23. MORAL VIRTUE AND THE GIFTS AND FRUITS OF: The Spirit
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the practical inference is made. Another, imperfect individual, however, syllogizes practically only with difficulty and delay. And if at last he chooses correctly, he is said to act not suddenly but sullenly, whereas another, perfect person as it were acts quickly with respect to that thing, since the time it takes him to act is imperceptibly short.
23. MORAL VIRTUE AND THE GIFTS AND FRUITS OF
THE SPIRIT
(Ordinatio III, supp!., dist. 34) In regard to dist. 34 [of Bk. Ill] I ask: Do the virtues, gifts, beatitudes, and fruits make up the same habit?
[Arguments Pro and Can} For the affirmative:
Gregory the Great; look up his exposition of Job [1:2]: "Seven sons and three daughters were born to him."
Furthermore, if these were different from one another, then their classifications would not overlap. But the consequent is false, because fortitude is a gift and also a virtue. And against the claim that the two represent different sorts of fortitude is the fact that their action is identical.
For the negative:
The number of gifts and beatitudes is not the same; also what is enumerated there clearly does not coincide, for there is a beatitude that is not a gift and a gift that is not a virtue, and the same with the fruits.
[Body of the Question} [A. The Views of Others} [I. Henry of Ghent] In q. 23 of Quodlibet IV, Henry gives this answer to the question. Just as one can react to intense delight in three ways, namely, humanly, superhumanly, and inhumanly, so one can react to inordinately sad situations in a human way when one bears such terrible things in a fitting fashion, and the acquired or infused moral virtue serves this purpose, but it does not do away with sorrow, according to Aristotle (Ill Ethics) and Augustine (XlII On the Trinity, ch. 7).
Superhuman behavior is to face the terrible with joy, as some of the martyrs did. A nonhuman, and quasi-godlike, way is not only to accept death with joy but to look forward to it eagerly, as Paul did when he wrote [in Philippians 1:23]: "I long to be freed from this life and to be with Christ." Augustine proves that this is not human in his first homily on John, where, referring to I Corinthians I: 10: "Since there
The Intellectual and Moral Virtues is schism among you, are you not behaving like men?" he says, "Paul wished them to be gods, as is said in the Psalm [82:6]: 'I said, You are gods.'" This third mode corresponds to the heroic virtue of Ethics III, which the Philosopher thought was opposed to bestiality, or an inhuman indulgence in vicious pleasures. Virtues, it is said, perfect a person humanly; gifts, superhumanly; beatitudes, heroically.
[Refutation of Henry] The first objection to this is that charity is the most excellent of the gifts of God, according to Augustine in Bk. XV of The Trinity, ch. 17, n. 29, and even more, according to the Apostle in I Corinthians, ch. 13: "If I have fortitude and hand over my body to be burned" -which seems to be nonhuman or godlike, because one seeks to bum for God-"but have not charity, I gain nothing"; therefore it does not seem that any gift perfects one more than even the first degree of charity, which is a virtue.
Furthermore, the habit of fortitude enables the human will to rightly steer a mean course in the face of terrors, and hence to act even more rightly, or with the highest degree of rectitude possible for such a nature. But if that is possible, then the identical habit of fortitude, while remaining specifically the same, can develop in strength, the degree of which does not vary its species; therefore, the same specific habit can dispose one to face something terrible with a minimum of courage or most perfectly.
You may claim that fortitude in the two cases is not the same, and that the habit which disposes one to bear up with only a minimum of courage is necessarily imperfect as to its act and object, since in the face of the terrible it cannot make one more perfect, and to act perfectly under such circumstances, another species of habit is needed.
But several species should not be postulated without manifest necessity, namely, that one species is not enough, which is clearly not the case here.
