32. PERJURY
Sin their nature are signs of something amiss; [5] someone else can do some things which are not signs of their nature, but know also that they can be perceived by those present as signs of something wrong.
For example, to perspire is a natural sign of fatigue or of some bodily weakness; but to spit so that saliva runs down the beard is not of its nature a sign of mental illness, although from the circumstances one could judge this to be a sign of madness or insanity-if, for instance, in that locality, it was customary to regard it as such.
Generally speaking, then, I say the first and second types of simulation are sins and frequently mortal sins, because this is hypocrisy. The third type, provided no other evil accompany it, is laudable, in that a man does not reveal one evil by means of another. In indifferent matters the first kind of simulation, in regard to certain things, would perhaps be evil, but not a grave matter; for instance, if someone could make himself perspire, but had not'labored, as certain pranksters move their bodies in such a way as to signify certain dispositions not in them or certain actions they had never performed. But the other simulation, which is the second in indifferent matters, is no sin and it is the sort that David performed. But Jehu's simulation must not be excused.
For besides the simulation that perhaps could be excused he added a lie: "I have a great sacrifice to offer Baal." This lie-though from his intention it was a kind of officious lie, because it was destructive of the worship of Baal-was of itself pernicious, not just because it procured the death of others, but also insofar as it was of itself provocative of [i. e., it tended to provoke] the worship of Baal. Although he was commended because of his detestation of the cult of Baal, and his prosecution of such, nevertheless he was blamed because he did not withdraw from the golden calves of Ieroboam, nor was he a true worshiper of God.
32. PERJURY
(Ordinaria III, suppl., dist. 39) Regarding this thirty-ninth distinction [of Bk. III] I ask: Is every perjury a mortal sin?
[Arguments Pro and Con] For the negative view:
[Arg. I] Sometimes an oath is taken which it is not licit to fulfill; but what is illicit per se does not become licit just because one swears under oath to do it; therefore, it still remains illicit after the oath is taken, and hence one sins mortally in fulfilling what is sworn to. But according to Christian law, one is never faced with the quandary of
Perjury 3 I 5 sinning mortally whether one does something or omits doing itwhich seems to apply here. Nevertheless one would commit perjury by not fulfilling what one swore to do; hence to commit perjury is not a mortal sin.
[Arg. 2] Also, it is more serious to swear by God than by the Gospel according to [canon law; see Decretum Gratiani, ibid., c. 6] ("Si aliqua causa fuerit"), just as it is more serious to swear by the author than to swear by a work of his, or by the temple than by the gold of the temple, because it is the temple that makes the gold sacred; and the same evaluation applies to reverence [due to God]; therefore, if it is a mortal sin to perjure oneself, the most serious perjury is one based on swearing by God; consequently, ordinary persons would be sinning mortally all through the day, because they consider it as nothing to swear "By God," even when asserting something false, or promising something difficult, which they are not sure of doing-which seems to be too harsh an interpretation.
[Arg. 3] Also, every promissory oath necessarily obliges according to [canon law; see Decretum Gratiani, ibid.], causa 22, q. 4: "It is better not to fulfill a foolish promise than to commit a crime." Proof of the antecedent is found in the canon about a forced oath (look for it in the [Decretales Gregorii IX II, tit. 24, c. IS, Verum)); and also in the case of the deceitful oath, it is clear that the one swearing does not intend to oblige himself; for no one is obligated unless he intends to obligate himself (see the [Decretales, ibid.] in the Glosses on "De iureiurando," where it says, "If someone swears five times," etc.). The antecedent is also proved in the case of an incautious or rash oath, because if a person fulfills it, "he will come to a worse end," according to the [Decretum Gratiani II], causa 22, q. 4, "Si aliquid." Therefore, it would be a greater evil to fulfill the oath. Proof of this in the case of these two oaths, namely, the deceitful and the forced oath, is found in the analogy with marriage, for a forced or deceitful oath, that is, one that is simulated, does not bind persons to matrimony; see the [Decre~ tales Gregorii IX], "Concerning Those Things Which Happen because of Force or Fear"; and [ibid.] "Concerning Espousals and Marriage" ...
