Question Six
[QUESTION SIX
Whether the Definition of Univocals is Good]
t is asked whether the definition of univocals is suit-
able, namely, this <definition>: "Univocals are <those
things> the name of which is common and the account of the substance is the same."1
1. One can argue that it is not <suitable> according to the first three arguments in the preceding question.2—And <these arguments> are solved in a similar manner just as they are solved there.3
2. Likewise, "white" is predicated of a man and of a horse according to the same account; for otherwise it would be equivocal. And nevertheless it is not a univocal predicate with regard to them, since it is denominative. One can make a similar point about every denominative predicate, and, most <of all>, of intentions, since this predicate "genus" is said according to the same account of substance and of quantity, and nevertheless it is not univocal, since it is denominative. And univocal and denominative are opposite ways of predicating, just as univocal and equivocal <are opposite ways of predicating>.
3. Second,4 all equivocals have the same name,5 namely, the 1. Categories, Ch. 1 (1a 6–11).
2. Cf. supra, q. 5 nn.1–3.
3. The first three arguments alluded to are the first three arguments of question 5. Having solved, however, these similar arguments in q. 5, nn. 13–15, Scotus immediately dismisses them here.
4. Although in one sense, this is the third argument, it is only the second original argument. As a result, in n. 13 Scotus refers to this as the second argument.
5. Categories, Ch. 1 (1a 1–5).
QUESTION 6
name "equivocals," and the same account of the substance, that is, an essential <account>, according to that name, namely, the account of equivocals. Therefore, if the definition said <of equivocals> were suitable, <then> all equivocals would be univocals, which is false, since opposite is predicated of opposite.
4. Third, those <things>, of which the essential substance is the same, are the same essentially. But univocated univocals have the same account of a univocating substance. Therefore, all univocates would be the same essentially, which is false, since in this way man and a donkey would be the same essentially.
5. To the opposite is Aristotle.6
[I. The Response To The Question] 6. It must be said that the description is suitable, and one can suitably understand univocates in this way: Univocates are those <things> of which, not as of the significates, the name of the univocating <term> is common. Since that name does not signify something univocal, but <the things> of which, as of the contents under the univocating <term>, the name of the univocating
<term> is common, and <of which> the account of the substance of the univocates <is> the same, according to that univocating name.
And then no univocating univocal is denominative with regard to the same <thing>, since the account of a denominative is not a substantial account of the denominates.
7. Similarly, one can understand univocating <univocals> in this way: Univocating <univocals> are <those things> of which the name, as the part of the whole, is common to the univocates, and the account of the univocating substance <is> the same as the univocates according to that name. The definition of equivocals, however, was not able to be understood of equivocating <things>, since they do not have a name, since nothing is equivocating except only the utterance. Similarly, they do not have any definition; therefore, they <have> neither a diverse <definition> nor the same <definition>. But neither of these <problems> impedes this definition from being understood of univocating
6. Categories, Ch. 1 (1a 6–8).
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
<things>, since they have a name (since not only the name univocates), and they have the same account of the substance.
8. Nevertheless, Aristotle seems to understand more of univocates. For he says:7 "for example, man <is> an animal, and cow <is an animal>.8 For both animals are called by a common name," which is manifestly said of the univocates. And he adds of "the same account": "if anyone assigns the account of each, what they are, in that they are animals, he will assign the same account of each"; which similarly is manifestly referred to the univocates.
[II. To The Principal Arguments] 9. To the first argument,9 it is said that no denominative
<term> has the account of a substance <i.e., an essential account> with regard to that thing with respect to which it is a denominative <term>, although in its own genus it can have the account of a substance <i.e., it can have an essential account>.10
And for this reason no denominative <term> is predicated <of a substance> according to the same account <of a substance, i.e., as an essential account>.11
7. Categories, Ch. 1 (1a 9–12).
8. The Latin is as follows: ut animal, homo atque bos, which literally is translated as "just as animal, man and cow."
9. Cf. supra, n. 2.
10. Traditionally, a denominative term is an accidental term, such as "grammarian," which either primarily signifies an accident, such as "grammar," and secondarily signifies an underlying substance, or vice versa. Thus, Scotus argues that no denominative term can be predicated essentially of a substance. Since
"grammarian," however, primarily signifies grammar, there can be an essential definition of it within its own, primary genus, i.e., as an accident. Scotus will, however, propose a new solution to the question of the signification of denominative terms in q. 8.
