Questions Thirty-Seven through Thirty-Eight
<QUESTIONS THIRTY-SEVEN
AND THIRTY-EIGHT>
[Question Thirty-Seven Whether Opposition is a Real or an Intentional Accident] As often, however, as things are accustomed to be opposed,1 etc.
oncerning this it is asked first whether opposition is a
real or an intentional accident.
1. It seems that it is real:
Since it is only for the metaphysician to consider being and real accidents of being; for accidents of being, as they are considered by reason, pertain to the consideration of the logician. But the metaphysician considers opposition, as is evident in Bk. V of the Metaphysics.2 Therefore, opposition is a real attribute.
2. Second, opposition is a species of differentia, and differentia is a species of diversity, and diversity is a real attribute; therefore, opposition <is a real attribute>, since a genus is not more truly a being than its species.
3. Third, if the understanding did not exist, there would <still> be opposition; therefore, it is not an intentional accident.
The antecedent is evident inductively; for there would be a mutual action between hot and cold and a motion between these,
<even> if the understanding did not exist; therefore, contrariety also <does not depend upon the existence of the understanding>.
Similarly, if the understanding did not exist, some father and 1. Categories, Ch. 10 (11b 16 [in apparatus]).
2. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 10 (1018a 20–b 8).
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some son would <still> exist, since the existence of "to bear" and "to be born"3 do not depend on the understanding; therefore, relative opposites also <do not depend upon the understanding>.
Similarly, <if the understanding did not exist>, <something> lacking habits would be, in its nature, designed to have a habit; therefore, privative opposites <do not depend upon the understanding>.4
Similarly, a contradiction also <exists>, since that follows any opposition; therefore, if any other <type of opposition> remains in this way, <a contradiction> can exist without the understanding <existing>.
4. To the opposite:
An accident does not have a truer existence than its subject; but oppositions are founded in the intentions as in a subject; therefore, they are not real but only intentional. The minor is evident inductively. For genus and species are referred to each other; and the genus and the non-genus contradict <each other>; and so it is about the other opposites.
5. Second, in intentional accidents alone it is possible for something to be predicated of itself denominatively; but this is possible in oppositions; therefore, etc. Proof of the major: a denominative predication of something is a predication of an accident of <that> subject; but no accident, except an intentional
<accident>, can exist in something of itself as in a subject. Proof of the minor: "every division is between opposites";5 but opposition is divided into contrariety and privative opposition and <others> of this kind; therefore, these are opposed; therefore, also oppositions are opposed.
6. Third, nothing real is found in every most general <genus>; but opposition and its species are found in every genus; therefore, etc. The minor is evident, since a contradiction ac3. In Latin, both words are in the perfect tense.
4. For the sake of clarity, this sentence is amended. In the critical edition, it reads: Similiter, esset carentia habitus in apto nato habere habitum; igitur et privative opposita. Cf. Metaphysics, Bk. IV, Ch. 2 (1004a 14–16).
5. Cf. infra, n. 7.
QUESTIONS 37–38
cording to the same aspect (rationem) is found between man and non-man, and between white and non-white, since <it is found> according to this aspect: "<it is> an opposition of which there is not an intermediate in itself."6––It seems similar about contrariety, which is discovered in diverse genera, according to this aspect: "the greatest distance of forms which are of such a nature to happen mutually concerning the same <thing>."7
[Question Thirty-Eight Whether the Division of Opposition into These Four, Namely, Relative Opposition,
Contrary Opposition, Contradictory Opposition, and Privative Opposition, is Suitable]
fter this it is asked whether the division of op-
position into these four, namely, relative opposition,
contrary <opposition>, contradictory <opposition>, and privative <opposition>, is suitable.
7. It seems that it is not:
Since every division is through opposites, according to Boethius in his book On Division;8 this <division> is not <through opposites>; therefore, etc. Proof of the minor: since this division is between oppositions, and no opposition is opposed. Proof: since if it were, then it would be opposed through another opposition; and with equal reason that <opposition would be opposed through another opposition>, since it could be divided against another opposition; and so it will proceed to infinity in oppositions. Therefore, this division is insufficient, since it does not happen in all these oppositions.
