Question Twenty-Nine
[QUESTION TWENTY-NINE
Whether the Same Thing can be Essentially Referred to Diverse Things]
t is asked whether the same <thing> can be essen-
tially (per se) referred to diverse <things>.
1. Proof that it cannot:
Since in Bk. V of the Metaphysics in the chapter "On Relation,"1 Aristotle holds it as ridiculous that the same thing is said twice, that is, that it is referred to two correlatives.
2. Second, if some relative, for example A, can be essentially (per se) referred to two things, as to B and to C, it follows that the same thing can simultaneously be and not be. The consequent is false; therefore, the antecedent <is false>. Proof of the implication: since its two correlatives, as B and C, do not refer to each other; therefore, one <of them> can exist without the other <existing>, as B can exist if C does not exist; but if B exists, A is; and if C does not exist, A is not; therefore, the same <thing>, that is A, will simultaneously be and not be.
3. Third, the being of a relative is to have itself to another;2 but a relationship (habitudo) to two is not the same <relationship>; therefore, the one being of one relative is not to have itself to two. Therefore, no relative, <which is> essentially (essentialiter) one, is essentially (per se) referred to two things.
4. Fourth, if <the same thing could be essentially referred to two things, then> there could be two definitions of the same relative, and so the same relative could simultaneously be known
1. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 15 (1021b 2–3).
2. Categories, Ch. 7 (8a 32–33).
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and unknown. This seems untenable, since there is only one cognition of one non-complex <term>.
5. To the opposite:
All species of a relative are said to that to which its genus <is referred>, according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the Topics.3 And beyond this it can have another proper correlative other than the correlative of its genus. Therefore, it is essentially (per se) referred to two: for it is essentially (per se) referred to the correlative of its genus, since upon whatever genus it essentially depends, so also does the species.
6. Second, the species is referred to the genus and to the individual, therefore to two. Otherwise, Porphyry4 would not have assigned two or three of its definitions <to it>; therefore, etc.
7. Third, the more similar is essentially (per se) referred to the less similar, and beyond this it is referred to that to which the absolutely similar is referred; therefore, <it is referred> to two <correlatives>. One can argue in this way about every relative, said according to more and less, that the more is referred to the less and vice versa, and also beyond this, that they are referred to that to which a simple relative also is referred.
[I. To The Question] 8. One can reply to this that the same thing is not primarily referred to two, that is, according to its own proper account; since then it would not be essentially one, as the one reason to the contrary proves.5 Nevertheless, something can be essentially
(per se) referred to two things that are not altogether diverse, but of which one includes the other in some way, as the reasons to the opposite prove.6 Since according to its proper form something can be said to one, and according to the form of its genus <it can be said> to another to which it is not primarily said (since it is not <said to the other> according to its proper
3. Topics, Bk. IV, Ch. 4 (124b 16).
4. Isagoge, Ch. "On Species" (AL I6 9; ed. Busse, 4.9–13).
5. Cf. supra, n. 3.
6. Cf. supra, nn. 5–7.
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account according to which it is distinguished from the other species), although <it is said to be related to it> essentially (per se), since <it is said> according to the genus which is essentially
(per se) of its understanding.
[II. To The Principal Arguments Of Each Part] [A. To the Principal Arguments] 9. To the arguments, <the reply> is almost evident.
10. To the first <argument>:7 Aristotle holds it as ridiculous that something is primarily referred to two as to its understanding and to its <being> intelligible,8 according to what is said there; or perhaps to two altogether diverse things, of which kind there are two others.
11. To the <second argument>,9 I say that––when B and C are two existing <things> to which A is essentially (per se) referred— either it is not possible for one of them to exist when the other does not exist, for example, if one includes the other; or it does not follow that its <essential> being is to the being of each, but only to the being of its primary correlative, since its being does not stand for (stat) the non-existence of the other which is its essential (per se), but not primary, correlative.
12. To the third <argument>,10 I say that the same relationship (habitudo) is not equally primary to two altogether diverse
<things>, although it can be to two things <which> include each other: to one primarily, to the remaining <one> essentially (per se) even though not primarily.
13. To the fourth <argument>,11 it is evident that it does not have two definitions according to its own proper nature (rationem), but one such <definition>; the other according to the nature (rationem) of its genus. And perhaps the two definitions must not be said absolutely, since that which is of it according to the nature (rationem) of its genus is part of the definition which 7. Cf. supra, n. 1.
