24. Are The Moral Virtues Connected?
The Intellectual and Moral Virtues species of these virtues. Also if we were only to consider what Scripture had said about this distinction, for in one place it lists eight, in another seven, it would be necessary to distinguish these; and then why not also distinguish the ninefold habits mentioned in the second epistle of Peter [1:5]: "Minister in your faith, virtue," etc.? Scripture frequently, then, expresses the same reality in different words, now omitting one thing, and elsewhere explaining what it omitted there.
[To the Opposing Arguments} The answer to the initial argument for the opposite is clear enough, because although the numbers are not the same, this is not because one habit is other than these seven habits, but either because they are intermediate species falling under one of the seven, or because some of these are omitted. Everything that is listed, however, whether here or there, falls under the same seven virtues we have stated.
To the argument for the first opinion based on what the Philosopher says of heroic virtue, I say that he assigns four grades in each of the specific habits he mentions, namely, endurance, continence, temperance, and the heroic. The most perfect degree in any species is the heroic, and thus some speak of it metaphorically as perfecting man in an inhuman or nonhuman way, because everyone does not generally attain that degree in any species. And what he adduces about it being opposed to bestiality can be similarly explained as referring to an excess in the same species of vice. But bestiality could be better explained as belonging to something specifically different, because it has to do with a different object; but from this his proposal does not follow, because one could err and act in a vicelike way and nevertheless in some other matter act in a way that is perfectly right in all its circumstances. Therefore, although bestiality is a habit other than that common to human vice, because it has to do with another object, it does not follow that heroic virtue is of another species, because such virtue refers to the same object, but in a more excellent way; nor is it manifest that this excellence cannot be another degree of the same species.
24. ARE THE MORAL VIRTUES CONNECTED?
(Ordinatio III, supp!., dist. 26) As for dist. 36 I ask: Are the moral virtues connected?
[Arguments Pro and Can} For the negative:
[First], someone can be naturally inclined by temperament to per-
Are the Moral Virtues Connected?
form acts of one virtue rather than those of another; thus one by nature may be readily incited to vent his anger who is nevertheless not disposed by temperament to acts of self-indulgence; therefore, such a person might practice control of temper rather than acts of temperance. Another, on the other hand, might practice only such acts towards which he is inclined and not those opposed to his bent, and so would have a virtuous habit in regard to the former and not the latter, towards which he is disinclined.
Second, in accord with one's inclination, one may have matter for practicing acts of one virtue rather than those of another, for instance, a religious could have occasion for restraining his passions, but not for confronting or sustaining the terrors of war; therefore he would develop temperance but not fortitude.
Third, because of erroneous knowledge, the will could elicit an act against one's erroneous judgment, and yet actually make the right choice one ought to make; therefore by frequently making such choices a moral habit could be generated in the will, and yet prudence not be generated in the intellect, because it did not dictate correctly; thus moral virtue could exist without prudence.
Fourth, conversely the intellect might give the right dictate but the will not choose what it dictates but rather the opposite; by frequently dictating correctly, the intellect could develop a habit of prudence, whereas the will generates in itself, not a moral virtue, but rather a vice; wherefore, etc.
Fifth, an act of despising all things for the sake of God is arduous and yet consonant with right reason; therefore, there can be a virtue which inclines a pauper to such an act; therefore, the pauper seems to have the virtue which inclines him thus, but such a person could not have the virtue of generosity or liberality, because-it seems-he does not have the wherewithal for such a virtue, since he has nothing he could give. Similarly, many who are not paupers have other virtues
[that a pauper has].
Sixth, conjugal continence seems to be a virtue, for it is a certain type of chastity, and nevertheless it exists without virginity, which also seems to be a virtue.
Seventh, magnanimity is a virtue, which seems to be opposed to humility, because the magnanimous adorns himself with great honors, whereas the humble person adorns himself with few honors, because they have little value in his eyes.
For the opposite, the affirmative view, there are the texts from Bk. VI of the Ethics and from the Trinity, Bk. VI, ch. 4, of Augustine.
[Body of the Question] [Division of the question] In this question there are many articles,
The Intellectual and Moral Virtues the first of which concerns the interconnection of the specific moral virtues among themselves on the basis of whether they are species of the same or different genera; the second article treats of the connection of each of the moral virtues with prudence; the third, of the link between the moral and the theological virtues; and the fourth article, of the nexus between the theological virtues themselves.
[Article I: On the Interconnection of the Moral Virtues Themselves] [A. The Views of Others} [I. The opinion of Henry of Ghent] As for the first it is said that the Philosopher in the first chapter of VII Ethics distinguishes four stages in every category of goodness or evil, of which the first is endurance, the second is continence, the third is temperance, the fourth is heroic virtue. In the first two stages there is no virtue as such, but only a certain imperfect disposition suited by nature to be followed by perfect virtue. The third stage represents what is commonly called virtue, but the fourth is that surpassing degree of virtue that is characteristic of a most excellent [or godlike] person. Now, [Henry] concedes that in the first two stages there is no connection, for where virtuous habits are concerned, someone can be practiced in acts of one virtue and not another and thus can have acquired both endurance and continence, and also one but not the other. At the third stage, a distinction is made, because virtue can exist there in three degrees: either in an inchoate or in a mediocre or in a perfect form; and there need be no connection of virtues in the first two degrees, for the same reason as before, for someone can be practiced to such a degree in acts of one virtue but not necessarily to that same degree in another. But in the third degree of this third stage, and even more so at the fourth stage, there is a connection between virtues. This is proved in many ways.
