3. A jocose lie is a story which all hearers know is not true; neither is
Sin with one, or harms one to a greater or lesser degree regarding any other temporal good, the gravity of the lie is weighed according to the good lost, so that it is more or less grave on this score, and generally every such lie that deliberately asserts what is not known to be such or the opposite of what is known to be true is a mortal sin. It is simply forbidden by the precept: "Do not bear false witness against your neighbor." This refers not just to testimony in court, but to any deliberate assertion of something that is not known or is the opposite of what is known. Hence, whoever says the opposite of what he or she knows to be true with the intention of deceiving the person spoken to or of giving misinformation about the person spoken of, and by so speaking injures the one addressed or spoken about, is bearing false witness against a neighbor. Whether lack of deliberation excuses one from guilt will be treated in the following question.
2. An officious or polite lie is one that is useful for someone and hurts no one.
3. A jocose lie is a story which all hearers know is not true; neither is it told as something true, nor are those who hear it deceived; neither does the speaker intend to deceive, nor are the words he uses of themselves deceptive, because it is not the sort of tale that is apt to be believed by those who hear it, but rather it is recognized as something told without the purpose of convincing one of its verity. Similarly a lie is jocose when someone jokingly intends to deceive in such a way that the victim is truly deceived but not as regards something that would inflict any great harm and where those who play the joke know him to be deceived. And one can be formally joking, as Augustine says was the case with the lie of Joseph, who truly wished to deceive his brothers in saying: "You are spies," etc., though he himself, because he knew the truth, could have been joking about the deception and fear which they suffered; and others also, if they had known the truth and finally recognized that this was not said seriously, they too could have joked about this.
As for these two lies, namely, the polite and jocose, it is commonly conceded that neither sort is a mortal sin in imperfect men, because neither of itself violates charity, nor do they militate against anything necessary to the status of the persons who tell such lies.
[Re states of perfection] But some claim both of these lies are mortal sins in the perfect [Le., those who are in an exalted position or state of perfection], because they destroy the authority such are entitled to, and they demean their status itself as well as scandalizing those who hear them tell such lies.
But against this, others argue that no circumstance makes something that is venial for one a mortal sin in another unless the one is
Lying 30 9 necessarily obliged to something the other is not. But persons in such an exalted state, by vow or oath, have no more bound themselves than other Christians to tell the truth; therefore, the circumstance of being that specific sort of person-though not specially obligateddoes not tum a venial matter into a mortal sin.
[Scotus' opinion] One can admit this provided one distinguishes what is meant by a person in such a perfect state. One sense refers to a person exercising some exalted office, like a prelate; another refers to one striving for perfection, such as a religious.
[Re r] As for the first, one can concede that in the act of exercising some function that pertains to such a state of perfection, such as teaching, judging, or preaching, either sort of lie would be a mortal sin, because it destroys the authority and utility of the message being preached, according to the principle Augustine laid down in his third letter to Jerome: "If lies, no matter how jocose, are to be admitted in the Holy Scriptures, they will retain nothing of their authority." If, in preaching, for example, a prelate were to mix in the jocose lie, his message would lack any solid authority, because one could doubt the truth of what he says just as one could question the word of anyone else. The same reason for not assenting to his jocose lie would apply equally to whatever else he says, and so the authority of a Doctor of the Church in teaching would perish and any utility for the listening audience would likewise be lost.
The same would be true of a solemn judgment or solemn teaching.
(I am thinking of the case, of course, where the lie in question is not recognized as distinct from the act of judging or teaching. For one sitting in judgment may introduce something in a lighter vein which is recognized from the manner of speaking as not pertaining to the judicial decision as such.)
[But there is a problem here.] For it seems that while one jocose or polite lie would not destroy the authority of a judge or teacher, it would, however, where this sort of lie is frequent or customary, but then, since two judicial acts according to law establish a custom, it follows that the second such act would be a sin, though the first would not, even though the second seems to be entirely similar in circumstances to the first. Whatever is to be said of one or more such lies in teaching or judging, at least where other acts are concerned such a lie would not seem to constitute a mortal sin, where scandal is excluded.
