25. The Infused Virtue Of Charity
PART VII The Love of God, Self, and Neighbor
25. THE INFUSED VIRTUE OF CHARITY
(Ordinatia III, supp!., dist. 27) Regarding dist. 17 [of Bk. III] I ask: Is there some theological virtue inclining one to love God above all?
[Arguments Pro and Con] For the negative:
[I] If there were such, it would be a certain kind of friendship, which is clear from its corresponding act, which is to love. But according to the Philosopher in VIII Ethics, ch. 7, there is no friendship towards God because God excels beyond any proportion, and such an excess prohibits any friendship towards him, because friendship is among equals in some sense.
[2] Also, no virtue moves one to an act that is impossible, but it is impossible for us to love God above all. This is proved in two ways: first, because the marks of friendship are measured by one's relationship to oneself, according to the Ethics IX, ch. 9; but what is measured does not exceed the measure in the perfection of qualities measured; therefore, love for oneself exceeds that which one has for another.
Second, because friendship is based on how much another is one with us; but it is impossible that anything be more one with me than myself.
[3] Also, thirdly, to the main issue, someone without virtue can love God above all; therefore no theological virtue is necessary for this.
Proof of the antecedent: First, because if one can do something with a habit, it is also possible to do such without a habit, because the habit
The Love of God, Self, and Neighbor does not give one, in an unqualified sense, this ability to act, for then it would be a potency [and not a habit] for such, and second, because one could, by one's natural endowments alone, enjoy something as an end, and not necessarily inordinately; but there is no ordinate enjoyment or fruition of any object other than God; therefore, etc.
[4] Furthermore, from frequent acts of loving God above all, a habit could be acquired similar to that of charity whereby we love God above all; therefore charity cannot coexist with one who has such a habit, because if it could, two habits of the same species would be in the same subject, which seems incongruous. The antecedent is evident, since-from the preceding argument-God can be loved above all by purely natural endowments, and hence nature is capable of acting repeatedly in this way and thus generating a habit of this sort. Nor can one object that these two habits are compatible because, having different efficient causes, they are of different species. For the efficient cause alone does not suffice to distinguish the effect specifically, as is clear from Augustine in On the Trinity III, ch. 9, and also Ambrose,
On the Incarnation, who insists that differences in origin do not make for different species. He makes the same point clear in the case of man produced by creation as compared to production by generation, because Adam was of the same species as myself; therefore, etc.
Against this we have the statements of the Master in-the text of this distinction as well as Augustine in Christian Doctrine, 4 and 5, whom he quotes. Look it up in his Sentences.
[Body of the Question] In this question there are three points to be investigated: (I) Since habits are revealed by their acts, we must first see whether this act of loving God above all is something morally right, so that there could be a virtue corresponding to it. (2) What is the formal object or objective basis of this act and of the habit that inclines one to that act? (3) Can nature without an infused habit perform such an act?
[Article I: Is It Morally Right to Love God Above All?] As for the first, I say that to love God above all is an act conformed to natural right reason, which dictates that what is best must be loved most; and hence such an act is right of itself; indeed, as a first practical principle of action, this is something known per se, and hence its rectitude is self-evident. For something must be loved most of all, and it is none other than the highest good, even as this good is recognized by the intellect as that to which we must adhere the most.
A confirming argument: Since the moral principles are of the law of nature, "Love the Lord, your God," etc., is also, and therefore such an
The Infused Virtue of Charity
act of love is known to be right. From this it follows that there can be a virtue inclining one naturally towards such an act. Now, this virtue is theological, because it is directed immediately to a theological object, viz., God. Nor is this all, for this virtue is based immediately upon the first rule of human action, and it had to be infused by God, since this sort of virtue is made to perfect the highest portion of the soul, which cannot be perfected in the best possible way except immediately by God.
This virtue is distinct from faith, because its act is one neither of belief nor of understanding. It is also distinct from hope, because its act does not desire the good of the lover insofar as it benefits the lover, but is an act that tends to the object for its own sake, and would do so even if, to assume the impossible, all benefit for the lover were excluded. This virtue which thus perfects the will insofar as it has an affection for justice, I call "charity."
