15. God'S Justice
PART IV God and the Moral Law
15. GOD'S JUSTICE
(Ordinatio IV, dist. 46) Because the forty-sixth distinction [of Bk. IV] treats of how both justice and the mercy of God concur in the punishment of the evildoers, therefore four questions are raised here: first, whether there is justice in God; second, whether there is mercy in God; third, whether in God justice is distinct from mercy; and fourth, whether in his punishment of evildoers justice and mercy concur on God's part.
[Arguments Pro and Con} To the first question it is argued that there is no justice in God:
[Arg. x] According to Bk. V of the Ethics, ch. 6, there is no justice where lord and servant are concerned, because of a lack of equality.
All the more so is this true of the God-creature relationship or the creature-God relationship, since what Paul says in I Corinthians 4:[]]:
"Name something you have not received," could be uttered even more forcefully by God.
[Arg. 2] Furthermore, Bk. X of the Ethics [ch. 8] says it is tasteless and injudicious to praise the separate substances [or gods] for acts of virtue, particularly justice. And [Aristotle] confirms this using an analogous argument about why it is meaningless to speak of their temperance and, by the same token, to speak of their justice.
[Arg. 3] Furthermore, justice inclines a person to render others what is their due; but God is a debtor to no one.
To the contrary is that passage from Psalm [48: I I]: "Of justice your right hand is full."
God and the Moral Law [Body of the Question] [Definition of justice] To begin here with a definition of justice: Anselm in his De veri tate gives the most general notion: "Justice is rectitude of will served for its own sake." The Philosopher in V Ethics makes this specific with the addition: "it has to do with another."
It is clear that God has justice in both senses: the first, because he has rectitude of will-indeed, a will that cannot be gainsaid, because it is the first rule or norm, and is "served for its own sake." Not that "served" here implies any submission or acceptance on the part of the one observing it, but rather it is "served for its own sake" in the sense that it is always spontaneously preserved. It is clear he also has justice in the second sense, because he is upright to others, and therefore, in all his actions towards others there is rectitude.
[Justice towards another] This second sort of justice is subdivided, because either [a] it is quasi-universal with respect to others, for instance, to the legislator and to the law, insofar as the law is a certain general regulation determined by the legislator, and some call this
"legal justice"; or [b] it is particular, for instance, uprightness to another in some specific aspect pertaining to law.
And this second is subdivided, because it can be toward another in an unqualified sense, or to oneself as quasi-other. (This second member of the division is illustrated from what was said about penance, namely, that this sort of punitive justice regards not only others in an unqualified sense, but also oneself as quasi-other, because it is granted to individual persons, as ministers of the judge [God], to punish themselves as guilty. )
Now, the first of these, namely, legal justice, could be postulated of God if there were some other law antecedent to any decision of his will, with which "law and its legislator" as other his own will could rightly agree. Now, there is indeed this law, "God should be loved"if one ought to call it a "law" rather than a practical principle of law; and in any case it is a practical truth that is prior to any decision on the part of the divine will. As for particular justice, however, it would be the second sort that is in him, namely, that which has to do with oneself as quasi-other, since his will is determined by its very rectitude to will what is becoming to his goodness. And this is a quasi-rendering to himself and his goodness what is due to it as other-if one could call such justice "particular," because it is in some way universal, at least virtually.
And these two kinds of justice, namely, legal justice and particular
God's Justice
justice to oneself as quasi-other, are the same thing, as it were, in God, because they are identical with the rectitude of the divine will with respect to his goodness.
[Commutative and distributive justice] If one speaks about the other type of particular justice, which has to do simply with neighbor, this is divided into commutative and distributive; and in this way we distinguish justice in ourselves, as is clear from V Ethics. In distributive justice equality of proportion is required; in commutative justice, some require quantitative equality, not only proportional equity. These are explained in that book.
As to whether these are in God, commutative justice properly speaking has to do with punishment and reward, namely, in exchange for merits, as it were, rewards are rendered, and for sins punishments.