[I] The first is this. No perfect and true virtue is deficient or twisted to what is opposed to a person's end, according to what Augustine says in a sermon on the works of mercy: "Charity that can be deserted never was true charity." But if a single moral virtue could exist without the others, one could be turned from one's end, and therefore it would not be true virtue. Proof of the minor: since one virtue strengthens the will only in regard to such desirables as it regards per se, the will can tum away from other desirable things presented to it if it has no virtue in regard to such. But in so doing it can tum away from the object of some particular virtue; therefore, etc. An example clarifies this. One who has fortitude but not temperance is not strengthened against overindulgence in delightful things, even as another who has temperance but not fortitude is not strengthened against terrorizing incidents; therefore, the second, if confronted with choosing something
Are the Moral Virtues Connected?
terrible, like undergoing death, or something delectable, like fornication, can be turned away from facing what is terrible and as a consequence turned towards things involving temperance, for he prefers not to face death, rather than not to fornicate, since he is not fortified against such great suffering.
[2] A second argument for the same goes this way. To function with delight is characteristic of a virtue according to II Ethics; but one virtue without the other is not a principle of functioning delightfully, as is apparent from the aforesaid example, for one who is tempted to overindulgence, if he is not brave, will not flee those things that involve intemperance and as a consequence is not perfectly temperate unless he is also brave. In the same way one could cite the example of the miser, who chooses to hoard money rather than use it with moderation.
[3] Furthermore, thirdly, there is this argument: Perfect virtue leads to the end of virtue, for perfection in the moral virtues leads to one's end; but one virtue without the other does not of itself lead one to this end, nor does it make a man a good citizen; therefore, etc.
[Confirmation from authorities] This is confirmed by Gregory in his Moralia, Bk. XX, ch. 1: "Whoever believes he is strong in one virtue, is truly strong, when he is not subject for the rest to any vices," and again in ch. 3 of Bk. XIX: "One virtue without the other is not perfect virtue or amounts to nothing. "-And the Commentator at the beginning of Bk. VI of the Ethics asks, "if temperance is not there, what sort of justice is there?"-implying there is nothing there. And there is also his comment: "We call by the name of temperance what preserves prudence, for the virtues are sisters to one another," etc. Look for it there. This is also proved by the gloss on that text of the Apocalypse
21:16: "The city was square." Look for it there.
[Refutation of Henry's view] Against this it is argued in many ways, the first of which is this. According to you virtues are not connected in the first two stages, namely, of endurance and continence, and similarly they are not connected in the first two degrees of the third stage, namely, when virtue is imperfect and mediocre. One can argue in the same way about the third grade, because one could have virtue according to the first two grades of the third stage, and by continual practice achieve the third grade of one virtue and not the other; for a person with a habit for functioning in regard to that object is no less disposed than another having no such habit; therefore if someone at the outset was able to become practiced in regard to the object of one virtue and not another, all the more so, when he has developed the habit of that
The Intellectual and Moral Virtues one virtue as far as the first two degrees of the third stage, will he continue to exercise himself in regard to the object of the one virtue and not the other, and thus achieve perfect virtue as regards that virtue and not the other. This is confirmed because it could happen that he had no opportunity to act in the matter of the other virtue so as to become inclined towards this in the way he did with the matter to which he became habituated.
If one objects that although there was no external occasion to face the matter of the other virtue, a person's imagination would bring the matter before him and he would have to choose correctly and acquire the virtue to some degree, this will not save one's case. For it is possible that the intellect does not consider this other, but only that to which the habit of virtue inclines one, because the intellect cannot deal simultaneously with more than one distinct object according to what is commonly said, or if other things occurred which pertained to another virtue, the will could not choose them, neither the good nor the bad, but will command that these things be not considered but rather that the other things which pertain to the virtue which one has be considered, and thus what I propose stands.
[2. The opinion of St. Thomas] Another and better view says that it is possible to acquire any habit to any degree of perfection in the category of nature by frequently elicited acts in regard to the object of one virtue without the acquisition of the other virtue. But this habit, no matter how intense, does not have the character of virtue unless it is conformed to other acquired virtues, and therefore such a habit is not a virtue, because the accord one habit has to another is necessary in any habit if it is to have the character of a virtue.
[Refutation of this opinion] This statement could be easily refuted if a moral virtue were a per se thing or something one per se in the category of quality, but because I do not believe this to be true, as will be treated later, therefore I argue otherwise in this way.
[I] Virtue, with all that pertains to its essential character, is generated by acts conformable to right reason, which is evident from the second book of the Ethics: "Virtue is a habit concerned with choice, lying in a mean, relative to us, this being determined as a man with practical wisdom would determine it." But both an act and a habit can be conformed to right reason as a guide to one's choice without any accord with other concurring virtues in the same agent. The assumption is evident, because one does not choose correctly about a matter of temperance unless there be a prior judgment and dictate of right reason as to the choice in question. But one can have a correct judgment about some matter pertaining to one virtue without any dictate of reason as to matters pertaining to any other virtue. Therefore, etc.
Are the Moral Virtues Connected?
[2] Furthermore, it follows secondly from that statement [of Aquinas] that each virtue will be the essential reason why another is a virtue; but the consequent is false; so too, then, is the antecedent. Proof of the implication: If this habit of temperance is a virtue only because another virtue, say fortitude, accompanies it, then fortitude, insofar as it accompanies temperance, will be the essential reason why temperance is a virtue; and by the same token, temperance, insofar as it accompanies fortitude, will be the reason why the latter is a virtue; and every habit will be the reason why another habit is a virtue; the consequence is false, because it would follow from this that something is a virtue before it is a virtue and thus no virtue will be first. Proof of these points: Let us take a habit in the category of quality that ought to be temperance. Now, if this cannot be a virtue unless accompanied by another virtue, which is fortitude, then fortitude must first be a virtue before temperance is a virtue, and it cannot be a virtue unless accompanied by the virtue of temperance, on this hypothesis. Therefore, fortitude will be a virtue before it is a virtue. This same situation implies that no virtue will be first. For temperance is not the first virtue, because it cannot be a virtue, on this hypothesis, without the concomitance of all the other virtues in their character as virtues, and no one of these others will be first, because none of them can be a virtue unless accompanied by temperance as a virtue.
