22. The Will As The Seat Of The Moral Virtues
PART VI The Intellectual and Moral Virtues
22. THE WILL AS THE SEAT OF THE MORAL VIRTUES
(Ordinatio III, supp!., dist. 33) Regarding the thirty-second and thirty-third distinctions [of Bk. III]
I ask: Are the moral virtues in the will as their subject?
[Arguments Pro and Con} For the negative:
In Bk. I of the Ethics, the Philosopher says that they are in the irrational part of the soul and the Commentator explains that they are in that which is intermediate between the vegetative and the rational parts; but this is not the will but rather the sense appetite.
Furthermore, in Bk. III of the Ethics the Philosopher places fortitude and temperance in the appetite of the sensitive portion of the soul.
Also, look up the seventh comment on Bk. VI of the Ethics, which explains what prudence is.
Furthermore, according to Bk. I of the Politics, ch. 3, reason rules the inferior appetite with a despotic rule, but the higher appetite with a political, i. e., civil, rule, so that the appetite can be countermoved; therefore, in order that it may be moved delightfully by right reason it will be necessary to posit some virtues in it.
Also, fortitude and temperance are said to be in the irascible and concupiscible portion; these are not distinguished in the will, however, but only in the sense appetite, because the conditions in the object which they are concerned with, namely, the arduous and delec-
The Intellectual and Moral Virtues table good respectively, do not alter the object of the will per se, but only the sensible good which confronts the sense appetite.
For the positive:
Virtues are habits of choice, from their definition in II Ethics; but election is an act of the will or of reason according to the Philosopher in VI Ethics, for it is a deliberative appetite. But this pertains to the will, which presupposes rational knowledge for its operation. Now, a habit is in that potency to which that operation pertains per se; therefore, the moral habit pertains per se to the will itself.
Besides, virtue has the honorable good [bonum hones tum] as its per se object; but this is the per se object of the will; therefore, etc.
Furthermore, virtue is the principle or source of a praiseworthy act according to II Ethics; but nothing is worthy of praise unless an action of the will is involved; therefore, virtue pertains to the faculty that acts freely of itself and is the reason why a person acts laudably, and that is the will.
[Body of the Question} [A. The Opinion of Others] Some claim that the Philosopher's sentiment was negative, or otherwise he expressed himself insufficiently concerning the moral virtues.
For wherever he speaks of them he seems to say they are in the sensitive part, and nowhere, apparently, except in speaking of justice in Bk. V of the Ethics, does he admit they are in the intellective part.
Arguments are presented for this view, the first of which is this. The will is of itself determined to what is simply good in an unqualified sense, for this-in contrast to the good of nature, which is the object of the sense appetite-is its proper object. Or if the will could tend towards a good of nature, it would be sufficiently determined to tend or not tend towards such accordingly as reason reveals the good to it, for it seems that the object insofar as it is apprehended moves the will, and therefore there is no need to postulate a habit in the will, but it is enough that the intellect be perfected so that it will show the good correctly.
The second argument is based on the liberty of the will, for as free the will can sufficiently determine itself, and needs no habit to determine it. Or the argument could also be put as follows: if the will acts freely of itself, then anything that would determine it, in such a way as to incline it to act, would be repugnant to it. But virtue acts after the fashion of nature, and therefore, virtue is repugnant to the very way the will acts and hence is not to be found in it.
A third argument is this. Where there are extremes there is a middle ground; where there are extremes of passion therefore there is
The Will as the Seat of the Moral Virtues
virtue which moderates the passions. Now, the passions are in the sense appetite and not in the will; therefore, etc.
Fourthly, I argue in this way. If virtue could be produced in the will by righteous actions other than acts of the sense appetite, then an angel could acquire virtues by performing such righteous acts of the will as pertain to the moral virtues. But the consequent is incongruous and clearly is contrary to what the Philosopher says in Bk. X of the Ethics, where he denies moral virtues in such [pure spirits].
[Refutation of This Opinion1 This view can be refuted by arguments similar to those presented in its favor.
[I. Arguments from authority] The first is based on the authority of Aristotle, for in the Politics I, he admits it is necessary for the regent to possess virtue in order to rule rightly, and this is even more necessary for him than for the servant to be rightly submissive, and he draws an analogy there with the higher and lower portions of the soul.
