30. The Sin Of Malice
Sin And if you object: Then the good really did not pursue happiness very well, but only did well to moderate this desire, I reply:
To want an act to be perfect so that by means of it one may better love some object for its own sake, is something that stems from the affection for justice, for whence I love something good in itself, thence
I will something in itself. And thus the good could have wanted happiness so that, by having it, they could love the highest good more perfectly. And this act of wanting happiness would have been meritorious, because they are not using what is to be enjoyed as an end, but are enjoying it, for this good that I covet for myself, I desire in order that I may love that good in itself [Le., God].
Seeing what the angel initially desired inordinately, we can assume he went on to covet for himself some further good, such as superiority over others. Or he could have had an inordinate dislike, such as hating anything opposed to what he wanted, for instance, he could have been unwilling to have happiness in a lesser degree than God himself, or disliked the very existence of God. Or he might have been unwilling to postpone his happiness to the end of his period of probation, or to earn it through merits. Consequently, he was unwilling to submit to God, and to that extent, did not want God to exist. In this his malice appears to have reached its peak, for just as no act is better formally than to love God, so no act is formally worse than to hate God.
30. THE SIN OF MALICE
(Opus oxoniense II, dist. 43, q. 2) In reference to dist. 44 [of Bk. II] the question is raised: Can the created will sin out of malice by willing something that does not have the characteristic of a true (Le., unqualified) good or apparent (or qualified) good?
[Arguments Pro and Can} Here it is claimed on the authority of Dionysius in The Divine Names that "no one acts with an eye for evil."
But this does not seem to be so, because then the created will could not tend towards an object under any aspect other than what the divine will could, for the divine will can tend towards every good underlying that deformity [that is evil], even though the divine will cannot will the evil aspect that accompanies it.
[Body of the Question: Two Opinions} If it be conceded that everything capable of being willed by one will is also able to be willed by the other, since the object of either will is equally extensive, it still does not follow that what is willed orderly by
The Sin of Malice
one is not inordinate for the other, because a well-ordered volition depends not solely on the object, but on whether the act and its object are in harmony with the faculty. For an act towards some object may very well be appropriate for one will [i.e., the divine] but not for the other [i.e., a created will].
This opinion is challenged, however, because hatred of God is conceived by some created power that is not in error, and hence is presented under the aspect not of good but of evil. Now, if the will can will this [hatred], the counterthesis is proved, because there is no goodness in this act prior to the act of willing itself. For if one may assign some good because of the act itself of the will, this is not something that exists in the object prior to the act, but something consequent upon the act of volition. If one cannot will this obvious evil except under some aspect of good and not evil, it follows that either one simply cannot will it or else there is a blinding of reason, which seems inconsistent, and against that argument in Bk. VII of the Ethics about using only the universal premise, and not the particular [when sinning knowingly].
[Solution to the question] If one holds on this question that it is possible to sin out of malice, then it is easy to distinguish a sin against the Holy Spirit from other sins. For the will, because it is joined to the sense appetite, was made to join in its delight, and so if one sins, moved effectively by the inclination of the sense appetite towards its delectable object, one sins out of passion, a sin of infirmity or impotency. This sin is described as against the Father, to whom power is appropriated. The will also requires intellectual knowledge to act, and hence, if reason be in error, it does not will rightly, and its sin of error is said to be one of ignorance against the Son, to whom wisdom is attributed. The third type is a sin of the will on its own, not influenced by sense delight or a mistake of the mind, but out of sheer liberty, and this would be a sin of pure malice, and appropriately described as being against the Holy Spirit, to whom goodness is appropriated.
But even if one does not assume that a created will could will evil under the aspect of evil, one could still assign a sin of certain malice
[as being against the Holy Spirit], viz., when the will, without passion in the sense appetite or error in the mind, freely sins. Now, here is the fullest meaning of sin, for there is nothing other than the will attracting one to evil, but one acts then out of pure malice. Here is as complete and perfect malice as there can be in a sin, since with full liberty and without any external excusing occasion, the sinner chooses for himself a bad volition. However, the malice is not such that the will in sinning tends to evil insofar as it is something evil.
Sin
3 I. LYING
(Ordinatia III, supp!., dist. 38) Regarding dist. 38 [of Bk. III] I ask: Is every lie a sin?
