13. Morally indifferent acts
Introduction three distinct ways in which an action that could be morally good or bad possesses some natural goodness. One is ontological or transcendental, which accrues to a human action by reason of its positive entity as an "accident" inherent in the agent as its subject. The second would be its "essential goodness," which would be characteristic of the act inasmuch as it falls into the generic category of quality and comes under the first of the four "species," or divisions, Aristotle gives of "qualities." For genus and species determine the "essence" of any entity. The third would be the accidental goodness opposed to what is naturally bad or evil. Thus one could characterize an action performed with a certain natural grace as good, as opposed to one that is awkward or badly done.
The Latin source for the translation is a revision of the Wadding edition based on Codices A, V, and S.
13. Morally indifferent acts In dist. 4 I of the Ordinatio II Scotus has an ex professo discussion of indifferent acts. He begins by contrasting the moral aspect of the act with that act as falling into "a determinate species in the category of nature." The assumption here is that the act possesses a natural goodness in virtue of the specific sort of act it is and the way in which it is performed. Hence it would seem to comprise or include all three notions of "natural goodness" referred to above. Here he does not allude to the fact he deals with elsewhere, namely, that a naturally good act could also be morally good if it is done deliberately because it is prudent to do so, or because it is in accord with right reason. It makes no difference, in other words, whether or not it is the initial act of this sort or whether it proceeds from a habit one has acquired of so acting.
One such act, according to Scotus, seems sufficient to induce a "habit" or virtue, because a single act of some specific nature could suffice to dispose one to repeat this act rather than its opposite, given the same set of circumstances. Here, he seems to presuppose that one has performed such a naturally good act for a morally good reason before and hence has acquired-in an incipient stage at least-the virtue of justice. The point he wants to make with moral goodness is that one could still perform a naturally good action as a kind of automatic response to a familiar concrete situation without either actually or virtually doing this because it is just and in accord with right reason, or because it is intended as a manifestation of one's love of God. Such an act, he claims, would be naturally good but morally indifferent. Even more so in the case of meritorious acts, where their merit depends on whether one is in the state of grace and, if one is, whether the act