Furthermore, those who hold this other view concede that justice is in the will; therefore, arguments based on what holds commonly for both the will and the moral virtues are not conclusive. Nor should the authority of what the Philosopher says in Ethics I about those portions of the soul that can obey the rational principle be applied only to the sense appetite, because if that is the only part he understands to be obedient to reason, then he has not covered the divisions of the soul adequately insofar as it is capable of moral virtue. And insofar as he had no intention of treating this subject adequately, it follows also that he had no intention of covering its divisions sufficiently either. For he treats of the soul insofar as it is subject to moral virtue, such as justice, at least, which resides neither in the reason as such nor in that portion which obeys reason, as he understands these two terms.
Furthermore, before defining virtue in terms of a mean [between two extremes] the Philosopher, wishing to investigate the character of happiness [as an activity in accord with virtue], says in Ethics I that apart from the nutritive part of the soul, what comes next is the sensitive part, which seems to be common to all animals. What remains is a certain operative part of the soul, which indeed can be persuaded by reason, and this insofar as it is intelligent and willing. From this text it is clear that he first excludes the sensitive portion, because in it there is no distinctive operation of man qua human, such as that which is in accord with the moral virtues. Consequently, these virtues were not to be located mainly in that part; therefore, that which remains, namely, the operative part possessing [such virtues]' is that portion of the soul that excels per se the entire sensitive portion, and he divides this part
The Intellectual and Moral Virtues into what is intelligent and what is readily persuasible by reason.
Hence, by "persuasible by reason" he there understands the will, because by "intelligent" he certainly refers to the intellect. Thus it seems we can infer expressly from his own words that he sometimes speaks of the will as able to obey reason, whereas at other times he speaks of the sense appetite as such, as at the end of the first book. Now, just as he takes "able to obey reason" in a twofold sense, so he also gives "rational" a twofold meaning. One sense is strict and primary, and refers only to the intellect; the other is neither strict nor primary, but is still properly called "rational" in an unqualified sense, and this is applicable to the will. The third sense, however, is not proper, but is taken broadly as referring to the sense appetite. Hence, the will, which is in the middle, is at times called "rational" in comparison to one of the extremes [the irrational appetite], and at other times called "able to obey reason" in comparison to the other extreme [or intellect]. For taking reason strictly, it is "persuasible by reason," whereas taking
"reason" not properly, but broadly as anything pertaining to the mind, the will is rational. The sensitive appetite is not only persuasible but able to obey, and one could well ponder these words, for what is truly free is persuasible, but the sense appetite is not properly persuasible, but is able to obey, because it is subject to the command of the will.
Furthermore, there are many authorities for what we say, one of which is Augustine in The Morals of the Church, ch. 15, where he wants to point out that the four moral virtues are nothing more than well-ordered love or various orderly loves. Look it up. And also what
Augustine says at some length in The City of God, Bk. XIV, chs. 5 and 6, is also to the point. Look for it there. And Avicenna also has something about this in the last chapter of Bk. IX of his Metaphysics.
[2. Arguments from reason] Furthermore the reasons cited for this other opinion can be turned in favor of the opposite view.
[As for the first] Take the first argument, about the will being undetermined as regards opposites. Now, it is such not only as regards opposite objects but also as regards opposite ways of acting, namely, rightly and not rightly; therefore it needs something which inclines it specifically to act rightly, and this will be a virtue. The implication is clear, for the sole reason for postulating virtues in the powers is to regulate what of itself could act either rightly or not rightly. Proof of the antecedent: the will can choose whatever is shown to it in which it sees some aspect of its first object, but in choosing such it can act in a way that is not right.
If you claim it is enough that reason presents the object correctly and hence reason requires the virtue, not the will, this is not true. If it
The Will as the Seat of the Moral Virtues
were, reason would have to make a mistake in revealing the object before the will could make a bad choice, and thus there would be an error in the intellect before the first sin is in the will, which is irrational, for then the punishment [i. e., a darkening of the intellect] would precede the fault.
