14. Is Moral Goodness Conformity To God'S Will?
Is Moral Goodness Conformity to God's Will?
As for the other, I grant that similar acts give rise to a corresponding habit, and that many indifferent acts can produce a habit that inclines one to perform similar indifferent actions; but it does not incline one to them insofar as they are either good or bad, just as it in itself is neither good nor bad, as it was not produced by acts that were good or bad.
And so this incongruity that is brought up turns out to be no inconvenience at all, but a truth that must be admitted.
14. IS MORAL GOODNESS CONFORMITY TO GOD'S WILL?
(Ordinatio I, dist. 48) In regard to dist. 48 [of Bk. I], I ask whether the human will, or more generally, whether a created will is morally good whenever it is conformed to the uncreated will.
[Arguments Pro and Can] That it is:
When the created intellect is conformed to the uncreated intellect it possesses truth. It is the same, then, where the created will is concerned. It is good when it is conformed to the uncreated will.
To the contrary:
The Jews willed that Christ suffer and die, something which Christ also willed; and still they sinned ("Forgive them, Father," he said, "for they know not what they do"); therefore, etc.
[To the Question] I reply: according to Dionysius On the Divine Names, ch. 4, good stems from a cause that is good in every respect, and the Philosopher in Bk. II of the Ethics indicates that if an act is to be morally good, it must be so in all its circumstances. A defect in anyone suffices to make the act morally bad.
Suppose the created intellect is in substance conformed to the divine will, be this conformity one of substance together with anyone circumstance or one involving all circumstances having a bearing on moral goodness. Even if the created will were conformed in every respect, so that the two wills willed the same thing and in the same manner, and so with all the other circumstances, the created will
Moral Goodness would still not have to be good in the way the uncreated will is good, because where the agents are basically different, the circumstances proper to their respective actions are not the same. A created will is not suited to love a good as intensely as does the uncreated will. There is indeed a great difference in the intensity of the acts whereby acre' ated and an uncreated agent regard an object. And whatever is to be said of a conformity in every respect between a created and an uncre, ated will, at least the goodness of act and object is not sufficient conformity, because it still allows for possible difformity in regard to the other circumstances required for the goodness of an act of the will.
[Reply to the Initial Argument] As for the argument for the opposite view, I say the situation is not similar, for truth of intellect depends solely on the object's being such as it is understood to be. Goodness, however, depends not solely on the object, but on all the other circumstances as well, particularly upon the end. For that reason, notice, all our volition is especially oriented towards that ultimate end which is both Alpha and Omega, beginning and end, to whom be all honor and glory, world without end.
Amen.