8. Cf. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 15 (1021a 30–32).
9. Cf. supra, n. 2.
10. Cf. supra, n. 3.
11. Cf. supra, n. 4.
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is of it according to its proper nature (rationem). According to this, <a solution> is evident to the fifth reason of the preceding question.12
[B. To the Reasons to the Opposite] 14. To the first reason to the opposite,13 it must be conceded that the species of a relative is referred to the correlative of its genus, but not primarily. Nor also is the correlative of the genus simply diverse from the primary correlative of the species, but perhaps it is included in it. Since, according to Aristotle in Bk.
II of the Topics,14 there is an implication in itself <implied> in relatives, so that if the relative of one part follows a relative <of the other part>, then the correlative of the second follows the correlative of the first. From which it seems to follow that the correlative of the first genus is superior to the correlative of the species, just as the genus is also <superior> to the species, which is manifestly said in Bk. IV of the Topics, in the chapter on the 7th consideration of relative opposites.15
15. To the second <reason to the opposite>,16 it must be said that a species is first referred to its genus; but through the nature (rationem) of its genus, which is universal, it is referred to the individual (just as every universal is said <to be related> to those <things> of which it is predicated); and so it is not primarily <referred> to each. And the other <one> of these correlatives, for example, a genus, includes the primary correlative of the other, as a universal; and so it cannot exist <when> the remaining essential (per se) correlative does not exist. Also universally, the primary correlative <is said> to the non-primary but essential
(per se) <correlative>, or depends <on it>, or includes it or includes something which depends on it. Therefore, the primary
<one> can never exist when the remaining <essential one> does not exist, although at some time it may be the other way around.
When, however, the primary correlative does not exist, <and when> the remaining <correlative> which is its essential (per se)
12. Cf. supra, q. 28, n. 7.
13. Cf. supra, n. 5.
14. Topics, Bk. II, Ch. 8 (114a 14–19).
15. Topics, Bk. IV, Ch. 4 (124b 35–125a 4).
16. Cf. supra, n. 6.
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but not its primary correlative, does exist, it is not necessary that the primary exist; since the position of the essential (per se) and non-primary correlative does not include the position of the remaining.
16. To the third <reason to the opposite>,17 I say that the more similar is primarily referred to the less similar; and every
<thing> more <is referred> to <something> less according to that form. But essentially (per se) and not primarily, it is referred to the correlative of its positive <form>. And the other <one> of its correlatives, for example, the less similar, includes the remaining one as similar, according to Aristotle in Bk. II of the Topics18 in the conclusion: "what is in <something> according to more and less, is also in it absolutely."
[III. The Response Against Certain Suppositions] 17. Against certain suppositions in this question:
For it seems that nothing is a primary relative to another, that is, according to that which adds <something> to the genus.
Since no differentia in the genus of relation is essentially (per se) a relation, just as a genus is not predicated essentially (per se) of some differentia in other genera. Therefore, no differentia in the genus of relation is said essentially (per se) to a relative, since a relative is not said essentially (per se) unless <it is said> essentially (per se) from a relation; therefore, neither <are> special relatives <said> through proper differentiae, which they add to the genus; and so <they are> not <said> primarily but all <are said> according to the genus.
18. To this one can respond by conceding that no differentia is essentially (per se) a relation, nevertheless a species constituted through a differentia is essentially (per se) a relation, and so a primary relative said denominatively from a species can be properly referred to something, although no <relative> said denominatively from a differentia is such.
17. Cf. supra, n. 7.
18. Topics, Bk. II, Ch. 11 (115b 4–5).
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[IV. What Must Be Noted About The Preceding Question] 19. It must be noted concerning the preceding question19 that just as in the definition of one essential (per se) relative the other ought to be posited as in the definition of relation, from which that relative is said, the other relation corresponding to it, or a relative said from another relation, ought to be posited
<in the definition>, so that filiation or son (filius) ought to be posited in the definition of paternity. Since a relation (relatio) is essentially a relationship to another (habitudo ad aliud), and it is impossible to conceive a relationship (habitudo) without the term to which it is <related>. And it is necessary to posit everything, without which the defined cannot be conceived, in the definition of something, since the definition expresses the complete understanding of the defined. Therefore, it is necessary to posit the term, toward which it is, in the definition of relation.
20. Nevertheless, it seems more <likely> that a relation, for example filiation, ought to be posited in the definition of a relation, for example, of paternity, than a relative <ought to be posited>, such as son. Since a son is simultaneous by nature with a father, and father is naturally posterior to paternity. But it seems that no posterior ought to be posited in the definition of the prior.