Furthermore, even granting the will could be sufficiently determined by the intellect to choose rightly, it would not follow that no habit is produced in the will. Since the intellect, insofar as it has an operation that precedes the act of the will and acts in a purely natural fashion, is more determined to judge correctly, one would not deny that a habit, such as prudence, is produced there by its frequent acts of correct judgment. Since the will, then, is not a potency that is of itself more determined to one way of acting than the intellect, by its frequently elicited acts, the will can produce a certain correct aptitude inclining it towards similar acts, and that aptitude is what I call a virtue.
Furthermore, a habit is postulated not only that powers may act rightly, but that they may act promptly and with delight. Now, even though the will would be able to choose correctly on the basis of reason, it would not do so delightfully or promptly without a habit of its own. Proof: if a man with a previous vice were recently called to act rightly in the opposite way, and right reason dictates that something opposed to his vice should be chosen, even though he chooses this, he would not do so delightfully. For his first righteous act does not immediately destroy the entire vicious habit he had acquired previously; indeed it makes little or no inroad against it. This is clear from experience, for the newly converted chooses what is good only with difficulty and would find it delightful rather to choose in his earlier customary way. If the will is to follow the dictates of reason with delight, it needs a habit to choose the sort of act that conforms to that habit.
To this first argument, then, I reply that it is based on an equivocation as to what constitutes "good" in an unqualified sense. For this can be understood in contrast either to an apparent good or to good in particular. If it is taken in the first sense, then an unqualified good is not an adequate object of the will, because then the will could not choose an apparent good, for no potency can have an act in regard to something in which there is not some aspect of its first object; and thus the will of any pilgrim by virtue of its object would be confirmed [in grace] already in this life and prevented from sinning. Understood in the second way, one could concede that good under the aspect of good in general is an object that can be sought by the will with its proper cognitive power [i.e., the intellect]. The sense, according to the
The Intellectual and Moral Virtues common dictum, knows the singular and the intellect the universal.
Therefore, the sense appetite could have as its object the good as now present, that is, the singular good with all its individuating conditions, whereas the will has as its object the good as revealed to it by the intellect, which is the universal good and is simply good without qualification. Also the addition to the argument that reason by showing what is right suffices [to determine the will to tend to the good] is against that erroneous article about the will being unable to choose the opposite of a universal or particular good [condemned in 1277, viz., "'If reason is right, the will is right' is an error"].
[To the second argument] The second reason given also can be used to prove the opposite. For an agent needs a disposition even more for some action in its power than for anything else, for if it does not have this in its power, then it will not be credited with any praise or blame when it acts or in regard to the way it acts. But because the will has it in its power to act in a praiseworthy or blameworthy manner, it needs a principle that will enable it to act laudably, and virtue is just such a principle. Also it would seem strange if that for which a man's actions are praised is located precisely in that portion of his soul that is common to him and the brute. Nor is it valid to argue here that a natural agent is determined to acting, therefore the will is also, since it is a kind of naturally active agent, for all agree no habit is needed for agents acting in a purely natural manner, because they are inclined to do so in the highest way. But they do not deny a habit in the intellect, although it acts in a more natural way than does the will, because it is not of itself inclined in the highest degree. Neither does this indetermination [of the will] stem from an imperfection in the agent, but from its [superabundant] lack of limitation, which is a perfection in the agent. For other merely naturally acting agents are limited to one action, so that they cannot perform the contrary or even [refrain from acting when all external conditions for acting are present]; but the will is not thus limited, as was said in dist. 25 of Bk. II.
As for these two proofs, then, I say to the first that although the will by reason of its liberty could determine itself to act, nevertheless in virtue of its action it receives an aptitude that directly inclines it to a similar act. For this unique determination of the will is not the sort of natural form that one finds in fire, for instance, as regards the way it behaves, but it comes from a free action stemming from a potency that is undetermined, and it is in this way that it is determinable by a habit. The answer to the second proof is clear from what was said in dist. 17 of the first book and dist. 25 of the second about how a secondary cause acting naturally can concur with a primary free cause to produce a free act, and how the effect is called free because of the free-
The Will as the Seat of the Moral Virtues
dom of the primary cause. Now, a habit, if it is a cause, is a secondary one where the will is involved.
