13. Morally Indifferent Acts
Moral Goodness ness arises from the appropriate way the act is related to the end. This appropriate relationship stems from the fact that the act is elicited by charity. One can explain the authorities cited in this way, namely, meritorious goodness does stem from the end.
As for the second, I say that so far as an act of understanding goes, the effective cause, inasmuch as it is a function of the intellect or a habit of the intellect, is a cause that acts naturally [and not freely].
Neither can it act otherwise than the object allows, and that is why it always acts correctly. But the will does not always act in such a way that it is conformed to the object, because it is a free agent and not a natural cause. Consequently, when there is rectitude on the part of the principal portion of the moving cause [which is the will] the whole action becomes righteous, but this is not something that is here because of the intention.
As for the third objection, I say that while this one goodness does unite in itself all that is becoming to the act, it does not stem from any one thing, any more than in the case of bodily beauty.
13. MORALLY INDIFFERENT ACTS
(Ordinatio II, dist. 41) As for the forty-first distinction [of Bk. II], this question i.s raised:
Could any act of ours be indifferent?
[Arguments Pro and Can] For the negative: between possession and privation there is no medium; good and evil are privatively opposed; therefore, etc. The major is evident from Bk. V of the Metaphysics, where the point is made that privative opposites are contradictorily opposed in something which is suited by nature to have one of them. But between contradictories there is no medium, according to Bk. IV of the Metaphysics.
Furthermore, habits result from actions. If there were some midpoint between good and evil, there would be some habit that is neither good nor evil.
To the contrary is Ambrose's statement cited in the text [of Peter Lombard]: "It is your motive which gives the name to your work." If there were no act that was of itself indifferent, it could not become good per se by one act and bad per se by another.
[Body of the Question] [St. Bonaventure's opinion] Here it is claimed that while no particu-
Morally Indifferent Acts I79 lar act is indifferent, acts in general are indifferent. Look it up in Bonaventure.
[Scotus' own view] One could say that the case is different where moral goodness or evil and where meritorious good or demeritorious evil are concerned.
[Moral goodness] As for the first type of goodness or badness, comparing it to a natural act, one could, it seems, find an indifferent act, namely, when-in relation to all its causes-it is of a determinate species in the category of nature, it could still be indifferently related to moral goodness or evil. This is proved first from the Philosopher in II Ethics: "The habit of justice is not produced by doing what the just do, but by doing such things in the way that the just do them." The first sort of act is not morally good, because it does not proceed from virtue. The same would hold even for acts elicited after virtue is acquired, for just because the will possesses a virtue this does not mean it must necessarily use it at all times, but it may be used only when passion becomes so violent that it would subvert reason if one did not make use of the virtue.
[Meritorious goodness] Speaking of this second type of goodness or evil, it seems there could also be something in between a good and a bad act. For given the existence of moral goodness, as was pointed out in the preceding question, merit seems to be a relationship to an end that ought to be there, a relationship that stems from the existence of charity in the agent. Now, an act can be referred through charity to its end in three ways: (I) Actually, as is the case where one is actually thinking of the end and loving it. (2) Virtually, which is the case when from a knowledge and love of the end one has come to will this means to that end-for example, from a knowledge and love of God in the higher portion of the soul, the lower portion considers doing some act, for instance, of penance, and afterwards carries out such an act voluntarily, but does not refer it to the end because at that time one is not actually thinking of or loving the end. (3) Habitually-for instance, every act, able to be referred to the end so long as charity
(which is the basis for the referral) remains, may be said to be habitually referred to the end.
Also there are three ways in which we may sayan act is not referred to its end. [4] One would be in an absolutely negative way, because it is not referred either actually or virtually. [5] Another way is privatively, because it is not suited by nature to be referred, as would be the case with a venial sin, for though it could coexist with charity, it is not suited by nature to be referred to such an end by means of charity.
[6] A third way would be contrarily, namely, where the act destroys
IBo Moral Goodness the principle of reference, namely, charity, as would be the case where the act is mortally sinful.
In the last two cases, namely, of venial and mortal sin, it is certain that the act in question is evil. As for the first two cases [of actual and virtual reference], it is certain that the first is meritorious and suffi~ ciently probable that the second is also. As for the two middle types, namely, where the act is referred to the end only habitually or not at all, it is doubtful whether such an act is meritorious or venially sinful
(for it cannot be mortally sinful) or whether such an act is just in~ different. If one claims it is either of the first two alternatives, it would seem that a man continually in the state of grace would either con~ tinually merit or continually sin either mortally or at least venially, since there are many such acts which he elicits continually and which are neither actually nor virtually referred in the aforesaid way.
For that reason it seems probable that we should assume such acts to be indifferent because they do not seem to be sufficiently malicious to be venial sins, since it is possible that there is nothing disorderly about them to make them sins. For man is not bound, either under pain of mortal sin or under pain of the lesser venial sin, to always refer his action to God either actually or virtually, because God does not oblige us to do this. But neither does there seem to be sufficient goodness in these acts for them to be meritorious, since it seems unlikely that any relation less than a virtual reference would suffice for merit.
There are many indifferent acts, therefore, which are such not merely because of the being they have as a specific nature, but also according to the being they have as something moral. And there are also acts that are indifferent as regards the goodness that is meritorious or the evil that is demeritorious, for one individual good can be of this sort and another of that sort. Many individual elicited acts can also be indifferent, because they are neither the meritorious sort nor the other, and we are not speaking here of nonhuman acts, such as stroking the beard or brushing off a bit of straw and suchlike, acts which originate with the sense imagination and not from any free impulse, for freely elicited acts may also be indifferent.
[Reply to the Initial Arguments] As for the first argument, I say that where moral goodness and bad~ ness or meritorious goodness and demeritorious badness are concerned, you do not have the privative opposition between acts. For an act is not evil solely because it lacks this or that goodness, but only if it lacks some goodness that it should have. Not every act, however, is required to have such moral or meritorious goodness.