23. Moral virtue and the gifts and fruits of the Spirit
Introduction efficacy an agent possesses. Hence, one could apply the term in this way to bodily skills, and a fortiori to a habit produced in the sense appetite by the will acting in accord with right reason. But this is using the term "virtue," or "moral virtue," in a less perfect way than when the term designates "that quality in the will that inclines it to choose rightly."
Scotus concludes the question with a somewhat lengthy discussion of how Henry of Ghent solves the initial argument based on what Aristotle says about reason ruling the sense appetite with "despotic rule"
(Politics I, ch. s, 12S4b3-S). Henry distinguishes between the will acting (I) as nature, (2) as free, and (3) as deliberative. When it acts as nature no virtue is needed because it tends naturally to the object; neither is virtue required when it acts freely, for virtue is a habit and habits act necessarily; only when the will acts as deliberative is virtue required.
Scotus objects that the will never acts as nature, for all its acts are free, and Henry's third member includes the second, because all deliberate acts are free. He goes on to explain that though virtues or habits act of necessity, when two causes act as a common principle, one free and the other of necessity, the resulting act is still free because the will is the principal cause of the act and the habit only a cooperating cause. Also he points out that what Henry regards as the will acting as nature are those voluntary acts where the time of deliberation is so short as to be imperceptible, i. e., the virtuous person has been so conditioned by prudence to make a correct judgment as to what should be chosen that he seems to act automatically rather than to be making a choice. The rapidity of the action, however, stems from the speed with which the practical judgment is made, in contrast to the slow or reluctant way a person acts who has not acquired the virtue of prudence; for such a one can "syllogize only with difficulty and delay" in making the correct choice.
The Latin source is distinction 33 of the supplement to Ordinatio III, revised with the help of Codices A (ff. I74ra-7svb) and S (ff.
2Isra-16va).
23. Moral virtue and the gifts and fruits of the Spirit The gifts refer to the workings of the Holy Spirit mentioned in Holy
Scripture and manifested in Christ and in the life of his Church.
Promised already in Isaiah, the Holy Spirit actually revealed himself at the baptism of Jesus and communicated himself to the apostles at Pentecost and thereafter to the Church. Six gifts are mentioned in the Hebrew version of Isaiah II: 1 - 3, namely, "a spirit of wisdom and of
The Intellectual and Moral Virtues
understanding, a spirit of counsel and of fortitude, a spirit of knowledge and of fear of the Lord." The Greek Septuagint, however, adds a seventh, viz., piety or godliness, and it was this version of the gifts that influenced the scholastics of the thirteenth century.
The beatitudes refer to the eight beatitudes mentioned by Christ in the Sermon on the Mount. According to Matthew 5:312, they are
(I) poverty of spirit (which Scotus, following Augustine, interprets as humility); (2) meekness; (3) sorrow or mourning; (4) hunger and thirst for justice; (5) mercy; (6) purity of heart; (7) peacemaking; (8) suffering persecution.
The nine fruits of the Holy Spirit refer to St. Paul's list in his letter to the Galatians (5:22-23), viz., "The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, patient endurance, kindness, generosity, faith, mildness, and chastity. "
Though most theologians denied the distinction between the virtues, gifts, beatitudes, and fruits, basing themselves on St. Gregory the Great, during the third decade of the thirteenth century, due to the Summa de bono of Philip the Chancellor, many theologians, especially at Paris, began viewing the gifts as superior to and distinct from the virtues, whether acquired naturally or supernaturally infused.
Thomas Aquinas, for example, after discussing various aspects of the virtues, devotes qq. 68, 69, and 70 of the Summa theologiae Iallae respectively to the nature of the gifts, beatitudes, and fruits, and how they differ from the virtues. In art. 1 of the first of these he writes:
Now it is manifest that human virtues perfect man insofar as it is natural for him to be moved by his reason in his interior and exterior actions. Consequently man needs yet higher perfections if he is to be disposed to be moved by God. These perfections are called gifts, not only because they are infused by God, but also because by them man is disposed to become amenable to divine inspiration.
If the gifts are distinct habits from the virtues, what of the beatitudes and the fruits? Aquinas is clear on this matter. He regards them not as habits (or virtues) but rather as acts proceeding from such habits. In art. 1 of q. 69 he points out that the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts, "not as habit from habit, but as act from habit"; and in the first article of q. 70 he explains that the fruits are special sorts of acts:
The word "fruit" has been transferred from the material to the spiritual world.