[Arguments Pro and Con} [Arg. I] Genesis 22:[4]: "The boy and I will go on over yonder, and after we have worshiped, we will come back to you" [said Abraham to his servants], but he intended to kill the boy, because he was commanded to do so; therefore he did not intend that the boy would come back with him; hence he said the opposite of what he had in mind; therefore, he lied. But it does not seem probable that he sinned in carrying out this act of obedience for which God commended him.
[Arg. 2] Furthermore, the same point is proved by many other examples, as is clear from Genesis 22:[19] about Jacob, who said he was the firstborn, though he knew this was false.
[Arg. 3] Also, in Genesis 42 and 44 we read of Joseph saying to his brothers: "As Pharaoh lives, you are spies" [42: 16], knowing the opposite to be true. Also, frightening his brothers with the goblet he had hidden in Benjamin's sack, he said he used this goblet for divination.
He was not an augur, however, for it was not licit for those who observed the law of God to practice augury.
[Arg. 4] Furthermore, Rahab lied about those spies referred to in Joshua [2 and 6:25]; Judith also lied, according to the account in Judith [10:12-13], and so did Rachael, when, sitting on the camel cushion under which her father's idols were hidden, she excused herself from rising, saying: "A woman's period is upon me" [Genesis
31: 35]. The midwives also lied, according to Exodus I, when they said the Hebrew women have the art of midwifery [v. 19]. Now, it does not seem that they sinned, nor is it said that they did, for God dealt well with them and built up their families [v. 20]; but God would not have rewarded them with good for doing evil; therefore, etc.
[Arg. 5] Furthermore, simulation in words is not a greater sin than simulation by actions, because actions speak more clearly than words, so that where falsity is found in both, actions seem more blameworthy than words, because falsity in deed represents an even greater pretense of what is in one's mind than does falsity in speech. Now, a lie or simulation in deed is not always a sin, as is clear from the case of King
David, namely, when, in the presence of King Achish, he feigned madness when he was not mad [I Samuel 21 : 14]. Also, Jehu pretended to worship Baal, whose worshipers he wished to destroy [2 Kings
10:18-19]; neither was he blamed for his ruse, but rather he was praised, because he seemed to have zeal for God against Baal.
Lying For the contrary view, we have Augustine's frequent remarks in his book On Lies and the citations from him in the text [of the Master].
Furthermore, every lie is a mortal sin; I prove this because it is against the commandment and law of nature: "Do not do to others what you do not want them to do to you" [Matt. 7:12]; for no one wants to be deceived by his neighbor when his neighbor ought to say what he has in mind; therefore, he should not act otherwise in his regard.
Furthermore, whatever is against some virtue or some act necessary for some virtue is a mortal sin; a lie is this sort of thing, because it is against truth or veracity, which is a virtue that falls under justice. For a truthful person communicates to his neighbor whatever he has conceived in his heart that should be shared with him. But one who lies does not communicate, but rather removes from his speech what ought to be shared, because he speaks for the purpose of communicating his ideas, and by lying he does not express these but asserts the opposite.
Furthermore, to lie is to abuse speech; for as Plato says in the Timaeus: "Words were instituted and imposed that they might become present indices of what we have in mind"; but liars do not use words as indices of such, but of the very opposite; therefore, etc.
Furthermore, the citations from Augustine in the aforementioned books seem to assert this. Look them up.
[Body of the Question] In this question, all commonly hold the conclusion that a lie is a sin, a persuasive argument for which is the reason Augustine gives in his book Against Lying, that it is foolish to believe a person for whom lying is permitted. But one must believe many things, otherwise there would be no sharing of concepts and affections of the mind, and social life among human beings would be destroyed; therefore, in these things which need to be believed, it is not licit to lie.
But different persons give different reasons why lying is illicit.
[Article I: Various Opi";ons Why Lying Is Sinful] [The first view] Some say that a lie is necessarily a sin, because it necessarily turns one away from God, who is truth, and a lie is opposed to truth.
But against this is the fact that a lie is opposed not immediately to the first truth [i. e., God], but to the truth of some particular thing one is talking about. Therefore, just as badness opposed to some created good does not necessarily tum one away from the first uncreated good, so neither does the falsity opposed to some truth that has no relationship to the first truth tum one away from that first truth.