Furthermore, Christ suffered in his passion, as we have pointed out in dist. 15 of this third book, and generally every martyr, left to himself without miraculous intervention, howsoever much he suffers voluntarily, does not endure such suffering without sorrow. This is clear from that passage of Augustine, in ch. 7 of Bk. XIII of The City of God, where he challenges the philosophers who say they are happy because they have whatever they want, for if good things happen, they are pleased with that, and if adverse things occur, they are also pleased with that, because they bear these patiently. He argues against them that in adversities they did not have what they want, because so far as the event itself goes, they did not wish for it to occur, and if it hap-
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pened by accident, they wished patiently to put up with it, lest, by losing their patience, they become even more miserable. And this argument is generally persuasive, for patience cannot have to do with something desirable in itself. That is why the martyrs by sustaining adverse things in this life faced a situation they did not entirely want, because the object of their patience was not something absolutely desirable or capable of being willed or desired absolutely, but rather something to be put up with for the sake of God.
Furthermore, the same agent is not simultaneously able to perform some act humanly, superhumanly, and inhumanly; for then a virtue previously acquired or infused in baptism would be rendered null by an acquired gift, or if it did remain, it would be unable to go into action, or it would no longer be necessary, because its function would be replaced by the more perfect gift. In the same way the beatitudes would obviate the need for both the virtues and the gifts, which seems incongruous, especially if we are speaking about the theological virtues, because in heaven charity will not pass away, nor will faith and hope in this life.
Furthermore, "superhuman" and "nonhuman" are metaphorical terms, for every act of man is properly speaking human. For just as it is necessary for a right act to be in harmony with its object, end, and other circumstances, so it is also necessary that it be suited to the agent performing it; for it does not suit me to behave like a king, and much less to act like an angel. Therefore, to perform a right act a man must necessarily act in a human way; whatever habit, then, disposes a man to act in a simply human way in performing some action, disposes him in an unqualified sense to perform such in regard to this.
Furthermore, if someone were always at prayer and were given the gift of understanding, but had never studied about matters of belief, such a one would not act in a human way about such beliefs, because acquired faith would be lacking, without which infused faith is inoperable. However, according to you, he could still operate superhumanly because he would have the gift of understanding, and hence could act in a more excellent way in regard to matters of belief than another skilled in Sacred Scripture, which we do not find to be the case. Indeed every such person will perhaps err more easily in regard to such matters than one well acquainted with the Scriptures.
Also, there are as many things apt to be ordered humanly as there are things apt to be ordered superhumanly or nonhumanly; therefore, they will be ordered by the same sort of habit in each case. Otherwise, true blessedness in heaven would be the act of some beatitude as a quasi-supreme habit, [rather than the virtue of charity].
The Intellectual and Moral Virtues [2. The view of St. Bonaventure] Another explanation is that the virtues enable one to act rightly; the gifts, to act perfectly; and the beatitudes, to act quickly.
On the contrary: by the same virtue I act rightly (because virtue is rectitude in the faculty) and quickly (because virtue is a habit making the operation quick and easy) and perfectly (because virtue is a perfection in the one who has it and is that whereby the action is rendered perfect).
[3. The view of Richard of Mediavilla] Another says that something is necessary to dispose the will so that it is able to be moved by right reason, and that is virtue. But something else is needed so that the Holy Spirit can move it, and that is the gift; and these two are postulated as moving the will.
To the contrary: this view is false, to begin with, because it falsely assumes that reason causes the will's movement, so that virtue is nothing more than a mobile disposition of that faculty. Secondly, it fails to distinguish the beatitudes from the gifts and virtues. And thirdly, since God gave the will this habit, he continues to assist both will and habit to act accordingly, just as after miraculously curing the blind man, he continued to assist him so that his eyes could be moved to see. The same habit, then, disposes the will to be moved in both the first and the second way, for though the habit disposes the will to move itself, it also disposes it to be moved by the Holy Spirit as the other mover; but this is no reason why other habits need to be postulated here.
[B. Scotus' Own View} One could say to this question, without asserting it categorically, that the only virtues necessary in this life are the moral virtues, the intellectual virtues, and the theological virtues. This is shown in the following way. For natural reason infers the necessity of the intellectual habits perfecting the intellect in regard to theoretical matters and the intellectual habit perfecting the intellect in practical matters, and so we have the habits covering theoretical and practical knowledge.
Similarly natural reason infers the necessity of a habit perfecting the appetite in regard to what is desirable for oneself and what one can seek in relationship to others, and so we have the first distinction of appetitive virtues ordering those habits to self and others.