Distributive justice has to do with natures and their additional perfections, which are bestowed on them, as it were, in proportion to their essential perfection. Just as distributive justice in our republic bestows on persons of various gradated stations in life the goods that pertain to their station, so too in the hierarchy of nature as a whole our princely God distributes to the more noble natures those greater perfections suited to them, whereas the less noble natures receive lesser perfections.
Now, the first of these [Le., commutative justice] cannot be in God in an unqualified sense where creatures are concerned, since there is no simple equality there, but there can be something akin to it such as obtains between a master and a servant. For a generous or liberal master may fittingly give a greater reward than the servant could merit, and still there could be some proportionality as to what is given in exchange, so that if the servant does what he should, he is rewarded accordingly. In the same way, such a master may punish delinquent servants to a lesser degree than they merit.
But the second [viz., distributive justice] could be present in God in an unqualified sense, because he could give natures the perfections that are their due or are suited to their degree of excellence.
Thus the whole definition of justice, then, insofar as it is applicable to God, could be reduced to two sorts, the first of which would be called rectitude of will with respect to what is due to divine goodness; the other, rectitude of will with respect to what the exigencies of the creature demand. And we find this distinction in Anslem's Proslogion, ch. 10, where he says of God: "When you punish the wicked, it is just, because punishment corresponds to their merits"-so far as the second member goes. He adds immediately: "When you spare the wicked, however, it is just, not because it corresponds to their merits, but
I86 God and the Moral Law because it befits your goodness." This last clause refers to the first member of the division [Le., what is due to the divine goodness]. And such is the distinction between these two kinds of justice that God cannot operate against or beyond the first justice [viz., what is due to his goodness], but he can go beyond what the second requires, but not in all matters, for he cannot damn the just or the blessed.
[Objections to this view] One may object that in God the first sort of justice cannot be other than the second sort, because then there would be one that is the rule, namely, the first sort of justice, and another that is regulated, namely, the second sort of justice; but in the divine will there cannot be rectitude that is the result of regulation, and this is proved as follows. In us the same virtue inclines us to our proper end and to those things which are means to that end precisely qua means; therefore, if that virtue which inclines us to our end were simply perfect, it would incline us to the means to that end in a simple unqualified manner, as is clear from the way the virtue of charity functions in the case of the blessed in heaven. Now, the first sort of divine justice is simply perfect; therefore, in the divine will nothing more is required.
However, what is said about the inability of the divine will at times to act against the second sort of justice does not seem probable, for whatever does not include a contradiction, the divine will could do, and therefore could will. But it could not will something that it could not will rightly, because God's will is the first rule or regulation; therefore, whatever does not include a contradiction, God can will and do so rightly, and therefore, he could act contrary to this second justice.
Perhaps some would concede the first of these points, namely, that in God there is not a double justice, but only one, which has, however, two different effects, as it were, namely, insofar as God could will some things as due to his goodness and will other things in accord with the exigencies of the creature.
However, it seems clear that the second argument implies that to whatever the first justice inclines the divine will the second justice does likewise, since it inclines that will definitely after the manner of nature [and hence not freely]; thus it leaves no room for the possibility of the will acting against or beyond what the second justice requires, and so there will be no distinction between those matters where the will could act beyond justice and those where it could not.
[Scotus' own view] Not by way of disparaging these distinctions, I reply with greater brevity to the question that in God there is but one justice, both conceptually and in reality, although by stretching the meaning of "justice" one could say that in addition to the aforesaid
God's Justice r87 justice there is some justice, or rather something just, about the way he deals with creatures.
To explain the first: justice properly speaking represents a habitual state of rectitude of will, and hence as a habit it inclines one in a quasi-natural manner to another or to oneself as quasi-other. Now, the divine will does not have any rectitude that would incline it deterministically to anything other than its own goodness as a quasi-other
(recall that the divine will is related to any other object only contingently, so that as will it has the capacity to will either this or its opposite). From this it follows that there is no justice in God except that which inclines him to render to his own goodness what is its due.
