Question Eight
[QUESTION EIGHT
Whether a Denominative Signifies the Same as an Abstract]
oncerning the definition of denominatives, it is asked
whether they differ by ending alone,1 that is, in regard
to the subject by only declining <away> from the principal <cases> from which they have denomination, or whether they also differ in their significates.2 And this is to investigate whether a denominative <term> signifies the same as an ab-
1. Although literal, "ending alone" is perhaps misleading. A denominative term is one that is derived from another term, as "grammarian" is derived from "grammar." In Greek and Latin, a denominative term, such as "good person," is often formed from the abstract term "good" simply by changing the gender from neuter to masculine. To capture the meaning in English, the question might better be paraphrased as "it is asked whether the two terms differ by spelling alone, that is, by changing the spelling from the abstract noun in regard to the subject from which a denominative term is formed, or whether the two terms differ in their significates."
2. Sten Ebbesen provides the following two columns and an explanation of the controversy regarding denominatives:
GOOD (to agathon) good person (ho agathos)
JUSTICE (dikaiosyne) just person (ho dikaios) Column a contains names of absolute entities. The higher entity is the genus of the lower. Column b contains the names of entities which participate in the absolute entities of Column a. If, as in the case of the just person, they have a name that is cognate with that of the absolute entity in which they participate, they are said to be paronyma (Latin: denominativa) from it. No Column b entity is a genus, nor is it in a genus. "Good" is a genus, and justice is in that genus, being precisely (or essentially: hoper) good. "Good person" is not a genus, and "just person" is in no genus –– the just person is not "precisely good." Similarly, whiteness is in the genus "color," but the white man is not. In the Latin tradition entities of type a came to be called abstracta; those of type b, concreta, i.e., "combined" or "mixed"; Ebbesen, "Concrete Accidental Terms," 109.
QUESTION 8
stract <term>, namely, <whether it signifies> only the form, or something else as the subject.3
1. And it seems that it signifies the subject:4
For, according to Aristotle in Bk. I of On Interpretation in the chapter "On the Verb," to signify <something> is to establish an understanding <of it>;5 but a spoken, concrete noun establishes an understanding of the subject; therefore, it signifies that <subject>. Proof of the minor: it establishes an understanding of an accident, and it is impossible for an <accident> to be understood without its subject: first, since it is impossible <for an accident> to exist without a subject, and "as each thing is with respect to being, so is it with respect to truth," that is, to a true cognition, according to Aristotle in Bk. II of the Metaphysics.6
Second, since, according to Aristotle in Bk. VII of the Metaphysics,7 "substance is the first of all <things> in the cognition."
Therefore, nothing is signified without that <subject>. Through this <argument>, it is also proved that the subject is signified primarily, since the <subject> is primarily understood by a spoken utterance, since an accident cannot be understood without a <subject being understood>, and the <subject> is prior in cognition to the accident, according to Aristotle in Bk. VII of the Metaphysics.8
2. Second, a term signifies the same <thing> that it supposits;9 but a concrete accidental term supposits <as> a subject; therefore, etc. The major is evident: since a suppositing term, by the fact that it supposits, does not have a new significate. The 3. The question is whether denominatives differ by case alone, and hence signify only the form, or whether they also differ in their significates and hence signify the subject as well as the form.
4. That is, it seems that it does not signify the form alone.
5. The Latin is as follows: . . . et significant aliquid—constituit enim qua dicit intellectum, et qua audit quiesci; see On Interpretation, Ch. 3 (16b 20–21).
6. Metaphysics, Bk. II, Ch. 1 (993b 28–31).
7. Metaphysics, Bk. VII, Ch. 1 (1028a 31–33).
8. Metaphysics, Bk. VII, Ch. 1 (1028a 37–b 3).
9. An alternate translation would be: "a term signifies the same thing that it stands for." For example, in the statement "Socrates is a man," the subject term both signifies an individual and stands for him in the statement.
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
proof of the minor is according to Aristotle in Bk. I of the Posterior Analytics:10 this is accidental: "<the> white <thing> is a log," since that which is signified, to which white is accidental, is a log; therefore, that <thing> to which white is accidental, as a subject, is supposited there through "white."