Now fruit, among material things, is the product of a plant when it comes to perfection, and has some attraction for the taste. Accordingly, in spiritual matters, we may take the word "fruit" in two ways: first, in the sense that the
Introduction fruit of man, who is likened to a tree, is that which he produces; second, in the sense that man's fruit is what he gathers. Yet not all that man gathers is fruit, but only that which is last and gives pleasure ... In this sense man's fruit is his last end, which is intended for his enjoyment. But if by man's fruits we understand a product of man, human actions are called "fruits," because operation is the second act of the operator, and gives pleasure if suitable to him. If, then, a man's operation proceeds from man in virtue of his reason, it is said to be the fruit of his reason, but if it proceeds from him with respect to a higher power, which is the power of the Holy Spirit, then a man's operation is said to be the fruit of the Holy Spirit.
And in the second article of this question, he explains the difference between beatitude and fruit in this way:
More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit, because it is sufficient for a fruit to be something ultimate and delightful, whereas a beatitude must be something perfect and excellent. Hence all the beatitudes may be called fruits, but not vice versa.
This view of Aquinas, particularly on the relationship of the virtues to the soul and to the gifts, fits in with his overall theory of how the soul and its potencies or faculties are interrelated. He considered the soul as really distinct from its intellectual and volitional powers; hence, he believed special infused virtues, in addition to the sanctifying grace residing in the substance of the soul, are required to fully supernaturalize human nature. Furthermore, he thought the will could be moved naturally (and hence, even necessarily under certain conditions) by right reason and that it was moved in a similar way supernaturally by the Holy Spirit. Hence, he deals with the difference between the virtues and the gifts in terms of what habits condition the will to be moved in these several ways. Among the Franciscan masters, Richard of Mediavilla was particularly impressed with Aquinas' interpretation, and he broke with the earlier tradition that denied any distinction between the virtues and the gifts.
In his initial arguments Pro and Con Scotus refers first to this older view and then to the more recent opinions that sought to differentiate them. He writes:
The number of gifts and beatitudes is not the same; also what is enumerated there clearly does not coincide, for there is a beatitude that is not a gift and a gift that is not a virtue, and the same with the fruits.
Since the argument for the opposition in the introductory Pro and Con usually represents the position Scotus will eventually take, we may assume he believes some sort of distinction must be made in regard to the virtues, gifts, etc. In the present case, however, the dis-
The Intellectual and Moral Virtues
tinction he wishes to make is a somewhat intricate one, and it could be said to favor the affirmative view (viz., that the gifts, fruits, and beatitudes are not something other than the intellectual, moral, or theological virtues that perfect man in the natural and supernatural order). At the same time, it respects the negative view in showing that they are distinct, not in the sense that they represent distinct species of supernatural gifts on the part of God, but rather in the sense of the inadequate distinction that exists between a genus and some particular species that falls under it, or between a species and a subspecies. Furthermore, his view of the distinction is presented only as a possible or probable theory, "without asserting it categorically."
Before developing it, however, Scotus first presents three opposing opinions as to how these four items differ. The first is that of Henry of Ghent, to which as usual Scotus devotes the most attention. According to Henry, one can face adversity in a threefold way: humanly, superhumanly, and in an "inhuman" or heroic way. Through the virtues a person faces such humanly; through the gifts, superhumanly; through the beatitudes, heroically. Scotus plays upon the meaning of the term
"inhumano modo" -which Henry understands in a positive and transcendent sense, rather than in either the quasi-neutral sense of "nonhuman" or the negative or contrary sense of "inhuman." The triple distinction itself is drawn from what Aristotle says in the opening chapter of Bk. VII of the Nicomachean Ethics, where-as Henry interprets it-he contrasts the three moral states to be avoided, namely,
"vice, incontinence, and brutishness," to three opposing virtuous states, namely, "virtue, superhuman virtue, and a heroic or godlike kind of virtue."
To this Scotus objects that, since it is the supernatural virtues one is talking about, charity-according to St. Paul-is better than superhuman or even heroic fortitude. "If I have fortitude and hand over my body to be burned, but have not charity, I gain nothing" (I Corinthians 13:3).
Furthermore, since the virtues are acquired and increase in strength with practice, Scotus sees no reason why they cannot be developed to an even heroic degree without altering their specific nature, and hence the principle of parsimony would apply, viz., species should not be multiplied without necessity.