8. Second, when one seems to follow another, the division is insufficient; but contradictories follow all other opposites; therefore, etc. The minor is evident, since all other opposites include contradictory opposites.
6. Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, Ch. 4 (72a 12–13).
7. Categories, Ch. 6 (6a 12–19); Metaphysics, Bk. X, Ch. 4 (1055a 5–33).
8. Boethius, Liber de divisione (ed. J. Magee, p. 48; PL 64, 890D–891A).
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9. Third, relative opposites are said of the same <thing>; therefore, they are not opposites. The antecedent is evident, since it is argued thus in the chapter "On Quantity":9 "this is great <in comparison> to this, and this is small <in comparison> to this <other one>; therefore, this is great and small." Therefore, if that mode of arguing is valid, two relative opposites can be inferred absolutely from themselves <when they are> posited in comparison to diverse <things>. For Aristotle understands relative opposites through "great" and "small," as is evident there.
10. Fourth, privative opposites are said of the same thing; therefore, they are not opposites. Proof of the antecedent: since, according to Aristotle in Bk. II of the Topics,10 in privative opposites the implication holds in its very self;11 therefore, if sensation follows sight, then the lack of sensation (insensibilitas) follows blindness. But it follows that "sight is sensation; therefore, every seeing is a sensing," since an implication essentially
(per se) holds from the abstracts to the concretes. Similarly, "if deafness is a lack of sensation, then a deaf <person> is insensible." Therefore, if the same <person> is seeing and deaf, then the same <one> will be sensible and insensible, and so privative opposites <will be said> of the same <thing>. This same <thing> is evident in another example, since it follows "that <one> is similar to this <one>; therefore, that is similar," and "<that one is> dissimilar to that <other one>; therefore, that <one> is dissimilar"; therefore, <that one> is similar and dissimilar. The implication is evident, since a relative posited with respect to any term implies itself absolutely, since no term distracts from the nature (ratione) of a relative absolutely.
11. Fifth, contraries are said of the same <thing>; therefore, they are not opposites. The antecedent is evident. First, since the nature of each extreme is in an intermediate <that is> said through participation; otherwise <an intermediate that is said through participation> does not differ from an intermediate said through negation; otherwise there would also not be motion to the intermediate from each extreme, as an intermediate said through participation is denominated from each extreme.
9. Cf. Categories, Ch. 6 (5b 34–39).
10. Topics, Bk. II, Ch. 8 (114a 7–10).
11. "in its very self": i.e., directly.
QUESTIONS 37–38
Second, since a shield, of which the middle place is <partly> white and <partly> black, is colored; therefore, the shield is either white, or black, or an intermediate <color, such as gray>.
The implication is evident, according to Aristotle in Bk. II of the Topics:12 "it is necessary that whatever is in a genus or denominated from a genus, is also in some species or is denominated from some species." It is manifest that it is not an intermediate
<color>. If it is white, with equal reason it is black; therefore, contraries are said of the same <thing>.
12. To the first proof,13 it could be said that the nature of extremes is imperfectly in an intermediate,14 and for this reason an intermediate is denominated from neither extreme.––
Against this: each extreme is some form; therefore, it is simple, according to the author of the <book> On the Six Principles in the beginning: "simple, when it exists, is in itself whole."15
Therefore, if each extreme is in the intermediate according to some of itself, <then> according to itself, the whole will be in the intermediate.
13. It is said to the second proof,16 that a shield is not colored (coloratum) but <multi->colored (colorata).––Against this: therefore, it is this color (coloratum) and that <color>. Since according to Priscian, "plural is not <anything> except the single doubled."17 But the consequent is false, since then it would be a multiplication of subject and accident.
14. Sixth, contradictory opposites are said of the same <thing>; therefore, they are not opposites. Proof of the antecedent: since contradictory opposites follow every other <opposite>; but all other <opposites> are said of the same <thing>, as was shown;18 therefore, also contradictories.