To the contrary: Exodus 20:7 [and Matthew 5:33]: "Do not take a false oath; rather make good to the Lord all your pledges"; and in Psalm b6: 12]: "Make vows to the Lord, your God, and fulfill them."
[Body of the Question} In this question we must first examine the nature of an oath; and, second, see from this why perjury is a mortal sin; and third, distinguish special kinds of oaths and see what sort of sin each is.
Sin [Article I: The Nature of an Oath} As for the first, I say that an oath is an assertion that some human statement is true, and this in a final or ultimate sense, according to that text from the Epistle to the Hebrews [6: 16]: "An oath confirms a statement and ends all argument." And the reason is this. Man knows he cannot trust completely his mendacious and ignorant fellowman, since he can be deceived and can deceive. Therefore, he turns to a witness who is truthful and knows the facts, one who can neither deceive nor be deceived, and he does this by taking an oath; for there he asks God, who knows the truth and cannot lie, to bear witness to what he is saying.
[Article 2: Perjury as a Mortal Sin} From this our thesis on perjury follows. For it is an act of irreverence to call upon God as witness to the truth of a false statement; or to treat him as if he were ignorant of the truth, and hence not omniscient; or to deal with him as though he would gladly bolster a lie, and thus were not entirely truthful. All of these, however, manifest an irreverence towards God that is immediately opposed to that commandment of the first table: "You shall not take the name of the Lord, your God, in vain" [Exodus 20:7]. Hence, any deliberate instance of this would be a mortal sin.
[Two doubtful points] But here two doubts arise: First, does lack of deliberation excuse one from serious sin? Second, may one sin mortally by calling upon God to bear witness in the aforesaid way to some opinion one believes to be true, although it is not true, or to something which has some plausibility, but one is more inclined to think it false?
[Re I] As for the first, it is commonly conceded that a single indeliberate instance of perjury in a light matter would not be mortally sinful, but where this becomes customary or habitual the perjury would be a mortal sin, because habits generated by many acts incline one to a more serious act than those which preceded.
But this is not so. If the first act of perjury was not a mortal sin, then neither is any other, even if it results from habit, for the habitual inclination cannot increase the seriousness of the act. If someone through repeated acts has acquired a formidable habit of impurity and shortly after repenting is moved impurely to do something towards which the strong habit inclines him, he does not sin mortally; indeed his sin is not more notably serious than such an act would be in another who had no such habit.
Confirmation of this. If we can speak of the gravity of a habit at all, it cannot be graver than the acts by which it is acquired, since to be
Perjury 3 I 7 exact, it has no culpable gravity apart from those acts. But since the acts whereby it is engendered are themselves only venial, the habit itself will not give acts elicited by force of habit some mortal gravity.
Hence it seems one could maintain that habit or custom is completely irrelevant. Perjury with full consent, however, is against a precept of the first table [of the natural law] and hence turns one immediately from one's ultimate end. Consequently there is nothing to keep it from being a mortal sin. But if the perjury is not deliberate, then no matter how often it occurs one could never say it is mortally sinful. To be meritorious an act must be fully human and thus done with full deliberation. Now, no less is required for demerit, for God is not more inclined to condemn a sinner than to spare such. Consequently one could claim that this indeliberate perjury, no matter how often it is repeated, is never a mortal sin.
What must be kept in mind, however, as was noted earlier in speaking of the virtues, is the fact that the deliberation required for a virtuous act may be so short as to be imperceptible, because one's prudence may be so great that one deliberates almost instantaneously. So too a person habitually imprudent could acquire the facility of deliberating so quickly that it seems but an instant. And this sort of deliberation would suffice for sin just as it does for merit.
