27. Love Of God And Self
Love of God and Self To the second, the same notion applies, because this virtue only has
God as the object that satisfies it per se. For the immediate object of its reflex act, however, it can have something created. Perhaps in this way the vision had in heaven could also have something created as an object, not as something standing there on its own, but as pointing to God.
To the third, I say that the habit of principles is directed towards a principle according to the truth proper to it, which it has by reason of its terms. The habit whereby I know a conclusion, however, is directed to the conclusion according to the truth proper to it, which is something other than the truth a principle has. But that is not the case here, for there is but one goodness towards which charity is directed, and that is God in himself and neighbor as turned towards God in love. For the goodness of the neighbor does not move me more than if a straw could love God. But if I love God perfectly, then I love him to be loved by all who are able to love him in a way that is not inordinate, and whose love is pleasing to him. This same situation does not hold universally in regard to objects shown to us by the intellect and in regard to objects that are attractive to the will.
27. LOVE OF GOD AND SELF
(Ordinatio III, supp!., dist. 29) In regard to dist. 29 [of Bk. III) I ask: Is everyone bound to love self most after God?
[Arguments Pro and Con} For the negative:
Bk. IX of the Ethics censures the self-lover, and there are many other passages that do the same.
Furthermore, Gregory, commenting on that passage in Luke, "He sent them two by two," etc., says: "No one properly speaking is said to have charity towards himself, but rather he is said to have charity who reaches out to another in love. Truly charity is this love of another."
For the affirmative:
The measure is more perfect than the measured; but love of self is the measure of love of neighbor, according to Matthew 22:39: "You shall love your neighbor as yourself."
[Body of the Question} From what was said in the preceding question, viz., about how charity has reference to neighbor, the solution of this question is clear.
For insofar as charity is the principle of tending directly towards God
The Love of God, Self, and Neighbor by a direct act, it is also the principle for reflecting on those acts whereby one tends to God; and on this account, as was pointed out there, it is the principle for wanting everyone able to love God to do so. This is the principle for loving a neighbor whose love is pleasing, or not displeasing, to God. Among all the acts of the same nature, however, the principle of tending to God is also the principle of reflecting most directly upon the act one elicits; this is the act by which one having charity loves God. Therefore, most directly after loving
God, charity inclines a person to love that by which he tends to God, or by which he wants himself to love God. In wanting himself to love
God, he loves himself out of charity, because he wills for himself a just and honorable good. Therefore, immediately after love of God, he loves himself out of charity.
This is also confirmed, because weighing the reasons of goodness and unity, which are grounds for love, and primarily love of the infinite good, in which the aspect of goodness is most perfect, one sees in oneself the next greatest reason, viz., that unity which is perfect identity. Hence, everyone is naturally inclined to love himself most after the infinite good. Now, a natural inclination is always right; therefore, etc.
[Reply to the Initial Arguments] To the first argument, I say that what the Philosopher is explaining there is how despicable is an immoderate love of self, but not a selflove that is moderate.
To the second, I say that everyone who loves out of charity, loves himself in reference to the infinite good, because he loves that act or habit whereby he tends to that good; and it is in this way that his love is directed to another. For God is the principal object of his act, and then he has charity for himself not as the ultimate end, but as a proximate object that is ordered to the first and ultimate end distinct from himself.