3. Third, a name and the definition signify the same <thing>, according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the Metaphysics:11 "the account (ratio) which the name signifies is the definition": but the definition of a concrete <thing> has in itself a subject and accident; therefore, the name signifies these <i.e., a subject and accident>. The minor is evident according to Aristotle in Bk. VII of the Metaphysics, who says that an accident is defined through a substance.12
4. Fourth, an exclusive expression excludes everything that is essentially (per se) beyond the significate of the term; but <when an exclusive expression> is added to a concrete term, it does not exclude the subject; therefore, etc. Proof of the minor: when it is said thus, "only white runs," a body is not excluded from running, since it is included. Proof: it follows that "only white runs; therefore, white runs," and furthermore "therefore, a body runs"; therefore, from first to last, and so the body is not excluded.
5. Fifth, this is seen through the authority of the Commentator, <in his commentary> on Bk. I of the Physics, where he says that "a concrete name signifies the form and the <thing> susceptive <of the form>";13 and <in his commentary> on Bk. XII of the Metaphysics, the Commentator says that it signifies both.14
6. Sixth, in Bk. VII of the Metaphysics,15 Aristotle says that in accidental expressions, "that which is" is not the same with that to which it belongs "on account of it signifying two things, as musician and white"; therefore, <denominative terms> of this kind signify two.
10. Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, Ch. 22 (83a 5–9).
11. Metaphysics, Bk. IV, Ch. 7 (1012a 23–23).
12. Metaphysics, Bk. VII, Ch. 5 (1031a 1–4).
13. Averroes, Physica I com. 25 (ed. Iuntina, IV f. 9rb).
14. Averroes, Metaph. XII com. 39 (ed. Iuntina, VIII f. 152vb).
15. Metaphysics, Bk. VII, Ch. 6 (1031b 21–25).
QUESTION 8
7. To the opposite is Aristotle. Here <i.e., in the Categories> it is said that "denominative <terms> differ by ending alone" from the principal <names>;16 therefore, <they do> not <differ> in significate; but abstract <terms> do not signify subjects, since then they would not be in any genus; therefore, neither <do> denominative <terms signify subjects>.
8. Second, a little lower in the chapter "On Substance,"17 he says that "white signifies only quality."
9. Third, <in his commentary> on Bk. V of the Metaphysics, the Commentator says that Aristotle has decided that it <i.e., a denominative> only signifies the form.18 And the reason for this is that otherwise there would be a vain repetition by adding an accident with a subject, which seems untenable. The implication is evident, since by positing the account (ratio) of a concrete <term> in place of a name, the same subject would be said twice.
10. Fourth, if a concrete <term> signifies a subject, then this <predication> "<the> white <thing> is a log" would be essential
(secundum se); since the subject, with respect to its own significate, would naturally supposit <as that significate>. The consequent, however, is false according to Aristotle in Bk. I of the Posterior Analytics.19
11. Fifth, if "white" signified the subject and accident, as "the white man," then it would be accidental (secundum accidens); which seems to be contrary to Aristotle in Bk. V of the Metaphysics, since there he divides being essentially (secundum se) into the ten genera.20
12. Sixth, if a concrete <term> signified a subject, then it would not be defined through an addition. The implication is evident, since then whatever would be posited in its definition would be of its essential account. The consequent is contrary to Aristotle in Bk. VII of the Metaphysics.21
16. Categories, Ch. 1 (1a 13–15).
17. Categories, Ch. 5 (3b 19).
18. Averroes, Metaph. V com. 14 (AverL 130–131).
19. Posterior Analytics, Bk. I (Ch. 22, 83a 5–9).
20. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 7 (1017a 23–30).
21. Metaphysics, Bk. VII, Ch. 5 (1031a 1–4).
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
13. Seventh, it is impossible for things belonging to diverse most general genera to have some common account of the substance; therefore, a name signifying two such kinds cannot be univocal. But subject and accident are of diverse genera. Therefore, if a concrete <term> signified each of them, it would be simply equivocal, which does not seem suitable. For then that proposition would not be absolutely true in which it <i.e., the concrete term> is posited; there would also be no contradiction in them; <there would also be> no implication; in addition, an attribute could not be demonstrated of its subject when it is concrete—<for> in demonstration something is not equivocal, according to Aristotle in Bk. I of the Posterior Analytics.22 All these seem untenable and contrary to Aristotle, and the fourth especially <seems contrary> to Bk. I of the Posterior Analytics.23
[I. The Response To The Question] 14. It must be said that if one could understand a subject and an accident in one act, and impose one name from them on the composite, just as the name Iliad24 <is imposed on> the whole of the Trojan history, that name would not signify each <of them, i.e., subject and accident> under its proper account; nor does a concrete <term> concern another <thing> than its significate.