Although one may conclude perhaps by natural reason that man is not sufficiently perfected by these habits (as the solution to the first question of the first book does), other information is required to indicate just what additional cognitive and appetitive habits are needed, for natural reason alone does not show clearly enough what intellec-
The Gifts and Fruits of the Spirit tual and what appetitive virtues there are other than these. But one may reasonably hold, according to the persuasive arguments presented in the second question of the first book, that besides these there is a necessity for that cognitive habit and that appetitive habit which the Catholic Church says is necessary, and by faith we hold that three theological virtues are necessary and that they perfect the soul immediately with respect to the uncreated object [God].
[ I. The Virtues} [Enumeration of the virtues] And from this I argue as follows. We ought to postulate only such habits in a person in the present life as perfect such a one in regard to every object that one can be perfected by at present. Such are the seven virtues in general [Le., prudence and the three moral virtues and three theological virtues]-I am not concerned here with the acquired theoretical virtues. Apart from such acquired theoretical sciences, then, no habit ought to be assumed in the pilgrim besides these seven. Proof of the major. God and creatures are the only objects one can be perfected by. Where God is concerned, the three theological virtues perfect one sufficiently in his regard, and if these three habits are most perfect, they do so in the highest measure in which it is possible to perfect a pilgrim. Where creatures are concerned {and I am not speaking of the theoretical sciences} the intellect is perfected most perfectly by prudence, if that virtue is most perfect. For then one would have the most perfect practical knowledge about every possible action and under every possible circumstance. In a similar fashion the three moral virtues perfect the appetitive part in the highest measure, if they are most perfect, because they have to do with all that can be sought for others as well as what is needed and is desirable for oneself. And they do this either primarily and directly, or secondarily, as means for attaining the primary goals. And when I speak of the four cardinal virtues, I do not understand each of these four to be a numerically single habit in anyone, as if there were a universal temperance or a universal justice which extended to everything. Rather there are single species of justice in an individual, each concerned with its own proper subject matter.
Through these three theological virtues, however, the pilgrim is sufficiently perfected immediately as regards God, because in regard to understanding him, faith is adequate perfection for this life, because we cannot have any knowledge of him except that of faith, as was said above in [dist. 24 of] this third book; therefore, etc. Charity sufficiently perfects me regarding God as lovable in himself, and hope does the same regarding God as a desirable good for me. But there are no other orderly acts it is fitting for me as a pilgrim to have towards God than to love him in himself and to seek him for myself as my good;
The Intellectual and Moral Virtues therefore, etc. Similarly in regard to any good object other than God the pilgrim is sufficiently perfected when he or she is perfected by intellectual and appetitive habits towards these things. But all such intellective habits as suffice to perfect the intellect are what we call intellectual virtues, for such virtues sufficiently perfect the pilgrim insofar as considering things and reasoning about them practically are concerned. Also the appetitive habits are also virtues of the appetite that sufficiently perfect it when it seeks or loves self and others. Hence, a man perfected by reason of the three theological virtues, the speculative and practical virtues, and the moral virtues that concern self and others is perfected as far as a pilgrim can be appropriately, and therefore there seems to be no need to assume any other habits than the theological, intellectual, and moral virtues.
[Generic virtues] Note further that just as habit in the category of quality represents a certain intermediate genus, so it has under it many intermediate genera before one comes to the most special species. For it may first be divided into the intellectual and appetitive, as seems probable, and the intellectual is further divided into the acquired and infused, and the appetitive similarly into acquired and infused. Or one may divide habits first into acquired and infused and both members into intellectual and appetitive, and the acquired intellectual at least can be further divided into speculative and practical, and the acquired appetitive into that which is ordered to self and that which is ordered to another. But the acquired speculative habit is divided further into real and rational, depending on whether it is concerned with real beings or those of the mind. That dealing with real being is divided according to the division proposed in VI Metaphysics, which is into Physics, Mathematics, and the Divine Science [or Metaphysics], and each of these, perhaps, can be further divided by many subdivisions before one comes to the most special species. But the acquired practical habit is divided into that which has to do with acting and that which has to do with making, and that which has to do with making has a number of divisions before one comes to the most special species, one of which is the practical habit concerned with this specific sort of activity, such as building. And the practical habit concerned with acting is also divided by a multiple division, as is clear from the [next] question on the connection of the virtues. For whether it be practical science or practical prudence, insofar as it deals with all that can be done, prudence is not just a single science, as will be explained in that question.
