Question Three
[QUESTION THREE
Whether Some Intentional Predicate is Univocal to the Most General Genera]
t is asked about something posited in the previous
solution,1 namely, whether there is something univo-
cal to the most general <genera>, and primarily whether some intentional predicate is univocal to them.
1. It seems that there is not:
Since if something were <univocal to them>, then that would be prior to and more common than they, and thus these would not be the first and most general genera; which is contrary to Boethius.2
2. Second, if something were univocal to the <categories>, since they are diverse among themselves, they would be "the same beings in some respect; therefore, <they would be> different."3 The implication is evident through the definition of "different" posited in Bk. V of the Metaphysics.4 The consequent is false, since the categories are diverse in themselves and not different, since then they would be species.5
3. Third, the intention is caused by the thing;6 therefore, the 1. Cf. supra, q. 2, n. 19.
2. Boethius, In Categ. Aristot. I (PL 64, 160A–B). Cf. supra, q. 1, n. 1.
3. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 9 (1018a 12–13).
4. Ibid.
5. In this objection, "different" (differentia and differentium) is the plural, present active participle of differo, and should not be confused with differentia, which is a first-declension noun. If A differs from B, then A and B are different from one another. That by which they differ, however, is a differentia.
6. See Perler, "Duns Scotus on Signification," 107.
QUESTION 3
unity of the intention <is caused> by the unity of the thing; but no thing pertains univocally to them; therefore, neither does any intention <pertain univocally to the ten categories>. The first proposition is evident; for that which is caused by the intellect, and not by the thing, is a figment, of which kind there is not any intention.
4. Fourth, no univocal is denominative; but an intentional predicate is said only denominatively of those things which are things of first intention; therefore, no intentional predicate is univocal to them. Proof of the major: first, since univocal is distinguished here over against denominative, just as it is <distinguished> over against equivocal; second, since a little lower in the chapter "On Substance" Aristotle says that "certain things are predicated according to the name, and not according to the account (ratio) of the name," such as concretes or denominatives, and he exemplifies it concerning white.7
5. To the opposite:
Something intentional is said of these ten <categories> according to the same name and the same account (ratio); therefore, <something is> univocally <predicated of them>. The implication is evident according to the definition of univocals.8 Proof of the antecedent: substance is a genus, quantity is a genus.
6. Second, "substance" is essentially (in quid) predicated of many things which differ in species, and similarly "quantity" <is essentially predicated of many things which differ in species>; which is why "genus" is predicated of these according to the name and the definition. In this way, one can argue about many intentions inhering in them and contained under them, such as "species" <is> to man and whiteness.
7. Likewise, diversity alone in accidental matter does not diversify that of which there is a species, since the differentia
7. In other words, while it is correct to say that "the table is white," it is not the case that "the table is a color," even though it is true that "white is a color."
Categories, Ch. 5 (2a 29–34).
8. Porphyry defines genus as that which is "predicated essentially of many things which differ in species." Isagoge, Ch. "On the Genus" (AL I6 6–7; ed.
Busse, 2.15–18).
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
of the species is a formal differentia. But an intention, applied to a thing of one genus and of another, has only a differentia similar to matter by accident. Therefore, it does not differ in species from that which exists in them; therefore, neither is univocity taken away on account of that, since what does not take away the unity according to species, does not take away univocity. The first proposition is evident, since a golden circle and a bronze circle do not differ in species. And the reason is evident, since such a differentia, with that to which it is added, does not make it a being except accidentally, since it is not by nature the species of a genus. The minor is evident, since no intention is essentially (per se) in a thing of first intention, as was shown previously; but there is only diversity here and there according to the things of first intention; therefore, only according to accidental matter.
[I. The Response To The Question] 8. To the question one must say that some univocal intention can be applied to the things of all genera, since every diversity in things of first intention does not in itself impede the intellect from conceiving of those things through the same manner of conceiving.9 Intentions, however, are attributed to them insofar as they are conceived by the intellect, and for this reason intentions specifically the same can be attributed to diverse things.
[II. To The Principal Arguments] 9. To the first argument,10 one can say that they are the first and most common genera of things, <but they are> not <the first and most common genera> of intentions.