No name, however, can signify each <of them> under its proper account (ratio), unless it is equivocal. It is untenable, however, to concede that every concrete name is equivocal, since it would destroy the purpose of speech,25 for hardly would anyone be able to express a determinate concept. Therefore, one must say that the concrete name does not signify the subject, but only the form.26
22. Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, Ch. 11 (77a 7–10).
23. Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, Ch. 6 (75a 29–31).
24. Metaphysics, Bk. VII, Ch. 4 (1030a 7–10).
25. Cf. Duns Scotus, De Soph. Elenchus, q. 21, n. 9.
26. According to Pini, Scotus has a parallel account regarding abstract and concrete intentions. See Pini, Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus, 128 and 152.
QUESTION 8
15. Perhaps it may be said that it is not equivocal, since it does not signify each under a proper account, but <that it signifies> the form insofar as it is informing, and the subject insofar as it is informable.27
16. Against <this argument>: because it does not signify something under its proper account, it does not signify that <thing>, just as he who does not understand something under its proper account, does not understand that <thing>. Therefore, one must say simply that it does not signify a subject.
17. Likewise, a proper account of a subject is an informable account; therefore, a name signifying that <thing> under an informable account, signifies that <thing> under a proper account, and in this way two opposites would be said in that account (ratio).
18. Nevertheless, on account of the arguments, it must be understood that although an accident does not exist without a subject, nevertheless in itself it is a certain essence distinct from the essence of the subject (although not to such an extent perfected); for according to Aristotle in Bk. I of the Topics:28 "In every genus one is to seek the essence (quid)." Similarly, unless it were a distinct essence in itself, it would not be essentially (per se) in another genus than the subject, which is manifestly false.
One may be able, however, to understand any essence under its proper account, since that which something is, is the first object of the intellect. Therefore, one may be able to understand such an essence under its proper account, and in this way to signify <that essence>. And to such a mode of understanding corresponds the abstract mode of signifying. In another mode one may be able to understand such an essence insofar as it informs the subject, and to this mode of understanding corresponds the concrete mode of signifying. Therefore, just as the same essence is understood under each mode of understanding, so the same <thing> is signified through a concrete and an abstract name, but by a diverse mode of signifying. But on ac27. Cf. John Duns Scotus, Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Bk. IV, q. I, 60 and fn. 60.
28. Topics, Bk. I, Ch. 9 (103b 35–38).
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
count of such a mode of signifying, perhaps it is said that the subject is co-understood, not as though <it were> essentially (per se) intrinsic to that understanding, but inasmuch as the understanding of an accident depends upon <a subject> under such a mode of understanding.
[II. To The Principal Arguments] 19. To the first argument,29 I say that as something establishes the understanding of something, so it signifies that <thing>.
A concrete <accidental> noun,30 however, does not principally establish the understanding of a subject, but <it does so> only from the fact that that <form> of which it primarily establishes the understanding, under such a mode of understanding, depends upon a subject and in this way signifies the <subject>.
That is <to say>, from such a mode of signifying it gives <one> to understand <a subject>, which is not to signify as we now speak of signification, which is a representation of something from imposition.
20. To the proof of the minor,31 when it is said, "it is impossible for an accident to be understood without the subject," I say that it is impossible to understand that "an accident exists" without a subject so that "without a subject" expresses a mode of understanding.32 In another mode, one can accept that it expresses a mode of the act of understanding, under the sense that "it is impossible to understand an accident without the subject being understood." And then one can respond according to what has been said above, "unless the subject is understood," not in such a way that <the subject is> essentially (per se) intrin29. Cf. supra, n. 1.
30. Since the question is about denominatives, the context makes it clear that Scotus is speaking about accidental nouns, such as "white," as opposed to concrete substantial nouns, such as "man." Furthermore, it must be remembered that nomen would include both nouns and adjectives. See also Ebbesen,
"Concrete Accidental Terms," 108–9.
31. Cf. supra, n. 1.
32. In other words, a concrete accidental term cannot be understood to exist without a subject also being understood to exist even though that subject is not signified by the accidental term.
QUESTION 8
sic to the understanding of the accident, but in such a way that <the subject is> that on which the understanding depends; and in this way it is signified.
