19. On Marriage And Bigamy
The Moral Law in General
19. ON MARRIAGE AND BIGAMY
(Ordinatio IV, dist. 33, q. I) In regard to the thirty-third distinction [of Bk. IV] I raise a question first about bigamy and then about divorcing one's wife. On the first subject I ask, so far as the Mosaic law or the law of nature is concerned, was bigamy ever licit, or were the patriarchs of old allowed to have several wives joined in the bonds of matrimony?
[Arguments Pro and Can} [For the negative view]:
[Arg. I] To the first question, it is argued that bigamy was not permitted, because it is against the law of nature. Proof of this is found [a] in those words of Genesis 2:24: "They shall be two in one flesh," which express the law of nature about matrimony; hence there cannot be more than two; [b] in one of the interlinear glosses on Genesis 4: 19 about Lamech, "who took two wives," etc., where he is presented as the first to introduce bigamy and as doing so in violation of the law of nature.
[Arg. 2] What is more, a woman is never allowed to have two husbands; neither, then, is it lawful for a man to have two wives. The entailment is proved from the fact that so far as the conjugal debt is concerned, each spouse has equal rights according to Paul's first
Epistle to the Corinthians, ch. 7 [vv. 2-5].
[For the positive view]:
Against this view is the fact that Abraham had Sara, Agar, and Keturah (Genesis, chs. 16 and 25); Jacob had two wives (chs. 29 and 30); and David had many wives and concubines, according to 2 Kings 5
[i.e., 2 Samuel 5:13-16]. Now, it is hardly probable that these holy patriarchs were doing anything wrong in entering into these unions.
Therefore, etc.-Also, there is that text from Augustine's Good of Marriage, near the end [i.e., ch. 25], where he explains that "the just patriarchs did not make sinful use of their many wives, nor did they sin against nature, but did what they did for the sake of progeny; nor was there anything contrary to the law or to mores, for at that time there was no law prohibiting polygamy."
[Body of the Question1 Here we must see: (I) what strict commutative justice demands of the marriage contract, and this [a] on the part of those entering into the contract and [b] further on the part of the superior [or lawgiver];
(2) what suffices after the Fall so far as this matter is concerned. And here the question is asked, what is needed to make [bigamy or polygamy] completely just?
On Marriage and Bigamy
[Article I: What Commutative Justice Requires of the Marriage Contract] About the first, I say that in every exchange on the part of those who make the exchange and from the standpoint of what they exchange, strict justice requires that, as far as possible, what is exchanged be of equal value in terms of the purpose for making the exchange. In the case of the matrimonial contract, there are two reasons for the exchange: one, the procreation of offspring; the other, a remedy against fornication. As regards the first purpose, the male body is of more value than the female, for the same man could fecundate several women during the time it takes for the same woman to conceive through men.
Therefore, so far as strict justice in regard to this end goes, bigamy would seem to be licit, so that a man could make a bodily exchange with as many women as could be fecundated in the way it is possible for a man to do so. Hence, it would not be a violation of nature if, in certain other situations, one male had several females; but this was not the case in the state of innocence, where matrimony was and would have been strictly a duty of one's state, and when to have several wives would have been bigamous. For a man had no need to share his body with several women to procreate many children. The simple exchange between one man and one woman would have sufficed for reproduction, since neither man nor woman would have been sterile then.
As for the second purpose, which only held good for the state of fallen nature, namely, to avoid fornication, the bodies of man and woman are of equal value. Therefore, so far as strict justice in the state of fallen nature goes, this contract, if both ends are considered, demands a one-to-one exchange of bodies. I add that there is complete justice in this exchange of rights only because of the authority of the superior who instituted or approved of such and such an exchange.
Although some things belong to their owners, still what determines whether such and such an exchange is licit depends on the legislator, and this is true even more so as regards the mutual bodily exchange in the presence of a legislator who is God. But he has ordained as the rule both for the state of innocence and for that of fallen nature that this bodily exchange be one-for-one, and therefore it is only in such a way that justice in full is to be found.