[Intellective virtues] The whole of this numerical division of intellective habits is taken over under the single infused virtue, which is faith. And there is a kind of intermediate genus with respect to many
The Gifts and Fruits of the Spirit
practical acquired virtues which is called "prudence." And if one also enumerates together species that are sufficiently common, there can be three such general virtues-faith, speculative science, and prudence. Nevertheless speculative science does not perfect a man in acting well morally, and therefore it is not enumerated among the moral virtues, for it is less necessary for man to live rightly than is prudence, and is also less necessary than is faith for a person to live rightly in the Church as a polity.
[Appetitive virtues] Under infused and acquired appetitive appetites, as their first species, are two infused and two acquired habits.
First, under the infused are hope and charity; and under the acquired is the virtue disposing the appetite towards oneself and that disposing it toward another, and the latter goes by the common name of justice.
The one towards self has no common name, and one descends to its subdivisions. Perhaps that is why it is not enumerated under the cardinal virtues, which include other, less generic virtues that fall under it [viz., temperance and fortitude].
[Virtues of the concupiscible and irascible appetites] Under the desirables for oneself are listed those which can be sought as such, namely, those which are suited immediately to agree with one, and others which are primarily to be avoided, namely, which are apt immediately to be disagreeable. Other things are not primarily desirables or avoidables, but are such secondarily, as it were, because of what is primarily sought or avoided. And the common virtue which disposes a person in regard to the first is temperance, and in regard to the second, is fortitude. Indeed the first appetibles pertain to the concupiscible appetite and the second to the irascible.
[Digression on anger and the irascible] Looking at this distinction in general, we should note that the concupiscible has to do with something agreeable or disagreeable of itself, so that on its part nothing more than apprehending such is required for an act of delight or sadness, or pursuit or flight, to follow. But the irascible does not have such things as its object. For the act of the irascible is to be angry. But to be angry, according to the Philosopher in Bk. II of the Rhetoric, is to seek vengeance in a conspicuous way for a conspicuous slight. Therefore, the object of anger is revenge, and more truly, if this is its act, then its object is what can be avenged. It could be called the "irascitive," or in more customary terms, "something offensive." What offends is not immediately disagreeable to the concupiscible, but it is something that impedes what is primarily agreeable, for instance, if food is what is first attractive to the taste of a bird, and therefore it desires it, and it is kept from this food or the food is removed, this
The Intellectual and Moral Virtues offends the bird that wants it. This offensive incident is the irascible object, and the irascible appetite bears a certain nolition towards itnot indeed by turning away or shunning it, properly speaking, as the concupiscible appetite flees what it dislikes, but rather by spitting at it or repelling it. For the irascible appetite repels what it dislikes, not by desiring that the impediment be removed, but by removing it and, further, punishing it. See dist. 26 of this third book, supra.
Because the irascible appetite's act is this will to be angry or vengeful, or this nolition, where the object nilled that one seeks to avenge is not present, its anger is always tempered with grief or pain-not, however, the grief associated with the concupiscible, but that associated with the irascible, and only for that moment or time when the irascible acts not with the sort of nolition it desires, but such as it has when it has not yet avenged itself and desires to do so. Once it has actually taken revenge, however, its act is perfect and is similar to fruition on the part of the concupiscible appetite, for then the irascible appetite's anger is no longer tinged with grief or pain, but associated with a great satisfaction peculiar to itself. For as Aristotle puts it in the Rhetoric: "A man's anger is like honey."