21. In another way, one can say that an accident cannot be understood without the subject, that is, <it cannot> be known33 completely, since "from the same <things> something is and is known."34 Nevertheless, one can know what is said through a <concrete accidental> noun when the subject is not known, just as a species is not known absolutely when the genus is not known; nevertheless, what is said is known through the noun without a knowledge of the genus, as Themistius exemplifies in <his commentary> on the Posterior Analytics,35 that if a boy is told, "bring a horse," he does not bring a cow but a horse, and in this way he knows what is said through the noun, but he does not know the essence (quid) through the genus and the differentia. And the same is held by Aristotle in the beginning of Bk. I of the Physics,36 that the defined is known prior to the defining <terms>. Thus in the question at hand: an accident can be known by that knowledge which is said through the noun, <even> when the subject is not known, and in this way a confused cognition suffices for it to be signified. In this way of speaking, one is able to save <the claim> that an abstract noun signifies the subject, and in the same way in which the concrete
<noun signifies the subject>, of which it was doubted. Nevertheless, it seems that, on account of the proofs of the minor posited above,37 the abstract noun may give <one> to understand the subject, but not absolutely, since the concrete <does so> directly, the abstract indirectly <or obliquely>, just as the subject is posited in diverse ways in the definition of the one and of the other. And then the concrete mode of signifying is not the cause of understanding the subject, as was said above,38 but, on account of its dependence on the subject, it itself <i.e., the essence or form> is that which is signified.
33. In this paragraph, cognoscere is translated as "know."
34. Metaphysics, Bk. IX, Ch. 9 (1051a 29–31).
35. Themistius, Posterior Analytics, Ch. 1, ed. J. R. O'Donnell, 245.
36. Physics, Bk. I, Ch. 1 (184b 10–14).
37. Cf. supra, n. 1.
38. Cf. supra, n. 19.
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
22. If it is objected against this <argument>: since an abstract <term> signifies the form under its proper account, then <an abstract term does> not <signify the form> insofar as it depends on the subject:
One can say that the proper account of an accidental form is to be of a subject. And in this way what is signified under a proper account and <what is signified> under a mode, as it is of a subject, stand simultaneously. This seems more probable than to say that the concrete mode of signifying is the principle <or cause> of understanding the subject, since otherwise it would not be necessary to posit a subject in the definition of an abstract accident. This is contrary to Aristotle in Bk. VII of the Metaphysics,39 where he says that "substance is the first of all
<things> in the definition," since it is posited in the definition of all <things>, and not the other way around.
23. When it is objected that "the subject is signified primarily, since it is understood primarily through an utterance":40 one can say that "something is understood primarily through an utterance" is twofold: either "without which not," or primarily from the intention of the one imposing. In the first mode one can understand the subject primarily, since an accident is not understood without it. In the second mode the subject is not understood primarily, as animal is understood primarily through the utterance "man," as if man is not understood without it; but not primarily with respect to the intention of the one imposing or speaking.—Otherwise, one can say, as above,41 that it is not necessary that the subject be understood for the understanding of an accident, namely, what is said through a noun, although it is necessary for a complete knowledge of the accident.
24. To the second principal <argument>,42 I concede that a term signifies that which it supposits. But it does not always supposit for that which it signifies, but a significate is only supposited for a significate when it is a simple supposition, just as 39. Metaphysics, Bk. VII, Ch. 1 (1028a 31–33).
40. Cf. supra, n. 1.
41. Cf. supra, n. 20.
42. Cf. supra, n. 2.
QUESTION 8
a common <term in personal supposition>43 supposits for the supposits and not as a supposit (commune supponit pro suppositis et non suppositum), since it does not signify the supposit. To the minor I say that a concrete term supposits for a subject, but does not <supposit as> a subject.
25. To the proof, I say that "<the> white <thing> is a log" is accidental, not since "white" supposits <as> a subject because it is in the nature <of a subject> to supposit—and then if the <subject> were supposited, it would be an essential (per se) predication, since it would supposit what it supposits naturally—but it is accidental, since the significate of "white," which is an accident, does not naturally supposit essentially (per se) with respect to such a predicate, but it supposits for that to which it is accidental.44
26. Against this <objection>: it seems that since he says that "<the> white <thing> is a log," what is signified here <as the subject>, to which white is accidental, is a log; which would not be true unless the <subject> to which white is accidental, were that which is supposited, and not only that for which <it is supposited>. For one cannot truly say that "man runs" signifies "Socrates runs," although "man" supposits for Socrates.