But one may object with some probability that one habit can be a virtue inasmuch as all the other virtues accompany it, and although one precedes the other inasmuch as it is a habit, none is prior to another as a virtue, but all the habits, whether they were generated earlier or later, take on the character of virtues by reason of their essential nature as habits and the fact that they are mutually concomitant. I argue against this, because it would follow that one act will make all the moral virtues become virtues, which seems incongruous. Proof of the implication: Assume some habit, say temperance, is generated first and after this the habit of fortitude to a similar degree, still neither of these will be a virtue until every other habit exists in that degree required for virtue; therefore either every habit is a virtue before the other, or it is not such. If it is, then we have what I propose, namely, that one virtuous habit can exist without the other, and thus there is no necessary connection among virtues. If not, then by one act all the habits become virtues in essence, which seems incongruous, because that act seems to be an act of a single virtue, and just as it would pertain to only one virtue, if such were generated, so also as a cause it would be generative of but one virtue, and therefore not of all.
[3] Also, thirdly, it seems more reasonable that specific moral virtues of the same genus would be more likely to be connected than vir-
The Intellectual and Moral Virtues tues which pertain to two different genera, because a person is more inclined to be related in an orderly way to matters closely related to some virtue he has than to more remote matters. Matters pertaining to specific virtues of the same genus, however, are more closely connected than matters pertaining to virtues that are generically different; but specifically different virtues of the same genus, such as virginity and conjugal chastity, are not connected; therefore, etc.
[B. Scotus' Own Opinion] As for this article, I concede there is no connection either of the generically different moral virtues, commonly referred to as justice, fortitude, and temperance, or of the even more general types I distinguished earlier, namely, those disposing one's affects towards self and others respectively.
For this opinion one can argue persuasively as follows. While virtue is a perfection of man, it does not represent complete perfection, for then one moral virtue would suffice. But when something has several partial perfections, it can be simply perfect according to one perfection and simply imperfect according to another, as is apparent in the case of man, who has many organic perfections, and can have one in the highest degree, and not have another. For example, someone may be disposed in the highest way as to sight and touch but lack any hearing. Someone can possess the highest degree of perfection in matters of temperance and not have the perfection required as regards another perfection, and consequently can be simply temperate also in regard to any act of temperance, although he is not brave. But one is not simply a moral person without all the virtues, just as one is not simply sentient without all one's senses. But this does not make one less perfectly temperate because one is less perfectly moral, just as one's vision or hearing is no less acute because one is less perfectly sentient in other ways.
[Solution to Henry's arguments: To I] And this will also explain something [Henry] brought up in support of the first argument, about virtue being twisted [to what is contrary to one's end], for it is false that virtue can be so twisted. Nevertheless, one who has one virtue but lacks another can be turned away from his end because of the virtue he lacks. But this does not mean the virtue a man has is imperfect because it does not direct him as regards everything, but only as regards its proper object, just as someone is not more deaf because he cannot see than he would be if he could see, but such a one is still deprived of what can be sensed. If one argues against this as follows:
"Such a habit is easily lost, therefore it is not virtue," I deny the antecedent. Quite the contrary, even though one act may be performed
Are the Moral Virtues Connected?
against his inclination, his good disposition is not destroyed except by many sins or vices or a few great ones.
[To 2] And this also answers the point raised about functioning delightfully, for one does act delightfully as regards the precise subject matter of the virtue. For instance, someone may delight in abstaining from something intemperate, but not find pleasure in facing terrible things, because he is not steeled against such; therefore, such a one will sadly commit an act of intemperance, because it goes against his habit, but because he would be even sadder if he had to undergo something terrible, he will flee what pains him and be less unwilling, as it were, to choose what gives him lesser rather than greater sorrow.
Therefore I concede that such a person is imperfect and acts sadly. He is not imperfect, however, nor does he act with sorrow in a matter concerned with his virtue, except where such is accidentally associated with something with regard to which he is not habitually disposed to act in a delightful or virtuous way.
[To 3] My argument also answers his other objection about the moral virtue directing a person to his end, because one virtue does not lead one perfectly to one's end, just as one sense does not lead a man perfectly to the perfect act of sensation, but each virtue does lead in that direction insofar as it is itself concerned, but all virtues are required to bring one fully there in a virtuous and delightful way. Therefore, I concede that one virtue does not adequately lead one to one's end, but so far as itself is concerned it does lead one sufficiently towards it, namely, insofar as the perfection of such a virtue suffices to do so.
[To the authorities Henry cites] To the text adduced in the first argument from St. Augustine, I say that the Philosopher in Bk. I of the Categories says not that a habit cannot be lost, but only that it is difficult to lose it; therefore, even though virtue could be lost and one who had it could be turned [from his end], it is not virtue itself that is turned away, but who has it withdraws from the heights of virtue. But it does not follow that this was not also perfect virtue as a habit, because it was not incapable of being lost, but only that it would be difficult to lose it. What Augustine says about charity, then, needs to be glossed in this way. Someone truly possessed charity, who afterwards sinned mortally, however, but that was not the charity that truly joins one to his end, namely, beatitude [of heaven).-As to the citation from Gregory, one could say that he is speaking there of the principles of [supernatural] merit; and in this sense it is true that one moral virtue without the other is not [supernatural] virtue, because one does not merit with one if it is not accompanied by the other, for one who
The Intellectual and Moral Virtues has the moral virtue of temperance does not merit [grace and glory] if humility does not accompany it, or at least if the opposite vice [of pride] is not in that person.-The same for the gloss on the words of Revelation.-And also for what the Commentator says about Bk. VI of the Ethics as to the virtues being "sisters." I grant they are sisters, and although they help one another to live, one is not the other, nor does one essentially perfect the other. And to the extent that these virtues do indeed aid one another, each helping to preserve the other, one can understand that saying that one is not whole without the other, because one cannot well be saved without the other. For if a man is exposed to many temptations regarding different matters, imperfection in one matter can be the occasion of acting imperfectly in regard to some other matter, whereas a perfect disposition in acting about one is a help to acting correctly about another matter; therefore, the two [virtues] assist each other like sisters, but neither is essentially required for the perfection of the other, just as one sister is born before the other; and this is always the case if both cannot be procreated simultaneously. But it is not possible to have simultaneously the two perfect acts needed to produce the two virtues, because one perfect act in one potency would impede at that time the act of the other potency needed for the two virtues to be generated simultaneously.