[Article 2: What Is the Formal Object of Charity?] As for this article, I say the "objective basis" of an act or habit of charity can be understood in three ways: the first meaning would be that which is suited by its very nature [as something absolute] to be the essential reason why an act tends towards it and rests with attaining it; a second meaning would be some [relative] aspect of the object, prior to the act, which makes it appropriate for an act to be directed towards that object; a third meaning would be something which only accompanies, or even follows, the elicited act as a kind of consequence.
Only in the first sense, and no other, is anything, properly speaking, an objective basis for an act or habit. And in this sense, God himself, as this individual essence, is the objective ground or object of charity. For the formal object ·or end towards which every theological act or habit inclines us is his unique essence, as was pointed out earlier in the question on the subject of theology in the prologue of Bk. 1.
And a brief proof is this. A power that regards something as an adequate motive or terminal object can only be perfectly satisfied in something in which that common feature is most perfectly realized.
Now, every intellective or volitional power has as its motive and terminal adequate object the whole of being. In no being, then, whether created or uncreated, can such a power be satisfied save in that in which the aspect of "being" is to be found most perfectly. But only this
First Being is this sort of thing.
According to the second meaning of the term, something relational can be called in some sense an objective basis precisely for being loved, for it is also in some sense suited by nature to be loved. And in the case of God, it is this relative aspect of his unique nature as a good,
The Love of God, Self, and Neighbor sharing itself with one who loves it. For just as in our case someone is first loved honestly, that is, primarily because of himself or herself, and only secondarily because such a one returns our love, so that this reciprocallove in such a person is a special reason of amiability over and above the objective goodness such a person possesses, so too in God.
Not only does God's infinite goodness, or his nature as this unique nature in its uniqueness, draw us to love such, but because this "Goodness" loves me, sharing itself with me, therefore I elicit an act of love towards it. And under this second aspect of amiability, one can include everything about God that proves his love for us, whether it be creation or redemption or preparing us for beatitude in heaven, but in such a way that among these manifestations of his love no distinction is made. For charity does not look more to the last, nor regard the second more than the first, but all of these reasons are combined, as it were, into the one notion that God is worthy of love not only for what he is in himself, but also because he shares himself and is our good as well; hence he deserves to be loved in return, according to that text from John: "Let us love God because he has first loved us."
The third meaning refers to the satisfying happiness God gives as our ultimate end, although this is not properly speaking a formal objective reason, since it is a natural consequence of the elicited act of loving him. Nevertheless, inasmuch as this satiety inevitably accompanies this act of love, it could serve as a kind of object. And in this sense God is loved inasmuch as he is that good object that makes us completely happy, and he is said to be loved in this way insofar as he is loved supremely, that is, not qua formal object, but under an aspect in the object that accompanies the act of loving it.
An example of this triple distinction: Suppose, first of all, in the nature of things there is one that is most beautiful to the eye; secondly, assume this beautiful object also gave the eye its power to see; thirdly, assume, if vision could be said to love such visual beauty, that in seeing this object the eye's love of seeing was satisfied to the full. The first of these represents visual beauty, as the adequate object of the power of vision, embodied in an object in all the perfection it is possible to have in beauty of this sort. The second represents an additional reason for loving such, inasmuch as it shares itself with the eye by giving the latter the power to see it. The third is something that accompanies an act in which the desire for visual beauty as a good in itself is perfectly satisfied. Therefore, the primary reason for vision, or love in vision, if vision could love, would be the nature itself of this most beautiful thing; whereas the least and most improper reason would be the fact that it is reached through a visual act. From this it
The Infused Virtue of Charity
follows that they speak most improperly who claim that God is the object of charity insofar as he is the beatific object, if they understand by "beatific" an actual relationship, viz., insofar as he is the actual terminus of the beatific act. But if they refer to an aptitudinal relation, then, as we have argued, it is only by reason of his nature that God functions as a beatific term or object.
