Question Thirty-Nine
[QUESTION THIRTY-NINE
Whether Some Contraries Lack an Intermediate]
t is asked whether some contraries lack an interme-
diate.
1. It seems that <some contraries> do not <lack an intermediate>:
Since if some were such <as to lack an intermediate>, then of them there would not be any intermediate in itself; therefore, they would be contradictories. Proof of the first implication: since if there were an intermediate in itself of them, then they would admit of an intermediate. Proof of the second implication: since a contradiction is defined in this way by Aristotle in Bk. I of the Posterior Analytics:1 "Contradiction is an opposition of which there is not an intermediate in itself"; therefore, those which have this definition are contradictories.
2. Second, according to Aristotle in the text,2 it is necessary for contraries that lack an intermediate for one (unum) to be in <the thing that is> receptive <of them>; but none are such; therefore, etc. Proof of the minor: since of all contraries, when one of the two (alterum) is not in <a subject that is receptive of it> by nature, it <can be> argued in this way: it is not necessary that this <one> be in <the subject that is> receptive of <it>, nor is it necessary for that one <to be in the subject that is receptive of it>; therefore, neither <one> is necessarily in <a subject that is receptive of it>. Both singulars are true; therefore, the universal is also <true>, since that universal is sufficiently arrived at in1. Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, Ch. 2 (72a 12–13).
2. Categories, Ch. 10 (11b 38–12a 2).
QUESTION 39
ductively through the two singulars; therefore, its contradictory <i.e.>, "the other one (alterum) is necessarily <in the subject that is receptive of it by nature>," is false.
3. Third, it is possible––if <those things> which are <subject to them exist>—for there to be motion among contraries that lack an intermediate;3 but while it is in motion, the mobile is under neither of the terms; therefore, it is possible for the subject to be under neither of the contraries that lack an intermediate.4
Proof of the second proposition: first, according to Aristotle in Bk. VI of the Physics:5 while it is in motion, the mobile <thing> is partly in the terminus from which <it is moving> and partly in the terminus towards which <it is moving>. Second, since if the mobile <thing> were absolutely in the terminus from which <it is moving>, it would not be being moved; since then motion would <just> be beginning. If it were absolutely in the terminus towards which <it is moving, again> there would not be motion, since then motion would <already> be completed.
4. Fourth, if it is possible for a change to happen among contraries that lack an intermediate, as is manifest, <then> Socrates would change from <being in a state of> health to <being in a state of> sickness. Since there would be some end <or terminus> of the duration of healthiness in Socrates, let the last end
<or terminus of health> be A, and the first end <or terminus> of the initial sickness be B. Thus either B and A are one instant, and then the same <thing> in one instant will be under two contraries; or there are two instants; <and> thus among those <two contraries> there is an intermediate time in which he is neither healthy nor sick. Therefore, those contraries are <such that they admit of> an intermediate, and so <it is> of all the others.
5. To the opposite is Aristotle.6
3. Cf. Categories, Ch. 10 (13a 19–20).
4. For example, odd and even are contraries that lack an intermediate.
Thus, it is necessary for a number, which is the subject, to be either odd or even.
When a number, however, changes (and hence is in motion) from being odd to being even, so the argument goes, it is neither odd nor even, since a thing that is in motion is between the two terms of motion.
5. Physics, Bk. VI, Ch. 4 (234b 10–22).
6. Cf. supra, n. 2.
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
[I. The Response To The Question] 6. It must be said that there are some <contraries that are>
"maximally distant in the same genus, of which it is necessary for one of the two (alterum) to be in a <subject that is> receptive <of it>";7 therefore, there are some contraries that do lack an intermediate. The implication is evident through an argument from definition (per locum a definitione), since, according to Aristotle, in Bk. II of the Posterior Analytics,8 the question "if it is" is not known demonstratively except through <knowing> "what it is."