That is why, in regard to its seriousness, I distinguish not as to the rarity or frequency of the perjury, but only whether there is deliberation or lack of it. Where deliberation is present, the perjury is mortally sinful, whether it be committed once or many times. Similarly, indeliberation excuses, whether it be a first or repeated offense.
[Re 2] As for the second doubt, I say that according to positive law or custom a person swearing regards the oath in one of two ways. Either [a] it represents an unqualified assertion of the matter sworn to or [b) it does not, but rather expresses something the person swearing regards as a probable assumption one ought to believe.
[Re a] Now, if one swears in the first way to something in any way doubtful, i. e., something that one has not yet determined is certain and true, I say that such a person sins mortally in calling on God to confirm as simply true and certain what is not simply such.
In this way one should understand the oaths of all who testify in court, where it is customary to pass some sort of sentence that would not be passed if the fact sworn to were not simply certain, for example, where the death penalty would not be imposed except for a certain crime. To swear to something criminal a witness is uncertain about, no matter how probable that person might think it to be, and to do so in a
Sin forum of justice, where by positive law or custom condemnation to death follows, would be to sin mortally. The same holds true of any forum where someone, through perjured testimony, is condemned as guilty or is declared to be infamous by law. For here there is not only irreverence to God's name, in violation of a commandment of the first table of the law, but a lie that is pernicious because it harms one's neighbor.
And if you object that it is in the interest of the state, because otherwise evil would be multiplied exceedingly, God himself replies:
"Justice and justice alone shall be your aim" [Deuteronomy 16:20]. For there are certain evils that should not be punished by man but left to divine justice. Such, for example, are all cases where man as man must lack sufficient knowledge, and concerning those things about which one cannot adequately learn the truth needed to pass a just punitive sentence. Nor is it only the witnesses that are guilty in such judgments, but the judge as well. For if the judge knows from past experience that the witnesses are not testifying under oath to anything more than what they suspect might be true, then he must not pass the sort of sentence he would if guilt were proven to him in an unqualified fashion. For he knows from experience that guilt has not been proven sufficiently to justify such punishment.
[Re b] But if from custom or positive law it is clear that the person is not swearing to his certainty in the matter but only to what he be~ lieves to be true, provided he has more probable indications that such is the case rather than anything else, then he does not sin, according to the [Decretales Gregorii IX I, tit. 12], ch. I, regarding the scrutiny required for those taking Holy Orders: "The Lord Pope replies that so far as human frailty permits one to know, he knows and testifies that the person is qualified for the burden of such an office, and the Pope goes on to say that we do not believe that a person sins in giving such testimony, provided he does not speak against his conscience. For he is asserting not that the candidate is worthy in an unqualified sense, but only that he should be considered as worthy insofar as he is not known to be unworthy."
In promoting candidates to Orders or to certain elected offices of dignity (such as a mastership in certain colleges, e.g., in universities, or in religious orders to the prelacy, or to other functions of this sort), if it be the approved custom that such replies be made under oath, either as to carrying out one's duties faithfully or as to promising obedience, all such oaths should customarily be understood to refer only to what the witness believes, viz., so far as human frailty permits him to know, the respondent believes a candidate to be worthy whom he
Perjury 3 19 does not know to be unworthy. All such replies should be understood according to common custom. Neither does the one testifying sin, even though the candidate for promotion is not worthy, although it would be safer for the witness there not to give a simple answer but to add some qualification, like that mentioned in the aforesaid decretal, namely, "so far as human frailty permits one to know." And in such cases the judge promoting such a candidate does not sin, since the custom is such that it suffices that the witness testify as to his belief. Here, then, that legal maxim applies: "The favorable is to be interpreted broadly, whereas the odious is to be interpreted strictly." The reason is that where matters of possible condemnation are concerned a witness under oath must tell the strict truth, and only about what he is sure of, for were it not for his testimony no sentence of condemnation would be passed. Confirmation of this rule: in favorable matters an oath concerning what the witness believes to be true suffices, especially where such is the custom, or where the positive law in a college requires one to state only what he believes, since the president can promote one to such an academic degree on the testimony of what the witness believes to be true.
