7. HAPPINESS
Happiness
I say then that the same thing holds for the will, because the natural will is really not will at all, nor is natural volition true volition, for the term "natural" effectively cancels or negates the sense of both "will" and "volition." Nothing remains but the relationship a power has to its proper perfection. Consequently, it is the same power that is called
"natural will" as regards the necessary relationship it has to its perfection as is called "free." The latter term expresses the proper and intrinsic relation that is specifically the will.
Another way in which one could speak of "natural will" would be to distinguish will from a supernatural power or will. In such a case the distinction would be between the will itself as in a purely natural state and the same will as informed by gifts of grace.
Still a third way would be to take "natural will" to mean the will insofar as it elicits an act in conformity with its natural inclination, which would always be aimed at its own advantage. The will is called free, however, insofar as it lies in its power to elicit an act opposed to this inclination, for it possesses the power to elicit or not elicit an act in conformity with this inclination.
I concede that every will is in control or master of its own act. . . I say that "natural will" as such and as natural is neither a will nor a potency, but refers to the inclination the potency has to tend towards its proper perfection, not the inclination to act in this way. It is imperfect unless it possesses that perfection to which this tendency inclines this power. Hence the natural will does not tend, but is the tendency itself by which the will as an absolute or nonrelative entity tends, and this it does passively, being a tendency to receive something. But there is another tendency in this same power inasmuch as it tends freely and actively to elicit an act. Thus there is a twofold tendency in the one power, one active, the other passive. Therefore, to the form [of the argument to the contrary] I say that "natural will" according to its formal meaning is neither a power nor a will, but rather an inclination of the will, being a tendency by which it tends passively to receive what perfects it.
7. HAPPINESS
(Ordinaria IV, suppl., dist 49. qq. 9-10) Must happiness be desired above everything, and is it the rationale behind all willing?
I reply to this first question: There is a twofold appetite or "will": one, namely, that is natural, another that is free. For the will can be considered as a certain kind of nature insofar as it has an inclination and natural appetite for its own perfection, just as any other nature
I56 The Will and Its Inclinations does. The first thing to consider about the will, then, has to do with its natural volition as a certain kind of nature; and then, secondly, we have to consider the will insofar as it is a free appetite with a volition that is free.
[Article I: The Will as a Nature] As for the initial article, we must first consider just what a natural appetite is. And I say it is not an elicited act, because the natural appetite of the will is related to the will as the natural appetite of the intellect is related to intellection. If this is not an elicited act of the intellect, then neither is the natural appetite in the will an elicited act.
Also, the natural appetite of the will is always present in the will; if it were an elicited act, then, there would be some elicited act that is perpetually in the will; but the will has no such perpetual act, for then we should have experienced it in ourselves. For it is incongruous that there should be some perpetual operation going on in us that we are ignorant of-as the Philosopher argues in regard to the incongruity of habits [being actions of ours].
Furthermore, if it were an elicited act in the will, then there would be two opposing acts in the will at the same time, because the free will can will the opposite of what the natural appetite desires. Consider St.
Paul, who cried out by reason of his natural appetite: "We do not wish to be stripped naked but rather to have the heavenly dwelling envelop us" [2 Cor. 5:4], and yet, according to his free appetite he longed to be freed from this life and to be with Christ [Philippians 1:23]. Hence the natural appetite is no more an elicited act of the will than is the natural appetite in a stone.
What, then, is it? I say that it is simply the inclination the will has towards its own perfection, just as in the case of other things that lack a free appetite. In Bk. I of the Physics, the Philosopher refers to this appetite when he says that matter desires form as the imperfect desires its perfection.
[To the question] If it is the natural rather than the free appetite that is referred to, then the reply to the question is clear, for the will necessarily or perpetually seeks happiness, and this in regard to a particular happiness.
That it does so necessarily, is obvious, because a nature could not remain a nature without being inclined to its own perfection. Take away this inclination and you destroy the nature. But this natural appetite is nothing other than an inclination of this sort to its proper perfection; therefore the will as nature necessarily wills its perfection, which consists above all in happiness, and it desires such by its natural appetite.
Happiness
That it seeks this in the highest measure is proved, because the supreme inclination of nature is towards its own perfection. For if nature desires its perfection, then it desires above all its supreme perfection.
The Philosopher argues in this fashion in his preface to Bk. I of his Metaphysics. If "all men desire by nature to know," then they desire above all that which is the supreme science [namely, metaphysics].
But since the supreme perfection of the will is happiness, it follows that the will as nature wills this above all.-Also, if as nature it seeks happiness necessarily, then it seeks it above all. The implication follows, because if it is not in something's power to tend or not to tend, then it is not in its power to tend in a remiss fashion. Therefore, if the will as nature is determined necessarily to seek happiness, then as nature it seeks it above all.