[Re 2] But if one speaks of a person in a state where perfection is to be acquired, not exercised, it seems one must judge otherwise. Such an individual does not seem to be more obligated than others are, except to those things of perfection he has vowed. For as a religious, one
Sin does not assume the pastoral office of care of souls, and hence, is not charged with acts pertaining to such. If such persons, then, are not exercising some exalted function, such as teaching, preaching, or the like, it does not seem they, any more than other Christians, sin mortally by a polite or jocose lie, except perhaps where scandal would arise. For those who have not entered such a state of perfection could be scandalized by the lie of such persons more than they would by that of an ordinary individual. Still, deeds cannot be evaluated simply on the basis of such scandal as mayor may not accompany them. For generally speaking according to the Gospel law, the scandal of the little ones should be avoided, according to that text of Matthew [18:7]:
"Woe to that man through whom scandal comes!" But this does not apply to the case of pharisaical scandal, according to what the Savior said in Matthew [15:1214]. When the disciples asked him: "Do you realize the Pharisees were scandalized when they heard your pronouncement?" Christ replied: "Let them go their way; they are blind leaders of the blind." Therefore, whether it is actions that are indifferent in themselves (such as eating meat, which the Apostle speaks of in his first letter to the Corinthians [ch. 8]: "Therefore, if food causes my brother to sin I will never eat meat again") or deeds that are venially sinful, but are apt by their nature to occasionally scandalize little ones who happen or chance to be present, such should be avoided because of scandal. Still, the scandal they may give is not the basis for judging what sort of sin a lie would be by reason of its nature.
As for the nature of a jocose or polite lie in the case of those in a state for acquiring perfection, it does not seem they are obligated by their profession to avoid such lies by some special reason or rescriction that other Christians do not have. Nevertheless, if right reason dictates that a single act or frequent acts of lying give scandal to those who hear it, where they would not do so where another person telling such was concerned, then such persons are bound by charity or the welfare of their neighbor to avoid scandal. In accord with that precept regarding flight in the face of persecution, the shepherd is bound at times not to flee, according to what is said in John [Io: 12]: "The hired hand-who is no shepherd-sees the wolf coming and runs away," etc. Augustine has a good treatment of this text in one of his letters.
Look up Henry [of Ghent]'s reference to it in his Quodlibet XV, q. 10 or 16. Others, however, who have not entered a state for acquiring perfection and are not pastors, while they are not bound of necessity not to flee if they can act otherwise, are still bound not to scandalize their neighbor by fleeing, for at times their flight would give scandal when the flight of those weak in faith would not give scandal. For
Lying 3 I I their neighbors might judge from the flight of those who have chosen such a strict form of life that they would not risk their life to defend their faith, because they do not think life worth jeopardizing for such a reason, or that faith should be taken so seriously.
[Reply to the Initial Arguments] To the arguments at the beginning of this question:
[To I] To the first I say that Abraham did not say something that he did not believe in his own mind. For Josephus in his book of Antiquities
[1, ch. 22] gives this account. When he went apart with his son, leaving his servants, he informed his son of how he had been miraculously conceived and how, if he were sacrificed, God would miraculously restore him to life. Abraham firmly believed this would happen, because he did not doubt the promise of God [in Genesis 2 I: I 2]: "It is through Isaac that descendants shall bear your name." Hence, even though he intended to sacrifice Isaac, nevertheless he also had in mind that God would miraculously restore him to life and he would return with him.
Hence, when he said to his servants: "We will come back to you," he said what he believed in his heart. Neither would Abraham, whose life was so exemplary, be easily accused of telling a lie.
[To 2] As for Jacob's lie, although some have tried hard to excuse him and other patriarchs of the Old Testament from the charge of lying, since in other matters it is conceded that they had a law that was imperfect and a modicum of grace, whereas we by contrast have a perfect law and an abundance of grace, and still there is no denying our people at times lie and have been deceitful, it does not seem very reasonable to deny that at times the patriarchs lied or could have lied.
And if this be so, even though they are praised for their good deeds, and we take them as examples in this but not in what they did badly, we do not obstinately defend them or excuse them. Nevertheless, such tales as are told of them could be understood figuratively, or given another meaning than what the words seem at first reading to express.
But there is no need to dwell further on such interpretations.
[To 3] In the case of Joseph, however, because he was a perfect observer of the divine law, one could say his lie to his brothers was only jocose, which is clear from what happened afterwards. For in the end he revealed the truth to them, and if he instilled fear into them for a time, he only punished them according to their deserts. For their treachery in selling their brother into Egyptian slavery, they not only deserved to be frightened, but merited a much greater punishment.