[Article 3: Does Nature Suffice to Love God Above All!} [I. The Opinion of Others} [First opinion] Regarding the third article, one view assumes that nature is not sufficient for this act of love without an infused habit:
First, because nature is determined to one action. But according to Bk. II of On Generation, nature is determined to seek its own being or existence, and therefore it cannot seek its nonbeing, and this no matter how it is proposed, unless one says it is determined to seek its being only conditionally, which does not seem probable. Every intellectual nature, then, is more determined to its own being than desiring that God be, if both could not coexist. For it is determined to seek its own being as its one natural desire, and no condition one assumes it bears towards anything else will incline it otherwise, for then it would only seek its own being conditionally.
Furthermore, a natural appetite, it seems, does not regard anything other than what is advantageous for its subject, and consequently its primary regard is the one for whom it seeks this advantage, which is none other than the loving subject itself. But if this is its primary regard, then it cannot have a greater regard for something other than itself.
[Second opinion] Another argues against this for the following reasons:
First, the part loves the whole more than itself. The macrocosm and microcosm illustrate this. In the macrocosm water rises lest there be a vacuum in the universe. This is clear from many experiments such as in an inverted vessel when a candle is burnt within it, and in many other instances. Now, this behavior is contrary to the natural inclination of water's particular nature, since it is naturally heavy and hence tends to descend, but the universal inclination overcomes this. For in this way the good of the universe as a whole is preserved, namely, its continuity and the contiguity of its parts. To this good-as in the present example-water is more inclined, wanting, as it does, the universal rather than the particular good. This is also apparent in the microcosm, for the hand exposes itself to save the head as naturally desiring more the safety of the head than of any other part, including itself;
The Love of God, Self, and Neighbor for the safety of the head preserves the health of all the other members so far as function of life and vital influences are concerned. From this, he argues further that since each creature is a kind of sharing in the divine goodness, it will seek more the divine good or the existence of the divine good than its own good or existence, and consequently, a rational creature will be able with its natural resources to love the divine good more than any other good, including itself as well.
Furthermore, a rational nature loves beatitude above all, as one gathers from Augustine in XIII On the Trinity, ch. 5. But the beatific object is loved no less than beatitude itself; therefore, a rational nature loves the beatific object above all else and hence above itself.-This is confirmed from the case of a person who kills himself in despair. He hates his existence but does not hate happiness, because he seeks it, if he could have it; therefore, he loves happiness more than himself, and consequently he loves the beatific object more than himself.
[Refutation of these arguments] These reasons are not cogent:
The first is not, because these examples do not establish his thesis, for they only show that the whole loves itself more than it loves a part, or a more important part loves itself more than a less important one.
This is clear from the first example of water. For it is impossible that water should move itself upward for any good of the universe as a whole. Because it has a natural form that is determined to one action, so long as that form remains the same numerically, it can never be the formal reason for acting in the opposite way. Therefore water itself does not move itself upward, but is only moved in this way by something moving it extrinsically. To this upward movement its nature contributes nothing, and in consequence it is moved violently in comparison with its own nature as water. This part, therefore, does not love the whole nor seek to preserve it out of love, but rather the whole, or the ruling power in the whole [Le., God], to whom all the powers of the universe are attributed, moves each part of the universe in such a way as is suited to the well-being of the whole. What we gather from this, therefore, is that the whole universe loves the well-being of the whole more than it does the proper welfare of this part. The same point we glean from the other example. The hand does not of its own desire expose itself for the good of the universe.
Rather it is man, having these parts, one as more important, another as less important, who exposes one less important part that could be lost without danger to the whole in order to save the whole or to save some part that could not be lost without damage to the whole and to the universe. And so too with what he proposes. Any argument he gives only proves that God loves the good of the universe or its wellbeing more than that of one part, or that God loves the more impor-
The Infused Virtue of Charity 28r tant part more than the less important part. But the argument cannot be made to prove that some part loves the being of God or that of the universe more than its own existence. In those examples he presents, a part, left to itself and considered according to its own inclination, never exposes itself to nonexistence for another. In other respects his simile limps, for while what he says about the parts may be truenamely, that these parts are something of the whole in reality and by saving the whole they save themselves insofar as they have existence in the whole-a creature is not something pertaining to God as if it were a part of God, though it is something that belongs to God as an effect of his or a participation of him.