That it seeks happiness in particular in this fashion, is evident, because this appetite is directed towards a perfection in which the will is really perfected; but real perfection is not something general or universal, but something singular. Therefore, it desires happiness in particular.-Furthermore, this "seeking" is not an act that follows upon knowledge, because then it would not be natural, but free. But the universal is only an object of the intellect or something consequent upon an action of the intellect; therefore, this appetite in the will refers to happiness in particular.
[Article 2: The Will as a Free Appetite] [The view of St. Thomas and Henry of Ghent] The second article asks whether all desire happiness necessarily and in the highest measure in virtue of their free appetite. There is one opinion which claims they do so in regard to happiness in general, but not in particular. The reason they give is this. That is necessarily desired in which there is no aspect of evil or defect of good. Such is happiness in general; therefore, it follows that such is desired in the highest degree, because that which has no power to act or function also lacks the power to act intensely or remissly. But they admit it is not necessary that happiness in particular be so desired, because then no one could sin.
[Refutation of this view] Against this opinion we argued at length in Bk. I in the question as to whether one who apprehends the ultimate end necessarily enjoys it as such. As for the present, it seems to me that the following involves a contradiction: "All necessarily desire happiness in general when they apprehend it, but this is not the case when they know of happiness in particular. " For if happiness known in general induces desire necessarily because it possesses every aspect of good and no evil aspect or defect of goodness, and happiness in particular possesses every aspect of good even more fully than does hap-
The Will and Its Inclinations piness in general, it follows that when the end or happiness in particular is known, all must seek it necessarily.
Also, the universal does not include any greater perfection than does the particular. Indeed, the particular seems rather to add perfection beyond that of the universal; therefore, happiness in general bespeaks no greater perfection than beatitude in particular. Hence, if it is impossible not to seek happiness when grasped in general because such lacks any aspect of evil, all the less could one fail to seek our particular end.
Furthermore, if the will necessarily seeks happiness in general, this necessity in the will can be presumed to stem from a natural inclination of the will to happiness. But the natural inclination of the will is towards something particular and not to something universal, as was made clear above. Therefore, all the more must one assume necessity in the will in its quest of the ultimate end.
A Iso, how can both these statements be true at once: "The will necessarily desires happiness known in general" and "The intellect, without a shadow of doubt, dictates that happiness is only to be found in this particular end, and nevertheless, the will need not necessarily will this particular end"? This is saying nothing less than that the will seeks the same thing necessarily and not necessarily.
[Scotus' answer to the question] I reply to this article that the will of a pilgrim in this life for the most part wants happiness, whether known in general or in particular, namely, where the intellect judges or asserts without doubt that happiness is to be found in this particular. Nevertheless, it does not of necessity will happiness either in general or in particular. The reason is this. Necessity in a superior cause cannot stem from necessity in an inferior cause, because the lesser cause cannot determine the mode of action of the superior cause any more than it can force it to act. Therefore, the superior cause, if it acts of necessity, does so because of something intrinsic to the potency and stemming from the nature of such a cause. If, then, the will were necessitated to will something, this necessity would pertain to it of its very nature and not from some other inferior cause. And then I argue further that the superior cause, if it acts necessarily, moves the inferior causes to act by the same necessity, whenever their action is required necessarily for its own function. Since the will requires apprehension in the intellect for its own act of willing, it follows that if the will necessarily wills happiness, then it necessarily forces the intellect to continually consider happiness, which is false.
I say therefore that the will contingently wills the end and happiness both in general and in particular, although in most cases it seeks
Happiness
happiness in general, and also in particular when the intellect has no prior doubt that happiness consists in this particular thing. Hence, if someone seeks happiness and at the same time believes that beatitude consists in the fruition of the divine essence shared by the three
[divine] persons, then for that moment it wills that end. But because it has no desire to live virtuously, it does not will that end, or at least it does not will the means needed to attain such.
The reason why the will wants happiness in most cases, is that the will for the most part follows the inclination of its natural appetite.
For it is impossible that the will be habituated or inclined to will something to any greater degree than it is inclined by its natural appetite.
Since the will, then, can only be habituated by a habit to follow for the most part the inclination of that habit and, indeed, to take delight in acting in accord with such an inclination, all the more so will the will, for the most part, will that towards which its natural appetite inclines it. And therefore, a just person, even when blessed with a gift or habit, finds death difficult to choose, and it becomes a matter of patience for such, because it runs counter to one's natural inclination.
Since all will happiness by reason of their natural appetite, as we said above, it follows that the will for the most part wills to be happy.
But is this act of the will whereby it wills happiness "natural"? I say it is not properly such, because "natural volition" refers to the will's natural inclination qua nature for happiness. But it can be called a "natural act" insofar as it is conformed to one's natural inclination. For that reason Augustine says in his Enchiridion: "Neither should we say the will is not free, because it so wills to be happy that it cannot will to be miserable." Hence, just as some volition is said to be virtuous, not because virtue elicited this act (for, I believe, no habit is the total elicitive principle of any act), but because it conforms to the inclination of virtue and is elicited in accordance with that inclination, so too in this case the will's volition of happiness can be called natural because it is conformed to the natural inclination of the will. Nevertheless, the act is not merely natural, but free. However, it is not the result of deliberation. For, to be deliberative, volition has to do with something like the means to an end, involving choice and known inferentially through a practical syllogism. "Happiness is a good and should be sought," however, is not a practical conclusion, but rather a practical principle.
