10. The Source Of Moral Goodness
The Source of Moral Goodness I69
10. THE SOURCE OF MORAL GOODNESS
(Quodlibet, q. 18) [Moral goodness] The moral goodness of an act consists in its having all that the agent's right reason declares must pertain to the act or the agent in acting.
This description is explained as follows: Just as the primary goodness of a being, called "essential" and consisting in the integrity and perfection of the being itself, implies positively that there is no imperfection, so that all lack or diminution of perfection is excluded, so the being's secondary goodness, which is something over and above, or "accidental," consists in its being perfectly suited to or in complete harmony with something else-something which ought to have it or which it ought to have. And these two suitabilities are commonly connected. As an example of the first, health is said to be good for man because it suits him. [As an example of the second] food is called good because it has an appropriate taste. Augustine gives an example of both. "Health without pain or fatigue is good," he says. This refers to the first type of suitability, since health is good for man because it suits him. Then Augustine adds: "Good is the face of a man with regular features, a cheerful expression, and a glowing color." This is an instance of the second, because here the face is called good for having what is appropriate to it.
There is a difference between the two. What suits someone is said to be good for him, that is, for him it is a good or a perfection, but we do not speak of it as being derivatively or actually good in itself. That to which something is appropriate, on the other hand, is called good denominatively because it has what is suited to it. In the first case, the form takes its name from the subject in which it is. As the soul is called "human," so something is called "good for man" because it is a human good. In the second case, the subject gets its designation from the form. Thus we say a man is good because of some good he has.
Now, an act by nature is apt to be in agreement with its agent as well as to have something suited to itself. On both counts, then, it can be called "good" with a goodness that is accidental. This is true in general of a natural act as well, so that this goodness, which consists in having what is appropriate to it, is not only an accidental, but also a natural, goodness.
And either this suitability stems from the nature of the terms or, if it must generally be traced back to the judgment of some intellect (since the intellect is the measure of suitability), this judgment will be that of the intellect which is the rule of the whole of nature, viz., the divine
I7° Moral Goodness intellect. Indeed this intellect, just as it knows perfectly every being, so it knows perfectly the harmony or disagreement of one thing with another.
Furthermore, some agents without intellect and will neither judge nor can judge what is appropriate to their acts. In such a case, what is suitable is determined by natural causes alone, and they incline the agent to act. Or if in addition there be the judgment of some mind and the movement of some will, it would be that of God alone as universal director and mover of the whole of nature. Now, the goodness in the act of an agent without intellect and will is merely natural.
Over and above this general judgment [of God] about the suitability of the action (which concerns alike agents that act with and those that act without knowledge), a general judgment is involved in the case of agents with an intrinsic knowledge of their actions. Those with sense knowledge alone somehow apprehend the suitability of the ob, ject of their action. But whether or not they judge the action appropri, ate, the goodness of the action does not transcend the natural. Others act by virtue of intellectual knowledge, which alone is able to pass judgment, properly speaking, upon the appropriateness of the action.
Such agents are suited by nature to have an intrinsic rule of rectitude for their actions. Only they can have an act whose goodness is moral.
But for this it is not enough that the agent have the ability to ad, judicate the appropriateness of his acts. He must actually pass judg, ment upon the act and carry it out in accord with that judgment. If someone is in error and still acts in accord with the correct judgment of another, he is not acting rightly, for by his own knowledge he was meant to regulate his actions, and in this case he is acting not in ac, cord with it but against it, and hence he does not act rightly. Simi, larly, such an agent elicits the sort of act that lies in his power. Now, he has in his power the sort of act he deliberately elicits, for the power of free choice consists either formally or concomitantly in knowledge and election. And so it appears clear how the moral goodness of the act lies in its suitability judged according to the agent's right reason.
We explain the added qualification "all that must pertain to the act" in this way: Every judgment begins with something certain. Now, the first judgment about the appropriateness cannot presuppose some knowledge determined by another intellect; otherwise it would not be first. Hence it presupposes something certain but judged by this intel, lect, namely, the nature of the agent and the power by which he acts, together with the essential notion of the act. If these three notions are given, no other knowledge is needed to judge whether or not this par, ticular act is suited to this agent and this faculty. For instance, if some,
The Source of Moral Goodness
one knows what man is, what his intellectual powers are, and what an act of understanding is, then it is clear to him that it befits man to understand with his intellect. Since he knows what it means to attain knowledge, it would also be clear to him what it is not appropriate for his mind to reach. Similarly, it is evident from the notions of the nature, the potency, and the act why understanding does not befit the brute, or rather why it is not compatible with his nature. For this first judgment, based precisely on the nature of the agent, the operative power, and the act, reveals not something just ill-matched, i. e., some unbecoming or disorderly connection, but a simple inconsistency, i.e., the absolute impossibility of any such union.