The second reason, from beatitude, is also inconclusive, because it is based only on the affection for the advantageous. Among the things desired for the lover himself beatitude or happiness is that which is desired most, but it is not that which is loved most of all, in the way the end is loved more than those things which contribute to that end.
Likewise, the assumption about beatitude is not true unless one speaks of it in general, not specifying what it consists in. For in general one cannot love some other thing more than oneself, for this "thing" other than the lover has not been specified as that in which beatitude consists.
[Scotus' own arguments] Hence, I do not rest content with these reasons but propose two other reasons of my own for the main conclusion:
The first is this. Natural reason reveals to an intellectual creature that something must be loved in the highest measure, because among all objects, acts, and habits that are essentially ordered to one another, there is something supreme, and thus there is some love that is highest and also some object that is supremely lovable. But natural reason reveals nothing other than infinite good to be such, for if it did, charity would then incline one to the opposite of what right reason dictates, and thus charity would not be a virtue. Therefore, natural reason dictates that the infinite good be loved above all. Consequently, the will can do this by its purely natural endowments, for the intellect could not rightly dictate something to the will that the natural will could not tend towards or carry out naturally. If it could do so, then the will would be naturally bad, or at least it would not be free to tend towards everything according to that aspect of good revealed to it by the intellect. This is what is said particularly about the angels [whom we suppose were created in a natural] state of innocence. For in that state they would not have been unjust and could not have had an act that was unrighteous, but only an elicited act that was right. Now, presupposing that they did act in some way, that act would have to be right,
The Love of God, Self, and Neighbor and it could only have been right if God were loved above all; therefore, [in their natural state of innocence the angels could have had an act whereby they loved God above all].
The second reason is this. The Philosopher, according to III Ethics, thinks the brave citizen ought to expose himself to death for the good and utility of the state. But the Philosopher did not assume such a person will receive his reward in the afterlife, as is clear from many passages where he expresses his doubts about whether the soul is immortal or mortal, and more often inclines towards its mortality. Now, if indeed someone, following natural reason, doubts about the existence of a future life, no one-because he is doubtful-is obligated to expose himself to a certain loss of a good and civic virtue. Therefore, apart from any future reward, every brave citizen ought to will his nonexistence lest the good of the state perish. According to right reason, then, the divine good and the good of the state must be loved more than the good of some individual. Therefore, everyone according to right reason should be willing to cease to exist for the sake of a divine good.
[An objection and its solution] Here it is claimed that the brave citizen in exposing himself to death for virtue's sake is experiencing the greatest good that virtue can bring, together with the greatest delight. It is because of this good-brief though it be-that one ought to choose and love such an act in preference to an ignominious life, for according to IX Ethics, ch. 8, one intense act is to be preferred to any number of desultory actions. In this case the brave citizen is choosing not his nonexistence, but rather his finest hour from a virtuous viewpoint, because right reason dictates that he should not forego this act of virtue with its many other advantages.-On the contrary, here I simply love more what I want to save and shield from evil. I am willing to lose something else rather than this other, for whose sake I am willing to surrender my very existence. But brave persons of this sort are willing that both themselves and their act of virtue should cease to exist rather than that evil befall their state or country. Therefore, they simply love the public good, which they wish to preserve, more than they love themselves or love to have this act of virtue. Hence they expose themselves to death, not for the sake of such virtue, but rather to save their country-and thus my argument stands.
A third reason is added, which is a kind of theological persuasive argument. If no one could have a virtuous act of loving God above all by purely natural means, then whoever would find himself performing such an act in this life would know that he possesses charity [and supernatural grace] because without charity, he would have no inclination to love God above all. But the consequent is false; hence the antecedent is also.
The Infused Virtue of Charity [2. Scotus' Solution to the Question} As for this article, because of these two reasons-conformity of the will to right reason and the case of the brave citizen-I concede the conclusion that by purely natural means any will could love God above all, at least as human nature existed in the state in which it was instituted. To clarify this, then, I explain first how "above all" is to be understood; then, second, to what extent a rational creature is bound to such love; and third, why, despite this natural capacity, the habit of charity is still necessary.