12. Topics, Bk. II, Ch. 4 (111a 33–25).
13. Cf. supra, n. 11.
14. Parts of Animals, Bk. III, Ch. 1 (661b 11).
15. Liber sex principiorum, Ch. 5, n. 54.
16. Cf. supra, n. 12.
17. Priscianus, Institutiones grammaticae, Bk. V, Ch. 9, n. 47 (ed. M. Hertz, I 172).
18. Cf. supra, nn. 9–11.
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15. Seventh, if opposition is suitably divided, then opposition is the subject of division. And beyond this, division is a subject of opposition, since division is opposed to some as indivision or collection. Therefore, the same <thing> with respect to the same <thing> is subject and accident, which seems unsuitable; therefore, etc.
16. To the opposite are Aristotle and Boethius in his Commentary <on the Categories>.19 Similarly <to the opposite is> also
Aristotle in the books of the Topics.20 For as often as he teaches <us> to consider about opposites, he teaches <us> to look only to these <four species>.
[I. To The Thirty-Seventh Question] [A. The Response of Scotus] 17. To the first question,21 one can say that opposition is equivocal. Since taken in one sense it is said univocally of contrariety and relative opposition; in another sense it is said univocally of contradiction and privative opposition. In its primary way, it is a being and a species in the genus of relation; if it is found in other genera, this is not as a species, but as an attribute. In the second way, it is an intention, since its other extreme is only a being according to the consideration of reason.
[B. To the Principal Arguments of the Thirty-Seventh Question] 18. To the first argument,22 it must be said that the metaphysician distinguishes many <things> that have many parts in Bk.
V, not since all are beings or real attributes of being, but perhaps he also posits some senses according to other <senses> just as he excludes <others> from the question; and so it is about opposition, one species of which is a being and a species <in the genus> of relation, and another sense is joined <to it> just as it is perhaps excluded from the question.
19. Cf. supra, n. 1; Boethius, In Categ. Aristot., Bk. IV (PL 64, 263B).
20. Topics, Bk. II, Ch. 8 (113b 15–114a 25).
21. Cf. supra, nn. 1–6.
22. Cf. supra, n. 1.
QUESTIONS 37–38
19. To the <second argument>,23 I say that opposition in one sense, namely, as it is said of contrariety and relative opposition, is a species of differentia; however, not as it is said of contradiction and privative opposition. Since being and non-being contradict <one another>, and nevertheless they do not differ, nor are they diverse, since diversity is a differentia of being, and similarly differentia <is a differentia of being>.
20. To the third <argument>,24 I concede that, if the understanding did not exist, contrariety and relative opposition would <still> exist; however, <I do> not <concede that> privative opposition or contradiction <would still exist>. Since the other extreme in these oppositions, for example, negation and privation, insofar as it is an extreme of the relation, is only a being according to reason. That is evident about negation, since even though it is said of some being, for example as "nonman" is said about a donkey, nevertheless according to the aspect which contradicts man, it is not a being except of reason.
Through this it is evident that even though contraries remain, if the understanding does not exist, it is not necessary that contradictories remain insofar as they are contradictories. Since the negation of white, as it contradicts white, is not in black, since
<insofar> as it contradicts <it>, it can be said of a being and of a non-being.25
21. If it is said that the negation of white at least follows black, as it contradicts white, and so contradictories exist if contraries exist:––I say that if the understanding does not exist, there is no implication. Similarly, even though a privation may be the negation of a habit in a subject,26 nevertheless it is only opposed to a habit by reason of a negation, and <thus> it is not a being except only according to reason.
23. Cf. supra, n. 2.
24. Cf. supra, n. 3.
25. On Interpretation, Bk. I, Ch. 3 (16b 14–15).
26. Cf. supra, n. 3.
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[C. To the Arguments to the Opposite of the Thirty-Seventh Question] To the arguments to the opposite.
22. To the first <argument>,27 I say that contrariety and relative opposition, taken in the sense in which they are species of opposition, are not in intentional subjects; although perhaps contrariety according to another sense––as it is said to be in propositions according to their quality and quantity––may be intentional and in an intentional subject, as in a proposition.
The other two, however, as contradiction and privative opposition, can be in intentional subjects.