[A doubt] But the above quotation from Augustine gives rise to a doubt. For if we cannot wish to be miserable, then I nill misery in an unqualified sense. And then this follows: "If I necessarily nill misery, then I necessarily will happiness." The implication is clear for two rea-
r60 The Will and Its Inclinations sons. First, because volition is no less related to happiness than nolition is to misery or evil. Second, because the act of nolition is only possible in virtue of some volition, for-as Anselm said above-l nill a thing only because I will something else. But a cause is more perfect than its effect; hence I will happiness even more than I nill misery.
[Solution] I reply that neither do I will happiness necessarily, nor do I nill misery necessarily. Hence, this does not follow: "I do not will to be miserable, therefore I nill misery," or "I nill to be miserable." Nor does this follow: "I cannot will to be miserable, therefore I must of necessity nill to be miserable," for nilling is just as positive an act as willing is, and one is as free as the other. Therefore, neither is elicited necessarily as regards any object, and hence I can refuse to elicit an act of nolition with respect to evil just as I can refuse to will what is good.
Nevertheless, when evil is shown to me I am able to elicit an act of nolition only, just as when offered some good, if I elicit an act, it can only be one of volition. And therefore, one ought to argue here in this fashion: "I cannot will to be miserable, therefore I cannot hate to be happy." But from this it does not follow that "therefore it is necessary that I do not nill happiness," because no nilling is necessarily elicited by the will, as was made clear above.
[Objection] But one may still persist in objecting that no power is necessarily deprived of performing an act except in virtue of some determination it has towards the opposite act, just as frigidity is not taken away from fire except by reason of its determination to heat, neither is some color excluded from a surface except because it has been determined by another color. Therefore, in the will there is no impossibility of nilling happiness unless it be because it is necessarily determined towards the opposite act, namely, towards willing happiness.
[Answer] I reply: the reason an act of willing misery or nilling happiness is excluded from the will is that misery is not suited by nature to be an object of volition any more than happiness is naturally suited to be an object of nolition. Just as the eye is excluded from seeing black through an act of vision produced by a dilation of the medium, because blackness is not suited to be such an object for that sort of visual act, so too in the case at hand. Hence, the will is incapable of having such an act with respect to such an object. I admit, then, that the will is determined to will happiness and to nill misery to this extent that if it should elicit some act with respect to these objects, it is limited and has to elicit an act of willing in regard to happiness and an act of nilling as regards misery. Nevertheless, it is not absolutely determined to elicit either the one act or the other.
As for the reason given to support the other view, namely, that the will must necessarily love whatever possesses no aspect of evil or lack
Happiness of good, I say that this is false, for the will is free with respect to any act of volition or nolition, and no object necessitates it. Nevertheless, the will cannot hate or nill happiness, nor will misery. Hence, one ought to argue in this way. The will cannot recoil from that object in which there is no aspect of evil or defect of good; therefore, the will cannot hate or detest happiness-which is true. But it does not follow from this that it wills happiness necessarily.
If you object: If the will of necessity neither wills happiness nor hates or detests it, then what sort of act can the will have when the intellect shows it happiness? I grant that in most cases it will have an act of volition, but it does not necessarily have any act. Hence, when it is shown happiness, it can refrain from acting at all. In regard to any object, then, the will is able not to will or nill it, and can suspend itself from eliciting any act in particular with regard to this or that.
And this is something anyone can experience in himself when someone proffers some good. Even if it is presented as something to be considered and willed, one can tum away from it and not elicit any act in its regard ...
As for the second question [viz., is happiness the rationale for all willing?], it must be admitted that so far as its natural appetite goes, the will seeks whatever it seeks because of happiness, since according to its natural appetite it seeks only what perfects it. Whatever perfects its natural appetite, however, is a perfection ordered towards its ultimate perfection, and therefore, since by its natural appetite it seeks whatever it seeks as something ordered to the good of the seeker, which is happiness, it follows that whatever the will seeks in virtue of its natural appetite, it seeks because of happiness.
But if one asks the question about the will's appetite insofar as it is an elicited act, then I say that it is not necessary that the will seek whatever it seeks because of its ultimate end as a source of happiness.
For one could fail to seek something because of happiness either negatively or contrariwise. Negatively, because one could seek something and not consider the ultimate end of happiness, and consequently at that moment the will would not seek it because of happiness, since one would not be thinking of it then. Similarly, one could seek something without ordering it to this other end, and therefore, it would not be sought because of happiness at that time. Also one could fail to seek something because of happiness in a contrary sense, if it were something contrarily opposed and not ordered to happiness. For someone having faith could conceive of happiness in particular insofar as it involves the enjoyment of the divine essence, shared by the three
[divine] persons, and at the same time such a person could think of