[To the third argument] The third reason, about moderating the passions, actually proves the opposite, both because there are passions in the will, according to Augustine (The City of God, Bk. XIV, chs. 5 and 6), and also because moderation of a passion can be understood in two ways. Either it is an existing passion or it is one in the future. [I]
An existing passion can be moderated in one of two ways: either [a] there is a diminution of a passion for an object which is apt by nature to delight the sense appetite immoderately if left to itself, or [b] the moderation consists in referring this delight to an end that according to right reason is appropriate, an end, namely, to which, considered simply as an object of the sense appetite, it would not otherwise be referred. [2] A passion that might develop in the future is moderated either by avoiding the object apt to delight it immoderately or by directing the sense appetite only to such objects as are apt to delight it in a moderate way, and then the passion is not itself moderated but is simply prevented from occurring.
But howsoever this moderation of a passion is to be understood, it pertains more to the will than to the sense appetite, because, properly speaking, the will is the rational appetite, and to refer a passion to some appropriate end is an action not of the sense appetite but of the will. For "to refer" is not a function one attributes properly to the sense appetite in the way one ascribes it to the intellect and will. And if one understands "passion" to be something one should avoid if immoderate or should indulge in if moderate, it seems sufficiently clear that as regards such future action it is the will rather than the sense appetite that can do what is right, because the source of the will's knowledge is not the senses but reason, whose role it is to counsel one about future things.
If we consider these arguments which are adduced to support the other opinion, it is clear how they prove the opposite, [first] because the will is not of itself righteous and is able to be rectified as regards that action that is properly its own; [second] because the will is no less undetermined and determinable than is the intellect to which one attributes virtue; [third] because it is also inclined by nature to delight in its own way in that action that is properly its own, and so it ought to have a habit whereby it can act in a way that gives it delight; [fourth] because it is the principal agent in performing actions that are distinctively human, inasmuch as they are free, and because human actions, if they are to be praiseworthy, require in the principal agent a virtue deserving of praise; [fifth] because the will, if it possesses virtues, can
The Intellectual and Moral Virtues more readily moderate the passions in a fitting way than the sense appetite can.
[3. Other arguments] In addition to these reasons, one argues against the individual who holds the opposite opinion in this way. If in the state of innocence there were not present in the sense appetite some passions opposing right reason, there would be no necessity of assigning any virtue to that sense appetite, and still virtues would have been present in that state, because they would have made man perfect, according to the Master. There is also the authority of Augustine for this, first in his thirty-fifth or thirty-sixth Letter, and also in his Soliloquies, where he says: "This is truly perfect virtue, reason arriving at its end." Also, ch. 15 of The City of God, Bk. I. The Master, also, in the text of this distinction assigns [moral virtues] to acts that could remain
[with the soul] in heaven.
[B. Scotus' Own Opinion] One could say to the question that the will on its own without a habit could perform an act that is right and morally good-nor is this true only of the will, for the intellect also could perform a correct judgment without an intellectual habit; for the first act of a correct intellect and a will that is right precedes the habit in whatsoever degree such exists, for from such acts is generated whatever is first present in a habit. Nevertheless, just as in the intellect, either through its first act or through frequently elicited acts, the habit of prudence is generated, so also with the first correct choice consonant with the dictates of right reason, or through many such correct choices, there is generated in the will a proper virtue which inclines the will to choose rightly.
What proves this is the fact that the will's act of choice is naturally prior to any command that it or reason gives to the sense appetite. For reason does not seem to reach the sense appetite except by way of the will, which is properly speaking the rational appetite. Also the will first wills something in itself before it commands any act of an inferior potency in regard to such, for it is not because it commands the inferior potency that it wills such a thing, but vice versa. Therefore, in that prior state, the will by its right choices-since it is just as indeterminate and able to be determined as is the intellect-generates in itself a habit inclining it to choose rightly, and this habit will most properly be called a virtue, because it is the elective habit that most properly inclines the will to act in the way it was generated, by making right choices.
One can concede, however, that if the will by willing can command the sense appetite (by moderating either its passion or the way it goes
The Will as the Seat of the Moral Virtues 23 I after or flees from a thing, if this be an act of the sense appetite), it can also leave behind in the sense appetite by such correct commands some habit that inclines that appetite to move more readily towards sensibles in the way the will commands. And this habit that is left there, although it is not properly a virtue, because it is not an elective habit, nor does it incline one to make choices, can in some sense be conceded to be a virtue, since it inclines one to such things as are in accord with right reason.