21. But to this <argument> it can be said that father is not posterior to paternity, by a posteriority opposite to that simultaneity which is in relatives. For just as those relatives are simultaneous <in one way> and are not <simultaneous in another way>, so father and paternity are simultaneous <in one way>, although paternity is prior to a father <in another way>, since it is more simple and formal. And nothing prohibits what is posterior to something <in one way>, from being posited, in an opposite way to that priority, in the definition of the prior in this way. According to this it would have to be said that a correlative, such as son, is more suitably posited in the definition of relation, such as paternity, than a relation <is posited>, such as filiation, since
19. Cf. supra, q. 28, nn. 11–14.
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the correlative more immediately signifies the term of a relation (habitudinis).
22. Against this <argument>. The essence of a relation is absolute in its own genus.
First, because everything seems to be absolute in its own genus, since everything in its own genus has the mode of an essence (quid), and the mode of an essence (quid) is the mode of an absolute.
23. Second, since every being is either absolute or compared (for these seem to be the differentiae immediately dividing being, according to what descends in the ten categories); but a relation is not compared <to something>, since it is not referred
<to anything>; therefore, it is absolute; therefore, it depends on nothing else in its own genus.
24. It <can be> argued similarly about relatives, since the essence of a relative is formally from a relation. And so, if a relation is absolute, <then> the essence of a relative will also be absolute; therefore, it does not depend on something in its genus; therefore, it ought not to be defined through another.
25. Likewise, if a relation depends on another as <it depends> on a relative, that other would be the term of its dependency; and the term is posterior to that of which it is. But this is false, since "relatives are simultaneous by nature"20—or <they are> also relations from which they are said relatively.
26. To the first of these <arguments>,21 one can say that a relative is absolute in its own genus, that is, in comparison to its own genus, since its own genus is said of it absolutely. But it is not necessary that it is absolute in this genus in such a way that it would depend on nothing else in the genus. When it is shown that it is absolute: to the first proof it must be said that whatever has the mode of an essence (modum quid) in its genus, that is, its genus is predicated of it essentially (in quid), then it is thus absolutely. But from this it does not follow that it is altogether absolute.
27. To the second proof,22 I say that "absolute" and "com20. Categories, Ch. 7 (7b 15).
21. Cf. supra, n. 22.
22. Cf. supra, n. 23.
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pared," as they divide being, are the same as being in a subject and being not in a subject. And in this way I concede that a relation is compared, since it is a being in a subject; nevertheless, it is not compared as a relative is said to be compared to a term, but it is a comparison to a term. Nevertheless, since this <is the case> it remains <true> that it is necessary to posit a term in its definition, since a comparison to a term cannot be conceived without a term.
28. It is manifest about a relative,23 however, that its essence is not absolute except with respect to its genus, since its genus is predicated of it absolutely and essentially (in quid); however its essence is absolutely "to have itself to another."24 Nor does it follow that its essence is absolute, if the relation is also absolute, since that which is in a formal principle is not necessary to be in the composite of which that <thing> is; just as it does not follow, if a form is simple, that the essence of a composite, which is through the form, is simple.—Or otherwise: when it has been conceded that a relation is absolute (as it was proved above on two accounts),25 and <has been conceded> that it does not depend on another in the genus of relation, it does not follow that it must not be defined through another in its own genus; since it is a comparison and depends on another, neither of which is defined without its term.
29. To the other <argument>,26 I say that not every term of dependency is posterior to that of which it is, especially when it is mutually dependent, as it is in essential (per se) relatives.
30. It must be noted that the solution of this question27 is true of relatives of equivalence when they are defined in the singular, since their being is "to have itself to another"; for the definition ought to indicate the being of the defined. But when they are defined in the plural, it is not necessary that their correlatives be posited in their definitions; for then the subject of the relation as well as its correlative are expressed through the same name taken in the plural.
23. Cf. supra, n. 24.
24. Cf. supra, n. 3.
25. Cf. supra, nn. 22–23.
26. Cf. supra, n. 25.
27. Cf. supra, n. 28.
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31. If it is argued against this, "therefore, something is defined through the same in species to itself," it does not seem inappropriate to concede this, as through an addition, when the relation is according to the same form in species; just as it is not inappropriate to concede about other relatives that something is defined through another in species, which, nevertheless, is not prior to the defined.—Or, it can be said that something that is similar differs from the similar species to which it is referred, since it is opposed to itself; and every opposition is according to form, although similitude in this and in that is the same in species. But this does not seem <to be the case>, when the same form exists, since some <things are> diverse according to that form.