What is more, from these three notions one can conclude what object is appropriate to a given act of a certain agent. Take the act of eating, for example. Food capable of restoring what man has lost would be its appropriate object, whereas a stone or something nourishing for animals but not for man would not be.
This delimitation introduced by the object first brings the act under the generic heading of moral. Not that the nature of its object determines its moral species; rather it opens it to further moral determination, for when an act has an appropriate object, it is capable of further moral specification in view of the circumstances in which it is performed. That is why an act is said to receive its generic goodness from its object, for just as genus is potential with respect to differences, so the goodness derived from its object first puts it into the generic class of moral acts. Only goodness of nature is presupposed. And once it has generic goodness, the way is open to all the additional moral specifications.
The procedure for determining specific goodness, called "goodness from circumstances," is as follows:
The first goodness comes, it seems, from the circumstance of the end, for given the nature of the agent, of the action, and of the object, one immediately concludes that such an action ought to be performed by this agent for such an end, and that it ought to be chosen and wanted for the sake of such an end. This circumstance is characteristic not precisely of the act as actually performed or not, but rather of the act as willed and as related to this end by an act of the will. Indeed, the decision to do something for a worthy purpose is no less good when the external act that ensues fails to achieve that end than when it succeeds.
The next circumstance seems to be the manner in which the action is performed. How it ought to be performed we infer from all or from some of the aforesaid considerations.
Moral Goodness Next comes our conclusion regarding the appropriate time. For a given action done for such a purpose and in such a manner is not always befitting such an agent; it is appropriate only when the act can be directed to or can attain such an end.
Last of all is the circumstance of place. Indeed there are many acts with complete moral goodness in which place plays no part.
It is clear, then, how many conditions right reason sets down, for according to the description given above, to be perfectly good, an act must be faultless on all counts. Hence Oionysius declares: "Good requires that everything about the act be right, whereas evil stems from any single defect." "Everything," he explains, includes all the circumstances.
Objection: Circumstances are relations, whereas good is a quality, according to the Ethics; virtue is also a quality, according to the Categories.
I answer: According to the Physics: "All virtue and malice are relative." That acts are good or virtuous, therefore, implies one or several relations. But like "healthy" or "beautiful," "good" and "virtuous" are spoken of, and predicated, as qualities, and this commonly happens with the fourth type of quality.
[Moral badness] In view of the second part of the citation from Oionysius we ought to look into the source of moral badness in an act.
Badness can be opposed to goodness in an act either privatively or as its contrary. Man is said to be bad in this second sense if he has some vice, for though this implies a privation of a perfection that should be there, a vice is certainly a positive habit. In the other sense, man is said to be bad privatively if he lacks the goodness he ought to have, even if he does not have the contrary vice or vicious habit.
We find this distinction in Boethius where he explains the first characteristic of quality: "They say justice is not contrary to injustice, for they think injustice is a privation and not a contrary state." And he adds in refutation: "Many habits are expressed in privative terms such as 'illiberality' and 'imprudence.' These would never be contrasted with virtues, which are habits, if they themselves were not habits."
Reason also justifies this distinction. For it can happen that an act is performed under circumstances that are not all they should be [to make the act morally good], yet neither are they so improper that they ought not to be there-for instance, when an action is neither directed to an appropriate end nor directed to an inappropriate one. In such a case the act is bad only privatively, not contrarily, as it would be if it were performed for some unlawful purpose. And from many
Degrees of Moral Goodness and Badness
similar acts, a corresponding habit would arise, namely, one whose badness is privative rather than a positive contrary. For example, to give alms, not for a good end, such as the love of God or to help one's neighbor, but not for a bad end either, such as out of vainglory or to hurt someone, is an act of this sort that is privatively, not contrarily, bad.
It is to such privative badness that Dionysius refers when he states that the absence of anyone of the required circumstances suffices to render the act bad. But for it to be bad contrarily there must be some positive circumstance present that involves some deformity.
Briefly, then, just as moral goodness is integral suitability, so moral badness is unsuitability. Privative badness is a lack of suitability, i.e., the absence of what ought to be there, whereas badness as the contrary of goodness is unsuitability as a contrary state, i.e., as some condition that is incompatible with suitability.
[Corollary] From what has been said this corollary follows. The same fundamental act can have a manifold moral goodness. It is not just that it is correct in all its circumstances (something which invests the act not with many goodnesses but with one integral goodness), but it can also have at the same time all that is needed for two distinct virtues, and thus be directed to several ends according to different dictates of perfect prudence. For example, I go to church to fulfill an obligation in justice, because of obedience or some vow. And I also go out of charity or love of God, to pray or worship him. And I also go out of fraternal charity to edify my neighbor. In short, the more morally good motives there are, the better the act is. This is true whether the goodness in question be moral goodness alone or that additional goodness we call meritorious.
