31. Lying
r06 Introduction presence of evil it is still free to hate or tum away from it or not, but it is not free to love it.
In the present question he raises the deeper issue of whether something evil can be willed for its own sake, and leaves the question open.
Later in a supplement to Ordinatio IV, dist. 49, q. 10 (art. 2), he resolves the question. That question reads: "Is everything that is desired, desired because of happiness?" ("Utrum omnia quae appetuntur, appetantur propter beatitudinem") and was presented earlier in selection 7.
The present question is taken from the Ordinatio II, dist. 43, q. 2, reconstructed with the help of three manuscripts, listed by the Scotistic Commission as A, P, and S.
31. Lying In dist. 38 of Bk. III of the supplement to the Ordinatio, Scotus asks:
"Is every lie a sin?" He may well have been reading St. Bonaventure, who in Sentences III, dist. 38, q. 2 (Opera omnia, Quaracchi ed. III, p. 843) begins his response in almost the same way as Scotus, indicating that all the doctors concur in asserting that every lie is a sin, but it is difficult to find the reason why this is so. However, he says, we shall attempt to do so by setting forth the various theories that have been suggested. The first is identical with that mentioned by Scotus, and Bonaventure shows its inadequacy in almost the same words as the subtle Scot. He goes on to give a second view, not mentioned by Scotus, which he also refutes, namely, that in lying a lack of harmony exists between the mind and one's speech. Noting that these first two opinions center on what is extrinsic to what a lie means, Bonaventure presents the following third view as something based on what is essential to a lie:
There is still a third way of speaking, which explains evil in a twofold way: either evil stems from the generic nature of an act, insofar as it has to do with some unsuitable matter, or it stems from a bad intention. Now, when it has to do with unsuitable matter, this can be understood in two ways, either with respect to God, or with respect to creatures. If it is with respect to God, then it is evil in itself and is so intrinsically such that it in no way can become good; such, for instance, would be hatred of the highest Good or the act of blaspheming God. If it is with respect to one's neighbor, such as doing him some personal or real harm, then though evil in itself, it could still be done for some good end, because given a dispensation one could do it for a right intention. However, if something is evil because of an evil intention, then whether it be with respect to God or with respect to one's neighbor, it is simply evil, and no end for which it is done can make it good, because a fitting purpose is by stipulation wanting in such a case. Hence, to make this evil
Sin !O7 thing good means nothing more or less than making something be at once good and evil. Now, lying is this sort of thing, for a lie implies something evil not only inasmuch as the act has to do with unfitting matter, but also on account of the indirect intention, insofar as in the essence of a lie these two things concur, namely, a false statement and the intention to deceive. And the first is evil in itself, and it could become good if stated by one who unknowingly said something false. By reason of the second, however, it is evil on its own account and in no way can become good, nor could there be a dispensation from it, just as there is no way in which one can have [carnal] knowledge of another with the intention of committing adultery or for some other wicked motive. One must concede, therefore, all those reasons that show that it is essential to a lie that it be a sin and that a lie is evil in itself, as Augustine says, for the very name "lie" refers to something that includes an inordinate intention, as was shown.
Scotus may well have had this analysis of Bonaventure in mind, for though differing in details, Scotus' general discussion of this question is roughly parallel to what Bonaventure has to say on this subject.
Scotus divides his treatment into two main articles. The first is a critical inquiry into the various opinions given as to why lying is sinful; the second analyzes the nature of the sin, which in tum depends on the kind of lie one tells.
In the first article he presents three views. The first coincides with Bonaventure's first view, namely, that a lie is a deliberate untruth and it necessarily turns one away from God, who is Truth, with a capital
"T." Scotus refutes this in the same way as Bonaventure; a lie is opposed immediately not to God qua Truth, but rather to sotne specific created truth, and hence a lie cannot immediately tum one from God.
Omitting Bonaventure's second unsatisfactory view, Scotus turns rather to his third, which he splits up into two distinct opinions on the basis of the two elements Bonaventure considers to be essential to a lie. The first of these the editors of the Wadding edition ascribe to Aquinas and the second (Scotus' third view) to Bonaventure himself and Gerard adonis.
