Question Fifteen
[QUESTION FIFTEEN
Whether the Parts of Substance are Substances] You should not be disturbed <if> the parts of substance.1
t is asked concerning this <statement> whether the
parts of substance are substances.
1. It seems that they are not.
Since substance as it is the most general <genus> is essentially (per se) a being; no part of substance is essentially (per se) a being while it is a part of substance, since then it would be "this something,"2 and one substance would be from many <things that are a> "this something," which does not seem true.
2. Second, let any part of a substance be A. If A is a substance, <then> by descending divisively from the most general <genus>, it would be necessary to concede that it would be either that substance of which it is a part, or a distinct species in opposition to it, or what is contained in some species distinct from that <one>. Since, according to Aristotle in Bk. II of the Topics3
"every <thing> that is in <some> genus, is in some of its species."
It is not that <substance> of which it is a part, since that <substance> is not predicated of it. It is not another species. Nor is it in another species, since then it would differ from its whole self specifically, and so <it would differ> through an essential differentia, and also <it would differ> from every other part. But this is not possible: both because every part would have a specific
1. Categories, Ch. 5 (3a 29–33).
2. On the Soul, Bk. II, Ch. 1 (412a 6–9).
3. Topics, Bk. II, Ch. 4 (111a 33–34).
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
form, since every differentia is taken from such a form, and so no part would be a part of the whole, nor would it constitute its essence, nor <would it constitute> one essentially with another part; and because then every part through a proper form would be a being in act, and "from two <things> in act it would not constitute one truly," according to Aristotle in Bk. VII of the Metaphysics,4 and so no whole would be truly one.
3. Third, if any part of a substance is a substance, and no part of a man is a man, it follows that "therefore no man is a substance." The conclusion is false, and not the minor, therefore the major. The form of arguing is evident according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the Physics,5 since such a form of arguing is used against those who posit that time is a circulation, in this way:
"any part of time is time; <yet> not any part of circulation is circulation; therefore, time is not a circulation." Therefore, if the form of arguing is valid there, it is also <valid> here.
4. Fourth, in Bk. VII of the Metaphysics,6 it is said about matter that "it is not what something is (quid), nor how it is (quale)," etc.; therefore, it is not a substance.
5. Fifth, form is not substance, since it is in a subject.7—Also, since it is "present and absent beyond the corruption of the subject,"8 as is evident in a substantial transformation.
6. To the opposite, one can argue through the three reasons made to the opposite of the preceding question.9
7. Second, the divided is predicated of <those things which> divide it; <and according to> Bk. II of On the Soul:10 "substance is divided into matter and form and the composite"; therefore, any of these is a substance.
8. Third, in Bk. VII of the Metaphysics,11 Aristotle says that 4. Metaphysics, Bk. VII, Ch. 13 (1039a 4–5).
5. Physics, Bk. IV, Ch. 10 (218b 2–4).
6. Metaphysics, Bk. VII, Ch. 3 (1029a 20–21).
7. Categories, Ch. 5 (3a 21–22).
8. Porphyry, Isagoge, Ch. "On Accident" (AL I6 20; ed. Busse, 12.24–25).
9. Cf. supra, q. 14, nn. 6–8.
10. On the Soul, Bk. II, Ch. 1 (412a 7–9).
11. Metaphysics, Bk. VII, Ch. 3 (1029a 2–8).
QUESTION 15
form is a greater being than matter, and therefore it is a greater being than the composite. In this implication it is implied that matter is a greater being than the composite. Then I argue in this way: substance is the greatest being;12 therefore, if that which is the least being, for example the composite, is a substance (as is evident), by much more will matter and form, which are greater beings than the composite, be substances.
9. Fourth, here in the text Aristotle seems to imply that the parts of substance are substances; otherwise, it would not be necessary to prohibit that <proposition, namely, that substance is not in a subject> as untenable, nor would it follow from what was said of property.13
[I. To The Question] 10. To the question, one can say that there are two kinds of parts, namely, (1) essential <parts>, as matter and form, which constitute the essence of substance; (2) other quantitative parts, which are not substances insofar as there is a substance, but insofar as it is quantified and extended. But one can say of the latter as of the former that they are not essentially (per se) substances, that is, the most general <genus> of substance is not predicated of them essentially (per se), nor truly in the abstract, on account of the first and second reason posited previously in that part of the question.14 Substance, however, is equivocal: as essential (per se) being is said <of it>, and in this way it is the most general <genus>; and as it is said of the essential (per se) principles of being, and in this way the parts of substance can be said <to be> a substance. Similarly, in the genus of substance, as it is the most general genus, <the parts of substance> do not exist as species, but <they are in the genus of substance> through an essential (per se) reduction to the principles of species; and it is not necessary that the genus be truly predicated in the abstract of those <things> which are in a genus through reduction.
12. Categories, Ch. 5 (2b 5–7).
13. Cf. Categories, Ch. 5 (2a 13).
14. Cf. supra, nn. 1–2.
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
[II. To The Arguments To The Opposite] [A. To the Arguments to the Opposite of the Preceding Question] 11. To the arguments of the preceding question, <insofar> as they are valid here.
To the first <argument>,15 that "non-substance is not prior to substance," I say that if non-substance is understood <in this way>, that is, as that of which the most general <genus> in the genus of substance is not predicated essentially (per se), the proposition is false.16 But it is true <if it is understood> in this way: non-substance, that is, <what is> in no way a substance, neither as a substance is the most general <genus> nor as <substance> is said of the principles of substance, <is not prior to substance>.
