24. Are the moral virtues connected?
Introduction natural reason alone does not show clearly enough what intellectual and what appetitive virtues there are other than these. But one may reasonably hold
. . . that besides these there is a necessity for that cognitive habit and that appetitive habit which the Catholic Church says is necessary, and by faith we hold that three theological virtues are necessary, and that they perfect the soul immediately with respect to the uncreated object [God).
Scotus divides his discussion into two articles, the first dealing with the virtues, the second with gifts, beatitudes, and fruits. The treatment of the first is almost purely philosophical, and is noteworthy for Scotus' conception of "generic virtue" and how the distinction of "irascible and concupiscible" appetites is to be understood. The second portion, since it treats of the relationship of the various supernatural gifts to the virtues, is obviously more theological. Nevertheless, what he says there throws considerable light on how Scotus, as a philosopher, in the tradition of Aristotle, understood the moral virtues.
The discussion in both articles is relatively clear and straightforward.
The Latin text translated here is from the supplement to Ordinatio III, dist. 34, and represents a revision of the Wadding reprint edition
(XV, pp. 464-575) based on Codex A (ff. 175vb-77rb) and Codex S (ff.206vb-18vb).
24. Are the moral virtues connected?
Lattin (1954, pp. 551-666) has traced the origin of this question and the various answers given to it by the scholastics. He sees the systematic treatise on the virtues by William of Auxerre, written around
1220, as first raising this question of the acquired virtues as distinct from the infused moral virtues given at baptism. William argues that if acts of temperance could exist without acts of fortitude, obviously the corresponding habits or virtues are not necessarily connected. However, many Fathers of the Church, including St. Bernard, following the classical philosophers like Seneca and Cicero, praised the harmonious interconnection of all the virtues. Thus Master Peter Lombard, in dist. 36 of his third book of the Sentences, credits Saints Jerome and Augustine with the idea that they are somehow one. For Jerome had written in the beginning of ch. 56 of his Commentary on Isaiah: "All the virtues hang together, so that if one is lacking, all are. Hence, one who has one virtue has them all." And Peter quotes Augustine in praise of charity in these words:
Where charity is, what could be wanting? But where it is not, what else could be of any value? Why then should we not say that he who has this virtue, has all the virtues, since charity represents the complete fulfillment of the law?
The Intellectual and Mcrral Virtues
The more it is in a man, the more is that individual endowed with virtue, and the less charity he has, the less virtue he possesses, and the less virtue is in him, the more he has of vice.
The scholastic theologians were loath to repudiate this traditional position completely. Around 1230 Philip the Chancellor found a solution. He distinguished between a broad sense of the cardinal virtues and a narrow sense; in the broad sense, for example, temperance is a necessary prerequisite for any virtue, since virtue has traditionally been recognized as a middle position between two extremes. The same is true of fortitude, prudence, and justice, for any virtue enables one to face a difficult situation with courage, and to act in a way that is both prudent and just. In the narrow sense, however, a cardinal virtue is defined by its object, namely, some formal specific good; in this sense temperance designates a moderation of the passions of the concupiscible appetite; fortitude is concerned with the irascible appetites; justice with rendering to each his due. Odo Rigaud, Bonaventure, Albert the Great, and others adopted this opinion. But when the complete translation of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics became available shortly after 1245, the problem was presented in a new way. The four cardinal virtues are no longer treated as a block, but "moral virtue" refers to the three that reside in the appetitive faculties (justice, temperance, and fortitude) and these are distinguished from the virtue of prudence, which resides in the practical intellect. The Aristotelian solution is no moral virtue without prudence, and no prudence without moral virtue. It is in this way that the four cardinal virtues are interconnected.
But this view did not totally replace the older view which envisaged the connection of the virtues among themselves; the two coexisted throughout the second half of the thirteenth century. Many combined the two views, like Aquinas, who distinguished between the imperfect and the perfect state of a moral virtue (Summa theologiae IaIIae, q. 65, art. I). In the imperfect state "moral virtue is nothing but an inclination in us to do some kind of good deed, whether such an inclination be in us by nature or by habituation." Here there is no connection.
But "the perfect moral virtue is a habit that inclines us to do things well, and if we take moral virtues in this way we must say they are connected." Aquinas gives two reasons, one the argument of Philip the Chancellor that if we look to the general properties, we discover a connection; the other reason is based on the Aristotelian thesis "No moral virtue without prudence, no prudence without moral virtue."
Towards the end of the century those who sought to defend the Aristotelian thesis introduced a distinction between two forms of prudence
Introduction similar to that in regard to moral virtue. One form of prudence was particular; it was proper not only to each moral virtue, but also to the concrete differences between acts falling under each of these virtues.
The other form of prudence was general, viz., that which unifies all human activity in view of man's unique final end, that common end towards which all moral virtue is directed.
Around 1280 Henry of Ghent, however, adopted a particularly vulnerable thesis. As for the patristic claim of the connection of the virtues among themselves, he distinguishes various stages and substages in the acquisition or formation of a virtuous habit. In the first two, i. e., the inchoative stage, or where the virtue exists only to a mediocre degree, there is no connection between the moral virtues. Only where the virtue has been developed to perfection, in the third stage, or where it is truly heroic, in the fourth stage, is there any connection.
Scotus divides his treatment of the question into four articles, in the first three of which he seems to have Henry of Ghent mainly in mind:
In this question there are many articles, the first of which concerns the interconnection of the specific moral virtues among themselves on the basis of whether they are species of the same or different genera; the second article treats of the connection of each of the moral virtues with prudence; the third, of the link between the moral and the theological virtues; and the fourth article, of the nexus between the theological virtues themselves.