[Article 2: The Connection of the Moral Virtues with Prudence} As for the second article, about the connection of moral virtues with prudence, there are two doubtful points to be cleared up. One has to do with an individual virtue's relation to some proper aspect of prudence, and the other with the relationship of prudence as a whole with each of the moral virtues.
[Part 1: How Is Each Virtue Connected with Some Aspect of Prudence?} [A. The Opinion of Others} [The view of Godfrey of Fontaines and Henry of Ghent] As for the first, it seems this connection is a necessary one.
[Arguments] Proof is from the Philosopher in Bk. VII of the Ethics, ch. 3. His view there is that if the will chooses badly, it is because the intellect was at fault. Henry cites other texts there to the same effect.
Look them up. The Philosopher says at the end of ch. 6 that evil makes the intellect lie and err about practical principles and thus destroys prudence.
Also, it is impossible that a prudent person should not be good and that a good person should not be prudent ...
{[Addition] Also, I presuppose two points, one that the intellect could not understand several things perfectly at the same time, and
Are the Moral Virtues Connected? secondly, that the will could not will something under the aspect of evil. Then I argue as follows: assume the judgment stands that something evil should be avoided; now the will either flees such evil or not.
If it does, then the will cannot be evil. But suppose badness is presented correctly; now if the will could choose it, then it could tend to evil under the aspect of evil or as something not thought of. To this I reply that the first supposition, about the two entirely disparate objects that are opposed to one another immediately, is false. This is clear if we consider the individual parts, because one correlative cannot be known without the other. Neither can one know an act without knowing its subject. Still less can one know a privation without knowing the subject apt to have such, since a privation presupposes a subject together with an aptitude to have some form it lacks. Therefore, the intellect cannot know the privation alone, as the argument supposes, but can only know it as in a subject, and one in the last analysis that is suited by nature to have what is lacking. Neither can one know one correlative alone without the other or know an act without a subject.
Therefore, if someone understands that evil must be avoided and presents this fact to the will, his will can elicit an act which avoids looking at the evil, though the evil is there as a quasi-necessary concomitant, and in this case the will still does not shun the evil. And even if the intellect could grasp the subject without the privation, it could not grasp the privation without a subject, because privative opposites are immediate so far as their natural subject is concerned.}
Also, On the Movement of Animals: "If the major premise is proposed by the practical intellect and the minor is taken from something known to the senses or imagination, the conclusion will be an operation," so that according to [Aristotle] it is necessary to act if one is not impeded. But according to him there is no operation that is completely counter to what reason dictates. Augustine also confirms this in what he says about that verse from Psalm 2: "He shall speak to them in his anger" -that "a twisting or darkening of the mind will follow those who sin against the law of God."
In support of this there is also that dictum of Dionysius in The Divine Names: "No one does anything considering it as evil," and that passage from III Ethics, ch. 3: "Every wicked man is ignorant of what he ought to do and what he ought to abstain from, and it is by reason of error of this kind that men become unjust and in general bad." And Wisdom 2:2 I agrees with this: "Their malice has blinded them." As for the way in which this argument is presented see q. 17 of Henry's
Quodlibet V.-And if one brings up that article condemned at Paris that says: "So long as general and particular knowledge of anything
The Intellectual and Moral Virtues remains, the will cannot will the opposite: an error," Henry replies in Quodlibet X, q. 10, that the proposition "So long as knowledge remains, etc., the will cannot will the opposite" must be distinguished according to composition and division. In the divided sense it is false, because it signifies that the will never has the power of willing the opposite, which is false; in the combined sense one must distinguish further, because the ablative absolute can mean either "if" or "because" or "while." If it is taken as meaning "because" or "if," it is false; and it is true that this is an error, for it means that correct knowledge or understanding is the cause of rectitude in the will. But if one explains it in the sense of "while," so that it signifies not causality but simply the fact that [error in the intellect] follows or accompanies
[error in the will], then one can give the aforesaid proposition a true sense and it is neither an error nor condemned. It must be so understood, however, that one does not assert that by priority of nature an intellectual error has to occur before the will can err; for it is only that error is present in both faculties simultaneously. But error in the will is prior by nature to that of the intellect, so that if one considers the intellect only insofar as it is prior by nature to the will, the intellect is correct, but the will, by freely choosing to err, blinds the intellect, and this blindness occurs at the same time as the will errs, even though by nature it is posterior [because it is caused by the will].-For this interpretation I argue in this way. If the first choice of the will did not blind the intellect, then neither did any other, for the first could be just as evil as any other, and if no act blinded it, then no matter what the actual evil in the will might be, it would never blind the intellect, and thus one could become evil to any degree whatsoever without there being any error in the intellect, which seems to contradict several authorities.
[Authorities against this view] Against this view, to begin with, there are these arguments from authority:
One is Augustine's comment on Psalm [124:2]: "Perhaps they would have swallowed us up alive," where he explains: "They are swallowed up alive who know what evil is and consent to it, or perhaps die." And there is his other comment on Psalm [69:23]: "Let their table become a snare," viz., "What is more vicious than knowingly to consent to vices one should not consent to? Behold, they know the mousetrap and put their foot in it." And again, re Psalm [119:20]: "My soul has desired ... ," he says: "The intellect precedes, but the affections follow slowly or not at all."