[To 4] As for the other arguments, about Rahab, the midwives, and Rachael, there is no need to excuse them; neither does Scripture commend their deeds insofar as their lies went. It rather praises the prudence of Rahab, whereby she saved herself and her family.
3 I2 Sin As for the statement about God building up the families of the midwives there are various opinions, as the Master of History [Peter
Comester] indicates in his exposition on this passage; and perhaps the more probable view is that which states that they had a good motive of charity, and it was for this that God gave them a temporal reward, since they did not deserve an eternal one, because of the sin connected with their action. Or even more probably, one could say that theirs was a polite or white lie, because it was useful in saving the Jewish children and harmed no one. Therefore God would have rewarded their motives and good will and would still not have denied them eternal life, since their sin was only venial.
But then this question arises. Should one, because of a powerful motive of charity, choose to tell such a lie and commit a venial sin, or should one refrain from both the lie and the act of charity it represents? That one should never choose to sin venially seems to prove the case of the second alternative, whereas in favor of the first is the fact that this state of venial sin will not remain forever and will be expiated either in this life or the next, whereas the magnanimous act of charity on the other hand will merit a reward great, because eternal, or at least the degree to which it will be rewarded will be eternal. Since such an evil is of itself not eternal but temporal, it does not seem one ought to omit something which of itself is the cause in some way of an eternal good. Though I will put off discussing this question here, this much can be said in reply to the present objection that the midwives only sinned venially, because their lie was an officious or polite one.
And their charitable motive-were anything else required for it to be meritorious-was of such great value that it would have merited eternal life as well as a reward in this life, because in that age God did bestow some temporal goods on his worshipers.
To the argument from Judith it is said that she did not sin, because the additional words said in the presence of Holofernes, she did not mean to direct to him but to God. Now, it is necessary that words said aloud be intended to convey not what the hearer has in mind, but what was intended by the speaker. But in speaking to a ruler, to whom one is bound to reply in good faith, some declare one is obliged to answer according to the mind of the inquirer, so that here-by using words that would be false if they were directed to the authority, but true if addressed to God-she does not speak truthfully, because in such a case one is not allowed to be addressing God. For if this were permitted, nothing would seem to be certain where human speech is concerned, nor would anyone seem to have any certainty about words one's neighbor spoke. At least no one would appear to lie no matter
Lying 3 I 3 what he might say to a second person, provided it would be true if addressed to God.-But if you are bound to answer truthfully only your ruler, though not someone else, and by not telling him the truth, you could be disobedient or lying, whereas you would not be disobedient or lying in not speaking the truth to someone else, it is still not clear how you are lying more by not speaking the truth to the one than to the other. If therefore those words, which were said there and which seem excessive, cannot be excused in some way, it does not seem to be a great inconvenience to admit that she was speaking a white or polite lie to her own people but perniciously to him, whose death she intended. Nevertheless, her lie in the first case is preferable to her perniciousness, because the good of the state, especially one worshiping God, is preferable to the temporal good of a private person, especially an infidel.
Some may object to this that even in warfare it is necessary to keep faith, so that the lack of faith or the lie of any Christian in war, even against the infidel, is condemned. If some subterfuge or deception not repugnant to truth is permitted in war, it would not include lying.
Also if she adorned herself with the intention of seducing Holofemes by her looks, and in this sinned mortally by wanting him to will to sin mortally with her, then it does not seem entirely certain that she avoided all mortal sin, and thus her exploit is narrated in Scripture and recited in the Church as something laudable only insofar as it manifested religious devotion, though some of the other circumstances connected with this deed are neither praiseworthy nor licit.
[To 5] To the last, about dissimulation, I say that one could do so in several ways: [I] a person could pretend some good was in him by using some probable signs or arguments. For example, through genuflections and adorations one could pretend devotion was present where there was none, and such simulation is hypocrisy and a mortal sin. [2] In another way, a person could pretend evil is not in him by showing signs to the opposite effect, or [3] he could simply conceal it by not manifesting signs that commonly reveal it. And the first of these would seem to pertain to hypocrisy, for instance, if some lustful man, hearing talk about women, were to spit and swear as a sign of chasteness, though he had opposite sentiments in his heart. The second is not an evil for someone who perceives such simulation. Indeed simulation of this sort can be something praiseworthy in an evil person, because it is shameful to parade one's sin, according to that dictum [of Isaiah 3:9]: "They declare their sin and hide it not." For though evil be in the heart, to add an external sign of it is to add evil to evil. But in indifferent matters [4] someone can perform some actions which of