among them there is not an essential (per se) dependency on one another.
21. Cf. supra, n. 9.