[Some Objections1 [I] Against the first part [of my thesis, namely, that virtues, properly speaking, are only in the higher portion of the soul] it is objected that on this view moral virtues could exist in an angel. I prove this because the angel can elicit a correct act of the will in regard to something towards which the sense appetite can be passionately attached, and so from many such righteous acts a virtue will be generated in the angel. What confirms this is that right choices are appropriate not only in regard to passions existing in the sensitive part of the soul but also in regard to passions that are revealed to a person by the intellect, even if they never were nor ever have been actually present there, as was pointed out in the question about practical knowledge in the prologue to the first book. By such choices, then, virtue may be generated in the will with nothing accompanying it in the sense appetite.
[2] Furthermore, if moral virtue were in the will, then such a virtue would be more noble than prudence, because the more noble the subject it perfects, the more noble will the perfection be. But the consequent contradicts what the Philosopher says in Bk. VI of the Ethics; therefore, the antecedent does likewise.
[3] Against the second part [as to what is produced in the sensitive appetite] it is argued that if it is only because the sense appetite is moved by a command of the will that a certain quality is produced there which inclines it towards similar acts, and this is a virtue, then by the same token, a moral habit can be generated in that part of the body that is frequently moved at the command of the will, and not only this, but the same thing can happen in inanimate and nonrational things which the will uses.
[Solution to the Objections1 [To I] To the first it can be granted that if an angel were created in a purely natural state with no moral virtues in the will, then these could be generated in it by many correct choices, not indeed as regards nonexistent passions of the sense appetite, which neither could be nor were nor would have been in the angel, but only as regards such pas-
The Intellectual and Moral Virtues sions revealed to it in general by its intellect, because assuming the intellect shows such to it and dictates to it what choices a person able to have such passions ought to make, the angel's will, by agreeing to such dictates through many elicited acts, could have a moral habit.
And this is evident because every will, if it necessarily lacks the perfection appropriate to the will, is suited to have any perfection of the will whatsoever. But to will what is good as regards actions that can be performed not only by oneself but by others (and this not merely as ordered to the divine good, but insofar as it is good for the agent) represents a certain perfection of the will, and the will of an angel is not necessarily imperfect; therefore, it can have a habit by reason of which it wishes me to have the good that is temperance insofar as such a good is suited to me. And this habit cannot be called "charity," because-as was pointed out-the habit of charity is not just something good that helps us to love God but something that helps us to do so in a special way according to that aspect of his goodness that is proper to him. But if it is not charity, neither is it something other than temperance, because the formal object of a habit does not vary in me and you. Therefore, just as I choose for myself this formal good by reason of the habit of temperance, so also by the same sort of habit everyone else wishes that I have this good, and therefore, in the angel there will be temperance in virtue of which it wishes me this good.
In this way, consequently, one could also postulate moral virtue in God, just as one admits charity in him without its accidentality. And thus the argument about the angel raised against our thesis can provide a reason in favor of it, for the will of the angel can will that good to me, which is properly the habit of temperance insofar as it is the sort of good that it is. And hence it can will this from a habit of temperance, as we have argued, and in this way temperance will exist in the angel, though not in a sense part.
And if one objects that this contradicts the Philosopher, who denies the gods have moral virtues in Ethics, Bk. IV, I reply: Perhaps one would deny them all accidental habits if one assumed as some do that they are naturally happy.
Otherwise, if one does not care to postulate moral virtues in them, one could simply deny the implication of this argument against us.
