10. The source of moral goodness
Introduction 10. The source of moral goodness The second selection, "What is the source of moral goodness and badness?" is taken from Scotus' Quodlibet, q. IB, which is concerned with whether the external act adds some moral goodness to the interior act. Scotus argues that it does, but he first prefaces his discussion of why this is so with one of the most extensive explanations we find in any of his works as to what precisely constitutes moral goodness and badness.
The translation is from Alluntis-Wolter, God and Creatures, IB.BIB.23· I I. Degrees of moral goodness and badness
Scotus asks one question in dist. 7 of Bk. II of his Ordinario: "Does the bad angel will evil necessarily?" This gives him occasion to raise the issue of the various ways in which an act may be morally good. He cites four ways in which an act may be good, where each presupposes the previous way; thus the list he gives represents degrees of goodness, the last three of which are aspects of moral goodness.
He begins by differentiating moral goodness from natural goodness, though there is some ambiguity as to what natural goodness he has in mind. For initially he seems to be talking about that metaphysical or transcendental goodness which accrues to anything insofar as it has entity or being, according to the principle: Omne ens est bonum. We have explained elsewhere how this Neoplatonic idea claims that every being to the extent that it is being or has entity is something good (see
Wolter, 1946, pp. 119ff). Scotus' first description seems to refer to this, for he says that "natural goodness . . . is characteristic of any positive thing ... according to the grade of entity it has (the more the entity, the more the goodness; the less the entity, the less the goodness)." However, when he describes the first grade of moral goodness, he seems to contrast it to the natural goodness of an act in a different sense, namely, as something accidental, in the way that he said earlier that beauty is something accidental, falling into the Aristotelian category of relation, rather than quality, for he speaks of it as "something appropriate to this act ... on natural grounds, as sunlight is suited to an act of vision." One could also distinguish another sense of natural goodness, namely, insofar as volition is an accidental quality that perfects the passive or receptive potency of the will, as Scotus explained earlier in selection 6. But whatever be the ways in which an act of volition could be said to be naturally good, this is obviously not
Maral Goodness
something that concerns Scotus here, since he is only interested, it seems, in showing that moral goodness in any of its three degrees goes beyond any sort of natural goodness, in that it implies a conformity of the act to the dictates of right reason. And this is something in addition to natural goodness, howsoever this be understood.
This first degree, however, serves merely as a sort of ground or base for a morally good act, without formally constituting the act as morally good. There is one exception to this, as I mentioned earlier (I, 4, b), namely, an act of the love of God for his own sake. For this act, stemming as it does from an affection for justice, is morally good ex genere, requiring no further specification, since it is obviously performed for a good and proper end, and no other conceivable circumstance could vitiate it. All other loves, by contrast, since they tend towards finite goods or objects, are indifferent in the sense that they can be either good or bad, depending on the circumstances, where the end or purpose is reckoned among the circumstances. This generic goodness of Scotus corresponds to what traditional moralists have referred to as morality derived from the object (as contrasted with that stemming from the circumstances or one's intention). That is to say, that act per se is the sort of behavior that apart from intention or circumstances tends either to honor God or to serve one's own objective good or that of a neighbor. The example Scotus gives is to give alms, i.e., to supply for a neighbor's needs. Hence the act described generically as something good needs to be specified further as to its concrete circumstances before it can be pronounced either morally good or morally bad. If the alms given is something belonging to the giver and is needed by the pauper to whom it is given out of love for God, then the act is morally good. We might note that in this example, the purpose indicates conformity to Scotus' primary ethical norm, namely, "God is to be loved" (Ord. IV, dist. 46, q. I, n. 10; Ord. III, dist. 27, n. 2).
The third degree refers to the supernatural order and specifically to such acts as merit a supernatural reward, since they are performed "because of that charity that makes one a friend of God, insofar as God views one's works with favor." The qualification refers to his acceptance theory of reward, namely, that no act by its nature automatically, as it were, deserves to be supernaturally rewarded, but it is up to God to determine what he will accept and under what conditions he will accept a morally good act as deserving "de congruo" of a special reward.
He concludes with the remark: "Now, this triple goodness is so ordered that the first is presupposed by the second, but not vice versa, and the second by the third, but not the other way round."
Scotus then shows there is a corresponding moral badness or defect
Introduction corresponding to the absence of one or the other degree of moral goodness. Moral badness is generic when the object is inappropriate or bad, such as hatred directed to God. The second sort of badness stems from the inappropriate circumstances, even though the act is directed towards a generically good object, whereas the third type of badness is that deserving of demerit and pertains to the supernatural order of grace and glory.
Scotus points out that each form of moral badness can occur either as a contrary or as a privation, the former being based on something positively inconsistent with goodness, whereas the privation is the simple absence of goodness that should be there.
Where generic badness is concerned, contrary and privative badness are coextensive attributes, that is to say, if a person is confronted with any object that right reason says can be morally good or morally bad, then it ought to be wanted or rejected, as the case may be; if there is no object, then there is no question of either act. In other words, Scotus is claiming that an object is either appropriate or inappropriate by its nature to be conformed with right reason, and hence generic goodness and badness represent immediate contraries.
Where circumstances are concerned, however, the contrary and privative differ. Some act can lack some circumstance needed for it to be virtuous, and yet not be a vicious act, for instance, giving alms to a pauper without any specific motive in mind. Such would be a morally indifferent act as opposed to giving alms out of vainglory like the Pharisees Christ spoke of. Here the bad intention makes the act contrarily bad.
Where merit or demerit are concerned, the contrary and privative also differ. As an act that is privatively bad, Scotus cites an otherwise good act that does not proceed from grace or charity; such would be an act in the state of simple innocence, that is, without supernaturally sanctifying grace and prior to any fall from grace. However, de facto we are in a supernatural order and as such are either in a state of grace or in a state of sin (at least that of original sin, which Scotus regards as the absence of grace that ought to be there had Adam not sinned). If this be so, then there is no indifferent state except in one case, where an act that is good circumstantially is performed, but one of the circumstances is not the sort of good that supernatural charity would incline one to. And hence the act would be deserving neither of merit nor of demerit. As a possible example of what Scotus has in mind, we might think of saving an animal's life, which is something naturally good and could even be morally good in the sense that it might be performed out of a natural respect for the dictates of right reason, and