Likewise, if we take the term "inhumano modo" seriously, it is difficult to see how anyone could at the same time act both humanly and inhumanly in any meaningful sense. This goes back to Scotus' basic thesis that the human intellect and will are naturally open at least to being supernaturally perfected, even though such perfection cannot be acquired without the intervention of some voluntary and transcen-
Introduction dent action on the part of the divine will (see, for instance, his opening question of the prologue to his commentaries on the Sentences;
Wolter, 1949, 1951). If Henry's theory were correct, Scotus argues, any previously acquired or infused virtue would be "rendered null by an acquired gift, or if it did remain, it would be unable to go into action," because "its function would be replaced by the more perfect gift." The same would obviously be true of the beatitudes, which the blessed enjoy in heaven. Yet this seems both incongruous and contrary to Scripture, for-according to Paul-"in heaven charity will not pass away, nor will faith and hope in this life."
In a more summary fashion Scotus deals with the views of Bonaventure and Richard of Mediavilla. The first stresses the activity and autonomy of the will; the second, the fact that the will always tends to be moved by another.
Bonaventure (Sent. III, dist. 34, art. I, q. I) believed that virtue gives the will the capacity to act rightly; the gifts, to act perfectly; and the beatitudes, to act quickly. Since it is the will Bonaventure is talking of, the virtues in question appear to be those we call "moral," rather than those called "theological." Because Scotus regards these moral virtues as acquired, rather than infused, he argues that the virtues that enable one to act "rightly" are also those that enable one to act easily and quickly, something the infused virtues (of faith, hope, or charity) do not. (We might note that Scotus held that the acquired virtues become supernaturalized by the fact that they exist in a soul that has been elevated by sanctifying grace, which is only formally distinct from the infused virtue of charity residing in the will. Since the will and the soul-substance are only formally, not really, distinct, what elevates or supernaturalizes one, supernaturalizes the other.) According to Aristotle, acquired virtues are a species of habit, and habits-as a second nature-enable one to act quickly and easily. If the habit is a virtue rather than a vice, then it perfects the potency or faculty in question. Consequently, given Scotus' account of the nature of the will and the fact that it is the immediate subject of the moral virtues of justice, temperance, and fortitude, he obviously cannot accept Bonaventure's account of the distinction.
As Lottin points out (1954, p. 695), Richard of Mediavilla (Sent.
III, dist. 34, art. I, q. I), whose views resemble those of Aquinas, is the second target of Scotus' criticism.
Another says that something is necessary to dispose the will so that it is able to be moved by right reason, and that is virtue. But something else is needed so that the Holy Spirit can move it, and that is the gift; and these two are postulated as moving the will.
The Intellectual and Moral Virtues Understandably Scotus objects to this because "it falsely assumes that reason causes the will's movement" -the assumption being that it is the total or principal cause of its movement. Furthermore, Richard's theory assumes it is the virtue-acquired or infused-rather than the innate "affection for justice," that naturally or exclusively disposes the will to act in accord with right reason. He also argues that this view of Richard "fails to distinguish the beatitudes from the gifts and virtues."
In the body of the question Scotus simplifies the interrelationship of these various agents of virtuous behavior by reducing the gifts, beatitudes, and fruits to some form of "virtue." There he presents this basic thesis: even though man is in a supernatural order, "the only virtues necessary in this life are the moral virtues, the intellectual virtues, and the theological virtues." The first two are acquired, the last infused supernaturally by God.
Scotus, however, understands the moral virtues as "generic virtues," each with a host of species or subspecies under it, for each specifically different moral act can generate a corresponding habit or virtue. Since this question of the distinction of virtues and gifts has to do with the moral life, he points out that his sevenfold classification of the virtues is not meant to cover those habits of knowledge that are theoretical, as these "intellectual virtues" are as numerous as are the various arts and sciences. In his classification, then, "intellectual virtues" refer to those which produce prudential judgments. Since such judgments can refer to specifically different subjects, "prudence" too is taken in a generic sense as covering all practical habits of knowledge needed to guide moral behavior.
Despite the fact that the question is obviously theological, dealing as it does with notions of how the Holy Spirit cooperates supernaturally with morally good human actions so as to make them meritorious as well as naturally and morally good, the question is of interest philosophically, for Scotus-in developing his "probable thesis"-is always careful to point out how far one can go using natural reason before indicating its natural limitations and where faith and revealed knowledge is necessary to complement what we can know naturally. Thus he writes, for instance:
Natural reason infers the necessity of ... intellectual habits ... covering theoretical and practical knowledge ... [and] of a habit perfecting the appetite in regard to what is desirable for oneself and what one can seek in relationship to others . . .
Although one may conclude perhaps by natural reason that man is not sufficiently perfected by these habits. . . other information is required to indicate just what additional cognitive and appetitive habits are needed, for