Generally speaking, however, whether it be in favorable or in odious matters, a person sins mortally who swears to the opposite of what he more strongly believes to be so, or swears to something simply dubious where he has no more reason to believe in his heart that this is true rather than that. For he calls God to witness something he ought to be certain about which is in neither way certain to him.
If you object to what was said about perjury being against a precept of the first table of the law, because it seems that according to the Master [Peter Lombard] perjury is a kind of lie and hence against that commandment of the second table, "You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor" [Exodus 20: 16], one could reply that in perjury there is a double sin, namely, [i) a lie (as the material aspect) and [ii] taking
God's name in vain, that is to say, not just uselessly, but irreverently, which is a sin against reverence. The first pertains to the second table, but the second pertains formally to the first table, because irreverence is prohibited there. One can also commit perjury without lying-for instance, if someone swears to something he has some doubts about, one might perhaps claim he was not lying, since he did not believe the opposite to be true-or at least in those cases where one taking an oath has to be certain, a person commits perjury if he is not certain, and nevertheless if he were to assert such without an oath, because he believed this rather than its opposite, he would not be lying. Hence it is dangerous to frequently utter oaths in speaking, for many statements
Sin where no oath was taken would not be sinful, whereas they would be if . an oath were added, and indeed, gravely sinful if the oath were fully deliberate. Hence, our Savior's counsel in Matthew 5:[37] is useful:
"Let your speech be, 'Yes, yes'; 'No, no.'"
[Article 3: Concerning Special Kinds of Oaths1 As for the third article [about the kinds of oaths and the sort of sin each is] I say that human statements are either about the present and the past, where the truth is determinate, or about the future, the truth of which is uncertain and indeterminate. In the first case the statements are said to be "assertive," where the term is applied broadly to both affirmations and negations. But those about the future are called
"promissory," because they are in the power of the one swearing or making the promise. And according to this, since an oath is an assertion of either of these statements, there are two forms of oaths, the assertive and the promissory, and they both are obligatory. The assertive is such because it obliges the person swearing to tell the truth, thus inducing such a witness to confirm what he says. The promissory is such because it obliges the one swearing to express his true intentions. But since the assertive oath obliges one only at the time of utterance, the promissory oath alone is called an "obligation," namely, in regard to the future. Hence, only the promissory oath is appropriately called "obligatory," because it obliges one to carry out something one swears to do in the future. And these two species of oaths resemble the two species of obligations used in sophistical disputations, namely, position and petition. Position obliges the disputant to uphold a postulate as true, and petition obliges the disputant to follow out the consequences of what is postulated.
But a doubt arises here. In a promissory oath is the swearer's quality [or constancy of purpose] presupposed, and, this having been weighed, a fitting witness [God] is called upon to confirm that the man is speaking his mind? Or is the veracity of the witness presupposed in order to consider secondarily the quality of a promise with God as continual warranty? For if the first were true, it would seem to be enough if the one swearing about the future had the intention at that time to carry out what he promised under oath, although afterwards he may change his mind. The second seems more consonant with the common opinion, because in that oath it is said that one will always remain obligated until one's promise is carried out.
So far as assertive perjury is concerned, there is no need to treat of anything in particular that is not covered by the article on perjury in general.
Perjury 32I But where perjury involves a promissory or obligatory oath, I say such can be deceitful, or rash, or forced, or lacking all these unfitting conditions.