The argument and authority of the Philosopher in II Ethics also supports this. First he says that "as a condition for virtue knowledge or
Are the Moral Virtues Connected? reason has little weight"; but if correctness of intellect in its considerations is accompanied by right volition, since knowledge contributes much to a correct evaluation of actions, consequently it will also do much for willing rightly. Indeed, if this were not so it would follow that one ought to persuade another not that he should not follow vice but that he should simply consider things according to right reason, for according to you, by considering things rightly according to a habit of knowledge, the will could not help but be right at the same time and, therefore, there is no need to persuade anyone to will rightly but only to consider things rightly.
[Six arguments from reason] There are also these arguments from reason:
[I] Given the fact that the intellect dictates correctly, the will can make no choice, since what the intellect dictates is not a matter of choice, and the intellect is not moved simultaneously from this and from that. If the will makes no choice, however, it generates no virtue in itself. But according to you, prudence is generated by right dictates; therefore, prudence will be produced without any other moral virtue.
[2] Also, a bad choice cannot blind the intellect so that it errs in its judgment about what can be done. Proof: terms of a proposition are the total cause of knowledge of first principles, whether these be practical or theoretical, according to Bk. I of the Posterior Analytics; and the syllogistic form is evident to every intellect, as is clear from the definition of the perfect syllogism in Bk. I of the Prior Analytics; therefore, once the meaning of the terms is grasped and put into propositions and a syllogistic deduction is made, it is necessary that the intellect assent to the conclusion, whose knowledge depends precisely on a knowledge of the terms of the principles and knowledge of the syllogistic deduction; therefore it is impossible that the will should make the intellect, considering principles through a syllogistic deduction, err about the conclusion, and much less err about the principles themselves, and therefore there is no way in which the intellect can be blinded so that it errs.-If you grant this conclusion and say that therefore the will blinds the intellect by turning it away from considering something rightly, I say: No. To turn the intellect away is not to blind it; even if it could be turned away in this fashion, prudence would still remain; for a prudent person need not be considering always what is prudent, but may at times be willingly concerned with other things.
[3] Before the will can turn away the mind, it needs some coexistent knowledge as a naturally prior condition for so willing. Now, either [a] this dictate, by which the will wills to turn away the intellect, is a
The Intellectual and Moral Virtues dictate that stands with right reason, and then it follows that it is no sin to will to tum away the mind, according to you, because the will to do so coexists with a correct dictate, or [b] this act of knowledge, prior to the volition to avert, is something other than a right dictate, and then there are two alternatives. If it is right, then it follows as before, namely, that the will to avert is not a sin, and thus no blinding follows as a consequence. But if this act prior to willing to avert is not right, there will still be no blinding of the intellect that follows from the actual willing to avert, because that act precedes this willing.
[4] Also, either the will chooses badly despite the right dictate given it, and then you admit my position, or else it chooses badly without the right dictate present. Now, to choose, the will needs some knowledge or act of the intellect, and this act is not right, because-according to you-if it were right, there would be no sin. Therefore, this other act that is not right will be prior to the bad will itself. And the reason why it is not right can only be some other evil will, and-since there can be no circularity here, since it would imply an infinite sequence of causes and effects-my proposal would follow [namely, that the will chooses badly despite a right dictate]' and consequently the will does not blind the intellect so that it dictates badly-a blinding that you claim follows from this bad will.
[5] Also, no one in this life is completely incorrigible; therefore, no one can be entirely in error about first principles. Proof of the implication. One who would err regarding first practical principles would have nothing which could recall him to what is good. For whatever one assumes might persuade him to return will be denied, for no assumption of this sort could be more knowable than a first practical principle.
[6] Also, the damned would not agree that the proposition "God must be hated" is true, for then they would not have the worm referred to in that last verse of Isaiah: "Their worm shall not die nor their fire be extinguished, and they shall be abhorrent to all mankind"; for they take unqualified delight in hating God remorselessly; therefore [they know God should be loved and their reason is not blinded].
[B. Scotus' Own Opinion] As for this article, it could be said that the intellect can have a dictate that is right in an unqualified sense without the will having to choose in conformity to that dictate. And since a single right act of dictating what should be done g~nerates prudence, prudence will exist in the intellect without any moral habit in the will. But if this is so, then one can ask: How does evil blind the intellect, as the authorities claim? To this one can say it blinds in two ways, one privatively, the
Are the Moral Virtues Connected? other positively. Privatively, because it turns the intellect away from the consideration of what is right; for the will by choosing the opposite of what right reason dictates does not allow the intellect to remain thinking for long about its right dictate, but turns its consideration to probable or sophistical reasons for the opposite, if such can be found; or at least it turns it to some other irrelevant matter, lest that actual displeasure remain that consists in the remorse for choosing the opposite of what one knows to be right.-Positively, however, it blinds it in this way. Just as the will in rightly choosing the end commands the intellect to consider those things which are necessary to attain that end, and the intellect, by thus considering the means ordered to attaining that right end, generates in itself a habit of prudence, so the will in choosing a bad end for itself (it can indeed prescribe that bad end for itself, as was said in dist. I of the first book) commands the intellect to consider the means necessary to attain such. Augustine has a good description of this in the final chapter of Bk. XIV of The City of God. For the will has its virtues, as he discusses them in that book, but what he implies here is that the will, by setting before itself an evil end, commands the intellect to find the means and set forth the ways needed to attain its delights and forestall any terrible consequences. And just as prudence is the habit generated in the intellect at the command of the will once it has chosen well-a command, namely, to dictate suitable means for attaining its well-chosen end-so also the habit acquired by the intellect (when it carries out the will's command to dictate means needed to attain the evil end it has chosen) represents an error, and a habit of knowledge directly opposed to prudence. One could call it "imprudence" or [as Augustine implies in the aforesaid chapter] "stupidity"-not however in a privative sense, but rather in a positive and contrary sense. For just as a prudent person has a habit whereby he quickly chooses the right means for a good and fitting purpose, so this person has a habit by which he quickly and correctly chooses those means ordained to achieve the bad end the will has prescribed for itself. And since this habit was generated under a command of the will, to that extent it is the evil will that blinds, not indeed by making the intellect err regarding some proposition, but by forcing it to perform an act and develop a habit of considering some means for attaining a bad end; and this habit as a whole represents an error regarding actions, though it is not an error theoretically speaking.