This could be done in either of two ways: first, because virtue is not concerned with just any good, but with something difficult. But the good which is assumed to be the object of the will is difficult only for one with a sense appetite, who is apt by nature to be pulled towards the opposite of this good, at least under certain circumstances, and from the fact that the sense appetite is so inclined, the will is apt by
The Will as the Seat of the Moral Virtues
nature to take delight in the same thing, and hence it is difficult for the will to tend to good under fitting circumstances. But since the angel has no sense appetite, its will is not inclined by nature to share the delight of such a habit or appetite, and therefore, without difficulty it can tend to what is morally good, and this under such circumstances as reason dictates.-The other way to deny the implication is to say that volition is twofold: one simple, which is a kind of pleasure or satisfaction taken in some object; the other efficacious, by which the person willing, if not impeded, goes after the object wanted. Only the second represents a choice as the Philosopher understands this term in III Ethics where he says: "We may wish for the impossible, but no one chooses such," that is to say, no one wills such efficaciously in the sense of going after it as the result of such a volition. By an act of simple satisfaction, however, one could wish for what is impossible, as happened perhaps in the case of the first angel, who sinned or could have sinned by willing such, namely, equality with God. Hence one could say that in those who have a sensitive appetite, the will could be a principle of many choices in regard to moral good, and this efficacious volition is what we call "choosing." This alone is suited by nature to produce the sort of habit which, though prior to any habit in the sense appetite, is nevertheless suited to be a principle for commanding such an appetite. In the angel, however, there is simple volition, but this is not suited by nature to command anything.
[To 2] As for the second, though one could say that while not every perfection in a more noble subject need be more noble, if there is some perfection there that is less noble than a kindred perfection in a less noble subject, that perfection in the highest of all noble subjects would still have to exceed the highest perfection of that sort among less noble things. But moral virtue is not the highest perfection in the will, nor is prudence the highest in the intellect; charity is the most noble perfection of the will as faith is of the intellect, and charity seems to surpass faith. Still, this answer does not seem to suffice, because with respect to the same object the more noble potency seems to have the more noble act when both act to their utmost, because in such a case there is no excess on the part of the object, which is the same, but only on the part of the potency, and to that extent the more noble excels. Therefore, if there be an act of the practical intellect and an act of the will in regard to the same object, such as a moral good, if both act perfectly, one dictating, the other choosing, then the right choice will be simply more noble than the right dictate, and consequently the habit generated by choices of this sort will be simply more perfect than those produced by correct judgments, which I grant.
The Intellectual and Moral Virtues As for the Philosopher preferring prudence, I reply that prudence is somehow related to the other virtues, insofar as it and its act preceded the generation of either an act or a habit of moral virtue, and because of this priority a moral act and habit is conformed to it as prior and not vice versa. And such priority according to the Philosopher implies that prudence functions as a rule and a measure, and it is in this that its dignity consists, but not in an unqualified sense.
[To 3] As for the third, it is conceded that there could be a virtue and habit in a part of the body, as is clear from the hand of a writer or painter. For my hand is not skilled in those abilities needed to play the cither. But by practice it becomes such, and this aptitude inheres in the hand and is presumed and conceded to be a kind of virtue, because it is a certain aptitude for performing a work of moral virtue. We also grant what was said further about nonrational beings, such as the horse, which can be trained to perform such acts as are customary for it. In purely inanimate things, however, we do not find such an aptitude, for a stone does not rise more easily because it is thrown repeatedly.
[Reply to the Initial Arguments] To the arguments at the beginning, I concede the point made by all the authorities quoted, namely, that there is a certain quality in the sense appetite that could be called a virtue, but that it possesses the character of a virtue less perfectly than does that quality in the will which inclines it to choose [rightly].
As for the last argument, about the irascible and concupiscible parts of the soul, I say that such a distinction exists not only in the sense appetite but also in the will. And when it is objected that the irascible and concupiscible has to do with arduous and delectable objectswhether this is a distinction of objects or not is discussed in the following question-the point is that this distinction can be found on the part of objects in relation to the will as well as in relation to the sense appetite. -As for the further claim that the will is sufficiently perfected by a theological virtue, I reply that this is true as regards the divine good, but this virtue has to do with no other good unless it be as ordered to loving God, so that no act is elicited by charity unless God be the object aimed at, even though it be by way of other objects that serve as means towards this. But not only can I will myself a good that is well ordered, because I willed this out of love for God, but I can also will this same good insofar as it possesses in itself a proper goodness becoming to me, and to will this good under the latter aspect pertains to a habit other than charity.-And if you object that this other habit, since it does not contain a reference to God, will not be a righteous act, because it seems one is enjoying [instead of using] a created
The Will as the Seat of the Moral Virtues
good, I reply that the lesser habit does not include in itself the act of a higher habit. Now, charity, which is the higher habit, has of itself the function of referring this other habit immediately to God. No other habit of itself, therefore, has this proper referral function, but rather has of itself as its proper act to love this good, which good ought to be referred to God through charity. From this it does not follow, however, that the inferior habit is evil, nor that it is a principle of fruition or enjoying this created good as one's ultimate end. For though, in a negative sense, this inferior habit does not refer this act to the fruition of God, it does not, however, fail to refer it in a contrary sense, namely, in a way that is opposed to right reason. For to enjoy something [created] as an end not only implies that in a negative sense there is no referral of the act to God, but implies something contrarily opposed to just using it, as was pointed out in the first distinction of Bk. I about fruition.