11. It must be remembered here that the phrase "according to the same account" is part of the definition of "univocal." Thus, Scotus argues that no denominative term is predicated of something according to the same account of the substance. For it is not the case that the account of "white" is different, i.e., not the same, when one says that "a man is white" and "a horse is white." Indeed, in these examples, the account of "white" is the same in both predicates; however, it is predicated of their subjects denominatively. Likewise, when one says that "substance is a genus" and "quantity is a genus," the predicate "genus"
QUESTION 6
10. Against this <argument>: A denominative <term> does not receive more and less except with regard to the subject with respect to which it is a denominative <predicate>. But in Bk. III of the Topics,12 <where he> concludes that an accident <is said> of something according to more and less, Aristotle teaches <us> to pay attention to the definition of the accident which receives more of the account of the proposition (that is, <the account> of the accident); for example, a whiter <thing> is that which is a colored <object> that disperses the vision more.13 Therefore, a denominative <term>, with regard to that with respect to which it is a denominative <predicate>, does have the account <of a substance; i.e., it is an essential account>.14
11. Proof of the first proposition: In the chapter "On Difference," Porphyry says: "The being (esse) of each thing,15 however, is one and the same, permitting neither increase nor decrease"—that is, the essence of anything consists in <something> indivisible. For he adduces that proposition to prove has the same account in both sentences, even though it is not predicated univocally. For the definition of the predicate is not applicable to the subject. In fact, there is no subject that can have a second intention predicated of it univocally, which is why it becomes necessary to distinguish between personal and simple supposition. In the sentence "man is an animal" the subject has personal supposition, whereas in the sentence "man is a species" the subject has simple supposition.
12. Topics, Bk. III, Ch. 5 (119a 29–32).
13. In this example, the definition of "whiter" is "that which more greatly disperses the vision"; hence Scotus's argument is that the definition of "whiter" is directly related to the substance and thus would be the account of the substance. Cf. infra, q. 30–36, nn. 94–113 and q. 42, n. 8.
14. The conclusion of paragraph 10, which is literally "that a denominative term does have an account," is meant to contradict the preceding question, where Scotus argues that "no denominative [term] has the account of a substance." There is, however, a textual variant that has rationem substantiae, and the context suggests that the force of Scotus's conclusion is that "a denominative term does not have the account of a substance."
15. The Latin has unicuique, which is in the dative case and would literally be translated as "being [esse], however, is one and the same for each thing." One of the textual variations, however, does have uniuscuiusque, which is also more faithful to Porphyry's quotation. "The being of each thing is one and the same and permits neither increase nor decrease, while being hook-nosed or snubnosed or colored in a particular way is both increased and decreased"; Isagoge,
Ch. "On Difference" (AL I6 16; ed. Busse, 9.21–23).
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
that the differentia does not receive more and less, with regard to that of which it is an essential (per se) differentia. Therefore, a denominative <term> in its own genus, insofar as it is a "what" in itself in its own genus, does not receive more and less; therefore, <it receives more and less> only in comparison to the subject which it denominates.
12. One can say otherwise to the first argument that man and horse are not univocates under white—neither are any other <things univocates> under some denominative predicate— since "univocals are <those things> the name of which is common, and the account of whose univocating substance is the same,"16 which account is for them "the account of a substance," even though <it is> not proper <to them>.17 The account of any single denominative, however, is not the account of a denominated substance. But since the account may be of the denominative, which is predicated according to the same name and according to the same account of the denominating substance, for this reason it must be said that the definition of the univocating <things> ought to be understood in this way: "and the account of the substance <is> the same," which account is essential to the univocates; which is not true of a denominative
<term>. For, according to Aristotle a little lower in the chapter "On Substance":18 "white is predicated of body, but it is impossible to predicate the account of white of that <body>," because in this way it would be understood that that account <of white> would be the account of body.
13. To the second argument,19 one can say two things. In one way <one can reply> by conceding the conclusion that all equivocals are univocals. Nor is opposite predicated of opposite except perhaps in a relative <sense>.
16. Cf. supra, n. 9.
17. To say that "Socrates is living" and "a dog is living" is to predicate "living" univocally of both Socrates and a dog, since it is within the genus of substance.
"Living," however, is not the proximate genus of either subject, and hence it is not proper to them.
18. Categories, Ch. 5 (2a 32–34).
19. Cf. supra, n. 3.
QUESTION 6
14. Or otherwise one can say that it does not follow that "equivocals have the common name 'equivocal' and the same substantial account of this <name, i.e., of 'equivocal'>, therefore they have the same name and the same account," but this is a fallacy in a certain respect and absolutely. This is because to have this account as the same is to have a diverse account absolutely and the same one in some respect, just as to coincide in a differentia is to coincide in some respect and to differ absolutely.
15. To the third <argument>,20 I say that those of which the proper and complete account of the substance is the same are themselves the same; but of <things> univocated, there is not the same proper account, although the account of the thing univocating is the same to them, since that is proper to no univocate.
20. Cf. supra, n. 4.