Sin [The second view] Another explanation is that an act is said to be good or evil by reason of its object, which puts it into the generic category of the moral, hence an act's genus is derived from what is potential with respect to its differences. But what first constitutes the generic character of an act as moral, so that it can be further determined by other circumstances as quasi-differences, is the object of the act.
For beyond the natural goodness an act has by reason of what it is, what first determines it as potential ethical material is its object. To the issue, then, it is said that an act that is generically bad never can be good, because no circumstance accruing to it can remove the badness which it has per se by reason of its object, for every circumstance presupposes the object. But to lie is an act that is generically bad, because it deals with matter that is inconsistent with the act in question, for matter suited to the act of speaking should be true or what is believed to be true. The subject matter of a lie, however, is opposed to this.
Refutation of this view. False beliefs are no more inappropriate or illicit matter for speech than is the innocent killing of a human being for the benefit of the state. But granted that all the conditions are the same which make this an illicit matter, namely, killing an innocent person, the act of killing can become licit, for example, if God revokes this precept: "You shall not kill," as was said in the previous question
[about the natural law]. In such a case it may be not only licit but meritorious, for instance, if God were to command one to kill, as he commanded Abraham to kill Isaac. Therefore, by the same token, or by the dialectical rule that what holds good for a lesser excusing reason holds good for a greater, it could also become licit to speak what one believes to be false if the precept of not deceiving one's neighbor were revoked. For the precept of not deceiving is not more binding than the precept of not killing-indeed one's neighbor loses less if occasionally given a false view or if deprived of our true opinion than he would if deprived of bodily life; in fact there is no comparison here.
This is confirmed, because if to lie had the malice necessary to make it become the sort of subject matter [that averts one from God], it would not be prohibited by a precept of the second table, because the second table of the law prohibits only what is bad for our neighbor.
But according to you this is not just an evil that harms our neighbor, because then, as the argument puts it, since it is a lesser evil than killing, it too could fail to be evil, just as killing might be. Would it more possibly be a violation of a precept of the first table? This does not seem probable, because it does not immediately turn one from God, just as the opposite action [Le., telling the truth] about some indifferent matter does not have to do with God as its immediate object.
Lying 30 7 Furthermore, if one who said "He is running" were deceived, so that he believed this to be true, his statement would have to do with the same subject matter as it would were he not deceived, but believed what he said to be false. But one who mistakenly believes he is telling the truth does not sin; therefore, there is no evil here that stems from the very nature of the object.
[The third view] A third explanation says that to lie by its very nature implies a bad intention, because a lie is intended to deceive, and although some acts which do not include a bad intention could be good by reason of some good circumstance, nevertheless an act that includes a bad intention could never be good, because it formally includes bad will; and so it is in the present case.
This can be explained as follows. Although the positive act and its malice do not represent anything that is one per se, a name can still be imposed which signifies not just the act or its deformity, but the whole combination at once. The name "adultery" is imposed to signify not just the natural act of copulation, but also the impropriety that it is not done with one's own spouse. The name "theft" has been imposed to signify nut just the taking of this thing, but also the illegal appropriation of what belongs to another against his will or that of any higher owner. It does not seem that the sort of combinations signified by such names could possibly be good, though it is possible for the underlying act to exist without the deformity, for instance, the act of intercourse or that of appropriating such a thing. Such is the case here. Although the utterance of such and such words with or without such signification could be sinless, nevertheless, to utter them knowing the opposite to be the case, and hence with the intention of deceiving, could not occur without sin, because it implies that in addition to the underlying act there are such circumstances as necessarily deform it. The assumption is evident, because Christ uttered the words "I know him not" without asserting them when he said: "If I were to say: 'I know him not,' I would be like you a liar" Uohn 8:55]. Also a Greek could utter any Latin words, no matter how false, without committing a sin.
[Article 2: What Sort of Sin Is Lying?] Secondly, we must see what kind of sin a lie is, and though lies can be distinguished in many ways, for our purpose the distinction of the pernicious, the officious, and the jocose lie suffices.
I. The pernicious lie is one which harms the one lied to or lied about, and if it harms such so far as the Christian religion is concerned, for instance, in faith or morals, etc., then it is a mortal sin.
However, if it injures one bodily or keeps one from observing conjugal fidelity or separates one from a child or person in any way connected