[Virtues of the irascible appetite] Just as the concupiscible needs to be moderated by right reason lest it seek the things it desires inordinately, so too the irascible appetite requires a tempering habit on two counts: first, lest it punish immoderately and ward off what needs repelling in an unbridled way; or second, lest it angrily put off what should be endured or put up with. The first of these habits has no name, but it could be called "a fighting attitude" or something like that. The second is known as patience. And because it is more difficult not to thrust off in anger what offends one, patience is the most noble form of fortitude, according to the poetic saying: "Patience is the noble way to vanquish," for the patient person will conquer. The irascible, then, does not have as its object the arduous, as the concupiscible has the appetible, for its object is the offensive, so that its adequate act is to will to vindicate or nill the offensive, a nilling that is, as it were, imperfect so long as the anger is sustained before the offensive object is repelled. This phase is similar to desire on the part of the concupiscible appetite, whereas the perfected act of nolition, when with moderation it repels what is nilled or patiently puts up with it, resembles enjoyment in the concupiscible appetite.
And if you object that to nill one opposite is to will the other, and it is the function of the concupiscible to will one opposite, therefore it is the role of the irascible to nill the other, I give this reply. When the irascible functions there are two things nilled, one by the concupis-
The Gifts and Fruits of the Spirit
cible appetite and the other by the irascible. This is clear from the example cited above, for what is nilled by the concupiscible appetite is the lack of food, and from this nolition sorrow follows, whereby it eschews what it nills as it were but does not spit at it. For another event is nilled, the removal of food, and this is what the irascible appetite nills, not by eschewing it but by an act of repulsion. And so long as it does not actually vent its anger or express this repulsion, it suffers the pain or grief proper to the irascible appetite.
It is clear however that this grief or pain of the irascible and concupiscible are not the same, because if each is faced with something offensive that is impossible to throw off, the greater suffering is in the concupiscible appetite, and yet it does not tum into anger. The most fearful person is not angry, according to the Philosopher in II Rhetoric, and nevertheless the more one fears the more the concupiscible appetite suffers and turns from what it fears. Though the irascible at times suffers pain when it cannot vent its anger, namely, when it has no power to vindicate itself, it suffers in another way than does the concupiscible, namely, by lacking some object it desires. But the pain of both the concupiscible and the irascible appetite is accompanied by an organic change in the sensitive part of the soul. Look this up. In the concupiscible the organs are restricted, just as they are expanded with the opposite delight. But the pain of the irascible makes one hot when the blood courses to the heart. And from this it follows that the concupiscible and sensitive parts of the soul have different organs, because the same organ could not be simultaneously moved in contrary ways.
In the rational portion of the soul there is a distinction of objects similar to that in the sensitive, because something is primarily delightful to the will, for example, some good or what suits the will itself or also what suits it according to the senses, if indeed the will is apt to share in the delight of the sense appetite joined to it in the same subject. The will can also face an offending object in a way that is either against or in accord with right reason, and it can regard it as offensive and nill it by an act that is repulsive and imperious. But there is not the same sort of distinction there as in the sense appetite, because the will is not an organic faculty, nor is it necessary to speak of its other aspect as a distinct power or another potency. The distinction is similar to the distinction of reason into a higher and a lower portion as regards its different objects, which yet form one and the same power in an unqualified sense.
As for calling one part of this "force," I don't know what needs to be said, for the term is superfluous. For there is simply the same mode of
The Intellectual and Moral Virtues operation in regard to these distinct higher and lower objects, as we have said in dist. 24 of Bk. II. And the same can be said of the first and second types of delightful and painful objects here. The functioning element is completely one and the same, an active potency operating by the same power or force, for the same faculty that is potent is also forceful. In spiritual things the potency and its strength are the same.
Neither is there reason for distinguishing the potency on the basis of the objects towards which it tends, any more than we do in speaking of the intellect as tending to know principles in one way and conclusions in another way by means of principles. No one because of this distinction thinks of distinguishing the intellect into potency and forces.
[Conclusion] Presupposing these things, then, about the irascible and concupiscible, I return now to the virtues and declare that the proper habit perfecting the concupiscible appetite is called temperance and that perfecting the irascible is called fortitude, and I speak both of the acquired and of the infused habits. However, both infused virtues
[Le., hope and charity] perfect the concupiscible, because God, which they have as their object, cannot be nilled. Although both these species, namely, fortitude and temperance, can be commonly subdivided, nevertheless in the enumeration of cardinal virtues they remain undivided. According to this enumeration, then, there are three theological and four cardinal virtues. In 1 Corinthians, ch. 13. the Apostle refers to the theological virtues, while Wisdom, ch. 8, speaks of the moral virtues: "Wisdom teaches moderation and prudence. justice and fortitude, and nothing in life is more useful than these."
