26. Love of God and neighbor
Introduction intensity of only two will be able to love with an intensity of four, whereas a more perfect will capable of loving naturally with an intensity of eight will be able, with charity, to love with an intensity of sixteen. Hence, by not having charity the more perfect will will lose eight possible degrees in the intensity of its capacity to love, whereas the less perfect will will lose only two degrees, arithmetically speaking. Scotus' point in brief is that even though without charity the less perfect will might-with greater natural effort-equal the capacity of will with less effort to will (for instance, one that ordinarily wills with an intensity of four or eight), nevertheless that same natural effort, arithmetically speaking, would be immensely increased proportionally were infused charity present. Hence, speaking simply or in an unqualified sense, the more perfect the will's natural capacity to love
God is, the more it has to gain by having charity.
Apart from increasing the natural capacity of the will to love, charity also is responsible for a morally good act becoming meritorious, i.e., meriting an increase in grace or charity in this life and beatitude in the life to come. Since this refers to the supernatural order, namely, the capacity to share more intensely in the inner life of God through acts of love, it is a gratuitous gift dependent on what God freely deigns to give as a reward for loving him. In Ordinatio I, dist. 17, n. 129 (Vatican ed. V, pp. 202-3), Scotus explains that over and above the added intensity a habit like charity imparts to one's act of love of God, the habit also serves as a lasting mark in the soul, even when it is not eliciting an act of love. Charity indicates that the nature possessing it
"is formally accepted by God as habitually able to be beatified and that the acts elicited with its help are accepted as meritorious." Using Augustine's simile comparing the will to a horse and habitual grace or charity to its rider, Scotus explains that the horse is free to throw its rider (destroy charity through mortal sin) or it may not follow the guidance of the rider (and then its actions are not meritorious, but are either indifferent or venially sinful) or, thirdly, it may choose to follow where charity leads (and then its action is meritorious) (ibid., n. 155, p. 213). It is with this simile in mind that Scotus can say here that "as for this added circumstance, that the act has the special character of being accepted by God, this is something due principally to charity and less so to the will."
26. Love of God and neighbor In this second of the three distinctions devoted to infused charity,
Scotus raises the question: "Is it by the same habit by which we love God that we are bound to love our neighbor?" What prompts the question is that, according to the first epistle of St. John (4:21), "the
The Love of God, Self, and Neighbor
commandment we have from [Christ] is this: Whoever loves God must also love his brother," yet charity as a theological virtue has God as its formal object. Hence, in the first article, Scotus aims to explain how this habit whereby God is loved refers to our neighbor as well. His second article is devoted to answering the question: "Who is my neighbor ?"
In answer to the first question, "How does charity towards God refer to neighbor?" Scotus recalls his earlier discussion of the nature and function of the supernatural habit of charity (Ord. I, dist. 17), and uses Richard of St. Victor's definition of perfect love to solve the paradox of how love of God entails love of neighbor.
To the first I say, as in dist. 17 of the first book, that charity is defined as the habit by which we hold God to be dear. Now, it could be that someone is considered dear because of some private love where the lover wants no colovers, as is exemplified in the case of jealous men having an excessive love of their wives. But this sort of habit would not be orderly or perfect. Not orderly, I say, because God, the good of all, does not want to be the private or proper good of any person exclusively, nor would right reason have someone appropriate this common good to himself. Hence, such a love or habit, inclining him to this good as exclusive to himself and not to be loved or had by another, would be an inordinate love. Neither would it be perfect, because one who loves perfectly wants the beloved to be loved by others, as is clear from Richard [of St. Victor) ... Therefore, God, in infusing the love by which all tend towards him in a perfect and orderly way, gives this habit by which he is held dear as a good that is to be loved by others as well. Thus this habit which regards God in himself, inclines also to this, that he be loved by another, at least by anyone whose friendship he is pleased to have, or whose friendship is pleasing to him . . .
From this it is clear how the habit of charity is one, because it does not refer to a plurality of objects, but regards as its primary object God alone insofar as he is good and is the first good. Secondarily, it wills that God be loved by anyone whose love is perfect and directed to loving him as he is in himself, for this is what perfect and orderly love of God means. And in so loving, I love both myself and my neighbor out of charity, viz., by willing that both of us love God in himself. And this is something that is simply good and an act of justice. Thus the first object of charity is only God in himself; all the others, however, are certain intermediate objects. They are objects of quasireflex acts by means of which one tends to the infinite good, who is God. It is the same habit, however, that has to do with both direct and reflex acts.
The second article discusses the problem "Who is my neighbor?" with reference to this supernatural infused habit. Scotus explains:
My neighbor is anyone whose friendship is pleasing to the beloved, namely, anyone by whom God would want to be loved. But I am not obligated ra-
Introduction tionally to want that the one loved above all be loved also by one by whom he does not care to be loved, or whose love is not pleasing to him.
This qualification is understandable if we realize that Scotus is speaking of a love of neighbor that stems exclusively from the infused virtue of charity. For it is only under this aspect that, at the close of this question, he can answer the initial arguments against his position.
If one loves God, not for God's own sake or out of an affection for justice, but only because he represents a good for the lover, then that sort of love stems rather from the affection for the advantageous.
While such love is something good, since it is based on our God-given needs, at the supernatural level it is reinforced by the virtue of hope, rather than charity. In qualifying the scope of charity, then, Scotus does not have this less perfect sort of love in mind. He goes on to say:
Since it is certain that the love of the blessed in heaven is pleasing to him, however, it follows that I must want God to be loved by them in an unqualified sense. Since in this life, however, there is some doubt as to any specific individual" I ought to want such to love God conditionally, namely, if it pleases God to be loved by him or to be loved now or whenever it pleases God to be so loved. As for pilgrims in this life in general, since one must always presuppose there are some whose love is pleasing to God, or not displeasing to him, one can will absolutely that God be loved by them also. I ought not will that God be loved by the damned, the devils, or also those displeasing men who are blind to him.
This last observation about the damned, the devils, and those displeasing men who are blind to him is found only in Codex A. While it may sound strange or even paradoxical, it is a logical consequence of what Scotus has been saying about the extent and the limitations of the infused virtue of charity. Since this has God and his interests as its primary aim, it can extend to ourselves or others only if what we will for these is pleasing to God. If our love of God prompts us to pray even for sinners, then, it is only under the aspect that this is not displeasing to him. For, like God, we ought not "derive any pleasure from the death of the sinner," but "rather rejoice when he turns from his evil way that he may live" (Ezechiel 18:23). But, according to Scotus at least, love of neighbor under this aspect would seem to fall under the scope of more the infused virtue of hope than the infused virtue of charity.
The Latin source is from the supplement to Ordinatia Ill, dist. 28, and is a revision of the Wadding reprint ed. (XV, pp. 377-85) based on Codices A (f. I72rb-vb) and S (f. 2I2rb-vb).