[A doubt and its solution] Another doubt could arise here. If a correct intellectual habit and a good appetitive habit need not be simultaneously generated, because it could happen that one dictates well regarding this matter but the other does not act well in its regard, two
The Intellectual and Moral Virtues questions arise: Is the intellectual habit generated without the moral virtue prudence? and vice versa, Is the habit generated in the appetite without this understanding [or that in the intellect] a moral virtue?
[One answer to the first question] To this first question about prudence one could say that strictly speaking prudence is never without moral virtue, because according to the definition in VI Ethics, ch. 2, prudence is a correct judgment "in agreement with right desire"; but the appetite is not right without moral virtue. Now, if this be true, then [not only] could the first dictates about practical principles be right without being the result of prudence (though they are a sort of seedbed of prudence), but also right dictates about the means necessary to attain some end prescribed by the will could be a habit dictating correctly, yet not one called prudence.
Thus there could be two correct intellective habits in regard to actions neither of which would be prudence. One is that which would precede correct choice of a particular end, and this would not be prudence, because it is not concerned about the means to an end, whereas
[prudence] is a consultive habit, and counsel is not about the end but about the means to the end. Prudence is also discursive, because it is consultive, and thus has to do with things one treats discursively. But once a good end has been chosen, not only in general but also in particular, such as to live chastely, there can be some directive intellection as to the means for achieving such an end, but it is not actually accompanied by a right choice. Now, this would be prudence, so far as the object is concerned, for it is right judgment about means to an end, but the other condition is lacking, namely, it is not accompanied by a righteous desire regarding the same object.
According to this way it must be said that any habit generated in the intellect, although it is practical and correct as regards a particular or universal end, or in regard to the means necessary to attain the particular end chosen, if it is not accompanied by a right choice of the will in regard to the same, is not prudence.
[Objection] And if one argues against this as was done in the preceding article about the connection of moral virtues, namely, that it would follow that by reason of this accord, prudence constitutes the moral virtue and vice versa; and thus one act in the last analysis suffices to generate both habits, namely, prudence and the moral virtue; but this act cannot be one of both the intellect and the will; therefore, it is an act of one or the other, and hence it could not generate both habits-[Solution] it could be said that what is necessary is not conformity of one moral virtue with another, because no one is the rule for the other, but conformity of each moral virtue to pru-
Are the Moral Virtues Connected? dence, because a defining characteristic of virtue is that it is an elective habit in accord with right reason; and therefore, a habit could be constituted also in its moral being by the presence of prudence as a concomitant condition, and vice versa, prudence could be constituted by moral virtue as a concomitant condition; but one moral virtue does not constitute another in this way. And then one could grant that one habit that is prudence and another that is moral virtue could be generated simultaneously, and that this effect is produced by one act or one habit which ultimately generates either the moral virtue or the corresponding habit of prudence. For while it is incongruous that one act generate two moral virtues, it is not incongruous that such should occur with prudence and temperance, because this act which generates prudence in its regulative role, also generates temperance in a regulative role. But since temperance does not have its character as a virtue except by reason of this regulative role, this act or habit also generates it in its character as a virtue. But one cannot say this about temperance as regards fortitude, because fortitude does not exercise a regulative function in regard to temperance.-Hence one would not claim that prudence and moral virtue constitute themselves as virtues according to any priority, as though one were a virtue before the other was, but by a simultaneity of nature there is the intellectual habit of prudence and corresponding to it a moral virtue.
And if one asks: By what are these two habits produced in their perfection? I concede it is by one act, whether that act be a right choice
(for without a right choice of the end there is no appetitive habit in accord with right reason, and therefore, neither is there prudence) or an act pertaining to the intellect (for without a right dictate of the intellect there is no choice in accord with right reason, and hence nothing virtuous or productive of moral virtue). Therefore, either the act of the intellect or the act of the will, by generating something per se in its natural being, can concomitantly give both it and, what is more, its correlative their respective regulative characters, and thus one act can generate by a simultaneity of nature both the moral virtue and the prudence that corresponds to it.
According to this it may be said that both habits preceding a righteous choice would indeed be habits of moral science or of special moral knowledge. For just as in making art products the artist is directed by experience, because the artist knows the reason why, but the one with experience knows how to do it, according to Bk. I of the Metaphysics, and also the artist is not prompt in acting, whereas one with experience is (ibid.), so too it is in morals. One who has only a right habit of practical principles or conclusions, but is not experi-
The Intellectual and Moral Virtues enced in acting or in loving or in ordering or in directing in such matters, although he may have a habit that is remotely directive
{which can be called understanding or moral science)-such a one, I say, does not have a proximate directive habit, such as prudence, which is like the habit of one experienced in making things.
[A more probable answer] Although the above may seem a probable solution to the distinction of practical knowledge and prudence, prudence is concerned not only with means ordered to attaining one's ultimate end, but also with directing one to an end, at least to a particular end, such as chastity. This is proved first in the following way. For, according to a certain order of nature, moral virtue always follows some form of prudence; but by choosing a particular end such as chastity, a moral virtue is generated; therefore some prudence precedes this choice. Therefore, it seems that prudence should not be restricted solely to the habit for dictating the specific means which are ordered to a particular chosen end, but should also be concerned with that end properly and per se.
This is proved secondly because otherwise one specific prudence would not correspond to one moral virtue, for such a virtue is unified by reason of the choice of its end, and to this it principally inclines one. But if prudence dictated nothing about that end but only about the means thereto, there would be no object from which this prudential direction would get its unity, but there would be many "prudences" concerned with the many dictates directed to that end, and yet there would be but one moral virtue derived from the unity of its end.