[II. To The Principal Arguments] 7. To the first argument,9 I say that <the phrase> "there is not an intermediate in itself" can be understood in two ways: either it is a negation of a mode absolutely, or it is a mode of negation. In the first way, it pertains to contraries that lack an intermediate; in the second way, it pertains to contradictories and is posited in their definition, since only contradictories have in no way an intermediate. Therefore, in itself, it inheres in both those that do not have an intermediate, and in those which in no way have an intermediate. To have an intermediate, however, in some way pertains to all other opposites.
8. To the second <argument>,10 I concede that this proposition "it is necessary for one of two contraries that lack an intermediate to be <in a subject that is> receptive <of it>" is false from the force of the expression. And similarly <I concede that> this <proposition is false> "it is necessary for one of the two (alterum) contradictories to be in a subject <that is> receptive <of it>, as "one of the two (alterum)" is a sign of the particular, since a particular is never true unless some singular is true. Nevertheless, for the common way of speaking, it must be understood that <the phrase> "one of the two (alterum)" is commonly taken
<to mean> "this or that." And this must be distinguished accord7. Categories, Ch. 6 (6a 12–19); Metaphysics, Bk. X, Ch. 4 (1055a 5–33).
8. Posterior Analytics, Bk. II, Ch. 1 (89b 28–35).
9. Cf. supra, n. 1.
10. Cf. supra, n. 2.
QUESTION 39
ing to composition and division, <as> if it were said thus "it is necessary for this or that to be in a subject." In the sense of composition, the proposition is true, and it is a proposition about a disjunctive predicate. In the sense of division, it is false, and it is so taken when <that specific> one of the two (ly alterum) is taken as a sign of a particular <definite one>. Aristotle understands it in the first mode, and it is commonly understood <in this way, as> when we say "it is necessary that one of two contradictories be true" and <likewise of others> of this kind; nevertheless, insofar as it brings forward the force of the expression, it is a particular proposition.
9. To the third <argument>,11 I say that in the whole time motion is the subject under the prior form, and in that last terminus,12 motion is under the posterior form, and so it is always under one of the two (altero).––To the first proof, I say that an accidental form, according to which there is motion, receives more and less, and according to that grade, according to which it is a terminus of motion from which, it does not remain in motion, since in the whole motion more and less is remitted.
But the essence of the term "from which" always remains. And therefore the saying of Aristotle must be understood in this way: that is, the term from which it participates according to some remitted grade, and it only approaches to the term toward which.––Similarly, <a reply> is evident to the other proof, since while a subject is in the terminus from which according to that grade according to which it is a terminus from which, it does not begin to be moved. When the subject is in the terminus toward which, according to that grade according to which it is a terminus toward which, then motion is finished.
10. To the fourth <argument>,13 I say that it is impossible to grasp the last instant of <the state of> health or of some permanent form in a subject, in which terminus that form has existence; but the last term of duration of a preceding form is the first term of a subsequent form, in which term there is a subse11. Cf. supra, n. 3.
12. In the present paragraph both "terminus" and "term" are employed for rendering the same Latin word, terminus.
13. Cf. supra, n. 4.
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
quent form and not a preceding <form>, as it is determined in Bk. VIII of the Physics.14
[III. What Must Be Noted About The Other Modes Of Opposites] Indeed, privation and habit, etc.15
11. What the special nature (ratio) of these opposites is must be noted, since <this mark, i.e., that "it does not happen concerning the same <thing>" pertains to other opposites <as well>.
Their nature (ratio) is not "to happen concerning the same <thing> in a certain order,"16 since <this> does not pertain to all privative opposites unless it is understood "according to nature," <namely, as> if some subject is of such a nature that it should have a habit <or possession> which it is said to be deprived of.17 And so perhaps it is of <all> contraries, since in all
<contraries>, the subject is naturally ordered previously <to be> more perfect in the extreme than imperfect. But the general nature (ratio) of these opposites is that "a form and the lack of a form is in a subject that is apt by nature <to receive it>."18 And it is principally distinguished from contraries through this, where neither extreme is only the absence of the remaining, but some positive form <is absent>.