23. To the second <argument>,28 I say that the major can be denied, since also in compared real accidents it seems that some denominative is predicated of itself, of which kind are oppositions.
24. Against <this argument>: it is impossible in things for something to be in the same species as in a subject; and a denominative predication is properly of a subject. Or one can say that when it is said "oppositions are opposed," that which denominates "oppositions" is not a real opposition but an intentional <opposition>, and so the same <thing> does not denominate itself.
25. Against this: contrariety and relative opposition divide opposition as a genus; therefore, they are absolute species.
Therefore, their opposition is something real, since each extreme is also a being. And for this reason it must be answered just as it is said to the first argument of the following question.29
26. To the third <argument>,30 I say that contradiction and privative opposition can be discovered univocally in every genus, and similarly contrariety and relative opposition <can be discovered univocally in every genus>, perhaps as attributes,
<but> not as species.
27. Cf. supra, n. 4.
28. Cf. supra, n. 5.
29. Cf. supra, nn. 28–29.
30. Cf. supra, n. 6.
QUESTIONS 37–38
[II. To The Thirty-Eighth Question] [A. The Response of Scotus] 27. To the second question,31 it must be said that the division of opposition into these four is suitable. Since a real opposition is of those <things> which are in the same genus.32 Of these, therefore, either one of them depends on another, and so it is relative opposition; or <one of them does> not <depend on the other>, and so it is contrary opposition. An opposition having non-being as the other extreme is said of privative and contradictory opposition; either it has non-being as an extreme, according to <which> no subject <is> determined to itself, and so it is a contradiction; or it determines some subject to itself, and so it is a privative opposition. And thus the sufficiency is evident.
[B. To the Principal Arguments of the Thirty-Eighth Question] 28. To the first argument,33 one can say that not every division is between opposites, properly speaking, since not <every> division <is> of a genus into species, as <the division of a genus is> in the genus of substance. And so contraries and relatives divide opposition, as species; and the others <namely, contradiction and privative opposites divide opposition>, as species, although in another sense of opposition. And it is not necessary for the species dividing <an opposition> to be contraries unless contrariety <is taken> metaphorically, which is not an opposition as we speak of it here, but perhaps it is a common intention to all disparate <parts>. It is in no way necessary, however, to oppose properly <the things> dividing <a thing> having many parts, and thus neither <is it necessary to oppose> a contrariety to a contradiction.––Or otherwise: this is not valid to the question, since no opposition of these can denominate all these dividing <things>; nor is some <thing> in itself in comparison to another in one sense divided into contrariety and relative op31. Cf. supra, nn. 7–16.
32. Metaphysics, Bk. X, Ch. 8 (1058a 10).
33. Cf. supra, n. 7.
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position in this division, although all <things> are said <to be> disparates, and so contraries <taken> metaphorically.
29. Nevertheless it must be understood that the division of opposition into these is absolutely a division of an utterance into its significations. But opposition taken in one sensed is divided into contrariety and relative opposition, as a genus <is divided> into its species; similarly, taken in another sense it is general. Therefore, <the things> dividing it in each sense are opposites, as contrariety and relative opposition are perhaps contraries, by speaking of contrariety taken metaphorically, which is a differentia according to species; but it is not necessary for <the things> dividing opposition in one sense to be opposed to <the things> dividing <it> in another sense.
30. To the <second argument>,34 I say that the division of opposition is into these intentions, so that one member of these does not follow another, since it does not follow <that> "these are contraries; therefore, these are contradictories." But the implication is between those <things> which subsist, as it follows
"<something is> white and black; therefore, <it is> white and non-white"; and into those there is not a division except accidentally (per accidens).
31. Against this: by speaking of intentions, all <oppositions> are relative opposites, since a contradictory is said to be a contradictory to the contradictory, and a contrary <is said to be> a contrary to the contrary, and so <it is> of the others.
Response: a contradictory is a relative <opposite> accidentally (per accidens), as a man is white; a contradiction, however, is not a relative opposition. The division of opposition, however, is thus: into abstract <opposition> or into concrete <opposition>, taken essentially, not for every thing that can denominate, since then "qualified" would not be divided into denominatives of its species, since those can be predicated of the same <thing> and of each other mutually, although accidentally (per accidens).