Thus there is also but one act, conceptually and in reality, to which this habit of justice inclines this will. Nevertheless this will-act, in terms of what follows from it, has to do with many secondary objects in the same way as we explained (in Bk. I, dist. 35) that the divine intellect, in addition to its one primary object and act, regards a multiplicity of secondary objects. There is a difference, however, between the intellect there and the will here, because the divine intellect of necessity regards these secondary objects, whereas here the will regards its secondary objects only in a contingent manner. And hence not only is it the case that both there and here neither act depends upon its respective secondary objects, but here the will is not necessarily related to its secondary objects in the way the intellect necessarily knows its secondary objects.
But if we wish to distinguish this one real will-act into many conceptually distinct acts, just as there we distinguish one real intellection into many conceptually distinct acts of knowledge insofar as it has to do with a multiplicity of secondary objects, I say that where the will-act is concerned one cannot even speak of conceptually quasidistinct "justices." In fact we cannot even speak of one justice as regards these multiple secondary objects, howsoever that justice might be distinct or indistinct. The reason is that a habit inclines after the manner of nature and thus limits the respective faculty to but one mode of action, so that it would be repugnant for a potency having such a habit to tend towards the opposite. But there is nothing in the divine will that inclines it specifically to any secondary object in such a way that it would be impossible for it justly to incline towards its opposite. For without contradiction the will could will the opposite, and thus it could justly will such; otherwise it could will something absolutely [i.e., by its absolute power] and not do so justly, which seems incongruous.
And this is what Anselm says in ch. I I of his Proslogion: "Only what you will is just, and only what you do not will is not just." As
God and the Moral Law such, if one postulates in the divine intellect some intellective habit with respect to oneself and to others, one could make a stronger case for a conceptual distinction than in the case at hand, because there the intellect is deterministically inclined to each of the secondary objects, but that is not the case here with the will. Nevertheless, one could say that this single justice, which determinately inclines the divine will to its first act, modifies each of these secondary acts, although not in a necessary manner, as though it could not also modify the opposite of each. Neither does this justice precede the will, as it were, inclining it after the manner of nature to some secondary act; but the will first determines itself in regard to each secondary object.
And by this very fact this act is modified by that first justice, because that act is in ha"rmony with the will to which it is conformed as if the rectitude inclining it this way were the first justice itself.
In this second way God is said to do what is right in a creature from the way he makes one created thing correspond to another (just as we say it is just on the part of the creature that fire be hot and water cold, that fire rise and water descend, and so on), because this created nature demands this as something suited to it-just as we could say in politics that while justice exists as such only in the ruler himself, we could still speak of him as being somehow just in the things he ordains, namely, to the extent that he arranges things in such and such a way, since this is something demanded by the things themselves insofar as they are destined by nature for the use of the citizens.
However, the primary justice intrinsic to God does not determine him to be just in this second way in the same manner that it determines him in regard to his first act, because this primary act [of justice towards himself] does not look to any [created] object or secondary act, because insofar as it looks to such his justice does not incline his will in any necessary manner, as was said.
[Objections] against this:
[I] To begin with, justice can only exist in a will if it inclines the will according to some dictate of prudence, which is the conclusion of a practical syllogism; now, the divine intellect does not reason syllogistically, since it does not think step by step.
[2] Also, the divine intellect first knows of a possible action before the will can will it, and the will cannot disagree with the intellect understanding it; but the intellect apprehends the possible action in a definite way, so that it does not grasp it as an indefinite either/or; therefore the will definitely wills this action in such a way that it cannot will the opposite if it is to will rightly.
[3] Also, if it is just to save Peter, and God justly wills this, then it is
God's Justice unjust to damn Peter, and thus if God can will to do so, he can will something that is unjust.
