16. God'S Absolute And Ordained Power
God's Absolute and Ordained Power object of this justice, as it were. But in truth nothing outside of God can be said to be definitely just without this added qualification. In an unqualified sense where a creature is concerned, God is just only in relationship to his first justice, namely, because such a creature has been actually willed by the divine will.
16. GOD'S ABSOLUTE AND ORDAINED POWER
(Ordinario I, dist. 44) In this forty-fourth distinction-where the Master [Peter Lombard] asks whether God could have made things better than he did-I raise this question: Could God have made things otherwise than he has ordered them to be made?
[Arguments Pro and Can] It seems not:
For then he could have made things inordinately. The consequent is false, therefore the antecedent is also false.
On the contrary:
That things could have been made otherwise is not self-contradictory, neither is the world necessary; therefore, etc.
[To the Question] I reply:
In every agent acting intelligently and voluntarily that can act in conformity with an upright or just law but does not have to do so of necessity, one can distinguish between its ordained power and its absolute power. The reason is that either it can act in conformity with some right and just law, and then it is acting according to its ordained power (for it is ordained insofar as it is a principle for doing something in conformity with a right or just law), or else it can act beyond or against such a law, and in this case its absolute power exceeds its ordained power. And therefore it is not only in God, but in every free
-agent that can either act in accord with the dictates of a just law or go beyond or against that law, that one distinguishes between absolute and ordained power; therefore, the jurists say that someone can act de facto, that is, according to his absolute power, or de jure, that is, according to his ordained legal power.
But when that upright law-according to which an agent must act in order to act ordinately-is not in the power of that agent, then its absolute power cannot exceed its ordained power in regard to any object without it acting disorderly or inordinately. For, as regards such an agent, the law must remain in force, but an action that is not in con-
God and the Moral Law formity with this right and just law will be neither right nor ordinate, because the agent is bound to act in accord with that regulation to which it is subject. Hence all who are subject to a divine law, if they do not act according to it, act inordinately.
But whenever the law and its rectitude are in the power of the agent, so that the law is right only because it has been established, then the agent can freely order things otherwise than this right law dictates and still can act orderly, because he can establish another right or just law according to which he may act orderly. In such a case it is not simply necessary that his absolute power exceed his ordered power, because his action might still be ordered according to another law just as it had been earlier, but he would still exceed his ordained power according to the prior law if he acted beyond or against such.
This could be illustrated in the case of a ruler and his subjects in regard to a positive law.
Applying this to the issue at hand, I say that there are some general laws, ordering things rightly, that have been set up beforehand by the divine will and not by the divine intellect, as something antecedent to any act of the divine will, as was said in dist. 38. But when the intellect presents such a law to the divine will, for instance, "Everyone to be glorified must first be in a state of grace," if it pleases his free will, then it becomes a right or just law, and so too with other laws.
God, therefore, insofar as he is able to act in accord with those right laws he set up previously, is said to act according to his ordained power; but insofar as he is able to do many things that are not in accord with, but go beyond, these preestablished laws, God is said to act according to his absolute power. For God can do anything that is not self-contradictory or act in any way that does not include a contradiction (and there are many such ways he could act); and then he is said to be acting according to his absolute power.
Hence, I say that many other things can be done orderly; and many things that do not include a contradiction other than those that conform to present laws can occur in an ordained way when the rectitude of such law-according to which one acts rightly and orderly-lies in the power of the agent himself. And therefore such an agent can act otherwise, so that he establishes another upright law, which, if it were set up by God, would be right, because no law is right except insofar as the divine will accepts it as established. And in such a case the absolute power of the agent in regard to something would not extend to anything other than what might happen ordinately if it occurred, not indeed ordainedly with respect to this present order, but ordinately with reference to some other order that the divine will could set up if it were able to act in such a way.
God's Absolute and Ordained Power
Keep in mind also that what is ordained and happens regularly can occur in two ways:
One way is with reference to a universal order. This would involve common law, like the common law that ordains that "every impenitent sinner must be damned" (as if a king were to establish the law that every murderer is to die). The second way is with reference to a particular order. This involves a particular judgment or decision that does not pertain to a universal law, since a law has to do with cases in general, whereas in a singular case what is involved is not a general law, but rather a decision according to law about something that is against the law (for instance, a decision that this murderer is to die).
I say, therefore, that God can act otherwise than is prescribed not only by a particular order, but also by a universal order or law of justice, and in so doing he could still act ordainedly, because what God could do by his absolute power that is either beyond or runs counter to the present order, he could do ordainedly.
But we speak of ordained power in reference only to an order established by a universal law, and not to that which rightly holds by law for a particular case. This is clear from the fact that it is possible for God to save one whom he does not actually save, a living sinner who will die, however, without repenting and will be damned. Admittedly, however, God could not in the same way save Judas, who is already damned. (But for God's absolute power not even this is impossible, since it does not include a contradiction.) It is impossible, therefore, to save Judas in the same way it is possible to save this other sinner, since it is true that the latter could be saved by God's ordained power, whereas Judas could not. And God could save the sinner not just by a particular order (which is concerned, as it were, with only this specific action and particular operation), but by one that is universal, because if he were to save this sinner, he could still do so within the framework of his preestablished just and right laws about the salvation and damnation of individuals. For the salvation of such a sinner is still consistent with the decree "One who remains evil to the end, will be damned" (which is a preestablished law about those who will be damned). The reason is that this sinner has not yet died in sin, and can still cease to be a sinner (especially while still in this life). By his grace God could prevent him from dying impenitent-like a king who prevents someone from killing, and then if he does not condemn the man, he is not violating his universal law against homicide. But it is not consistent with the particular law he did establish that he could save Judas. God could foresee that Judas could be saved by his ordained power-not what is now his ordained power, for at present
I94 God and Moral Law Judas could only be saved by God's absolute power; but Judas's salvation could have been accomplished by God's ordained power in another order he might have set up.
The sort of possibility the divine will still retains with regard to particulars and to what has been instituted according to just and right laws, without God actually willing the opposite of what he now wills, is explained in dist. 39.
[Reply to Both Arguments at the Beginning] To the initial argument, it is clear that the implication does not hold, because to make something in another way than is presently ordained is not by that very fact to act inordinately, because other laws could be set up according to which he would be acting ordinately.
To the argument for the opposite I concede that it proves God has absolute power; but if his power were to become a principle or cause of anything, it would by that very fact be ordained, but not according to that same preestablished order he had before.