32. To the third <argument>,35 I say that relatives are not relative opposites except in comparison to the same <thing>. And 34. Cf. supra, n. 8.
35. Cf. supra, n. 9.
QUESTIONS 37–38
so they cannot be inferred from themselves <when they are> posited in comparison to diverse terms, although absolute relatives can be inferred. In what manner the reasoning of Aristotle about large and small is valid, however, was said above.36
33. Against this: in the beginning of this chapter,37 where he gives the differentia between contraries and relative opposites,
Aristotle says that in relative opposites one <thing> in itself is said to another, and <this is> not <so> in contraries.38 And he says the same <thing>, when he assigns a differentia between a relative opposition and a contrary <opposition> and <between> two relatives taken in comparison to the same <thing>, so that "the father of this" and "the son of this" are not said <in respect> of each other, but they are taken absolutely. Therefore, he understands relative opposites to be relatives absolutely.
To this it can be said that in relative opposites there are two <things>: an opposition and an added relation. By reason of the opposition it is necessary that opposites are accepted in comparison to the same <thing>, since, to be taken in comparison to the same <thing> is generally <true> for all opposites.39 By reason of the differentia added to the opposition, which is a relation, it is necessary that those <opposites>, according to which there is an opposition, be referred to each other.
35. Therefore, the saying of Aristotle40 must be understood of those forms among which there is an opposition, since those are referred to each other, since in this, opposite forms differ here from the opposite forms in the other genera of opposition. Nevertheless, in all <these> it is necessary for opposites to be referred to the same <thing>.41 And therefore Aristotle, when he ought to have distinguished this opposition from others, did not posit this condition <to be taken in comparison to 36. Cf. supra, q. 24, nn. 16–24.
37. Categories, Ch. 10 (11b 32–35).
38. Knowledge and the knowable are opposed to one another as relative opposites; since knowledge is of the knowable, the knowable is related to knowledge. In contrast, good and bad are opposed to one another as contraries, since the good is not the good of the bad, but rather good is opposed to bad.
39. Cf. supra, nn. 6, 33.
40. Cf. supra, n. 33.
41. Cf. supra, nn. 6, 33.
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the same thing>, but that <condition, i.e., to be referred to each other> in which this <opposition> is distinguished from others.
36. To the <fourth argument>,42 one can say that in privative opposites, the implication does not hold in itself <i.e., directly> except in comparison to the proximate subject.43 For example: if it follows "man is seeing; therefore, man is sensing," it does not follow by the same order in privative opposites "man is blind; therefore, man is insensible." Since if it did––since it would further follow that "therefore, man is non-sensible" from the affirmative of a privative predicate to the affirmative of an indefinite predicate according to Aristotle and Boethius in Bk.
II of On Interpretation44 and according to Aristotle in Bk. I of the Prior Analytics;45 and further it would follow that "<man> is nonsensible; therefore, man is not sensible" according to those <authors> where <it was said> previously––it would ultimately follow, from first to last, that "<man> is blind; therefore, <man> is not sensible," where it is manifestly a fallacy of the consequent.
37. Nevertheless, the saying of Aristotle in Bk. II of the Topics46 can be understood of a proximate subject of an inferior habit and its privation. As perhaps if it follows "an eye is seeing; therefore, an eye is sensing," similarly it follows that "an eye is blind (or a man is blind with respect to his eye); therefore, an eye (or a man with respect to his eye) is insensible." The reason for the difference (differentiae) is because "a privation is the negation of a habit <in something> that is apt by nature <to have it>."47 The negation, however, of an absolutely superior habit or <a habit> in a remote subject does not follow the negation of an absolutely inferior <habit> or <a habit> in a remote subject, but <this> is a fallacy of the consequent from the proposition having more causes of truth than one (ad unum). Nevertheless
42. Cf. supra, n. 10, et infra, n. 40.
43. Cf. supra, q. 3, n. 12. The proximate subject of sight is the faculty of seeing, whereas the remote subject is the sentient soul.