14. Physics, Bk. VIII, Ch. 8 (261b 27–262a 12). For a fuller discussion, see Norman Kretzmann, Incipit/Desinit, in Motion and Time, Space and Matter, ed.
P. Machamer and R. Turnball (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1976), 101–36; Norman Kretzmann, "Continuity, Contrariety, Contradiction, and Change," in Infinity and Continuity in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, ed.
Norman Kretzmann (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982), 270–96; and Paul Vincent Spade, "Quasi-Aristotelianism," in Infinity and Continuity in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1982), 297–307.
15. Categories, Ch. 10 (12a 26).
16. Categories, Ch. 10 (12a 28–29).
17. This sentence is amended for clarification. The Latin is: Nec est ratio eorum "fieri circa idem ordine quodam," quia non convenit omnibus privative oppositis nisi intelligatur "secundum naturam" si aliquod subiectum aptum natum sit prius natura habere habitum quam dicatur privari.
18. Metaphysics, Bk. IV, Ch. 2 (1004a 14–16).
QUESTION 39
12. This implication of Aristotle,19 <i.e.>, "if to be deprived and privation were the same, they would be predicated of the same," must also be noted: since from this it follows universally that denominative and abstract are not the same.
13. Similarly the saying that "opposition in concrete <terms> and in abstract <terms> is the same,"20 must be noted.
14. On behalf of the differentia which Aristotle21 assigns between privative opposites and relative <opposites>, it must be noted that not all relative opposites are said reciprocally according to the same mode of referring, but only those which are essentially (per se) referred to each other. Therefore, that differentia is perhaps of certain <things> relative to privative opposites; but a prior differentia is more universal.22 This is valid for an understanding of the third property of relatives, which is "all relatives are said to be convertible,"23 that is, mutually to each other, which property is true in some relatives according to the same account (rationem) of referring, as when each extreme is essentially (per se) relative to the other. In other <relatives>, however, it is not <true>, when one extreme is essentially
(per se) referred to the other, and the other is not <referred> to it except accidentally.
15. Or otherwise one can say, insofar as it is to the question, that although not all relatives are said reciprocally, nevertheless all relative opposites are said reciprocally, since those relatives where each is not said essentially (per se) to the other, are not relative opposites, since they are not both in the same genus.
For "knowable" is not in the genus of relation, neither as a relative nor as an essential (per se) relation, and so of other relatives to which others are essentially (per se) said and not the other way around. And according to this, this is the general differentia between relative opposites and privative <opposites>.
Since, however, neither <privation nor possession are opposed> as contraries, etc.24
19. Categories, Ch. 10 (12a 40–b 1).
20. Categories, Ch. 10 (12b 4–5).
21. Categories, Ch. 10 (12b 21–25).
22. Categories, Ch. 10 (12b 15–21).
23. For the phrase, omnia relativa dici ad convertentiam, see the Wolter quotation in ch. 25, fn. 39, p. 219, supra. Cf. Categories, Ch. 7 (6b 24–27).
24. Categories, Ch. 10 (12b 26).
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
16. It must be noted that Aristotle assigns a twofold differentia between contraries and privative opposites. One, taken as if from the division of contraries, is such: "of contraries that admit of an intermediate, it is never necessary for one of the two (alterum) to be in <a subject that is receptive of it>,"25 but of privative opposites, it is always necessary for one of the two (alterum) to be in <a subject> when the subject is of such a nature that it should receive it.26 Therefore, privative opposites are not contraries that admit of an intermediate. "Of contraries that lack an intermediate, it is always necessary for one of the two (alterum) to be in <a subject that is> receptive <of it>,"27 since it is the nature of the <subject> that is receptive of them always to receive them. Of privative opposites, it is not always necessary that one of the two be in <a subject that is receptive of them>, since the nature of the subject is not such as always to receive them; therefore, privative opposites are not contraries that lack an intermediate.
25. Categories, Ch. 10 (12b 32–33).
26. Categories, Ch. 10 (13a 3–8).
27. Categories, Ch. 10 (12b 29–30).