The second article is subdivided on the basis of the two meanings of "prudence": one dealing with prudence as a particular virtue directed to a specific sort of moral action; the other, with prudence as a general or generic virtue.
The third and fourth articles seem to have been occasioned by the fact that the quotation from St. Augustine Peter Lombard cites in his
Sentences apparently refers to the infused or theological virtue of charity. Once Scotus has clarified his views on the first two articles, he is in a position to show that the "moral virtues do not require the theological virtues in order to be perfect as regards their own specific nature, though without such, they do not have that further extrinsic perfection they could have." The theological virtues, infused as they are, e.g., in baptism of an infant, obviously do not necessarily impart acquired moral virtue. Neither are the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity necessarily connected, since-according to the Scriptures-in heaven "the habits and acts of charity exist without the habits and acts of faith and hope." Even in this life, one who sins mortally can lose sanctifying grace or charity and yet retain the virtue of faith or hope.
The Intellectual and Moral Virtues As for the first article-namely, the connection of the moral virtues among themselves-Scotus takes on Henry of Ghent as his principal protagonist, but also touches briefly on what seems to be Aquinas' solution, though he generalizes and applies what Aquinas says of prudence to all the virtues. Neither view seems to be sufficient to justify a necessary connection of the acquired moral virtues. Hence-as Lottin points out-Scotus breaks completely with Philip the Chancellor's defense of the Fathers of the Church, and denies categorically that there is any necessary connection among the acquired moral virtues, whether one treats of them particularly or generically.
I concede there is no connection either of the generically different moral virtues, commonly referred to as justice, fortitude, and temperance, or of the even more general types I distinguished earlier [i.e., in selection 23), namely, those disposing one's affects towards self and others respectively.
For this opinion one can argue persuasively as follows. While virtue is a perfection of man, it does not represent complete perfection, for then one moral virtue would suffice. But when something has several partial perfections, it can be simply perfect according to one perfection and simply imperfect according to another, as is apparent in the case of a man, who has many organic perfections, and can have one in the highest degree, and not have another; for example, someone may be disposed in the highest way as to sight and touch but lack any hearing. Someone can possess the highest degree of perfection in matters of temperance and not have the perfection required as regards another perfection, and consequently can be simply temperate also in regard to any act of temperance, although he is not brave. But one is not simply a moral person without all the virtues, just as one is not simply sentient without all one's senses. But this does not make one less perfectly temperate because one is less perfectly moral, just as one's vision or hearing is no less acute because one is less perfectly sentient in other ways.
He goes on to discuss how the points Henry brought up that seem to be true could be explained in terms of the above.
As for the second article, viz., the connection of each moral virtue with prudence, Scotus asks whether it is a specific or a generic virtue of prudence one is speaking of. If one is speaking of particular prudence, one can admit only the first half of the Aristotelian solution proper (viz., no moral virtue without prudence). Moral virtue does require a measure of prudence. Hence Scotus will admit that "what is necessary is not conformity of one moral virtue to another, because no one is the rule for the other, but conformity of each moral virtue to prudence." And he goes on to acknowledge the probability of the view that one morally good act can produce both a moral habit of virtue in the will and, at the same time, a particular prudential habit in the
Introduction intellect. But he is particularly concerned to show that the prudential choice is not limited to the means to an end, but may also refer to a particular end that represents the aim of a particular moral virtue.
As for the second part of the Aristotelian solution (viz., no prudence without moral virtue), Scotus wants to defend the freedom of the will to choose the opposite of what right reason dictates and, by its control over the intellect (see selection 3), the will's ability to turn the intellect's consideration to sophistical reasons or to irrelevant matters-Hlest that actual displeasure remain that consists in that remorse for choosing the opposite of what one knows to be right."
Hence, his general conclusion as regards particular prudence:
This habit, generated by correct judgments, whether about the means to an end or about the ends themselves (at least certain particular ones which are properly speaking the ends of distinct moral virtues and where perhaps there is no other judgmental habit about such ends), is prudence, even though a correct choice does not follow. . . But the converse relationship is different, for no choice can be morally right unless it is conformed to some rule or measure, which is a correct dictate. Such a right dictate, however, is suited by nature to generate prudence, even though this prudence refers only to this particular matter. Therefore, one can concede the existence of the converse connection, since a moral virtue cannot exist without there being a prudential habit concerned with its respective matter.
As for the connection of all moral virtues with one general or generic prudential habit that comprises all the particular "prudences,"
Scotus concludes:
How all these "prudences" form one habit and how all habits of geometry pertain to one universal science has been explained in my first question on Bk. VI of the Metaphysics, for one should understand this not as a formal but as a virtual unity. Just as a habit which is about a first subject is formally one by reason of that subject, and is virtually concerned with all those things contained in that first subject, though it is not formally about them, so this habit, which is formally about some end of certain actions, is virtually, but not formally, concerned with all of these possible actions, the practical knowledge of which is virtually included in that end. And so, by extending the name
"prudence" to that habit which is an understanding of first practical principles, that prudence, which is formally one in itself, is virtually concerned with all the virtues.
This reference to his Metaphysics is one of two Scotus makes in this question. Lottin, on the basis of his study of manuscripts other than
Codex A where Scotus treats of this problem of the connection of virtues, was of the opinion that Scotus' revision of his earlier lectures extended to at least this distinction in the third book, if not further.