[Henry of Ghent's solution] to what was said in the Politics about reason ruling the sense appetite with a despotic power is this. He says that Aristotle thought the condition of corrupt [or fallen] human nature was the state in which it was instituted. (However, I have explained this in a different way in Bk. II, how the lower appetite is by nature to have its pleasure and how it could have been moved harmoniously by the will.) In my way also some virtue could have been postulated in both appetites, unless perhaps original justice gave the will a more perfect dominion over the sense appetite, so that it could use it immediately in a servile way. But this does not seem to save the situation, for no matter how much the will would dominate the sense appetite this would not seem to account for any delightful submission on its part, unless in that appetite there were some habit inclining it to obey such a mover. [And in such a case there would be a virtue in the will as well]; remember that if I will you to choose rightly regarding some passion, I could generate a moral habit in myself by so doing.
Now, by holding this view, then, that [virtues are in the will, Henry] goes on to distinguish between the will [a] as nature, [b] as free, and [c] as deliberative. He denies there is virtue in the will in the first way, because it tends naturally either to its end as such or to any good shown to it in which some aspect of its end is displayed; and because of such a determination virtue is not required in it as nature. Neither is it required in it as free, because virtue inclines after the manner of nature, and the will as free is not suited to be moved naturally; for if it could be naturally inclined, then it could be necessitated as free.
Therefore, only in the third way, as deliberative (not indeed as regards the end, but with respect to the means toward that end), will a moral
The Intellectual and Moral Virtues habit be present in the will. He adds also that virtue moves after the manner of nature, because it acts suddenly; hence according to the Philosopher in III Ethics: "It is thought the mark of a braver man to be fearless and undisturbed in sudden alarms."
[Refutation of Henry] What I have said in dist. 15 of this third book contradicts his first point, because the will, as nature, elicits no act whatsoever; therefore, as nature it does not tend to any object, be it the end or something else, by an elicited act, but only by way of a natural inclination, as a heavy object is said to tend downward even though it is at rest in some high place.
Against the second two divisions he gives of will, one seems to include the other, for insofar as the will is deliberative, it is free. For it is deliberative either in the sense of commanding one to deliberate or insofar as it chooses in accord with some previous deliberation. And either way, deliberation is something pertaining to the will insofar as it is free, since it freely commands that choice. From this it follows that to deny that virtue is in the will as free, and to concede virtue is in it only as deliberative, is a contradiction. Also his proof that virtue is not in it as free, for then it would necessitate the will, does not hold up, because a superior agent, in whose power the action of the inferior agent rests, cannot be necessitated by the lesser agent. But virtue, if it is somehow an agent of the act, is only an inferior agent, as was pointed out in dist. 17 of Bk. I. And there it was also explained why there is no contradiction about the will acting freely and the habit nevertheless acting after the manner of nature with respect to their common effect.
In like fashion one could also prove that virtue is not in the will as deliberative, if it is true that virtue acts suddenly, anticipating deliberation, for the will as deliberative does not seem to act suddenly and to precede any deliberation. However, it is not necessary to ascribe such action to it, because that text has to be glossed. No virtue acts with absolutely no deliberation. For just as no one acts in a fully human way unless that person acts intelligently, so-as regards those things that pertain to the end-no one acts in a human fashion without understanding the reason for acting, and this understanding is what deliberation means. Hence no one acts virtuously by acting suddenly without deliberation in the way nature acts according to II Physics.
Hence, that dictum of the Philosopher should be understood in this way. Just as the virtuous person is inclined to choose rightly by reason of a correct habit, so too he has been conditioned by prudence to make at once a correct judgment as to what should be chosen, and to deliberate imperceptibly, as it were, because of the rapidity with which