8. Synderesis and conscience
The Will and Its Inclinations
late the medium, whereas black produces large particles that compress the medium (Metaphysics X, ch. 7, IOS7b8-I2). Hence, black is not suited by nature to be seen by the sort of act of vision that white is, namely, an act of vision produced by dilating the medium (actus vi~ dendi disgregando).
The questions in this selection are taken from the supplement to Bk. IV of the Ordinatio, dist. 49 (Codex A, ff. 28Iva-82va), where they are listed as questions 9 and 10j a similar text is found in the Wadding reprint edition, as part of the Reportata parisiensia, dist. 49, qq. 8-9 (XXIV, pp. 6s8a-68b).
8. Synderesis and conscience St. Jerome, in the opening chapter of his Commentary on Ezechiel
(PL 2S, 22B), is credited with introducing the Greek term "synteresis" into Latin, referring to it as the spark of conscience (scintilla conscien~ tiae) which even Cain's sin could not eradicate from his nature. De~ rived from the Greek verb "syntereo" (to watch closely, to preserve or keep safe) it seems to have been nothing more than a poetic way of describing conscience. According to De Blic (1949), it was a medieval scribe who made the error of writing "synteresis" (conservation) for "syneidesis" (conscience) in copying Jerome's work on Ezechiel. The error was incorporated into the popular Glossa ordinaria and, through Peter Lombard's Sentences, passed on to the scholastic theologians, who speculated as to its exact nature, usually giving it a special func~ tion distinct from conscience.
Just where to locate synderesis and conscience, however, was a matter of dispute. In attempting to explain why man is naturally at~ tracted towards goodness, Peter Lombard cites various views as to what
"weighs human nature towards good." Referring to Jerome's commen~ tary, he says: "Man is rightly said to will good naturally, because he was established with a good and right will. For the higher 'spark of reason, ' which also, as Jerome says 'could not be extinguished in Cain, ' always wills good and hates evil" (Sent. II, dist. 39). This suggests that synderesis might be either in the intellect or in the will or simply in the soul as possessing both. In one of the first known commentaries on Peter's book, attributed to Udo (Lottin, 1948, pp. 107-8), synderesis is identified with Augustine's ratio superior. One of the first Franciscan masters at Paris, John of La Rochelle, went along with this interpreta~ tion of Udo. St. 'Bonaventure, on the other hand, interprets con~ science as a habit of the practical intellect, which inclines a person to know both general principles of moral rectitude and the goodness or badness of particular actions, whereas he sees synderesis as the "weight
Introduction of the will whose function it is to incline it towards the good in itself"
(II Sent., dist. 39, art. 2, q. Ij Opera II, p. 910). Thus it seems to perform much the same function as Scotus ascribes to the affection for justice (selection 4). But this "affection," for Scotus, is not an action, or elicited act, of any faculty. Peter Lombard, however, speaks of synderesis more as an action or "movement" (motus) associated with the higher portion of the rational soul, contrasting it with another "motus mentis" whereby the "mind, leaving behind the law of higher things, subjects itself to sins and entertains them." This suggestion that it is an action of some sort apparently caused Scotus to preface his remarks with this qualification. If one is considering not just inclinations
(which are not acts) but rather elicited acts, or habits that result from such acts and incline one towards their repetition, then one will have to assign such acts or habits of practical moral knowledge to the intellect rather than the will. Here, then, Scotus parts from Bonaventure, and more specifically and immediately from Henry of Ghent, to side with the majority of his contemporaries, who concede that synderesis is simply another name for the practical intellect insofar as it makes judgments based on general moral principles, whereas conscience refers to particular concrete actions. But insofar as the will, by reason of its affection for justice, is inclined to follow the judgments of right reason, synderesis and particularly conscience can be said to be a "stimulus to good."
We referred earlier to Scotus' theory that the intellect or its knowledge functions as a partial cause of volition. This same notion recurs in the present selection, when Scotus speaks of the intellect's practical moral knowledge playing the role of a partial cause enticing the will to elicit a morally good act. But because the intellect or its knowledge is not the principal but the less important of the two essentially ordered causes of volition, the elicited act of volition is free. What is more, the will need not follow this inclination of conscience, for in virtue of its intrinsic freedom it can determine itself in accord with either its affection for justice or its affection for the advantageous. Hence, Scotus says, there is no necessary or guaranteed assurance that the will actually will follow the better judgment of conscience or synderesis, though it is clearly inclined to do so.
The text translated here is from the Ordinaria II, dist. 39, qq. 1-2 (Codex A, f. 138ra-b).