Since Bonaventure had already sketched the main outlines of the view attributed to Aquinas, it obviously had enjoyed some considerable measure of popularity prior to St. Thomas. As Scotus describes it, this opinion states that lying is intrinsically immoral, since the primary or generic morality of an act stems from its object, and the object of speech is to convey the truth to one's fellowmen and not to mislead them. Hence, since the primary goodness or badness of an act stems from the object, an act that is bad or evil on this account cannot become morally good by reason of circumstances or the purpose for which it is done. Aquinas-we know-tended to lump together all
Introduction the precepts of the natural law, whether they be of the first table or the second, as something intrinsically either good or bad and hence as something God can not dispense from without contradicting himself, as it were. Bonaventure disagreed with this, as indicated by his cryptic remark about how one could do something otherwise bad for a good intention provided God gave a dispensation from those commandments that regard obligations to one's neighbor. Scotus agrees substantially with this position, but spells it out in greater detail than Bonaventure. Since the arguments given in the Pro and Con for the licitness of lying are all drawn from instances of the Old Testament where the patriarchs, or others, appeared to lie and yet seemed not to sin, Scotus sees the question of whether God dispensed from lying in the same way as he did from killing or monogamy as a real objection to Aquinas' solution.
According to the third view-which the editors of the Wadding edition rightly ascribe among others to St. Bonaventure himself-the malice of lying lies principally in the bad purpose or intention one has in not telling the truth, because bad will is essential to what is meant by the name "lie." Scotus agrees, but where Bonaventure simply states that the very name "lie" refers to something which implies an intention to deceive, Scotus explains in some detail how this works where the thing named is not something that has a per se unity. And since he explains rather than criticizes this third view, Scotus seems to credit it with probability and adopt it as his own.
In his second article, as to what sort of sin lying represents, Scotus distinguishes between (I) the pernicious lie, which is used to inflict harm on the one lied to or lied about; (2) the officious or polite lie, which is useful to someone and harms no one; (3) the jocose lie, which is told jokingly or in a light vein so as not to be taken seriously by the auditor.
In regard to the polite and jocose lies, Scotus refers to a dispute among moral theologians involving the distinction between "perfect" and "imperfect" individuals. Some say the perfect must avoid even such lies under pain of mortal sin; others claim that no circumstance makes something venially sinful mortally so, and persons referred to as "perfect" have no more bound themselves by vow or oath to tell the truth than have other Christians. (Note that this distinction of perfect and imperfect persons is based on a gloss on Psalm 5:7 attributed to Augustine, "It does not behoove the perfect to lie, not even to save the temporal life of another. For the perfect may not speak falsely, lest for the life of another they kill their own soul" [Glossa ordinaria, PL
113,851; Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, PL 36,85]. The Summa
Sin fratris Alexandri IIaIIae, inquisitio 3, tr. I, sect. 2, q. 2, c. 5 [Quaracchi ed. III, n. 403, pp. 406-8] may have introduced this problem to the earlier Franciscan masters at Paris. Bonaventure's fourth question, for instance, asks whether every lie is a mortal sin "in viris perfectis.")
Scotus' own solution to the dispute is to distinguish two senses of "perfect." The first refers to some person exercising an exalted office, such as judging, preaching, or solemnly teaching, where the dignity of the office itself obliges the person holding it to tell the truth. The other refers to those who have bound themselves by the vows of religious life to strive for perfection in a special way.
In the case of the first, where the individuals holding the exalted offices are actually involved in the solemn exercise of such, they have a special obligation under pain of serious sin to tell the truth where to do otherwise would threaten or imperil their authority or general credibility. Scotus briefly mentions a problem, here, without attempting to solve it, namely, that while a single lapse in regard to a polite or jocose lie might not destroy one's authority, since two judicial acts according to law establish a custom, would a repeated breach of truthfulness be a serious matter? Whatever is to be said of solemn judicial utterances of this sort, says Scotus, where other acts not ex officio are concerned, polite or jocose lies would not be seriously sinful where scandal is excluded.
As for those who have embraced a life where "perfection is to be acquired, not exercised," says Scotus, such persons are no more obligated than others except to those aspects of perfection they have bound themselves to by vow. Hence, where scandal is excluded, polite or jocose lies would not constitute a mortal sin.
However, even where scandal might occur, one must distinguish between avoiding "scandala pusillorum" and avoiding "scandala Pharisaeorum." Even Christ could not avoid pharisaical scandal, nor can those striving for perfection after the example of his disciples. Hence,
Scotus lays down some practical norms for both religious and other Christians, who are not "perfecti" in either of its two senses.
Having presented his idea of what a lie is and why it should be regarded as sinful, Scotus-in his reply to the arguments at the beginning-offers his own solution to those classic passages in the Old Testament where lying seems to have been permitted, excused, or even rewarded by God.
The text translated here is from the supplement to the Ordinatia III, dist. 38, revised from the Wadding edition on the basis of Codices A (ff. 180va-8Iva) and S (ff. 222rb-23va).