This sevenfold number of virtues, then, perfects the pilgrim in this life in an unqualified sense, so that to the degree he possesses each of these in its species he is perfect, for accordingly as these are more or less intense, not in themselves but in their capacity, he is more or less perfect, and if these virtues are as intense as they can be in this life, then man is simply as perfect as he can be here below. I am not concerned at present about the perfection we have through the speculative acquired virtues, which were earlier excluded from the present discussion. These seven virtues, then (considered both in themselves and in their necessary species, of which we shall speak later), provided they are most perfect in themselves, suffice to make man most perfect in an unqualified sense as regards God in himself and all things other than God. As intelligibles of practical reason and as things desirable either for self or for others, the appetitive virtues are suited to attain such in themselves or in relation to man's ultimate end, which is in the power of the acquired virtues when they are joined to charity.
The Gifts and Fruits of the Spirit
[2. How the Generic Virtues, Gifts, etc., Are Interrelated] We need to investigate further the interrelationship of the virtues, gifts, beatitudes, and fruits.
[a. The three generic moral virtues] Note that the three acquired moral virtues of justice, fortitude, and temperance represent intermediate genera, for the first desirables seem to be divided into two, namely, honor and delights in the strict sense. For everything that is a primary good, that is, agrees with one, is either an honorable good or something delectable. For the useful is not a primary motive of desire, because it is desired only in reference to something else. The authority of the canonical epistle of John [2: 16] also implies as much: "All that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes and the pride of life." For the concupiscence of the eyes, which looks to riches, cannot be first, speaking of riches insofar as they represent a useful good and not something delectable. If one may speak of them as delectables insofar as they are beautiful, then they can be desired primarily like any other visible beauty. Therefore, the first things desirable to a rational nature are, as we said, honor and delight in the strict sense. Hence, the first species of temperance, which moderates the desirable for oneself, will be twofold; that which moderates the desire for honors is called humility, whereas that which moderates the desire for delight retains the general name of temperance, and there can be as many species of it as there are distinct pleasures to which the will inclines one, for instance, one species of temperance regarding the delights of taste, another that of touchand not only sensitive pleasures, which delight the will joined to the body, but also those pleasures proper to the will as will. And hence the will of an angel can in som~ manner desire delectable goods, though it has no sense appetite as a pure spirit.
And that these temperances are distinguished is proved from the fact that in one there can be the highest delight and in another none.
For a man can be temperate in regard to venereal pleasure, and not want to use any but his wife for sex, or refrain from such pleasure completely and still be intemperate in regard to taste, wishing to eat what he should not or not wanting to eat what he ought. One can also be temperate regarding sensibles and intemperate regarding theoretical pursuits-for instance, if the will takes the highest delight when the intellect pursues such speculative interests as are not as useful in themselves as others, and where this delight in itself is immoderate and should be tempered, since it is inordinate in itself.
It is unnecessary for our purpose to explain the species of fortitude in detail, because in treating the other topics, fortitude is only touched
The Intellectual and Moral Virtues on in general or as patience. Patience, as we said above, is the most noble form of fortitude, because it does not throw off what one would tend to repel, so that to be patient is a sort of permitting. And if you will admit that permitting is a positive act of willing or nilling, or perhaps willing not to impede, then you can say this is the sort of act the will has in regard to bearing adversities patiently.
Justice, however, is subdivided with a view to what follows. Know that in regard to another, one can act rightly either by giving oneself to another insofar as one can or by giving him something else that belongs to him. The virtue inclining one to the first is friendship, by which one gives oneself to one's neighbor insofar as one can and one's neighbor can have one; and this is the most perfect of the moral virtues, because justice as a whole is more perfect than virtues that are directed to oneself, and this is the most perfect form of justice. If however one gives something else to another, either it is an extrinsic good or it is an intrinsic one; an intrinsic good would be one pertaining to what is necessary for human life. What concerns extrinsic goods men need to exchange is called commutative justice, and this justice is frequently called equity, where for so much, one gives something equivalent. But if one communicates something else that is necessary to man, either this is governance (and this species of justice has no name, but could be called "presidency" or "just domination"), or if what is given is just subjection, this is called "obedience."