[The deceitful oath] A deceitful oath is swearing to carry out some promise with no intention of doing so or of obliging oneself to what one swears to. In the act of swearing such a person sins mortally, because he calls God as a witness that he will do what he says, when he has no mind to do so. Nevertheless, after he has taken the oath he does not remain obligated, because with private obligations one is not bound to anything one has no intention of taking on. Nor does it follow that he profits by his deceit, inasmuch as he would have been obligated had he not sworn deceitfully. For to bear the burden of mortal sin is bad enough for him, and if he had not sworn deceitfully he would not have sinned mortally. Still, one who does not swear deceitfully is bound to his oath, whereas this one is not, and this intention to carry out one's oath is not so hurtful as is the penalty the other merits in swearing deceitfully, because he sins mortally.
[The rash or incautious oath] One can swear rashly in two ways:
[a] Either the matter is something entirely illicit, for instance, if someone swears to violate some commandment, e.g., takes an oath to kill someone or to commit adultery with someone; and such an oath does not obligate the person further so that he would have to carry out what he swore to do. Nevertheless, when he took the oath, if he did not have the intention to do so, he sinned mortally in calling God to testify to a falsehood. But if he did have the intention to do so, he still sinned mortally, because to will to sin mortally is itself a mortal sin. In either way, then, he sinned mortally in taking such an oath. But after the fact he is not obliged to carry out his oath, because he must not add one sin to another. For the fact that he swore to do something illicit does not make what was illicit licit, since it is a mortal sin.
[b) One could also swear rashly when one takes an oath to do something one could not possibly perform, if at the time one thought one could do it. And one must judge or view this in the way set out in the article on oaths in general, because if it could be done in the future, one would be held to it; but if it could not be done, since one believed at the time one swore to do it that one could do it, one is excused because the matter is in one's favor.
[A forced oath] As for an oath one is forced to take by the sort of coercion that can befall a steadfast person, there are various views.
Look them up in the fourth book.
[A promissory oath] A promissory oath that is not deceitful, rash, or
Sin forced obliges the person taking it never to retract his will in the matter, and one does not sin, even though how one reasonably fulfills it may differ, according to changing circumstances. Such a person first commits perjury, however, at the moment he or she decides not to fulfill the promise taken under oath, for that is when one first calls
God to be a witness to a falsehood.
[Reply to the Initial Arguments] [To I] The answer to the first argument is clear from [canon law; see
Decretum Gratiani II, causa 22, q. 4, c. 5]: "In turpi voto mutua de~ cretum." One sins mortally, however, in taking such an oath.
[To 2] To the other argument, I say that, other things being equal, the strongest oath is to swear "By God," because it is not licit to swear by anything else, except God be present there in some special way, for instance, "By the Gospel" [or Bible], because God is revealed there; or "By heaven," because God dwells there in a special way; or "By the Church," because God is worshiped there in a special manner. Never~ theless, reasonable custom has it that certain oaths are taken with greater solemnity than others, and when such a solemn occasion oc~ curs the presumption is that the oath must never be taken except with deliberation. Other oaths could be taken without deliberation, how~ ever. Therefore, God has established it that an oath taken "By the Church" has a certain sense of awe or dread about it, so that it is never taken without deliberation, and where one must assert the truth with~ out qualification or reservation. But the oath "By God" is generally and frequently taken lightly and without deliberation. Nevertheless, I say that, other things being equal, it is always more serious to swear by God. But assuming there is a lack of deliberation when using "By God," and full deliberation in another case, such as when one swears by the Church, one assumes there is a mortal sin here, not just because of the irreverence on the part of the one taking the oath, but because of the deliberation present in the one case but not in the other. And if you object: Why, then, is infamy attached to perjury based on an oath taken on the Gospels [or the Bible], whereas an oath "By God" does not make one infamous? I reply: Infamy is not always attached accord~ ing to the quality of the fault, but is based on whether the offense is a public or state crime. Now, it is established that an oath on the Gospel is taken or should be taken with deliberation and that it is a public matter and event, and therefore a transgressor, where such an oath is concerned, is presumed to be a violator of the faith and hence is rea~ sonably regarded as worthy of infamy; whereas this is not the presump~ tion in the case of one who lightly swears by God.