42. De ordine 1.1.1 (CCL 29:89); trans. Russell, FOTC 5:239–40 (modified).
The Philosopher 55
The Problem of Evil
The presence of evil in a universe overseen by an all-good and all-powerful God was a philosophic problem that deeply haunted Augustine. When he was younger, Manichean dualism had offered him an early and easy answer: the good God had not created the material universe and was thus not responsible for evil within it. Once Augustine converted to orthodox Christianity, he had to rethink the whole question. In On Order, the third of his Cassiciacum dialogues, he confronts the issue in writing for the first time. Here he articulates the classic philosophical dilemma. From On Order, Book 1:
(1.1) To perceive and to grasp the order of reality proper to each thing, and then to see or to explain the order of the entire universe by which this world is truly held together and governed—that, Zenobius, is a very difficult and rare achievement for human beings.41 Moreover, even if one had this ability, one might not be able to find an audience well-suited by the merits of their life or by the habit of a certain erudition to listening to such divine and obscure matters. And yet there is nothing that the most gifted minds search out more eagerly, nothing that those who, with heads uplifted as much as they may be, still see the rocks and tempests of this life below—there is nothing that these desire to hear and learn about more than how it is that God has a care for human affairs, and nevertheless perversity is so serious and widespread that it must seem possible not to attribute it to God's governance nor even to a slave's management, if indeed such management could be entrusted to a slave. Moreover, those who ponder these matters are seemingly forced to believe either that Divine Providence does not reach to these outer limits of things or that all evils are committed by the will of God. Both views are impious, but particularly the latter. For although it is unsound and the greatest danger to the soul to hold that anything is beyond God's control, yet even among human beings no one is blamed for what one could not do or prevent. Imputing negligence to God is much more pardonable than the charge of ill will or cruelty. Reason, therefore, is not unmindful of piety and is, in some sense, forced to hold that the things of earth cannot be governed by powers divine or that they are neglected and unnoticed rather than to hold that they are governed in such a way that all complaining about God is inoffensive and blameless.42
41. "Zenobius": A friend and patron of Augustine. Their friendship is evident from Augustine's warm remarks to him in ep. 2. The dialogue later touches on themes from a poem Zenobius had written (De ordine 1.7.20). See Conybeare, Irrational Augustine, 22–23. 42. De ordine 1.1.1 (CCL 29:89); trans. Russell, FOTC 5:239–40 (modified).