[b. The beatitudes] On this understanding, then, I say that the beatitudes which our Savior speaks of in Matthew 5 are the same habits that make up the virtues, although at times they name more specific species of the seven virtues previously enumerated. The Savior enumerates among his beatitudes two that are species of temperance. One is humility, which moderates our quest of honor, the first of the desirables, and he expresses this there with the words: "Blessed are the poor in spirit," of whom Augustine says, "They are rightly understood to be poor in spirit and God-fearing, who do not have an inflated spirit."
The other species, moderating delights in general, the Savior expresses as "Blessed are the pure of heart"; for purity of heart is the immunity the will has against all inordinate delight, both in regard to itself and by reason of the sense appetites to which it is joined.
He also speaks there of fortitude in its most perfect species: "Blessed are those who suffer persecution for the sake of justice."
The Savior expresses three species of justice: one indeed, which is the sharing of oneself in friendship, and this he indicates when he says: "Blessed are the meek," for though friendship implies more than benevolence, according to the Philosopher in Bk. VIII of the Ethics
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(for there is a recognized reciprocation and well-wishing that is more than meekness, because the meek are those who do not offend nor resist when evil besets them), nevertheless this is as it were the minimum requirement for friendship and expresses that whereby one shares oneself with one's neighbor. The other species, namely, that divided into just rule and obedience, is expressed by "Blessed are the peacemakers." For peace is served where the ruler governs justly and the subject obeys correctly. The third species of justice, which has to do with extrinsic goods, is indicated there in the words "Blessed are the merciful"; for there is no other way in which one can be disposed to give such things to one's neighbor than by being merciful. Though a person who is liberal will share with a friend, this is a lesser form of generosity than is mercy, and hence liberality is a less perfect form of justice than mercy is. God expresses this sort of justice in regard to temporal goods most specifically, in those words of Luke [14: 1214]:
"When you give a dinner. . . invite beggars and the crippled and the lame . . . they cannot repay you." And so we have the three moral virtues expressed either as such or in one of their species. And the Savior also indicates two of the theological virtues there, [the first] in the words "Blessed are they who hunger and thirst after justice." For hunger is not present without some wretchedness, but the habit whereby it is elicited is charity; for charity is most properly the habit whereby in this life we hunger for justice and love God in himself, which is truly justice. The second, which is hope, is expressed when he says: "Blessed are they who mourn, for they shall be comforted."
For mourning is the habit of desiring such.
And so in the eight beatitudes are expressed the two infused appetitive virtues and the three acquired moral virtues, fortitude in itself and temperance in two of its species, justice in three species. But the two intellectual virtues, one acquired, which is prudence, and the other infused, which is faith, are not expressed either as such or in their species, but they are sufficiently presupposed by the appetitive virtues, because the will is not best disposed without a corresponding virtue in the intellect.
[c. The gifts of the Holy Spirit] As for the gifts, I say that the four cardinal virtues are enumerated there. Prudence is expressed by "the spirit of counsel," for prudence is properly speaking a counseling habit, because it is a habit concerned with practical reasoning, and to reason in this way is to give counsel. Hence the habit whereby someone is counseled is prudence. Fortitude is expressed among the gifts under its own name. Fear of the Lord is a species of temperance, because it corresponds to humility, although it goes by a different name. This is
The Intellectual and Moral Virtues clear from Augustine's explanation of Matthew 5, "Blessed are the poor in spirit." Hence, Scripture frequently commends such fear, as in Proverbs 1 :7: "Fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom"; for nothing other than humility is the beginning of virtue; therefore something accompanies it in the intellect, and this is fear of the Lord. When it is said that such is "always blessed," this refers to what is the fond hope of the future, as is frequently indicated elsewhere in Scripture: "Blessed is he who has regard for the lowly and the poor" [Ps. 41:2), and "Blessed is the man who endures temptation" [James I: 12], and similar texts. Some wish to hold that someone is blessed who has some habit called "beatitude," because by means of its action a person merits happiness in heaven. When piety is included among the gifts this refers to what the Savior calls mercy, and it is a species of justice.