44. On Interpretation, Bk. II, Ch. 1 (19b5–20a 2); Boethius, De interpr., [ed. secunda] Bk. IV, Ch. 10 (ed. Meiser, 279–280; PL 64, 531A–533D).
45. Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, Ch. 46 (51b 5–52b 34).
46. Cf. supra, n. 10.
47. Metaphysics, Bk. IV, Ch. 2 (1004a 14–16).
QUESTIONS 37–38
a negation of a superior habit in the same subject does follow the negation of an inferior habit in a proximate subject of this habit, since in that subject there is not a superior habit of such a nature as to come <into being>, unless <it is> because an inferior habit <exists>. Nor is it marvelous with respect to some subject that the denial of an inferior habit implies the denial of a superior habit; <and> with respect to another <it does> not, since the implication is not between simple <things> but between propositions. First, since every inference pertains to the third operation of the intellect;48 therefore, just as the second operation of the intellect, which is composition and division, presupposes the first, which is the comprehension of the indivisible, and there is no composition except of such <indivisibles>, so the third operation presupposes the second, so that there will not be any inference in that <operation> except of composite <expressions> or divided <expressions>. Second, since every implication is reducible to a syllogism; however nothing is antecedent or consequent in a syllogism except a proposition; therefore, nothing is an extreme in an implication except such
<a proposition>.
38. To the fifth <argument>,49 one can respond as Aristotle says in Bk. X of the Metaphysics, in the chapter "About Intermediates,"50 where he principally proves that the intermediate is composed from the contraries, since the intermediate is more of one extreme, less of the other. Since an intermediate <which is> said through participation participates in each extreme imperfectly and virtually, nevertheless <it participates in> neither absolutely, and therefore it is denominated from neither absolutely.
39. <To the Arguments to the Opposite>––To the first <argument> to the contrary,51 I say that, just as an essential composition is from matter and form, a quantitative composition, which is from integral parts, <is from matter and form>, and a com48. On the Soul, Bk. III, Ch. 6 (430a 26–28).
49. Cf. supra, n. 11.
50. Metaphysics, Bk. X, Ch. 7 (1057a 18–b 34).
51. Cf. supra, n. 12.
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position according to grades of perfection <is from matter and form>, so <something constituted> through an opposite is lacking a composition (est simplicitas). And an opposite is a simple form by a simplicity in the first two modes of composition. But not every form is simple by a simplicity in the third mode <of opposition>, since in some same form there are diverse grades of perfection and virtue; which composition is not repugnant to the simplicity of the essence of a form.
40. To the other example about privative opposites:52 if this implication is conceded, "it is dissimilar to that; therefore, it is dissimilar," which seems <to be> on account of the nature (rationem) of a relation to the dissimilar, then it must be said that "dissimilar" taken absolutely is not opposed as a privative to "similar" <taken> absolutely, but it is necessary for each to be taken according to the same and to the same <thing>, as <something is> similar and dissimilar to the same <thing> in whiteness; and in this way these two cannot be said of the same <thing>.––Or otherwise: this implication "<this one> is dissimilar to that; therefore, <this one> is dissimilar" must be denied, since <this> consequent follows "therefore, <this one> is not similar," which does not follow the antecedent. Then to that proposition, "a relative with respect to any term implies itself absolutely," it can be conceded insofar as it is from the nature (ratione) of a relation; but it can be prohibited by reason of a negation when the negation is joined with a relation in the same <thing>, as it is in privative relatives, of which kind is the "dissimilar."
41. To the second proof about contraries:53 if it is conceded that "a shield of this kind is colored (coloratum)," one can say that it does not follow that "therefore, it is white or black"; since in that consideration which is accepted, Aristotle says that it is necessary that whatever is said denominatively from a genus or <whatever> has a genus, be said denominatively from a species or that it has a species. And through this he implies <that there are> two modes of denominating in accidents––one according to being, another according to being-in––which two modes he touched upon in the beginning of Bk. II.54 Therefore, what a 52. Cf. supra, nn. 10, 36–37.