[Article 2: How Is Justice Preserved If Bigamy Is Permitted?] About the second article, I say that a dispensation is either a clarification of the law or a revoking of the law. For God could have either clarified his law concerning this exchange or revoked it in a particular case, and he could have done so reasonably where a greater good would result from its revocation than from its observance. But at a
2IO The Moral Law in General time when members of the human race needed to be multiplied either in an unqualified sense or with reference to divine cult, since there were few who worshiped God, it was necessary that those who did so, beget as much as they could, since only in their progeny would faith and divine worship continue to exist. At such a time, then, God reasonably gave a dispensation so that one man might share his body with those of several women to increase the number of those who worshiped God, something which would not have occurred otherwise.
Now, Abraham and certain other patriarchs, presumably, were dispensed in this way.
How justice is preserved here, so far as the contracting parties go, is explained in this way. When there are two reasons why something is ordered, one the principal purpose, the other a less important end, it is reasonable to make use of such in a manner that favors the chief end, even if this militates to some extent against the less important purpose. Food, for example, contributes to both pleasure (which is less important) and nutrition (which is more important). According to right reason, then, food should be used in such a way as to serve the interests of nutrition, even though this should produce less pleasure.
Now, this marriage contract to render the carnal debt has as its main purpose the good of having offspring and as its less important end the avoidance of fornication. Right reason, then, dictates that those who enter into such a contract do so in such a way that the primary interests of procreation are given greater value even if rendering the debt when desired is given lesser value. But this takes place in a contractual exchange involving the body of one man and those of several women. Just as this is what ought to be done, absolutely speaking, so too in cases of necessity. That is to say, when it is extremely necessary that the primary end be attained, this must be done, in which case the secondary end should be neglected, as it were. And so it is clear how there is justice for both parties to the marital contract, because each ought to be willing, according to right reason, to surrender something he or she has a right to as regards the less important end in view of the fact that each receives an equal good as regards the more important end-an end that should be desired more, even if one party should have to sacrifice something in exchange to obtain it. And at times it would be necessary to do so, namely, when one is obligated to make such a sacrifice. And this would be completely licit and it ought to be done when this has been ordered by one's superior [Le., God, the lawgiver]. This is evident from Genesis 16, for Sara, as it were, forced
Abraham to have intercourse with Agar, her handmaid, that he might have a son by her servant, which he could not have from Sara herself.
On Marriage and Bigamy 2 I I If you object that in our own day this would be bigamy and would be illicit, I reply: It would be unlawful now, as there is no present dispensation by the lawgiver. Indeed, that law of nature, "They shall be two in one flesh," was restored through Christ (Matthew 19). Nevertheless, the reason it is not licit, speaking of justice on the part of the contract and contracting parties, stems from the fact that the principal end does not require it at present, since, of the faithful, many are dispensed from procreating entirely, and all the children of the faithful are schooled in the worship of God and receive a religious education.
Therefore, without such a polygamous contract the faith is increased.
But now, since the need to sacrifice the secondary end for the sake of the primary end no longer exists, the marital contract must be observed in such a way that justice is preserved as regards both ends, and this is best done when one man marries one woman.
But in case a multitude of men fell through war, the sword, or pestilence, while a multitude of women remained, bigamy could become licit even now, if one considers only precise justice on the part of the contract and contracting parties. And also women in contracting with men ought to be willing to give more in return for less as regards the secondary end for the sake of receiving equal for equal as regards the primary end. And in such a case according to right reason a woman should be willing that her man be joined to another woman that childbearing may occur. All that would be wanting for complete justice would be divine approbation, which perhaps would then occur and be revealed in a special way to the Church.
[Reply to the Initial Arguments] To the arguments [for the negative view]:
To the first I say (as I pointed out above in dist. 17) that something is said to be of the natural law in two ways, viz., first, what is simply a practical truth known py the natural light of reason alone. Here a practical principle known from its terms represents the strongest form of such a law of nature, only second to which are those conclusions demonstrated from such primary principles. What pertains secondarily to the law of nature, however, is anything that as a general rule is in harmony with a law of nature in the previous sense. There is no dispensation as regards the first class, and therefore anything opposed to such would always seem to be a mortal sin. But for the secondary type, dispensation occurs in a situation where the opposite seems to be generally more in harmony with the primary law of nature. And it is just in this secondary sense of natural that monogamy pertains to the law of nature and bigamy is opposed to such, and hence I concede the validity of the proofs from Genesis 2 and from the Ordinary Glosses on Genesis 4. But from this it does not follow that in a special case the