Thus among the gifts the four cardinal virtues and two infused virtues are expressed. The cardinal virtues are: prudence as counsel, and fortitude under its own name; the two others are not under their aspect as intermediate species, but rather as certain subspecies under these. Temperance, for instance, occurs as fear and justice as charity.
The two infused virtues enumerated there are charity and faith. Charity is called the "spirit of wisdom." For generally when the Scriptures praise wisdom, as in this and other passages like: "Blessed is the man who finds wisdom" [Proverbs 3:13], "wisdom" is taken for charity and wisd@m is charity, for it is the habit whereby the one possessing it savors that object that is to be savored in itself, namely, that good which pleases me in itself and also insofar as I wish to have it. Through the other two gifts, namely, understanding and knowledge, infused faith is expressed, not that these two are circumlocutions for two habits as "wisdom" or "sapience" for charity and "fear of the Lord" for humility, but "knowledge" and "understanding" are circumlocutions for the same habit possessed in an imperfect and a perfect manner, and both can be given from above; the first indeed without the second but not vice versa. And one can understand "understanding" as imperfect faith, which is a knowledge of the primary articles of faith, and "knowledge" or science as perfect faith, which represents an explicit knowledge of what these articles imply, just as in the case of what is known naturally, "understanding" refers to the principles and "science" or "knowledge" to the explicit knowledge of conclusions that follow from such principles. Hope here is not enumerated explicitly but is implied through the presence of charity, which is the sapience whereby I savor God both in himself and also as a good for me. For whoever savors in this sense, and approves of this taste he has in himself, desires such for himself.
The Gifts and Fruits of the Spirit [d. The fruits of the Spirit] As for the fruits, I say certain of these are virtues falling under our sevenfold classification; others are species of those listed there; and still others are neither the one nor the other, but rather delights that follow as a consequence of virtuous acts. For example, charity and faith are expressed there under their proper names, but hope is called "long-suffering." Hence, we read of the patriarchs that they were long-suffering in hope, eagerly expectant for a long while, as it were.
The moral virtues are also expressed there: fortitude, in the form called "patience," justice, in its specific form of mercy (which is here called "goodness," in the sense that one is commonly called "good" who shares himself with his neighbor), and in its other species, namely, friendship (which here is expressed as "benignity," which is a quasi benevolence and "being on fire with good"), and also in its first or third species, which has to do with ruling and being a good subject (which is here called "mildness" or specifically "obedience," for a person is mild who carries out injunctions without a murmur). Temperance is expressed in two of its species, namely, continence and chastity. If one cares to, one can say that chastity is concerned with venereal pleasure and continence with other pleasures, or one can understand both as a single species concerned with any pleasure whatsoever, as the Philosopher does in Bk. VII of the Ethics, where he refers to chastity as one of the degrees that can be present in any virtue. Prudence is expressed there as modesty, for one is modest who maintains a right and appropriate way of acting, and the task of prudence is to find a suitable way to act, to see how it ends, and to come to a decision about it.
Thus we have three theological virtues, as well as fortitude in the form of patience; justice in its three species; temperance in one or two species; prudence in one species; and thus all the virtues both intellectual and moral. The other things enumerated there are delights that either coincide with or follow the virtuous action, like joy and peace.
For joy is properly speaking a delight in the will, and peace in the same faculty is the assurance of having possession of the object without opposition.
[To the question] And thus it is clear how, by holding that the seven virtues, either in themselves or in their species, suffice to perfect man in this Me, we eliminate the need for any habits that are not these or species thereof, for neither among the beatitudes nor among the fruits and gifts are other virtues enumerated. And although the number of gifts and the number of beatitudes do not explicitly coincide, this is because some species of the seven virtues are expressed in one list but not in the other. It is not because they are other habits that are not