[Solutions] To the first, I say that if in us there can be another moral virtue inclining the will in accordance with the conclusion of a practical syllogism, all the more so is there in us a practical appetite which inclines in accord with the first practical principle, because this principle is more true, and consequently more correct [than a conclusion therefrom]. Justice, however, which in God is one, both conceptually and in reality, as we said, inclines the will in accord with the first practical principle, namely, "God ought to be loved." But if you want to insist that, strictly speaking, what does not incline in accord with the conclusion of a practical syllogism is not some special virtue, I concede that this justice which God has is only a quasi-universal and root sort of "virtue," from which all particular sorts of rectitude or justice spring, although not in a necessary manner.
To the second, I say that the intellect grasps or knows of some possible action before the will can will it, but it does not apprehend it as something definite that must be done, as if "to apprehend" meant "to dictate." Indeed it is offered to the will as something neutral; after the will makes a definite decision that this is to be done, the intellect consequently grasps as true that this is to be done, as was said in the matter about future contingents in Bk. I, dist. 39, q. I.
Granted that before the will wills something, the intellect apprehends that it should be done {e.g., "God must be loved"} and the will cannot disagree, it still does not follow, however, that it is by natural necessity that the will wills this. For while it cannot disagree about the object, namely, as regards willing or nilling what is shown to it as something it ought to will, the way each tends to that object disagrees, or rather should properly be distinguished. For the intellect tends to it in its way, namely, naturally, whereas the will tends in its own way, namely, freely. And these powers are always in harmony because they always tend to the same object according to their respective manner of doing this, just as the imagination and the intellect do not disagree if the former tends to the object qua singular and the latter to that same object qua universal.
To the third, I say the legislator in matters of state regards something as simply just if it is right for the public good, whereas he regards other, partial rights always in the qualified sense that they do not militate against this unqualified right of the community at large, and therefore in certain cases he sees it is right not to observe just laws concerning these partial rights, namely, when their observation would be detrimental to what is just publicly, namely, to what is in the best
God and the Moral Law interests of the state. In a similar fashion God is determined to do what is just publicly as something right and becoming to his goodness, and to do this not for a group that is just ail aggregation of citizens, but rather for a community whose members are knit together in a far more excellent way. But everything other than what is right for this community is only a partial right that may be just in this case but not in that, depending on how it is ordered to or in harmony with that more basic right.
I say therefore that God could will that Peter be damned and be right to will such, because this particular instance of what is just, viz.,
"Peter is saved," is not necessarily required for what is just for the community in the sense that its opposite could not also be ordered to that same end, namely, what is just for the community as befitting divine goodness. For the attainment of this end, indeed, no being represents a definitely necessary requirement.
[Reply to the Initial Arguments] To the first argument at the beginning I admit there is no simple equality except in God with respect to himself, and hence there is no justice in an unqualified sense except with respect to himself. Therefore, neither is there any unqualified justice with respect to himself as quasi-other. As for the latter, however, there can be a sort of equality such as obtains between a master and a servant whose respective stations differ exceedingly.
To the second I grant that no virtues that imply any imperfection exist there, but only such as can exist without imperfection. This is clear from the example of temperance, since this requires the nature it tempers to be capable of taking immoderate delight in something, and this represents an imperfection. For that reason one could more properly assume that justice is there, because this does not require some passionate excess or some such imperfection, in the way that temperance does. But it is questionable whether [a] justice as it exists in God is a virtue under this precise aspect that it is something formally distinct from the will that plays a quasi-regulatory function or whether
[b] it merely represents the will as determining itself according to some first rule [such as "God should be loved"]. For if the second be the case, then it is easier to answer the argument, because then justice is not present in God precisely as a moral virtue.
To the third, I say that God is no debtor in any unqualified sense save with respect to his own goodness, namely, that he love it. But where creatures are concerned he is debtor rather to his generosity, in the sense that he gives creatures what their nature demands, which exigency in them is set down as something just, a kind of secondary