[A. How Is "Above All" to Be Understood?} As for the first, "above all" can be understood either extensively or intensively. Extensively, namely, when one loves God more than everything else, for instance, when someone out of affection for him would will more readily that all else should cease to be rather than that God not exist. Intensively, for instance, because one wills God well with a greater measure of affection than one has for any other person's welfare. As for the first, it is commonly conceded that nothing other than God, nor all other things combined, can be as valuable as God.
[Opinion of others] As for the second, a distinction of this sort is introduced. One love may exceed another because it is more fervent or tender, or because it is stronger and firmer; and these loves are said to exceed one another in the way a mother loves her son more fervently and tenderly, whereas a father loves him with a love that is stronger and firmer, because he will expose himself to greater danger out of love for his son.
And it is said that the love of God above all ought to be of this latter sort in strength, lest something other than God be able to turn one away from him. But it is not necessary that he be loved above all as to tenderness and fervor and sweetness, because at times a person finds himself loving a creature more fervently than God is sometimes loved, as is clear in the case of a jealous person.
And this is confirmed, because if one could love God above all in both of these intensive ways, then one could fulfill that precept of Deuteronomy 6:[5]: "Love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your strength." But the opposite is true, according to Anselm, Augustine, and the Master in the text of this distinction. They do not wish to make this a precept that one is obliged to fulfill, but consider it rather as an ideal towards which we ought to strive.
[Refutation of this view] We argue against this distinction, because only one who loves more firmly loves more. For I love this more to which I will less evil and for the preservation of whose good I put my-
The Love of God, Self, and Neighbor self out to a greater extent, for readiness to put oneself out for someone is a consequence of love of that person. And I am speaking here about that love which is an act of the will, and not about that which is a feeling in the sense appetite. And although some others are said to love more fervently and tenderly who do not love firmly, this is not from some excess in them of that higher understanding-love, but perhaps results from some feeling of sensitive-love, as some who are said to be devout feel at times some greater sweetness than others who are much more solid and firm in their love of God, and are a hundred times more ready to sustain martyrdom for him than these others. But such sweetness is not an act elicited by the will, but a certain rewarding feeling associated with the will-act whereby God nourishes his little ones and draws them to himself lest they fall by the way.
[Scotus' view] I say, then, that this "above all" must be understood in both ways, extensively and intensively, for just as I am held to love
God above all extensively, so I am held to love him also intensively with a greater affection than simply anything else. I say "greater affection" because it is more opposed to anything incompatible with it, in the sense that one could more easily be turned against loving anything else than turned against loving God. As for what is added about that commandment, this is not valid. For it would be equivalent to giving a precept about the beatific vision, not as something we should fulfill, but as something we know we ought to tend towards. It is clear the opposite is the case with the commandment to love God above all.
[B. How Does This Precept Oblige?] I say therefore that this precept, both extensively and intensively according to the aforesaid way, can be fulfilled in this life, but not as to all the conditions which are implied by the words "with your whole heart, your whole soul," etc., because in this life there cannot be that recollection of our faculties with all impediments removed, so that the will could exert the sort of effort it could if our powers were all united and recollected and all impediments were removed. And it is in regard to such intensity, when all impediments are removed and our faculties are recollected, that one must understand the dictum of Augustine and the Master that this precept is not fulfilled in this life, for the propensity of the inferior powers in the present state impedes the superior powers from acting perfectly.
As to this I say that the affirmative precept of Deuteronomy 6 and Matthew 22: "Love the Lord, your God, with your whole heart," etc., not only always obliges us to refrain from the opposite, viz., an act of hatred, but also obliges us to elicit an act that is directed to [God] as our end, from whose goodness stems the moral goodness of any act
The Infused Virtue of Charity that is a means to that end. Just as man, then, is sometimes required to perform some virtuous act, so he is held sometimes to have at some time an action in accord with this commandment about gratuitously loving the end. But when this is to be, perhaps has been determined by that divine precept: "Keep holy the Sabbath and let every one remain recollected and raise his heart to his God." And the Church has specified that mass be heard on Sunday in canon [64, part 3, dist. I, of the Decretum Gratiani]. Nor is the law of love of neighbor similar in this respect, as will become clear in the following questions.