Hence, both because of the natural priority of prudence to moral virtue as well as for the sake of giving unity to the prudential knowledge involved with one moral virtue, it seems one ought to concede that this practical act that directs one rightly to a particular end is properly speaking prudence.
It is no objection to say that prudence is called a consultive habit, and so has to do with the means to an end and reasons to these, for concerning proper ends or those proper to moral virtues it dictates by reasoning from a first practical principle taken from some universal end particularly applied, and this discourse represents a first consultation, although more commonly counsel refers to the means for attaining virtues.
The other point that is added, about prudence being conformed to a righteous appetite, does not shake this position, for what is naturally prior does not seem to derive anything of its essential being from what is posterior. But prudence qua prudence seems to be naturally prior to moral virtue because it defines it. What therefore is said about a con-
Are the Moral Virtues Connected? formity there, must be understood in the way explained in our first question, about practical and theoretical theology, namely, it is conformed to right practice itself, i.e., the knowledge must be such that so far as it itself is concerned right practice must be conformed with it.
But knowledge is of this sort whether or not it is followed by a right choice on the part of the one who has such.
Hence one could give another answer, that this habit, generated by correct judgments, whether about the means to an end or about the ends themselves (at least certain particular ones which are properly speaking the ends of distinct moral virtues and where perhaps there is no other judgmental habit about such ends), is prudence, even though a correct choice does not follow. And then it would not be always necessary that a corresponding moral virtue be connected to a prudential judgment about some moral matter. But the converse relationship is different, for no choice can be morally right unless it is conformed to some rule or measure, which is a correct dictate. Such a right dictate, however, is suited by nature to generate prudence, even though this prudence refers only to this particular matter. Therefore, one can concede the existence of the converse connection, since a moral virtue cannot exist without there being a prudential habit concerned with its respective matter.
To the reason and authorities cited for the opposite view one can find answers. Look them up in Henry's Quodlibet XIV or V, q. 3.
[Part II: The Connection of All the Moral Virtues in One Prudential Habit] [The views of others] As for the other part of this article, namely, the connection of all moral virtues in one habit of prudence, it seems that the Philosopher says they are connected in Bk. VI of his Ethics, ch. [13]: "For with the presence of the one quality, prudence, will be given all the virtues." Look up the Commentator's remarks on this text.
As to how one can make a case for one virtue of prudence in regard to all moralia, even as one assumes one habit of science, look up the opinion of Henry and my critique of it in the first question on Bk. VI of the Metaphysics.
[Scotus' own view] As for this article, one can say that just as art regards all makable things, so prudence regards all possible actions, neither is there any greater connection of possible actions with regard to one habit than there is among makablesj therefore just as diverse artifacts require their own proper arts, so diverse actions require their proper prudencesj and just as one's affects towards some actions may be good and one's affects towards others bad, so also in dictating what should be done, one can be habituated to judge rightly regarding some
The Intellectual and Moral Virtues actions but not regarding others, but right dictates about the former are neither guiding principles nor conclusions about the latter.
How all these "prudences" form one habit and how all habits of geometry pertain to one universal science has been explained in my first question on Bk. VI of the Metaphysics, for one should understand this not as a formal but as a virtual unity. Just as a habit which is about a first subject is formally one by reason of that subject, and is virtually concerned with all those things contained in that first subject, though it is not formally about them, so this habit, which is formally about some end of certain actions, is virtually, but not formally, concerned with all of these possible actions, the practical knowledge of which is virtually included in that end. And so, by extending the name "prudence" to that habit which is an understanding of first practical principles, that prudence, which is formally one in itself, is virtually concerned with all the virtues.
[Reply to the authorities for the other opinion] According to this, one can explain that authoritative citation of VI Ethics, "For with the presence of the one quality, prudence, will be given all the virtues."
For either he speaks of one virtue formally, and then one must understand that all virtues will be there where one prudence exists perfectly, not merely intensively but extensively, for prudence is never as perfect extensively as it could be unless it is perfect in regard to all to which it could extend, and this area represents all the objects pertaining to all the moral virtues whatsoever.-The other way this citation could be glossed is that it is referring not to formal unity, but to a generic unity.
For just as temperance, according to the Philosopher, is said to be one virtue, formally other than fortitude, yet each of these virtues represents a sort of intermediate genus with many species under it, as was said earlier, so prudence also, according to this classification of intermediate genera, could be called one by reason of its unity as an intermediate genus. For even though it contains under itself many species, prudence can still be one by a generic unity. And understanding the unity of prudence in this way, it is the case that all the moral virtues are connected under one habit of prudence insofar as to each of its species some virtue is connected, and this presupposing what was said in the preceding part of this second article about the connection of each virtue to its own prudence, whether the interrelationship between the two is mutual or nonmutual.
[Article 3: The Connection of the Moral and Theological Virtues] As for the third article, Augustine says in his work Against Julian,
Bk. IV, ch. 3, that there are no true or perfect virtues without charity, and he proves this because such are not perfectly glorified in God.
Are the Moral Virtues Connected?
27 I Against this is what Augustine says in his sermon on patience . . .
[To the questionllt can be said that no virtues incline a person to his ultimate end except through the mediacy of that which regards the ultimate end per se; and thus, if only charity immediately regards the ultimate end, the other virtues do not order one to that end except by means of charity. However, in so far as the virtues are certain instruments perfecting man, they must also be instruments for ordering him to the ultimate end in which his supreme perfection lies, and therefore they are imperfect without charity, to which end they cannot otherwise be ordained. However, since this imperfection is not something that pertains to them by virtue of their specific nature, therefore each of the other virtues in their own nature can be perfect without such a virtue. Inasmuch, then, as they are without charity they are said to be
"unformed," and they are "formed" through charity in the sense that charity orders these and their respective ends to the ultimate end, in which ordination they achieve their true and highest extrinsic perfection.