10. Similarly, to the second <argument, one can say> that 9. In other words, while the categories as extramental essences do not have anything predicated univocally of them, as they are considered in logic, i.e., as beings caused by the intellect, they do have something univocally predicated of them, namely, "categories" or "highest genera." See Pini, Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus, 143.
10. Cf. supra, n. 1.
QUESTION 3
they are not different, since they are not the same beings in some respect, that is some thing.
11. Otherwise, to each <of the first two arguments,11 one can say> that although they are the most common and first <genera>, nevertheless something the same can be in12 all of them denominatively, which does not have to be said <to be> prior to and more common than they, unless it is said essentially of them.
12. So to the second argument,13 <one can say that the categories> are not the same in some respect; therefore, it does not follow that they are different. In a certain mode this is apparent—where it seems less <likely>—namely, in real accidents; since "white," signifying one thing, is said of a surface and of a man, which belong to two genera. But this <example> is not altogether similar; for a real accident has only some one thing as its proximate subject, in the way that it exists in no other, unless <it exists> through its nature. Therefore, another <thing> is only its subject through an accident, by mediating for a primary subject. But an intentional accident can equally <and> primarily be in the things of all genera, and not through another.
13. To the third <argument>,14 I say that a thing is not the total cause of an intention, but is only an occasion, namely insofar as it moves the intellect so that it considers in act, and the intellect is the principal cause.15 For this reason, a lesser unity
11. Cf. supra, nn. 1–2. The initial arguments are essentially that if anything is able to be said univocally of the ten categories, then that which is said would be prior to and more common than the ten categories, but since the categories are the first and most common genera, nothing can be prior to and more common than they. In reply, Scotus argues that because "the categories are the first and most common genera," one has already predicated something univocal of them, namely the predicate "the first and most common genera," which, as an intentional predicate, would be more common than that of which it is predicated.
12. In the objection, aliquid-idem entia is translated as "the same beings in some respect." In the reply, Scotus distinguishes between entia and inesse; thus potest aliquid-idem inesse is translated as "something the same can be in."
13. Cf. supra, n. 2.
14. Cf. supra, n. 3.
15. Cf. Duns Scotus, God and Creatures: The Quodlibetal Questions, translated with introduction, notes, and glossary by Felix Alluntis and Allan B. Wolter
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), q. 15, n. 26. For a fuller dis-
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
suffices in the thing than is <found in> the intention, since it suffices for the intellect to be moved by something extrinsic for the causing of many <notions> through the <simple> consideration <of that which is extrinsic>, <notions> to which nothing corresponds in the thing. Just as in <something> existing, whiteness is in a certain respect (secundum quid) "essentially remaining" (per se stans) and motion in a certain respect (secundum quid) has the mode of a "condition" (habitus). For to each the intellect attributes the mode of a "condition" and of "essentially remaining" similarly, as to a man; and each is absolutely considered a noun. But nevertheless there is something corresponding to that mode in each, but not truly in the same way as an intention caused by the intellect <that is> moved by it extrinsically. Similarly, the intellect considering through that one species can reflect innumerable times upon itself by considering its own operation, and whatever consideration there is, it has nothing extrinsic corresponding to itself, except only the first object for the occasion, insofar as that moves the intellect initially to consider it. This is treated in the book by Porphyry.16
14. To the fourth <argument>,17 it is one thing to say "something univocal is predicated of many," and <another thing to say> "there is a univocal predicate of many."18 In the first way a denominative <term> is univocal; in the second way it is not, as the account shows. Hence, I concede the conclusion that no intentional predicate is a univocal predicate of the things of first intention, but some univocal intention in itself is predicated of them, <although> not univocally. But about this more will be said afterwards.19 cussion of how the extramental object is an occasion while the intellect is the principal cause, see Pini, Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus, p. 110.
16. Cf. Duns Scotus, Super Porphyrii, q. 1, n. 12; q 5, n. 4; q. 9–11, nn. 20 and 28.
17. Cf. supra, n. 4.
18. The Latin is as follows: aliud est dicere 'aliquid univocum praedicari de multis,' et 'esse univocum praedicatum de multis.'
19. The editors of the critical edition claim that this topic is picked up again by Scotus in q. 4, nn. 26 and 37, where Scotus argues that "being" is simply equivocal to the ten categories. It seems to me, however, that Scotus returns to the distinction in question not in question 4, but in question 8, where he argues that abstract accidental terms and denominative terms signify the same thing.