[CO Why the Habit of Charity Is Necessary} As for the third point of this article, namely, the need for a habit of charity, I reply as I did in that seventeenth distinction [q. 3] of the first book, namely, that this habit adds to the substantial intensity of the act a further intensity, which the will alone could also have given to the act by exerting an equal effort. And the more perfect the created power is, so much more imperfect would it be (speaking arithmetically, for geometrically the imperfection would be equal) if it did not have created charity corresponding to it proportionately. For as much as a lesser will is deficient if it does not have charity proportionate to itself, so much the greater would the will seem to be deficient geometrically if it did not have the charity proportionate to it. As for this added circumstance, that the act has the special character of being accepted by God, this is something due principally to charity and less so to the will. Briefly, then, I say, as I said there, the reason habits are needed because of acts, especially the habit of charity, is due to something that is a circumstance of the act. As for the substance of the act, however, I maintain what I said there, that the habit is not required.
Also as to the condition of the habit, namely, that it be infused, I say-as I did above about faith and hope-that one cannot prove by natural reason that such habits are infused, but this is only held on faith. A good argument from congruity would be that it does not seem probable that for acts that have to be elicited immediately about God, the highest part of the soul could be perfected most perfectly except immediately by God.
[Reply to the Opposing Arguments of This Question} [To I] As for the initial arguments, I concede the first, that charity can be properly called friendship. I do not take it entirely in the strict sense in which the Philosopher uses the term when he speaks of it. If we somehow extend the meaning he had in mind so that it applies to God, we can say that charity is something more excellent than friendship. For this excess in the object does not take away anything of per-
The Love of God, Self, and Neighbor fection in it, but only removes what is imperfection. Therefore this excess does not invalidate our proposal. Uprightness indeed in what is lovable and a return of love in the beloved are per se conditions in the lovable object. But equality in these things is only a concomitant condition, and not a matter of perfection. Indeed, charity is not more perfect if it is only a return of love. God, however, has both grounds for being loved, namely, the fact that he returns our love as well as that more excellent amiability or goodness in itself, and with him there can be a friendship that is called "superfriendship." And if one argues that equality is also a basis for friendship, this is true, but it always presupposes some honorable good that deserves to be loved for its own sake, and this is the primary reason why something is amiable. Equality is a basis for friendship strictly speaking, but excellence is an even greater reason for a similar or even more perfect habit than friendship, and here I call such a habit "charity."
[To 2] To the second, I say that God can be loved above all not only by charity, but also by one's natural endowments, at least in the state in which nature was instituted. And as to the principle of the Philosopher in IX Ethics, I say that this citation ought to be understood about our recognition of friendship. For friendship for another becomes known when I desire things for another similar to what I desire for myself. It is not to be understood as its essential characteristic, however, as if there were no other sort of friendship, unless one is speaking strictly of that which holds between equals (for there indeed love for oneself is a measure of love for another, and not vice versa}.-And when one argues there about unity, I say that there are two concurrent conditions in the lovable object, namely, goodness and oneness with it, and though at times unity [with oneself] surpasses unity [with the beloved], the goodness of the latter may make up for this.
[To 3] To the third, I concede the conclusion, but this still does not make charity superfluous, as we have said.
[To 4] As to the fourth, I say that one cannot acquire by one's own acts a habit of the same species as charity. However, one could acquire some habit of friendship that tends to God under the same objective aspect and by a similar act, because by loving him above all, a habit of this sort can be acquired by way of repeated acts. Any two natures that cannot stem from an efficient cause of the same species are specifically different, because effects of the same species can only be from causes similar in kind, and therefore the sort of charity that can only be infused cannot be of the same species as this other friendship that can be acquired by actions.
[To the arguments in art. 2] I reply to the two arguments for the other member in the article about the formal object of charity. To the