12. To the proof,17 when it is said that "substance is the first being," I say that this is true in comparing the most general
<genus> of substance to the other genera, that is, of beings essentially (per se) in a genus, substance is the first being; nevertheless, it is not true of a substance having been produced absolutely (substantia principiata simpliciter), since the principles of such a substance are prior to that <substance>, as is said in Bk.
VII of the Metaphysics,18 that form and matter are greater beings than the composite. Nevertheless, perhaps one can concede absolutely that substance is the first with respect to perfection, although not by way of generation.
13. To the second <argument>19 "by the destruction of a non-substance, a substance is not destroyed": I say that if a nonsubstance is understood in the major <in one way>, that is, by 15. Cf. supra, q. 14, n. 6.
16. The claim that "non-substance is not prior to substance" is false if the "non-substance" refers to the differentia, which, as it was argued in the preceding question, is prior to a species of substance. For while a differentia is the same thing as a substance, "substance" cannot be predicated of it essentially.
Likewise, as the subsequent argument makes clear, it is also the case that the principles of substance, namely, form and matter, are prior to the composite.
17. Cf. supra, q. 14, n. 6.
18. Metaphysics, Bk. VII, Ch. 3 (1029a 2–8).
19. Cf. supra, q. 14 n. 7.
QUESTION 15
that <thing> being destroyed which is not essentially (per se) a substance in the genus of substance, <then the claim that> "a substance is not destroyed" is false, since by the destruction of the principles of substance, which are not substances in this way, a substance will be destroyed. Nevertheless, it can be true in this way: <if> what is in no way a substance, <neither> as it is the most general <genus>, nor as it is said of the principles of substance,
<is destroyed, then a substance is not destroyed>.
14. To the third <argument>,20 <which claims that> "nothing pertains to the essence of a substance except a substance," <a solution is had> through the same <type of distinction>: if "except" is understood <in this way>, "except" that which is essentially in the genus of substance, it is false; <if it is understood> in another way <it is> true, and in that way a part of a substance is a substance.
[B. To the Arguments to the Opposite of This Question] 15. To the other <arguments in this question>21 from Bk. II of On the Soul, I say that that division of substance is not a division of a genus into its species, since then matter would have a differentia distinguishing it from form, and it would be a being in act of itself distinct from form, which is not true; but it is a division of an equivocal into its equivocates according to the logician, or <it is a division> of analogy into its analogates according to nature. And in this way I concede the predication of substance of the things dividing it; but this is not insofar as substance is the most general <genus>.
16. To the <second argument>,22 I say that matter and form are greater beings than the entity composed of a principle,23 and so they are substances; nevertheless, they do not exist as species of substance.
17. To the authority of Aristotle,24 I say that Aristotle neither says nor implies here in the text that the parts of substances are substances; but he does say that, on account of the first property
20. Cf. supra, q. 14, n. 8.
21. Cf. supra, n. 7.
22. Cf. supra, n. 8.
23. The Latin has principii rather than principiorum as one would expect.
24. Cf. supra, n. 9.
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
of substance, it is not necessary to concede that they are not substances, since neither are the parts of a substance in a subject, that is, in some complete act existing as forms, although they are in the whole, since a mode of being in the whole is one
<thing> and <a mode of being> in the subject is another.
[III. To The Other Principal Arguments] 18. Then to the two arguments to the other part of the question which prove that form is not a substance through the fact that it is in a subject,25 it must be said that "matter" appropriately is only that which is in potency to the reception of form, not <something> having from itself some complete act, to which a form contributes being (esse) absolutely as it is in substances.
"Subject" is said to be that which, although it may be in potentiality to a form, nevertheless is from itself in a complete act, and for this reason an approaching form contributes to it only being in a certain respect (esse secundum quid). Therefore, the form of a substance, although it may be in matter, nevertheless is not in a subject.
19. According to the same <distinction, a reply> is evident to the other <argument>,26 since <a form> is not "present in addition to the corruption of the subject," etc., since not any
<thing> is its subject.
[IV. Notable Remarks About The Other Properties Of Substance] 20. Concerning the fifth property of substance,27 it must be known that the most general <genus> of substance is not said of something more and of something less, nor does some substance according to its own essence receive more and less; nevertheless, with respect to the act of standing under (actum substandi), which is one of its properties, namely, of standing under 25. Cf. supra, n. 5.
26. Cf. ibid.
27. Namely, that substance does not admit of a more and a less. Cf. Categories, Ch. 5 (3b 34).
QUESTION 15
(substantiae), something is said to be more substance than another, as species <is said to be> more substance than genus,28 since it stands under (substat) more <things>. Just as a genus is said to be more universal than a species, since it is predicated of more <things>, although universal is predicated equally of a genus and of a species as of its species. There is much difficulty concerning this property which should be left for the natural philosopher.
21. Concerning the sixth property of substance,29 which is "although it is one and the same in number, it is susceptible of <receiving> contraries according to its mutation," this is proper to substance and is convertible with substance, since there is no substance from the nature (ratio) of <being> a substance that is prohibited from receiving contraries, although some <substance> from its own proper form is determined to one contrary. Similarly, it must be understood that "a substance receives contraries," not <something contrary> to itself, but <it receives> some <things> which are contrary among themselves; otherwise this property would be repugnant to the fourth property.30
28. Cf. Categories, Ch. 5 (2b 8–9).
29. Categories, Ch. 5 (4a 10–11).
30. The fourth property is that substance does not have contraries; cf. Categories, Ch. 5 (3b 25).