In like fashion, badness multiplies if one and the same act violates several dictates of reason.
I I. DEGREES OF MORAL GOODNESS AND BADNESS
(Ordinatio II, dist 7, nn. 28-39) I say that besides volition's natural goodness, which pertains to it as something positive and which is characteristic of any positive thing according to the grade of entity it has (the more the entity, the more the goodness; the less the entity, the less the goodness)-in addition to this there is a threefold moral goodness according to its grade. The first of these is generic goodness; the second goodness could be called virtuous or circumstantial goodness; the third, meritorious or gratuitous goodness or goodness as ordered to a reward by reason of the divine acceptance.
Moral Goodness The first pertains to volition because the object willed is something appropriate to this act, not merely on natural grounds, as sunlight is suited to an act of vision, but according to the dictates of right reason.
This is the first moral goodness, and hence it can be called "generic" because it is as it were the material basis for all further goodness in the category of mores. For an act tending towards the object is formable, as it were, through whatever other moral circumstances there are and thus is quasi-potential-not as something lying completely outside the category of the moral (as would be an [unfree] act in the category of nature), but within the moral category, because it already has something of that genus, namely, an object appropriate to this act [of the will].
The second goodness pertains to volition on this score that the act is elicited by the will under such circumstances as right reason approves of in full. For according to Dionysius in The Divine Names:
"Good requires that everything about the act be right." This is specific moral goodness, so to say, because it has all the moral differences that delimit or specify generic goodness.
The third goodness pertains to the act on this ground that, presupposing the aforesaid twofold goodness, the act is elicited in conformity with the principle or source of merit, which is grace or charity, or in accord with the inclination of charity.
An example of the first goodness would be to give alms; an instance of the second would be to give alms of one's own means to a needy pauper in the proper place and for the love of God. An example of the third would be to perform the aforesaid act not only because of a natural inclination (as a person in the state of innocence might have done, or as perhaps even now an unrepentant sinner moved by natural affection for his neighbor might do), but because of that charity that makes one a friend of God, insofar as God views one's works with favor.
Now, this triple goodness is so ordered that the first is presupposed by the second, but not vice versa; and the second by the third, but not the other way round.
Opposed to this threefold goodness is a threefold badness. The first is generic, namely, when an act with only the natural goodness [of freedom] that would put it into the moral order is bad because its object is inappropriate, for instance, an act of hatred directed to God.
The second is badness that stems from some circumstance that makes the act inordinate, even though it is directed towards an object right reason approves of. The third is the badness that results in demerit.
Each form of badness can occur either as a contrary or as a privation of its corresponding goodness. As a privation, it is merely the lack of
Degrees of Moral Goodness and Badness I75 such goodness. As a contrary, it has in addition to this absence something that is positively inconsistent with this goodness. Boethius makes this distinction clear in the chapter "On Quality" in his work
On the Categories, where he deals with justice. But where generic badness is concerned, badness taken contrarily and privatively are convertible in the sense of being extentionally equivalent. Hence there is no middle ground between lacking goodness and having goodness, so that generic goodness and badness are immediate contraries. And the reason why is that there can be no act that is not directed to some object, and this object has to be either appropriate or inappropriate to the act in question. And so a worthy object makes the act necessarily good generically, whereas an unworthy object makes it generically bad.
But the privative and contrary forms of badness understood in the second way are not equivalent. For some act can lack some circumstance needed for it to be virtuous and yet not be performed in such a way as to become vicious. For example, if someone gives alms to the poor without a good reason, because he does it without considering why he does it, or gives alms when the circumstances required to make it virtuous are not present, such an act is not morally good or virtuous because of the circumstances, and yet it is not contrarily bad, since it is not done for an unworthy purpose such as would be the case where a person gave alms to the poor out of vainglory or for some other unbecoming reason.
The contrary and privative forms of the third type of badness are not extentionally equivalent either, because an act can be privatively bad in the sense that it does not proceed from grace, and nevertheless it need not be demeritorious. This is clear from what was said of the second type, since an act that is only morally good is not meritorious, and nevertheless not every such act is demeritorious. And so it seems there can be indifferent acts in the second way as well as in this third way-acts, namely, which are bad privatively though not contrarily, because they are indifferent. And we shall speak about this indifference elsewhere [namely, in dist. 41]. But it is not only because of its neutrality at the second level that an act is neither good nor bad in the third way, but it could have neither merit nor demerit insofar as these are contraries, because of the state the agent is in-for instance, someone in a state of innocence, without grace, could have acted rightly, and such an act would have been perfectly good in the second way, but not in the third, because the person did not have the principle of meriting, and nevertheless such a one would not be contrarily bad.
But perhaps in our present state there is no act that is neutral in the third way, except in the one case where an act is good by reason of