5. The Will And Its Inclinations
PART II The Will and Its Inclinations
5. THE WILL AND ITS INCLINATIONS
(Ordinatio III, suppl., dist. 46) According to Anselm, two affections may be assigned to the will, namely, the affection for justice and the affection for the advantageous.
He treats of these extensively in The Fall of the Devil, ch. 14, and The Harmony of God's Foreknowledge, Grace, and Predestination, ch. 19.
The affection for justice is nobler than the affection for the advantageous, understanding by "justice" not only acquired or infused justice, but also innate justice, which is the will's congenital liberty by reason of which it is able to will some good not oriented to self. According to the affection for what is advantageous, however, nothing can be willed save with reference to self. And this we would possess if only an intellectual appetite with no liberty followed upon intellectual knowledge, as sense appetite follows sense cognition. The only point I wish to make from this is the following. To love something in itself [or for its own sake] is more an act of giving or sharing and is a freer act than is desiring that object for oneself. As such it is an act more appropriate to the will, as the seat of this innate justice at least. The other act [of wanting something for oneself] pertains to the will inasmuch as it has an affection for the advantageous.
From this it follows that just as these affections are distinct in the will, so also the habits inclining one to these acts will be distinct.
That is why I say that charity perfects the will insofar as it is inclined to, or subject to, the affection for justice, whereas hope perfects the will insofar as it is inclined to, or subject to, the affection for what is advantageous. And so charity and hope will be distinct virtues not