27. To this <argument>, it is said that this proposition "<the> white <object> is a log" signifies a log to be in a white <thing>;
43. Supposition is often divided into three types: personal, simple, and material, which correspond to things that are only signified, things that are both signified and signify (i.e., intentions and concepts) and things that only signify
(i.e., vocal and written signs). Thus, personal supposition occurs when a term supposits the thing it signifies, such as "man is an animal"; simple supposition occurs when a term supposits for an intention of the soul, such as "man is a species"; and material supposition occurs when a term supposits for a spoken or written word, such as "man is a name." In order to solve this objection, Scotus distinguishes between a term that supposits as something and a term that supposits for something. For example, in personal supposition, such as "man is an animal," the subject term stands for the individuals or common nature that it ultimately signifies, but the term "man" does not stand as that nature. In simple supposition, however, the term stands for itself, not for something else. For a more detailed discussion of this difference, see Costantino Marmo, "Ontology and Semantics in the Logic of Duns Scotus," 172–73.
44. Cf. infra, n. 26, where, in the statement "man runs," the term "man" may supposit for Socrates, but it does not supposit as Socrates.
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
nevertheless, it does not <supposit> for itself but for that to which it is accidental. And so the authority of Aristotle ought to be understood in this way. For what is signified to which white is accidental is a log; nevertheless, it does not supposit <as> that, but for that. Just as it is often said when the subject does not naturally supposit for another with respect to the predicate as much as for this, we say that the predicate is signified to be in this, as here: "man runs," <i.e.,> that "to run" is signified to be in a supposited <thing>, although this is not had from the first signification of the sentence. In this way, since "white" with respect to such a predicate as "log" is not supposited naturally unless <it is> for the subject, the predicate is said to be signified to be in it.
28. To the third <argument>,45 it is said that the definition is twofold. One absolutely, which is of <something> having "that which is" absolutely, as of a substance; and such a definition has only a genus and differentia which are essentially (per se) intrinsic to the understanding of the species; and of this the major is true, and its proof is from Bk. IV of the Metaphysics. The other is a definition through an addition, namely, where something is added in addition to the essential <parts> of the defined
<thing>; and such is <the definition> of accidents. For since accidents are not known completely without a subject, and a definition is given for the sake of having a complete cognition, for this reason they are not defined without the subject. But since such a definition gathers in itself something that is not of the essence, for this reason it signifies more than the name of the defined <term signifies>; and of such, the major is not true, nor <is there> a proof of it.
29. To the fourth <argument>,46 I say that the major is false47 when what is included is compared to a real predicate. For then
<something> is not excluded unless <it is> diverse from it with respect to the predicate, since syncategorematic <terms> arrange the subject in comparison to the predicate.48 With respect
45. Cf. supra, n. 3.
46. Cf. supra, n. 4.
47. The major premise is this: "an exclusive expression excludes anything that is essentially beyond the significate of the term."
48. Cf. Peter of Spain, Syncategoremata, ed. J. Spruyt, intro., 13–14.
QUESTION 8
to a real predicate, however, the subject is not diverse from the concrete accident; therefore, it is not excluded. Therefore, it is commonly said that an exclusion does not always exclude another according to the essence, but according to being (esse), which is most true with respect to a real predicate.
30. To the authorities <i.e., authoritative quotations> of the Commentator <in response to the fifth argument>,49 "to signify" must be understood broadly for "to give understanding," since otherwise he would be contrary to himself in <his commentary on> Bk. V of the Metaphysics.
31. To the authority of Aristotle <in response to the sixth argument>:50 he understands <"white"> of "a white man" and such expressions, of which he proposed a doubt in the beginning of the chapter.51 For these are accidental beings, according to him in Bk. V of the Metaphysics.52
32. Against <this> position, it is argued in this way: if "white" signifies the same as "whiteness," but under the mode of pertaining to or of denominating, then that of which "white" is said, as <for example> of a man, is that of which its interpretation is said, namely, "whiteness as pertaining to," which does not seem true.
33. Here, one can say that this is not the interpretation of "white," since "white" only signifies the form under one mode of signifying. But this whole <phrase> "whiteness as pertaining to" signifies the form under two opposite modes, since "whiteness" signifies the form under one mode, and "as pertaining" expresses another opposite mode.
34. If it is asked what is the interpretation of this noun "white"—it is not possible except through some noun. The form can be signified only under one mode of signifying, which, perhaps, is not possible by adding this mode: "as pertaining to."
49. Cf. supra, n. 5.
50. Metaphysics, Bk. VII, Ch. 6 (1031b 21–25).
51. Metaphysics, Bk. VII, Ch. 6 (1031a 15–21).
52. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 6 (1015b 16–23).