This answers the various authorities cited above. Take those of Augustine, for instance. It is true to say virtues are not truly such without charity, because they do not lead to beatitude if it is missing.
On the other hand, there is some doubt whether the theological virtues presuppose the moral virtues. So far as their acts go, it is manifest they do not. For if someone who had been living a life of vice is suddenly converted, he has all the theological virtues from the beginning of his conversion, but not the moral virtues, at least not those that are acquired. For he does not act with delight regarding all those things to which virtuous habits incline one. Quite the contrary, it would be more delightful for him to act according to the old habits of vice he had previously acquired than to act otherwise.
But you may object that in the sacrament of penance all the virtues are infused in such a person in a way similar to that of the infant in baptism, and in this manner the connection is preserved, because if one does not possess the virtues innately, at least one has them by infusion. Proof of this is the fact that one will have them in heaven, according to Augustine, whom the Master quotes in the text of this distinction. But it does not seem probable that anyone would have them in heaven if he had not already acquired them on earth, since he may die suddenly.
Although much might be said about these infused moral virtues, namely, that they seem necessary because of the manner or the medium or the end, nevertheless {inasmuch as every end which they cannot have of their specific nature, is sufficiently specified by the inclina-
The Intellectual and Moral Virtues tion of charity, whereas the mode and the medium are specified by infused faith) it does not seem necessary to postulate infused moral virtues. Now, acquired virtues are enough in those persons who have acquired them or can have them; nor do these virtues seem necessary in those who have not acquired such, when there is no more pressing reason why they should be infused here if they are not infused in those who have acquired them.
And then there are several answers we can suggest in the case of infants: One is that there is no need to assume they have the moral virtues in heaven, but it suffices that they are well disposed towards what is desirable by charity. Charity indeed disposes one in regard to all objects that could be willed under one aspect [viz., love of God], but it is not necessary that one have knowledge of all such objects in their proper nature. It suffices to know them in the Word, which is perfect knowledge.
Or secondly, if they do possess such, one could say these virtues are infused in them at the instant they are beatified. For there is no greater need that those things which pertain to the pilgrim be thus given in baptism, when the infant is a future pilgrim, than that those things which pertain to the beatified state be given at the instant one is beatified. Indeed, there is less rationale for the former than there is for the latter.
Or one could say, thirdly, that if those virtues pertain to some perfection of one who has gained heaven, and are not given at the instant of their beatification, they could still have been acquired by their actions in heaven, for just as there appears no reason why one could not learn about some previously unknown things directly from those things themselves, so here there seems no apparent reason why one could not make good choices about some desirable things that are conducive to one's end, and this, not merely by willing them for the sake of God himself, but because they are something good for oneself, and thus one beatified could acquire a moral habit inclining him to such desirables for what they are in themselves and thus acquire moral virtue.
[Conclusion] To this article, then, I say, as I said before, that the moral virtues do not require the theological virtues in order to be perfect as regards their own specific nature, though without such, they do not have that further extrinsic perfection they could have. And neither is it necessary, conversely, that the theological virtues have the moral virtues, either in this life or in heaven.
[Article 4: The Interconnection of the Theological Virtues Themselves} As for the fourth article, about the connection of the theological virtues [of faith, hope, and charity] among themselves, I say that they
Are the Moral Virtues Connected?
are not necessarily connected, as is apparent in heaven, where the habits and acts of charity exist without the habits and acts of faith and hope. This lack of connection is also clear in this life, where faith and hope remain in the sinner without charity. Therefore, as to their existence, there is no necessary connection among them.
But what of their infusion or coming into existence? Are they connected here? I reply that whatever can be separated in existence such that one can be without the other, God can also separate from one another in their coming to be or their infusion. Hence, in their infusion they are connected not of themselves by necessity, but only by God's generosity, since he perfects man as a whole, for according to Augustine in True and False Penitence: "It is impious to hope for half a pardon from God." Just as no one is healed bodily unless he is perfectly healed, so also spiritually one is not healed save perfectly. But perfect health is present if one has faith in the intellect and hope and charity in the will.
But if one asks whether faith and hope without charity would be virtues, one can say, as was said of the virtues, that in their own nature they could be perfect insofar as they are principles of their own acts with respect to their proper objects; but without charity it is impossible to have that final perfection that comes of attaining the end to which they are ordered by charity. And this indeed is perfection, both in morals and in these supernaturalia. However, it is commonly said that in attaining the end through some elicited operation, because of some order these or those acts have towards our end, we can say, speaking precisely, that insofar as these acts are accepted by God, they are ordered to beatitude. And thus indeed no moral or infused virtue or moral act is accepted without charity, which alone divides the children of the kingdom from those of perdition.
As for the intellectual habits, there is no need to tarry, for they have no necessary connection with one another, unless some are subordinate habits, such as the habit of understanding principles and that of knowledge of conclusions, and in such cases the prior can be without the posterior, but not vice versa.
[Reply to the Initial Arguments] As for the arguments at the beginning, I accept the first two, because they are included in what was said in the first article.
To the third, I say that although by frequently acting [against his erroneous judgment] a person does generate a certain quality, which is suited by its nature to be in accord with right reason and which would be a virtue if it were accompanied by right reason in the person so acting, nevertheless this quality that is produced is not a habit of cor-
The Intellectual and Moral Virtues rect choice, and hence is not a virtue. For inasmuch as such a person lacks the right judgment, he has no correct rule for acting as he does, and therefore his choice, though apt by nature to be righteous, is not right for the simple reason that it does not follow a correct rule.
I grant the fourth argument, because its conclusion agrees with what was said in the second article about the connection of the moral virtues with prudence.
As for the other following arguments, about the incompatibility of certain virtues, I concede that, although one could say that no virtue, even taken specifically, is incompatible with another, insofar as they support my position, they prove that diverse species of the same generic moral virtue or those of different genera are not necessarily connected, as we have admitted in the first article.