53. Cf. supra, n. 13.
54. Topics, Bk. II, Ch. 1 (109a 19–26).
QUESTIONS 37–38
genus denominates, some species will denominate either according to being or according to being-in. And so it is true to concede that whiteness or blackness or an intermediate color exists in a shield, but it does not follow that "therefore, a shield is white," since in accidents it does not hold from being-in to being <simply> according to Aristotle in the beginning of Bk. II.
42. Otherwise, one can say that a shield is not colored (coloratum), since it is true to say that it is colored in no color; since of this universal any singular is true, since any opposite is false.
Nevertheless, it must not be conceded that it is <multi->colored (colorata); since perhaps just as colored (coloratum) expresses a unity in the form and in the subject, so <multi->colored (colorata) expresses a plurality in each; and neither is there a unity in each, nor a plurality in each, but a unity in the subject, <and> a plurality in the accident.
43. To the <seventh argument>,55 I say that it is not unsuitable <that> of two intentional accidents each <one> is in each
<one> as in a subject. Since any intentional <being>, beyond the fact that it is a mode of understanding the other, is essentially (per se) intelligible. When it is a mode of understanding, it has the character (rationem) of an accident; when it is intelligible, it is an essence (quid), and it can be understood under something that is its mode of understanding, of which, nevertheless, the mode of understanding was prior. And so there can be a concept56 and a mode of understanding (modus intelligendi) with respect to the same <thing>. And this is the reason why in intentional accidents the same <thing> can be predicated of itself denominatively, since the same <thing> can be a concept
(intellectum) and a mode of understanding taken under an extraneous aspect (ratione); and so under extraneous aspects (rationibus) it can be signified in the concrete and in the abstract.
So it is evident that this division is only of opposition that is in complex <terms>, since Aristotle handles the topic of opposition in one way in the work On Interpretation,57 where he distin55. Cf. supra, n. 15.
56. Or "understanding" (intellectum).
57. On Interpretation, Bk. I, Ch. 6 (17a 25–37).
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guishes opposition into enunciations. It is also evident of which it is a division, since primarily it is <a division> of an equivocal into its equivocates, secondarily <it is a division> of a univocal in each sense into its univocates.
[III. What Must Be Noted About The Division Of Contraries] 44. It must be noted that of contraries, some lack an intermediate,58 of which it is necessary for one of the two (alterum)59 to be in every <thing that is> receptive <of the contraries>; others are <such that they admit of> an intermediate, of which it is not necessary for one of the two (alterum) to be in <something that is receptive of it>. And of the <kinds that admit of> intermediates, some have intermediates through participation, which intermediates have something of each extreme; some only have intermediates through negation. Also of those <contraries which admit of> intermediates, some have many intermediates, some only one; and some intermediates are named, some are unnamed.
45. Nevertheless, it must be understood on behalf of the second division that no <contraries that admit of> intermediates are properly said <to be> contraries, except <those> which have an intermediate through participation. For an intermediate through negation is found in all <things>, especially in contradictories; but perhaps in some contraries <that admit> of intermediates, the intermediate is not named unless <it is named> through the abnegation of the extremes, as in good and evil and similar <cases>.
46. The cause of the third and fourth division is assigned in Bk. X of the Metaphysics in the chapter <that begins>, "However, since one <thing> is contrary to one <thing>," etc.,60 which is that sometimes the negations of contraries are consistent with (cadunt super) some one determinate <thing> of the same genus with its extremes. And then there can be one intermediate
58. Boethius, In Topica Ciceronis, Bk. IV (PL 64, 1119C).
59. Cf. infra, q. 39, nn. 2, 8.
60. Metaphysics, Bk. X, Ch. 5 (1055b 30–1056b 1).
QUESTIONS 37–38
<that is> named, just as the negation of a determinate greater and lesser <quantity> is consistent with <something> having the same quantity; and therefore of these there is one intermediate that is equally named. When, however, the negations of contraries are not consistent with some one <thing that is> receptive <of them>, then there is not one intermediate, but either it remains altogether unnamed, or, when the negation of the extremes is consistent with many forms of the same genus, <then there are> many intermediates <that are> named, as it is in colors.